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Abstract 
The 2016 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) confirms an increasingly alarming surge in the ongoing, systematic, and 
egregious abuses of religious freedom (RF) of Chinese citizens by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). I foresee that under a constitutional framework, a post-
Communist, democratized China will embrace cultural, economic, social, and 
confessional pluralism to help ensure the impartial and equal protection of all citizens’ 
religious freedom. A useful pattern for that new national pluralism is found and reflected 
within the existing minority of Chinese citizens who follow the Judeo-Christian faith and 
worldview. After analyzing different political philosophies, using religious education 
(RE) to illustrate the degree of religious freedom in different countries, my study 
demonstrates that neither political liberalism nor traditional nonprincipled pluralism will 
adequately protect religious freedom for all. Baorong Duoyuan literally inclusive 
pluralism, a contextualized model of principled pluralism, complements the Judeo-
Christian faith as well as non-Judeo-Christian faiths, and even nonprofessions of religion. 
As such, this theory proposes that the State functions as a religiously impartial institution. 
In my study, I conduct library-based theoretical/philosophical/theological work to 
ultimately propose that Baorong Duoyuan offers an untainted model to nurture and 
maintain religious freedom in a postcommunist China. When appropriately applied to 
China’s practices, this biblically supported, theologically warranted theory of principled 
pluralism helps to promote, nurture, implement, and maintain religious freedom for all 
citizens of China. To protect religious freedom for all, in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, my proposed Baorong Duoyuan model offers the most 
reasonable, consistent, and coherent option to achieve and to maintain such religious 
freedom and pluralism. 
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Preface 
 
Researchers have developed few studies in the context of China after Communism. 
Despite the sense that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian rule will 
continue for eternity in China, Baorong Duoyuan, the theory I develop from 
contextualizing, encapsulates the potential to facilitate religious freedom in China’s 
future. Baorong Duoyuan, which translates as ‘inclusive pluralism’ in English, correlates 
with the theme of letting each religion (or school of thought) resonate or speak freely in 
the public square. My theory also harmonizes with the Golden Rule, versions of which 
are found in all major contemporary worldviews. 
 Reflecting on the time I invested in conducting this study to develop Baorong 
Duoyuan, the process has presented several common collegiate challenges as well as 
some expected scholastic struggles. One benefit I gained during my research surprised 
me. Ultimately, this study transitioned or transformed me from a compassionate, biased 
activist, ready to take a stance of ‘us [Christians] against them [political liberals and CCP 
officials]’ to an even more passionate or compassionate, objective academic. 
 My quest to earn my PhD initially began in 2001 when, as a student attending 
Westminster Theological Seminary, I helped organize a retreat for numerous prominent 
political dissidents. The conference, ‘Christianity and the Future of China’, focused on 
the concept of the Christian faith and explored the potential role of Christianity for the 
democratization of the anticipated new China. During the conference, the CCP arrested 
58 leaders and sentenced 5 of the top leaders within the South China Church to death. 
Those of us attending the conference joined in prayer for these imprisoned, persecuted 
believers and explored how we might help them. 
 Later, however, I and others at the conference discovered that the circumstances 
were more complicated than we initially thought. We had originally considered this case 
to be another example of the State persecuting the Christian church due to its animosity 
toward unregistered religious groups. Then, we discovered that the founder of the South 
China Church, Gong Shengliang, had been engaging in numerous extramarital sexual 
relationships with other believers in his church network. Although we could not confirm 
the CCP rape charges against Gong, we realized that the State had a legitimate concern 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan xi 
 
for their investigation. This revelation forced me to rethink the State–religion relationship 
in China. Prior to this time, I had envisaged aspects of this connection as 100 percent 
black and white, with the State totally at fault when it targeted believers for their religious 
beliefs and legitimate practices. Now, I had to reconsider problems relating to both sides 
of the issue. 
 Ultimately, the CCP freed most of the jailed South China Church leaders after 
they had served their prison sentences. This experience prompted me to launch China 
Aid, a ministry with the mission to expose religious persecution, to encourage those 
brothers and sisters in the faith of Jesus Christ, particularly those the State persecutes, and 
to equip leaders to help strengthen the persecuted church in China.  The more involved I 
became in the work of China Aid and the more I learned of the ongoing, inhumane 
torture the CCP inflicted on the South China Church, the more concerned I became. I 
knew that torture occurred continually. However, I did not realize the extent of the 
cruelty that the church suffered – cruelty beyond my imagination. 
 As I regard myself as part of the church, I began to prayerfully and physically 
dedicate myself to helping persecuted believers, preachers, and their families in China. In 
2002, China Aid helped overturn the death sentences of the five South China Church 
leaders. My work with China Aid encouraged me to explore the potential for a healthier, 
biblical model for the State–religion relationship. Engaging in study about Abraham 
Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd helped shape my thinking in this area and stimulated 
my interest in principled pluralism, the initial focus for my thesis. Research I conducted 
at Boston University Library helped me recognize that a myriad of complex legal, 
theoretical, and other components contributes to the State–religion relationship. This 
revelation led me to expand my concentration beyond the purely theological form. 
 Due to being diagnosed with kidney cancer and undergoing treatments necessary 
for my recovery, I had to defer work on my thesis twice. After a medical sabbatical, my 
theoretical and philosophical quests continued to transform my activism from reactive to 
proactive. Both pursuits have not only complemented me personally and academically, 
they have presented opportunities which some academics never have the chance to 
experience. 
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 With my cancer in remission, I resumed my project with a renewed as well as 
heightened passion for my academic study. Shortly after this time, as I had decided to 
expand my focus to include secular considerations, I contacted Lord David Alton who 
referred me to Dr. Robert Song. 
 Dr. Song asked me, ‘Bob, do you just want to obtain a PhD to graduate or do you 
want to contribute to society or to the world in practical ways?’ 
 Without hesitating, I answered, ‘I want to work to contribute to the development 
of a better State–religion relationship in China that will help ensure religious freedom for 
all.’ Thus, under the direction of Dr. Song, this study evolved. Today, I prayerfully trust 
that, in time, Baorong Duoyuan will not only prove to be culturally compatible but also 
mutually beneficial to government officials, Chinese Christians, and those who choose to 
practice or refrain from practicing other religions. 
  
  
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In a globalizing world, linked in so many ways 
by economic, political, and security concerns, 
it is important to recognize the local impact of the global and 
the global impact of the local.1 
  – K. S. Nathan 
1.1 Introduction 
‘Help […]. Help? Help!’ 
 Carey Lodge reports that on 14 April 2016 in the Chinese jurisdiction of Guanjin 
sub-district, Zhumadian City, Henan Province, Li Jiangong repeatedly shouted, ‘Help!’ as 
he frantically dug in the dirt to free his wife, Ding Cuimei, from beneath a massive 
mound of freshly bulldozed soil where he and Cuimei had been buried alive.2 Lodge 
notes that on this particularly dark day when Jiangong attempted to save Cuimei,3 the 
dozer operator ignored the couple’s cries for help as he continued demolishing Beitou 
Church, the house church Jiangong pastored. Others ran to help Pastor Jiangong free 
Cuimei, but by the time they uncovered her, she had stopped breathing. 
 Earlier that morning, when Pastor Jiangong and Cuimei had tried to stop the 
demolition of Beitou Church, a man supervising the demolition crew workers shouted out 
orders, ‘Bury them alive for me! I am responsible for their deaths.’4 Initially, following 
Cuimei’s death by suffocation after being buried alive, the local government did not 
respond. According to Lodge, the authorities did not begin investigating Cuimei’s tragic 
death until after international outcries and pressure.5 
                                                 
1 K. S. Nathan, Religious Pluralism in Democratic Societies: Challenges and Prospects  
for Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States in the New Millennium (Singapore: Kuala Lumpur 
Malaysians Association for American Studies, 2007), p. 204. 
2 Carey Lodge, ‘Church Wins Land Dispute after Pastor’s Wife Bulldozed During Church Demolition 
Protest’, Christian Today (20 April 2016) <http://www.christiantoday.com /article/church.wins.land. 
dispute.after.pastors.wife.bulldozed.during.church.demolition.protest/84975.htm> [accessed 14 May 2016]. 
3 Lodge, ‘Church Wins Land.’ 
4 Qiao Nong [reported in Chinese] ‘Church leader’s wife dead after buried alive during church demolition’, 
trans. by Carolyn Song, written in English by Brynne Lawrence. China Aid (18 April 2016) 
<http://www.chinaaid.org/2016/04/church-leaders-wife-dead-after-buried.html> [accessed 14 May 2016] 
para. 3 of 10. 
5 Lodge, ‘Church Wins Land.’ 
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 Chapter 1 introduces my study and here I recount this and other horrific examples 
of the unbalanced State–religion relationship in China and the failure of the State to 
protect the religious freedom of its citizens. I present the premise for my study, which 
focuses on developing a contextualized model of principled pluralism that guarantees all 
Chinese citizens the freedom of religion as well as the right to profess anti-religious or no 
religious beliefs in the public square. 
 Donald Posterski describes principled pluralism as a positive, constructive 
engagement in which individuals mutually respect one another.6 James Skillen explains 
that, among other things, principled pluralism includes ‘government’s responsibility to 
recognize and protect each person and each legitimate human vocation, institution, and 
organization.’7 Skillen stresses that most of a person’s social life does not consist of 
political characteristics but an array of personal, familial, and community facets. 
Nevertheless, as citizens are, as well as being citizens, equally members of the political 
community, the government should attribute an equal civic basis to each citizen. I 
maintain that the State should not give special privileges to, or discriminate against, any 
citizen because of his/her religious, nonreligious, or anti-religious beliefs, commitments, 
or practices. 
 I allege, as does Randall Peerenboom, that contrary to the positive facade China 
projects regarding human rights under the control of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), a much darker reality reveals a brutal authoritarian State with regard to religious 
freedom.8  From my research, in which I investigate this critical concern for religious 
freedom for all in China, I develop my theory, Baorong Duoyuan.9 If Chinese citizens 
consent to protect religious freedom, then Baorong Duoyuan, a contextualization of 
                                                 
6 Donald Posterski, ‘8: What on Earth is Evangelism?’ in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: 
Religion Today and Tomorrow, ed. Arvind Sharma (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), pp. 54–64 (p. 60). 
7 James W. Skillen, The Good of Politics: A Biblical, Historical, and Contemporary Introduction (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2014), p. 124. 
 8 Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).  
9 Through my research, I found that because political liberalism was based on a secular worldview, it is not 
inclusive enough, while principled pluralism, due to its Judeo-Christian orientation and with minor 
favoritism toward Christianity, is perceived to be less pluralistic. In a society like a postcommunist 
democratic China, Baorong Duoyan, which I further define and develop in Chapters 5 and 6, will be 
sufficiently pluralistic and inclusive to protect religious freedom for all, including theists, atheists, 
agnostics, and those professing no religious belief.  
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principled pluralism, which closely aligns with international norms under a liberal 
constitutional framework, offers the most reasonable, consistent, and coherent guiding 
theory to help ensure that consensus. 
Since 2013, the CCP has removed approximately 1,700 crosses from Catholic and 
Protestant churches in Zhejiang Province.10 The World Watch Monitor reports that in 
Zhejiang Province (known as the ‘Jerusalem of the East’ for its strong Christian 
presence) the Chinese government formulates reasons to claim churches are illegal 
constructions and, therefore, demolishes them.11 The demolition campaign continues as 
the CCP regularly imprisons pastors and human rights lawyers in this area for reasons 
that conflict with international guidelines for freedom, particularly religious freedom. 
Activists claim that the CCP has targeted Zhejiang Province for religious persecution and 
that anti-Christian measures may soon increase in other provinces. 
In China, as the CCP officials misapply the unsound policy regarding religious 
freedom, the relationship between the CCP and organized religion continues to prove 
challenging to religious freedom for all. Eleanor Albert reports that in 2014, contrary to a 
number of pro-government voices proposing that the CCP demonstrate more tolerance of 
Christian groups, a spike occurred ‘in state repression against house churches and state-
sanctioned Christian organizations alike, including a campaign to remove hundreds of 
rooftop crosses from churches.’12 In July 2014, Chinese officials sentenced Zhang 
Shaojie, a prominent Christian pastor, to twelve years in prison for ‘gathering crowds to 
disturb public order. The 2014 annual report from China Aid, a Texas-based Christian 
NGO, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise.’ 13 
This account confirmed 572 cases of religious persecution, with more than 2,994 people 
                                                 
10 Morgan Lee, ‘Pastor of China’s Largest Church Jailed for Protesting Removal of 1,500 Crosses’, 
Christianity Today <http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2016/february/pastor-china-largest-
church-jailed-crosses-gu-yuese-chongyi.html> [accessed 12 April 2016]. 
11 World Watch Monitor ‘China: Woman Buried Alive in Church Demolition’, (19 April 2016). 
<https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/4194126/4382787/4419559> [accessed 14 May 2016]. 
12 Eleanor Albert, ‘Christianity in China’, Council on Foreign Relations (07 May 2015) 
<http://www.cfr.org/china/christianity-china/p36503> [accessed 27 January 2016]. 
13 Albert, ‘Christianity in China.’ 
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detained, and an additional 1,274 Chinese citizens sentenced in relation to charges 
connected with their demonstrations of their religious beliefs.14  
In another example of religious persecution and China’s unbalanced State–
religion relationship, Pastor Yang Hua, founder of Yang’s Huoshi Church in Guiyang, 
China, has been imprisoned by the CCP since December 2015 for resisting State attempts 
to seize church property. According to Joyce Huang, in October 2015, government 
authorities issued fraudulent notices claiming that the buildings Huoshi Church owned 
had not been officially sanctioned for church use.15 Subsequently, the State imposed fines 
of 12,960 Yuan (US $2,030) per day. On 9 December 2015, when Pastor Yang attempted 
to stop officials from destroying a hard drive belonging to the church, officials arrested 
him. Later, CCP officials charged Pastor Yang with illegally holding State secrets. 
Pastor Yang represents one of the latest cases among more than 19,42616 of 
Chinese Christians being detained for their faith and opposing the Chinese government’s 
religious oppression. To restrict religious practice, the Chinese government frequently 
fabricates charges (including ‘divulging State secrets’) against pastors who publicly 
oppose government attempts to restrict their activities.17 The 2016 Annual Report of the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom confirms an increasingly alarming 
surge in the ongoing, methodical, and egregious abuses of Chinese citizens by the CCP. 
The following two tables depict data analyses of instances of persecution during 
2014 in China by region and province.18 Table 1 portrays religious persecution and severe 
abuse cases in China by region. 
 
 
                                                 
14 China Aid (2016) <http://www.chinaaid.org/> [accessed 12 November 2015]. 
15 Joyce Huang, ‘Church Crackdown Continues in China’, VOA Learning (10 December 2015) 
<http://www.voanews. com/content/church-crackdown-continues-in-china/3096816.html> [accessed 14 
May 2016]. 
16 China Aid, 2016 Annual Report, Chinese Government Persecution of Churches and Christians in 
Mainland China (January–December 2016) China Aid Association, 2017) <https://drive.google.com/file/ 
d/0BwO5hRHaK WdOQWUwYTdDcnZSTnc> [accessed 23 July 2017] p. 35. 
17 Huang, ‘Church Crackdown Continues.’ 
18 China Aid, 2014 Annual Report, Religious and Human Rights Persecution in China (Texas, China Aid 
Association, 2015) https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B024UfutRtHodGVzbWhyLUtCdjg/view [accessed 27 
July 2017] pp. 12–13. Note: total number of persecuted individuals and the number of people arrested are 
relative numbers. For example: the total number of individuals persecuted during 2016 > 48,100. 
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Table 1: Religious Persecution and Severe Abuse Cases by Region 
 
Table 2 reflects religious persecution and severe abuse cases in China by province 
while Table 3 reports persecution that occurred in China during 2015 and 2016 in six 
categories.19 
 
Table 2: Religious Persecution and Severe Abuse Cases by Province 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 China Aid, 2016 Annual Report Chinese, p. 35. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Persecution during 2015 and 2016 by Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China Aid notes, as Table 3 reveals, that the 762 documented persecution cases in 2016 
represent an increase of 20.2 percent from 2015. During 2016 more than 48,100 people 
were detained, reflecting an increase of 147.6 percent from 2015. Of the detained 
individuals, more than 1,800 church leaders were harassed, an increase of 4.2 percent 
from 2015. The number of individuals arrested increased by 11 percent. This number 
includes more than 600 church leaders, a 15.2 percent increase from 2015. The 303 
individuals who received prison terms in 2016 represent a 30 percent increase from 2015. 
During 2016, 278 abuse cases, which included physical, verbal, mental abuse, and 
torture, depict a 42.6 percent increase from 2015. The 785 individuals abused constitute a 
69.5 percent increase from 2015. 
USCIRF has recommended that China be designated a ‘country of particular 
concern’ under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The CCP’s current 
campaigns reflect ‘unprecedented violations against Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, 
Catholics, Protestants, and Falun Gong practitioners. People of faith continue to face 
arrests, fines, denials of justice, [and] lengthy prison sentences.’20 Julia A. Seymour 
                                                 
20 USCIRF, Annual Report 2015: China (Washington, DC: United States Commission on International 
Religious Freedom, 2016) <http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/ files/China%202015.pdf > [accessed 25 
February 2016]. 
   
Year 2015 2016 
Number of persecution cases 634 762 
Number detained > 19,426                                      
(church leaders > 1,728) 
> 48,100                     
(church leaders > 1,800) 
Number arrested > 3,178                                    
(church leaders  > 521) 
> 3,526                                      
(church leaders > 600) 
Number sentenced  232 303 
Number of abuse cases 195 278 
Number of people abused  463 785 
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reports that the CCP interferes with religious affairs in the name of ‘the rule of law.’21 
According to Seymour, ‘Chinese officials are defending their human rights record and 
lashing out at a U.S. commission that accused the country’s communist government of 
continuing to commit “severe religious freedom violations.” ’22 The CCP plans to further 
consolidate its dictatorial monopoly of power over almost all aspects of Chinese citizens’ 
lives, including their religious freedom.23 
Contrary to the CCP’s current campaigns to stifle religious freedom, the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)24 decrees freedom of religious 
belief for its citizens.25  The State26 claims to defend normal religious activities and 
affirms that there may not be any discrimination against citizens because of their 
religious beliefs or affiliations. Article 36 specifically states: ‘No state organ, public 
organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any 
religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, 
any religion.’27 Historical and contemporary accounts, however, challenge China’s claims 
and confirm that the State’s stance appears convoluted regarding People’s Republic of 
China human rights legislation.28 
In the light of growing concerns regarding China’s human rights’ practices, 
especially in the areas of religious freedom, my study investigates the potential for a 
contextualized model of principled pluralism to help foster and maintain religious 
freedom for all in China.  In the next section, I recount my area of study. Following this, I 
detail the problem statement and the rationale for, and the significance of, my study. I 
also present an overview of the ensuing six chapters. 
                                                 
21 Julia A. Seymour, ‘China Denies Accusations of Religious Freedom Violations’, World (09 May 2016) 
<https://world.wng.org/2016/05/china_denies_accusations_of_religious_freedom_violations> [accessed 22 
May 2016]. 
22 Seymour, ‘China Denies Accusations’, para. 1 of 16. 
23 USCIRF, Annual Report 2015: China. 
24 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 36. Religious Freedom section 
<www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm> [accessed 25 November 2017].  
25 Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer, Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009) <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ 
fa3a/534a9a8d122e46ac52e1a91a82a482cdbd2b.pdf> [accessed 25 November 2017], p. 13. 
26 In this thesis, references to the word ‘State’ (noun) indicate any form of political governmental 
authority to which an individual or group may be subject. 
27 The Constitution, Religious Freedom section. 
28 Lum and Fischer, Human Rights in China. 
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1.2 Area of Study 
According to Peerenboom, China routinely oppresses citizens. The CCP practices 
‘restrictions on the press and the Internet, the arrest of lawyers and human rights activists, 
the closure or close monitoring of social organizations.’29 I consider Cuimei’s death to 
represent one of a myriad of serious violations of the rights to life, the rule of law, and 
religious freedom in contemporary China under the rule of the CCP. China denies 
credible allegations such as these and argues: 
We must solemnly point out with justice that in China, freedom of religious belief is a 
fundamental right to which all citizens are entitled by the Constitution and law and the problem of 
‘religious persecution’ does not exist in China. Such fact cannot be distorted by anyone in any 
means. 
 No single person in China has been or will be detained or imprisoned simply because of 
their religious beliefs or their legal religious activities. On the contrary, stipulations have been 
made within China’s criminal laws saying that any government employee who illegally deprives 
any citizens of their freedom of religious belief is subject to up to two-year imprisonment, or 
criminal detention according to the seriousness of the case. But those who use religion as a 
camouflage for illegal activities will be dealt with firmly according to law.30 
 
When questioned about religious freedom in China, CCP officials refer to China’s 
constitution, which reportedly guarantees a certain level of religious freedom for all its 
citizens.31 I assert that rather than the State being tolerant of diverse religions and 
protecting religious freedom as CCP officials proclaim, credible documented reports of 
China’s anti-freedom of religion practices expose it as intolerant and intent on eradicating 
all types of nonconforming religions. In contrast to such State practices, I propose that a 
contextualized principled pluralism is the optimal factor for China’s future political 
stability in general, and promotion of religious freedom. 
                                                 
29 Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat, p. 127. 
30 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, ‘China refutes U.S. Charges 
on Religious Freedom’ (2016) <http://www.china-emb assy.org/ eng/zt/zjxy/t36496.htm> [accessed 26 
February 2016] paras. 5 and 55 of 60.  
31 Nichol Jeannette Starr, ‘Who Asked You? The Appropriateness of U.S. Leadership in Promoting 
Religious Freedom Worldwide’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 33, 4), (2000) 
<http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-67532880/who-asked-you-the-appropriateness-of-u-s-leadership> 
[accessed 18 May 2016]. 
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1.2.1 Background and Rationale for the Study  
1.2.1.1 Background to the Study 
During the twentieth century, 27 million men and women were martyred for their 
religious faith, compared to a total of fourteen million individuals dying for their faith 
during the first nineteen centuries of the Christian era.32 Despite China’s constitution 
guaranteeing freedom of religion, infractions of religious freedom routinely occur in 
contemporary China. International reports confirm that the CCP regularly tortures and 
physically abuses these individuals.33 
 Human rights organizations report that during house raids and protests after 
citizens took exception to harsher government controls on religious expression and 
practice, police shot and killed Uighur Muslims. After police raided businesses and 
homes in Guangdong Province to examine residency registration documents, they took 
approximately fifty Zen Buddhists into custody, including twenty children. To rationalize 
official interference with Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, authorities frequently claimed 
that the Dalai Lama instigated protests against government practices. In several areas, 
local authorities punished members of unregistered religious or spiritual groups. Officials 
also used various methods, including administrative detention, to pressurize unaffiliated 
religious believers into joining patriotic associations. In Sichuan Province, authorities 
arrested thirty-six unregistered church members. Officials sentenced many of the adults, 
children, and elderly persons to a minimum of ten days in custody.34 In addition to people 
of the Christian faith facing martyrdom for their religious beliefs, followers of different 
religions in China routinely experience arrests, fines, refutations of justice, extensive 
prison sentences, and in some instances, the CCP closes or bulldozes places of worship.35 
 I concur with K. S. Nathan that what happens in the global environment impacts 
local regions just as things that occur in local areas (including religious persecutions) 
impact others throughout the world.36 I also maintain that the myriad of verbalized as 
                                                 
32 Nina Shea, In the Lion’s Den: A Shocking Account of Persecuted and Martyrdom of Christians Today 
and How We Should Respond (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1997). 
33 U.S. Department of State, China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), International Religious 
Freedom Report for 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, n.d.) 
<http://www. state.govj/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper> [accessed 29 December 2014]. 
34 China Aid, 2014 Annual Report. 
35 USCIRF, Annual Report 2015: China. 
 36 Nathan, Religious Pluralism, p. 204. 
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well as silent cries for help from those in local communities throughout the world being 
persecuted for their beliefs merits global attention. Instead of ignoring or minimizing 
these atrocities against humanity, the international community needs to be made more 
aware of what is happening. Sara Mels and Christiane Timmerman explain the evolving 
relationship between local and global communities: 
 the world becomes more and more interconnected [through globalization]. 
 Communication happens almost instantaneously, and the migration of  
 people, values and religious traditions around the world intensifies. In this  
 respect, culture and religion are no longer encapsulated within local communities with their 
various boundaries rooted in different historic, cultural and religious components. This does not 
mean that world society is a global and unified society; it is in fact made up of social groups that 
differ in their practices, beliefs and institutions. In this a paradox arises between a growing global 
cultural homogeneity and the ongoing creation of new cultural diversity. Rather than creating 
massive cultural homogeneity on a global scale, the world system is replacing local diversity by 
global diversity.37 
 
 The international response to the cries of ‘Help […]. Help? Help!’ relating to the 
death of Cuimei in a remote region of China mirrors how ‘social media can immediately 
relate what happens in one local area to the global community.’ Likewise, Mels and 
Timmerman assert that just as contemporary global processes are radically transforming 
world religions in diverse and various ways, these changes impact local regions. 
 
1.2.1.2 Rationale for the Study 
Xiaobing Li notes that along with recent reports of religious persecution in China, 
ongoing attacks on the economic and social freedoms of the citizens occur, and 
increased governmental controls are imposed on many aspects of individuals’ lives.38 
Such developments have produced occasional, mild ‘people power’ outbursts in 
China. Variables, such as local government actions, central government policies, 
civil and social activism, or short-term versus long-term trends, frequently stimulate 
disagreements as to whether progress has been realized in the realm of China’s 
human rights. Stories of increasing government restrictions often follow reports on 
the same citizens experiencing extensions of civil rights.39 In the light of China’s 
                                                 
37 Sara Mels and Christiane Timmerman, ‘General Introduction’, in Religions in Movement: The Local and 
the Global in Contemporary Faith Traditions, eds. Robert W. Hefner, John Hutchinson, Sara Mels, and 
Christiane Timmerman (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.1–5 (p. 3). 
38 Xiaobing Li, Civil Liberties in China (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2010). 
39 Lum and Fischer, Human Rights in China, p. 1. 
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repeated disregard for religious freedom, I examine numerous aspects of this critical 
contemporary concern with the aim of ultimately offering Baorong Duoyuan, a 
contextualized model of principled pluralism, to facilitate and help ensure religious 
freedom for all in China’s projected future. 
 
1.2.2 Significance of the Study 
Several firsthand experiences have overtly contributed to my decision to study traditional 
and contemporary State and religious systems in China as well as serving as the 
foundation for my study. As a survivor of persecution and imprisonment in China,40 my 
birthplace, and from personal interactions with many who have experienced persecution 
for their religious beliefs, I empathize with those experiencing all kinds of repercussions 
from the State-sponsored activities of Communist China. The ramifications of the 
interaction between the motives and rights of the church (religion) as opposed to the 
motives and rights of the State comprise critical contemporary concerns that challenge 
citizens in China not only locally but also globally. Both arenas correlate with each other 
economically and politically, as well as in the areas contributing to security and in 
relation to concerns about freedom of religion. 
 
1.2.3 Overview of Aim and Objectives 
The aim of my study is to explore principled pluralism and political liberalism, 
comparing as well as contrasting these two theories. I examine similarities and 
differences from these concepts as I ultimately contextualize principled pluralism in order 
to develop and propose Baorong Duoyuan as offering the most reasonable, consistent, 
and coherent guiding theory to help ensure religious freedom for all in China. My thesis 
therefore has three objectives: 
 Objective 1: to conduct an extensive literature review of credible 
contemporary as well as historical resources to fulfill my aim of developing 
my theory, Baorong Duoyuan, a contextualization of principled pluralism; 
                                                 
40 Bob Fu and Nancy French, God's Double Agent: The True Story of a Chinese Christian's Fight for 
Freedom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2014). 
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 Objective 2: to explore, compare, and contrast principled pluralism and 
political liberalism, contextualizing principled pluralism toward the 
development of Baorong Duoyuan; 
 Objective 3: to present Baorong Duoyuan as a practical, rational, workable  
framework for the State-religion relationship in China’s projected future that 
ensures religious freedom for all. 
 My study contributes to discussions about religious freedom in my development 
of a model for a peaceful transition as China’s projected future as a Christianized41 
democracy unfolds. My secondary aim is to preserve the authority of religion and the 
State in ‘tomorrow’s’ China without compromising either the fundamental tenets of a 
person’s faith or sacrificing the axioms of religious freedom. 
 
1.3 Synopses of Chapters 2 through 7 
1.3.1 Synopsis of Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I analyze numerous contemporary and historical scholarly sources, 
focusing on principled pluralism. First, I focus on the factors contributing to principled 
pluralism becoming established, expanded, and emulated. In the next section, I explain 
principled pluralism’s foundation and examine contemporary implications in relation to 
its introduction, especially those regarding the relationship between the State and the 
church (religion). Finally, in this chapter, I reflect on ways in which principled pluralism 
contrasts with three Christian nonpluralist views and make a proposal for principled 
pluralism being the best fit for ensuring religious freedom for all within a political State. 
 
                                                 
41 David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity is Transforming China and Changing the Global 
Balance of Power (Lanham, MD: Regnery Publishing, 2012), p. 285. Terms such as ‘Christianized,’ 
‘Christianized democracy,’ a ‘Christian State,’ or a ‘Christianized China,’ used in this thesis (e.g. pp.14-5, 
183, 248, 216) refer to a future China which demographically includes a substantial minority of Christians 
whose worldview is projected to have a major impact within China’s political, cultural and even military 
circles.  
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1.3.2 Synopsis of Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I critically survey political liberalism, the theory that the late John Rawls42 
designed, as a popular justification of diversity in modern times in democratic 
countries.43 Despite its professed commitment to promoting religious freedom for all and 
its proclamation of support for pluralism,44 political liberalism subtly camouflages 
concepts that prevent particular religious views from being expressed in the public 
square. I propose that political liberalism compromises its own proclaimed commitment 
to freedom, particularly in the way it addresses religious freedom. Contrary to political 
liberalism, principled pluralism permits all groups to equally manifest their voices in the 
public square instead of restraining certain comprehensive and particularly religious 
views. In addition, under a constitutional framework, it guarantees true religious freedom. 
 
1.3.3 Synopsis of Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, I examine how religious education complements the functioning of a State, 
is a vital part of its educational system, and represents the potential for its future 
generations to maintain religious freedom. Religious education epitomizes one of the 
most contentious issues in State–religion relations, with the content and curriculum 
design of the public education system being a focal point of controversy. My motives for 
using RE as my case study example in regard to political liberalism, principled pluralism, 
and religious freedom include the following three reasons: 
1. Religious education in the public-school system represents an excellent 
example for illustrating how both political liberalism and principled pluralism 
protect religious freedom; 
2. Religious education serves as a means to compare how states that practice 
principled pluralism and political liberalism would integrate religious 
education into their public-school systems and how they would address and 
adequately protect each citizen’s religious freedom; 
                                                 
42 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
43 Gerald E. Gaus, ‘The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism’, in Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism: New Essays, eds. John Christman and Joel Anderson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), pp, 272–306 (p. 289). 
44 Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
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3. Religious education, especially for children in State education systems, 
constitutes one of the most fundamental human rights for children and is 
recognized as a major criterion in the field of international religious freedom. 
As I consider religious education and its relation to political liberalism, principled 
pluralism, and religious freedom, I also examine what may be taught with regard to 
retaining the boundary between pure ‘theological education’ and civil education about/on 
religion. I assert that the merit of religious education in the public education system and 
its correlation to religious freedom deserve to be thoroughly investigated. 
 
1.3.4 Synopsis of Chapter 5 
In this chapter, I move toward contextualizing a model of principled pluralism to address 
China’s need for full religious freedom. First, I examine historical and contemporary 
trends in relation to, and challenges to, religious freedom in China under the CCP’s 
State–religion model. Next, I explain the general conditions for Baorong Duoyuan in 
China – pluralization and democratization – and rule out numerous components relating 
to political liberalism and principled pluralism from inclusion in Baorong Duoyuan. 
Finally, I present several proposals from these rival theories to design and develop 
Baorong Duoyuan for consideration in China’s projected pluralistic, Christianized, and 
democratic environment. 
 
1.3.5 Synopsis of Chapter 6 
In Chapter 6, I examine the vision, criteria, and design for religious education to be 
implemented under Baorong Duoyuan in postcommunist China’s education system. 
Numerous conflicts and deficiencies of the State’s contemporary education system, 
particularly regarding religious education, intrinsically contribute to China’s failure to 
protect religious freedom for all. I expound an unrequited concern from Chapter 4: if 
China’s education system under principled pluralism and political liberalism would not 
successfully contribute to the State’s ideological goals, could Baorong Duoyuan 
stimulate positive progress in this realm, particularly if it included religious education? 
As I further examine political liberalism and principled pluralism to reveal what 
education under these two concepts could establish, I propose that Baorong Duoyuan 
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constitutes a sustainable option for China’s education model in its projected future as a 
Christianized democracy. 
 
1.3.6 Synopsis of Chapter 7 
In Chapter 7, the concluding chapter of my study, I sum up the findings I have gleaned 
from my research. I recount my personal perspectives and the value I attribute to 
completing this study. After listing considerations for China in its role as a projected 
Christianized democracy, I offer recommendations for future studies relating to religious 
freedom in China, stressing the reminder from Nathan about the critical reciprocal 
process between global and local regions.45 I propose that when the global community 
responds to help relieve the cries of persecuted individuals at local levels, this 
simultaneously impacts others living throughout the world, no matter what their religious 
or nonreligious beliefs. 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have claimed that the CCP prohibits any religious activity the State does 
not perceive as ‘normal.’ As per numerous examples presented in this chapter, the State 
routinely persecutes Chinese citizens, including Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and 
Muslims as it dictates that religious adherents can only engage in what local officials 
define as normal religious activity at State-approved schools. In addition, the CCP’s 
philosophy supersedes any religious doctrine and the State forbids converting others 
away from, or toward, a new belief/philosophy. 
In Chapter 2, I retrieve and expound research focusing on principled pluralism. I 
examine components that contributed to this theory being established and the ensuing 
contemporary implications of such, especially those regarding the State–religion 
relationship. As I examine ways in which principled pluralism differs from three 
Christian nonpluralist views, I propose that Baorong Duoyuan offers an optimum 
opportunity for China to secure religious freedom for all. 
                                                 
 45 Nathan, Religious Pluralism.  
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
Principled Pluralism Expounded                                                       
in Relation to Religious Freedom 
 
Genuine freedom implies pluralism;                                                                                      
pluralism demands equality; and                                                                                                  
equality cannot be maintained under an ecclesiastical establishment.46 
– Ronald Thiemann 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I presented the premise for this study, which focuses on contextualizing a 
constitutional, democratic, and pluralist theory appropriate to a presumed post-
communist China, in which religions, particularly Christianity, will have substantially 
expanded in presence and influence. The thesis also explicates the place of religious 
freedom in such an order. In the previous chapter, in addition to noting a prominent facet 
of the area of study for this thesis – principled pluralism – I provided a statement of the 
problem, the rationale for, and the significance of this study. In my overview of the 
ensuing five chapters, I also disclosed my aim – to design and develop my theory, 
Baorong Duoyuan, a contextualization of principled pluralism. 
In this chapter, which outlines the model of principled pluralism, I initially define 
religious freedom, recounting the historical origins of principled pluralism – in the 
thought of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920) and its further development by Herman 
Dooyeweerd (1894–1977). Kuyper,47 a ‘theologian, minister, politician, newspaper 
editor, educational innovator, neo-Calvinist reformer, and prime minister of the 
Netherlands from 1901 to 1905’,48 developed the theory of sphere sovereignty,49 which 
                                                 
46 Ronald Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1996), p. 21. 
47 Tjitze Kuipers, Abraham Kuyper: An Annotated Bibliography 1857–2010 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
48 James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist Christian Democrat (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2013), front matter section.  
49 Jonathan Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public Justice, A Critical Exposition’ (PhD diss., London 
School of Economics and Political Science [LSE], 1983), p. 10. Dooyeweerd elaborated and extended the 
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provides the foundation for the type of Christian pluralism later recognized as principled 
pluralism. Dooyeweerd, a Dutch philosopher50 and legal theorist, fleshed out Kuyper’s 
theory of sphere sovereignty, especially regarding the role of the State.51 
From the historical roots of principled pluralism, I then move on to discuss 
several key contemporary neo-Calvinist authors, including Mouw and Griffioen as well 
as Skillen and Schmidt. Before I expound principled pluralism and argue why it provides 
the most reasonable, consistent, and coherent foundation for ensuring religious freedom 
for all in a pluralistic society, I introduce a full definition of the meaning and scope of 
religious freedom, primarily within the context of the international code of human rights. 
 
2.2 Religious Freedom 
2.2.1 Definition of Religious Freedom 
Although religious freedom may be defined in multifaceted ways and interpreted from 
the perspective of history, culture, ethnicity, nationality, and political and legal 
connotations, I choose to present the definition of religious freedom or Freedom of 
Religion or Belief (FoRB) from the legal and political standpoint. In 1948, the UN 
General Assembly unanimously approved and adopted the most commonly accepted 
definition of religious freedom, known as Article 18 in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Article 18 stipulates: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.52 
 Subsequently, in a similar spirit, the UN further reaffirmed and expounded these 
principles of religious freedom in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in 196653 and the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of 
                                                 
principle of sphere sovereignty (soevereiniteit in eigen kring, literally ‘sovereignty in one’s sphere’), which 
Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801–1876), the nineteenth-century Dutch Calvinist, first conveyed. 
50 Jonathan Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian Philosopher of State and Civil Society (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), Inside Front Book Cover. 
51 Corwin E. Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist Perspective’, in Church, State and Public Justice, Five 
Views, ed. P. C. Kemeny (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007), pp. 127–68. 
52 ‘Article 18’, in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights <http://www.un.org/en/ documents/udhr/> 
[accessed 22 May 2014]. 
53 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professional interest/ 
pages/ccpr.aspx> [accessed 15 November 2014].  
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Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief in 1981.54 The latter two 
are now accepted as internationally recognized, legally binding human rights treaties. The 
most recent U.N. update in February 2017 reports that 169 countries have signed and 
ratified the ICCPR. Six countries, however, including China, have signed but not ratified 
this international law.55 
2.2.2 Scope of Religious Freedom 
Religious freedom, as the previously specified, international agreements and laws 
prescribe, can only be actualized or achieved when the State fully guarantees the 
following two principles. Certain limitations may apply only when the stated laws, as 
noted by the ICCPR, are violated.56 
1. Everyone has the freedom to adhere to any religion or belief as well as the 
right to change his/her religion or belief, or nonbelief. 
2. Each person possesses the right to practice/manifest/observe his/her religious 
belief alone or in a group, in private or in public and to express that belief in 
public discourse. 
 The scope of religious freedom that international norms dictate encompasses 
private as well as public dimensions and, in Timothy Shah’s judgment, includes: 
the freedom to pray, to worship, to commune with one’s fellows of like mind and heart in the 
private practice of faith. But it is also the freedom to bear witness to one’s beliefs and 
commitments, to be visibly religious in public life, to associate freely based on religion, and 
peacefully to encounter others with differing views on a basis of equality. It is the freedom to 
organize and act politically, to vote, to make arguments about public policy, and to legislate, based 
on one’s religious beliefs, consistent with principles of universal justice toward others.57 
 
The above two principles imply several key parameters by which the degree or  
dearth of religious freedom may be measured. These parameters include not only the 
right for citizens to believe or to change their beliefs or nonbeliefs in any religion, in 
private and in public, but also to practice their beliefs or religions in any peaceful way. In 
                                                 
54 Passed by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 36/55. 
55 Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard <http://indicators.ohchr.org> [accessed 28 July 2017]. 
56 According to the ICCPR, Article 18, no. 3, freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  
57 Timothy Shah, Religious Freedom, Why Now? Defending an Embattled Human Right (Princeton, NJ: 
Task Force on International Religious Freedom of the Witherspoon Institute, 2012), pp. vi–vii. 
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addition, the State should neither show preference towards nor discriminate against one 
religion or worldview over another, particularly in its education system, but should offer 
teachings about diverse religions, making these equally accessible to all children in 
public schools.58 Furthermore, as part of religious freedom relating to children’s religious 
education, international laws stipulate that parents and legal guardians have the right to 
ensure their children receive an education that conforms with their own religious 
convictions.59 This right applies to both private and public education. 
 Heiner Bielefeldt asserts that regarding the freedom of religious practices, a civil 
government should ensure citizens have the right to proclaim their religion’s messages, 
convert others using noncoercive means, and present public policy proposals directly 
based on their religious convictions.60 Full religious freedom can only be realized when a 
country or State guarantees rights to its citizens in a pluralistic, democratic society, and 
protects those freedoms indicated in a constitutional mechanism – noted earlier – equally 
and fairly. 
 
2.3 Principled Pluralism Delineated 
Kuyper and Dooyeweerd, two prominent Dutch thinkers, created the terms ‘sphere 
sovereignty’ and ‘sphere universality’, which in time became known as principled (or 
structural) pluralism,61 one of numerous classifications of pluralism. Michael Barnes 
Norton explains that depending on the context of the term ‘pluralism’ or the authors’ 
intended use of the word, the term can indicate something ranging from the fact of 
religious diversity to a specific kind of philosophical or theological approach to such 
diversity. Typically, the approach would be ‘characterized by humility regarding the level 
of truth and effectiveness of one’s personal religion, as well as the goals of deferential 
                                                 
58 ‘Article 18’, in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
59 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, ‘Article 18 (4)’ of International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in International Standards. ‘The States parties to the 
present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians 
to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> [accessed 28 July 2017].  
60 Heiner Bielefeldt, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Thematic Reports of the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur 
2010–2013 (Bonn: Verlag fur Kultur und Wissenschaft, 2014), pp. 98–118. 
61 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 110. 
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dialogue and mutual understanding with other traditions.’62 In this context, the term 
‘diversity’ denotes different religious beliefs, practices, and traditions, while ‘pluralism’ 
refers to a certain form of response to that diversity.  
Jeffrey Wattles defines pluralism to portray an attitude that responds to the 
element of ‘diverse traditions of thought, faith, and practice’63 by: (1) appreciating each 
person’s shared humanity and their inordinate, inimitable individuality while examining 
the explicit differences of class, gender, race, religious belief, or other category deemed 
relevant for a certain purpose; (2) investing time to explore the course that ‘leads from 
understanding to tolerance, friendship, and love.’64 Principled pluralism should be 
perceived as one way of interpreting pluralism as understood in this general sense. 
 
2.3.1 Principled Pluralism Explained 
Sphere sovereignty provides the foundational framework for principled pluralism as the 
main principle of operation between religion and State within a pluralistic society. During 
his inaugural address, entitled ‘Sphere Sovereignty’, at the founding of the Free 
University of Amsterdam in 1880, Kuyper compares concepts of soevereiniteit in eigen 
kring,65 which means the sovereignty of each sphere,66 to State sovereignty, a condition 
which, according to Kuyper, ‘led to an idolatrous worship of nation.’67 Kuyper argued that 
because God allocated governing powers to diverse spheres within human society, it 
stood to reason that civil government could only make claims to limited authority.68 He 
                                                 
62 Michael Barnes Norton, ‘Religious Pluralism’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
<http://www.iep.utm.edu/rel-plur/> [accessed 23 January 2018] para. 1 of 4 in introduction section. 
63 Jeffrey Wattles, ‘What is Pluralism?’ (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 2002) <http://www. 
wabashcenter.wabash.edu/syllabi/w/wattles/mdiverse.htm> [accessed 22 January 2018] para. 1 of 2 in 
introduction section for course.  
64 Wattles, ‘What is Pluralism?’ 
65 A. Kuyper, Soevereiniteit in Eigen Kring (Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1880) <http://www.reformational 
publishingproject.com/pdfbooks/Scanned_Books_PDF/SouvereiniteitinEigenKring.pdf> [accessed 23 
January 2018], p. 13. 
66 Dennis P. Petrin and Frans Visscher, ‘Revisiting Sphere Sovereignty to Interpret Restrictions on 
Religious Freedom’, Philosophia Reformata, 80 (2015) <rg/download/religiousfreedom/Petri-Visscher% 
20-%20Revisiting%20sphere%20sovereignty%20to%20interpret%20restrictions%20on% 20religious%20 
freedom.pdf> [accessed 31 March 2018], pp. 99–122 (p. 100). 
67 K. A. Van Til, ‘Abraham Kuyper and Michael Walzer: The Justice of the Spheres’, Calvin Theological 
Journal 40 (2005), pp. 267–89 (p. 267). 
68 James D. Bratt(ed.)  Abraham Kuyper, A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 1998). p. 
241. 
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simultaneously stressed that because spheres interrelate and originate in God, the 
sovereignty of those spheres only exists under God’s infinite sovereignty.69 
 To be sovereign, an authority structure such as the State maintains the right to 
issue directives on matters that a certain sphere (domain, sector) encompasses. 
Authorities in one sphere may issue directives for those in that sphere – for example, 
higher education – but may not maintain authority for the entirety of life within that 
sphere. Kuyper explains that just as ‘the president of Yale has no right to issue directives 
to the students and staff of Harvard University,’70 neither the State nor any other 
authoritative body maintains the right to issue directives for the totality of life within a 
sphere. Corwin E. Schmidt notes the following regarding Kuyper’s perception of the 
roles of the diverse spheres: 
First, the state is to maintain parity between the different spheres. Thus it has an obligation to  
enforce mutual respect for the boundary lines separating the different spheres of authority  
whenever a conflict arises between areas or when one sphere steps over its boundary of authority 
into the domain of another. 
 
 Second, the state is to prevent authorities within a particular sphere from abusing 
their power by acting unjustly toward those who are relatively powerless within that                         
sphere. 
 
Finally, the state has the right to impose taxes to support the apparatus of government and    to 
facilitate its task of maintaining the health and vitality of the commonwealth. Thus, while the state 
is merely one among various social spheres, it does not enjoy supremacy and sovereignty. over 
those other spheres; in turn, the state is to be regulated by means of both constitutional law and 
representative government.71 
 
Kuyper challenges the homogeneity that the increasingly commercialized and 
industrialized world he lived in promoted. Instead of uniformity at each level of society, 
his theory of sphere sovereignty emphasizes diversity72 and embraces the idea that 
authority structures in society possess only a limited scope. Although all spheres are still 
perceived as an organic unity under God the Creator, Who exercises sovereignty over all, 
each sphere of society – the State, church, family, and others – enjoys its own autonomy. 
                                                 
69 Bratt, A Centennial Reader, p. 241. 
70 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920)’, in The Teachings of Modern Christianity on 
Law, Politics, and Human Nature, eds. John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, Vol. 1 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 315.  
71 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist Perspective’, pp. 136–37. 
72 Tracy Kuperus, State, Civil Society and Apartheid in South Africa: An Examination of Dutch Reformed 
Church–State Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 1967. 
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According to Kuyper, as only God retains the right to issue decrees to every individual on 
all matters, the State’s right does not include issuing directives to every citizen – only to 
specific people on certain matters.73 
 As he promotes Christian involvement in the political sphere, Kuyper embraces 
pluralism as God’s creation norm. He argues that rather than the State utilizing coercive 
power to defeat idols and false teachings, it would fare better to support a crowded, plural 
public square. This would permit truth to prevail through peaceful discussion, an essential 
element for ensuring religious freedom. Kuyper prefers pluralism structured on strong 
Christian principles with the role of the State including the protection of societal 
structures to enable them to function freely. Kuyper perceived the State’s role to also 
include overseeing structural balances. He insists that the span of the State’s sphere 
should otherwise encourage society to operate freely without coercive constraints.74 
 Kuyper stresses that the State should use its power to maintain order when 
necessary as well as maintain structural balance between different societal spheres. He 
typically proclaims that the State should basically permit other societal spheres, including 
that of the church (religion), to operate without State interference. He calls for equal 
rights for all, whatever the individual’s religion or situation. Kuyper maintains that he 
and others in agreement with his stance will defend freedom of conscience, a free press, 
freedom of assembly, and freedom of opinion with all their might.75 
 According to Kuyper, the sphere sovereignty of numerous distinct social 
institutions entitles each organization to express ‘a certain facet of a dynamic order of 
divinely created possibilities and each fitted to make a unique contribution to the 
realization of justice and the public good.’76 Sphere sovereignty provides the foundation 
for principled pluralism as the main principle of operation between religion and State 
within a pluralistic society. Kuyper’s body of work, especially proposals relating to 
                                                 
73 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern, p. 468. 
74 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern, p. 468. 
75 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern, p. 315. 
76 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 1. 
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sphere sovereignty, which constitutes the foundation for principled pluralism, continues 
to influence contemporary supporters of religious freedom throughout the world.77 
2.3.2 Principled Pluralism Expounded 
Sphere sovereignty, the groundwork Kuyper cultivated for principled pluralism, 
maintains that as a feature of the created order, God ordained distinct spheres of authority 
with each retaining a purpose for existence as well as its unique right to exist. Figure 1 
portrays the vertical interrelationships between God and His creations in human society 
as well as the societal relationships existing between the horizontally portrayed spheres. 
                                                 
77 Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, Modern, p. 1. Kuyper’s influence on Bratt, a professor from Calvin College and 
supporter of religious freedom, can be seen in the introduction of this book. He notes that Kuyper 
proposed believers utilize their religious freedom by expressing ‘the full weight of their 
convictions into public life while fully respecting the rights of others in a pluralistic society under 
a constitutional government’ (p. xiii). Kuyper also influenced James W. Skillen, the former executive 
director and president of the Center for Public Justice as well as a strong, contemporary advocate for 
religious freedom in ‘The point of Kuyperian pluralism’, Cardus, 1 November 2013, 
<https://www.cardus.ca/comment/ article/4069/the-point-of-kuyperian-pluralism/> [accessed 15 January 
2014]. Jonathan Chaplin notes that Skillen advocates not only religious freedom for religious entities such 
as churches and mosques but that the State should treat all faith-based bodies justly. In ‘Contested 
religious space in Jakarta’, Chapter 11 in Handbook of Religion and the Asian City: Aspiration and 
Urbanization in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Peter Van Veer (Oakland, CA: University of California 
Press, 2015), pp. 201–18 (p. 206), Chang-Yau Hoon notes that Dr. Stephen Tong, a renowned Chinese-
Indonesian, Christian theologian, philosopher, and founder of the International Reformed Evangelical 
Seminary (IRES), is an avid supporter of religious freedom. In personal communication with the author of 
this thesis it was found that Dr. Tong considers his theological beliefs supporting religious freedom to be 
rooted in Kuyperian teachings. 
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Figure 1: Interrelationships Kuyper Noted between Spheres78 
 
 The vertical alignment of each sphere reflects its sovereignty and independence as 
a part of God’s created order under His sovereignty. Simultaneously, each sphere also 
interrelates to each of the others as it functions in society within the designated 
boundaries that separate them.79 Gordon J. Spykman stresses that Kuyper’s sphere 
sovereignty captures the concept: ‘No sphere may exercise its authority at the expense of 
another. Each has its own rightful area of jurisdiction. Each is entitled to full and equal 
standing before the law.’80 In the next section, I examine both the philosophical and 
theological foundations of principled pluralism and then highlight the State–religion 
relationship under the framework of principled pluralism. Principled pluralism correlates 
with Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty in that both maintain that as the State performs specific 
tasks in its sphere, its primary task is to promote justice equally for its citizens. 
  
                                                 
78 Original figure developed and designed from information retrieved from Schmidt, ‘The Principled 
Pluralist’, p. 136. 
79 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 136. 
80 Gordon J. Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position’, in God and Politics: Four Views on the 
Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 78–99 (p. 98). 
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2.3.2.1 Philosophical Foundation of Principled Pluralism 
In addition to Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty providing a base for principled pluralism, his 
ideas reflect the philosophical foundation of this theory. Kuyper asserts that God has 
given each sphere, including the State as well as the church (religion), family, education, 
businesses, and other spheres, specific tasks to perform and that as each sphere remains 
subservient in its relationship to God, no sphere is ultimately sovereign. Nevertheless, 
each sphere possesses a level of sovereignty not only in its own domain but also in its 
interrelationships with each of the other spheres. According to Kuyper, ‘Each sphere has 
its own identity, its own unique task, its own God-given prerogatives.’81 Each authority 
structure within these different areas qualifies as ‘sovereign’, in that ‘each sphere in 
society has its own independent authority; no one sphere should dominate or usurp the 
role of the others.’82 Although Kuyper insists that the various social spheres retain their 
autonomy, he reserves a restricted, yet simultaneously ‘elevated’ role for the government 
regarding certain social settings. Robert K. Vischer contends that as Kuyper’s sphere 
sovereignty limits the State’s authority to the political sphere, it carves out analogous 
spheres of authority for other areas of social life, including education, family, business, 
the arts, and science.83 I agree with Vischer that Kuyper’s writings not only offer a 
detailed blueprint to appropriate power among the spheres but also argue that the framing 
Kuyper designates for sovereignty provides the image of a social order in which 
voluntary associations do not depend on the State for their legitimacy or authority. 
 Vischer argues that the significance of sphere sovereignty relates to its emphasis 
on the link between the preservation of various sources of authority in society and the 
common good of citizens.84 Principled pluralists assert that due to the social nature of 
humans, associations and communities constitute a fundamental feature of society. 
Instead of society being constructed by autonomous individuals, independent from each 
other, social groups, organically related, create a society. As they experience their lives, 
human beings commonly form social groups that include associations and communities. 
                                                 
81 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 136. 
82 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 136. 
83 Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and State 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 106. 
84 Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, p. 106. 
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Within the social structures of these groups, human beings establish their identities and 
form their values.85 These social groups and structures exist independently of and prior to 
the initiation of the State. 
 In creating a healthy polity, principled pluralists confirm the critical role of 
associations and communities, a stance between the extremes of the individualism that 
laissez-faire reflects and the collectivism that utilizes socialist and nationalist ideologies. 
‘This assertion of the social nature of human beings compels principled pluralists to 
oppose individualism (at least in its extreme forms).’86 Principled pluralists contend that, 
fundamentally, human beings are social beings. Kuyper argues, ‘Human life [...] is so 
constituted that the individual can exist only within the group and can come to full 
expression only in community.’87 Like those advocating at least some other pluralisms, 
principled pluralists accentuate the social nature of human beings and the inherent 
existence of associations and communities in society as well as the critical contributions 
society receives from these entities. I concur with Kuyper that, under a pluralistic but 
organic societal order, the worth of an individual in the community can be more fully and 
distinctly manifested and valued.  
 
2.3.2.2 Theological Foundation of Principled Pluralism 
Kuyper argues that neither the individual as an officeholder nor the magistrate is immune 
from fallen nature or the consequences of the ensuing human state of total depravity. God 
chose to allocate the authority to administer public justice to the magistrate, not to the 
individual person or to any societal institution or organization. Kuyper also passionately 
argues that a Christian should ‘meddle in politics.’88 As the following recounts, Kuyper 
rebukes what he deems the ‘pious’ concept of isolating oneself from the affairs of the 
world, a practice he considers ‘leaving the reins of government in the hands of the 
world.’89 
                                                 
85 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist.’ 
86 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 163. 
87 Kuyper, quoted in Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 140. 
88Abraham Kuyper, The Practice of Godliness (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), p. 40. 
89 Kuyper, The Practice of Godliness, p. 41. 
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       And moreover, they [those who feel that a Christian should not meddle in politics] protest that 
there is too much filth and crookedness about politics, so that no child of God can meddle in 
political affairs without becoming contaminated and suffering spiritual loss. 
  But this is not the Christian view. […] A life of pious isolation and meditation was not their 
[the Reformers] idea of obedience to God. They militated against such inactivity and passivity.90 
  
 
 Kuyper views the notion of a citizen being passive and not participating in politics 
as both unattainable and a misinterpretation of the Word of God. It muddles the 
difference between two kinds of duties in the Scriptures: (1) the duty of a private person 
or individual; and (2) the obligation of the official or magistrate. Kuyper not only argues 
for his concepts regarding sphere sovereignty, he also promotes an epistemology and a 
doctrine of common grace. Kuyper’s doctrine of common grace asserts that: ‘God gives 
knowledge and cultural blessings both to Christians and non-Christians which can be 
shared by all.’91 Kuyper’s antithesis doctrine declares that when the Scriptures provide 
guidance contrary to that of the world, including that which the State promotes, 
Christians are not to compromise Scriptural directives. 
 Kuyper notes that Reformers from France, the Netherlands, Scotland, and 
Switzerland militated against isolationism and extreme versions of separation of State 
and religion. Furthermore, according to Kuyper, Calvin and Zwingli, who were 
essentially theocratic in their mirrored views of the relationship between the two 
authorities, affirmed a more robust, forceful role for religion over the State’s authority, 
especially in the prevention of heresy. In a sense, Kuyper argues for the not yet named 
concept of ‘principled pluralism’, which I illustrate in the next section, contending that 
each sphere, including education, church (religion), business, etc. has the right to be 
sovereign in its own domain. 
                                                 
90 Kuyper, The Practice of Godliness, pp. 40–41. 
91 The Kuyper Centre for Christian Worldview Studies, <https://www.allaboutworldview.org/ worldview-
teaching-of-abraham-kuyper-faq.htm> [accessed 15 January 2014] ‘About us’ section. 
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2.3.3 The State–Religion Relationship 
2.3.3.1 Principled Pluralism, Sphere Sovereignty, and the Nature of the State 
Kuyper derived his perception of the role of the State from the Christian worldview, 
particularly the doctrine of common grace.92 He stresses, ‘The sovereignty of the state as 
the power that protects the individual and that defines the mutual relationships among the 
visible spheres, rises high above them by its right to command and compel.’93 
Nevertheless, Kuyper insists, another, much higher authority, namely that authority 
which descends directly from God separate from the State, overshadows the rule of the 
State. ‘Only God is Sovereign; […] He is sovereign and gives that authority to whomever 
He will – sometimes to kings and princes, other times to nobles and patricians, but 
sometimes also to the people as a whole.’94 Although the State can acknowledge that 
sovereign authority, Kuyper stresses, it cannot confer it. Kuyper perceives the State to 
possess a limited role to exercise its ‘power of the sword’95when it is required to maintain 
public order.96 
 Principled pluralism draws numerous concepts from the foundation of Kuyper’s 
notion of sphere sovereignty, particularly the fact that the social nature of humans, 
associations, and communities constitutes a fundamental feature of society. Instead of 
society being constructed by autonomous individuals, independent from each other, 
social groups, organically related, create a society. As they experience their lives, human 
beings commonly form social groups that include associations and communities. Within 
the social structures of these groups, they establish their identities and form their values. 
These social groups and structures exist independently of and prior to the initiation of the 
State. According to the designs Kuyper and Dooyeweerd97 developed, the State, as one of 
                                                 
92 ‘For he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust.’ 
Matthew 5:45b. 
93 Kuyper, Abraham Kuyper, p. 468. 
94 Kuyper, Abraham Kuyper, p. 307. 
95 Kuyper, Abraham Kuyper, p. 23. 
96 Gregory A. Boyd, The Myth of a Christian Nation: How the Quest for Political Power is Destroying the 
Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2005), p. 18, ‘The power of the sword is the ability to coerce 
behavior by threats and to make good on those threats when necessary: if a law is broken.’ 
97Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: The Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Company, 1969), p. 32. 
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the sphere authorities, should hold a rather crucial role to advance and protect justice and 
the common good, which includes religious freedom – for all. 
Dooyeweerd argues that the State could amicably explain the convoluted ‘right 
and might’ nature of its role. He defines the State as a legal institution of government 
grounded on the historical foundation of a monopolistic organization of power inside a 
specific geographical area.98  
As Dooyeweerd systematically fleshes out Kuyper’s theory,99 his work, like that of 
Kuyper, helps develop the theory of principled pluralism. 
 Dooyeweerd broadened his concepts regarding the nature and role of the State 
with his contribution of establishing a key component of PP based on his unique 
articulation of God’s two modes of revelation and the respective responses by 
individuals, both regenerated and unregenerated through various spheres of society. 
Figure 2 shows that Dooyeweerd advanced Kuyper’s construction of a social order from 
God’s creation perspective on two fronts: (1) Instead of only considering the biblical 
account of the creation order, he also took the ‘fall and redemption’ narrative into 
account; and (2) Dooyeweerd constructed his social order by including both sphere 
sovereignty and sphere universality, which I explained earlier. In this sense, Kuyper falls 
short by a long way, perhaps by being too ‘creation-based’, thus risking a baptism of 
factually existing institutions after the fall and foreclosing a critique of the spheres in the 
light of the redemption.  
 
                                                 
98 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical, p. 215. 
99 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist.’ 
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                     Figure 2: Dooyeweerd’s Perception of God’s Revelations100 
  
Dooyeweerd further developed the foundation for principled pluralism regarding 
legitimate authority, especially the sphere of the State. He also comprehensively and 
systematically expounded the task of each sphere, the norms or principles governing 
them, and how each sphere should relate to the other spheres.101 These proclamations 
evolved as an ongoing development under the scheme of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty.102 
 
                                                 
100 Original figure developed and designed from information retrieved from Kuyper, A Centennial Reader, 
pp. 461–463. 
101 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia, PA: The Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Co., 1955), pp. 102–105. 
102 James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2004), p. 33.  
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2.3.3.2 Sphere Sovereignty and the State–Religion Relationship 
Although principled pluralism is primarily oriented from a Christian worldview, Kuyper 
and Dooyeweerd do not consider an explicit Christian social structure necessary for the 
State to perform its duties and protect the freedom of its citizens.103 Their work provides 
support for my proposal of Baorong Duoyuan, my contextualization of principled 
pluralism in Chapter 5. Instead of insufficient pluralisms shared by Christian 
nation/reconstructionist/theonomist perspectives and secularist understandings, principled 
pluralism should be adopted in a manner that permits the State to function as one 
authority, advancing and protecting justice and common good for each of its citizens, 
despite their different comprehensive ideas. 
 Kuyper and Dooyeweerd concur on the concept of a limited, public-interest 
State.104 Jeong Kii Min also stresses the State should facilitate and nurture respect of 
people as unique individuals; distinct from their roles within their families and 
organizations.105  Thus, the relationships between the State and religious institutions 
should be both distinctive and interwoven. On the one hand, the State is neither capable 
of making nor assigned to make a judgment on any internal religious matter such as 
moral discipline or doctrine, or of taking part in ecclesiastical deliberation, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, the two must also partner together in fair cooperation in 
distribution of public justice, including the protection of religious freedom. Kuyper, as 
noted earlier, perceives the State to possess a limited role regarding exercising its ‘power 
of the sword.’ In the next section, I examine Dooyeweerd’s stance, emphasizing that, first 
and foremost, the State constitutes a legal institution with the primary purpose of 
establishing public justice through the manifestation of its coercive nature. 
 In exceptional scenarios, the role of the State encompasses some degree of higher 
allowance for conditional interference in other spheres. The State maintains the right to 
safeguard harmony between different spheres and protect justice for all, especially for 
                                                 
103 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, Chapter Eight. The Identity of the State. Also, see: Kuyper, Abraham 
Kuyper, p. 197. 
104 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, Chapter Eight. The Identity. Also, see: Kuyper, Abraham Kuyper, p. 
197. 
105 Jeong Kii Min, Sin and Politics: Issues in Reformed Theology (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
2009), p. 112.  
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vulnerable groups and minorities in society. In addition, according to Dooyeweerd, when 
conflicts arise between spheres due to injustice, the State can legally utilize coercive 
measures in order to intervene to secure order and justice according to different principles 
under each sphere.106 The State’s identity encompasses a distinct combination of justice 
and power or, alternatively, it is an identity where power proves to be foundational for 
the State but only in the sense that the promotion of justice serves as the destination.107 
This constitutes the State’s unique, irreducible role compared to that of other social 
institutions.  
 Jonathan Chaplin explains that Dooyeweerd further developed Kuyper’s initial 
theory of sphere sovereignty by expounding the unique qualifying function of the State 
with a justice-promoting role, applicable to all societal sectors including church, family, 
industry, and nation.108 Dooyeweerd accomplished this by characterizing the State with 
identifications of power and law, which he distinguished as its founding and qualifying 
functions respectively. Chaplin considers Dooyeweerd’s terms regarding the State as 
meaning that the State holds the following two functions:  
 1. founding function, to maintain a territorial monopoly of power;  
 2. qualifying function, to promote public justice by means of law. 
 Under Dooyeweerd’s structure of the dual function of the State listed above, 
Chaplin notes that the State holds intrinsically designed, essential coercive power as its 
founding principled function. This inseparable qualifying function does not merely 
encompass physical force but is a composite of resources through which public justice 
can be equally distributed. Chaplin further points out that Dooyeweerd’s understanding 
between power (the founding function) and public justice through law (qualifying 
function) assists in mapping the ways in which the State and other differentiated sectors 
of civil society should, under structural pluralism, pair together to achieve justice and 
public good.109 110 I endorse this solid, genuine view of the State’s role as public-legal, 
                                                 
106 Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public,’ pp. 64-65.  
107 Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public,’ p. 9.  
108 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd.  
109 Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public,’ 
110 Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public,’ 
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the leading function, because it implies that the norm of public justice directs the State in 
all its activities.  
From his examination of Dooyeweerd, Chaplin also surmises that the rightly 
formulated concept of public justice can serve to guide the State through significant 
public policy matters that confront a complex, modern society. His examination of 
Dooyeweerd’s thought reveals that Dooyeweerd perceives the State as an organized, 
segregated, public-legal community, yet distinguished by a juridically qualified, 
structural principle. The State’s public-legal leading function, the norm of public justice, 
according to Dooyeweerd, implies that this standard should direct the State’s actions in 
all its doings. Chaplin additionally notes that for Dooyeweerd ‘the founding function of 
the State is subservient to, and can only be analyzed adequately in relation to, its leading 
function.’111 The distinctive ‘legal sphere sovereignty’ of the State depicts its irreducible 
identity: the specific relationship between law and the power that the State possesses. 
‘The coercive power at the foundation of the State exists not for its own sake but only to 
sustain the State in realizing its definitive destination, which is the discharge of its 
distinctive task of advancing public justice.’112 According to Dooyeweerd, Chaplin 
explains that the State not only reflects a ‘juridically qualified community’ but also 
constitutes ‘a territorial public legal community.’ 113 The State’s essential responsibility 
in this reasoning is actualizing an amicable juridical balance in the public realm. 
Chaplin asserts that: 
Various interlocking concepts make their appearance in Dooyeweerd’s discussion of public 
justice. In addition to juridical harmonization, the most important of these are the distinction 
between internal functions and external relations; the principle of sphere sovereignty; the idea of 
the public interest; the distinctions between ‘structure’ and ‘purpose’ or ‘task’ and ‘typical’ and 
‘atypical’ tasks.114 
Chaplin stresses that the realization of Dooyeweerd’s view regarding the 
relationship between the State and society involving retribution, or harmoniously 
balancing diverse juridical interests, thereby precisely illuminating the interrelations of 
the diverse concepts, proves challenging. Nevertheless, in contrast with Kuyper, 
Dooyeweerd did not consider society to be an entity with an inherent internal 
                                                 
111 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 187. 
112 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 186. 
113 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 186. 
114 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 219. 
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infrastructure but as a system of multifaceted enkaptic interrelationships between 
structures like families, schools, and political parties. D. F. M. Strauss explains that the 
enkaptic which Dooyeweerd ‘developed (as) a specific theory in terms of which he 
accounts for the interconnections between different kinds of entities – where each entity 
maintains its sphere sovereignty – designated as the theory of enkaptic interlacements.’115 
A straight-forward whole-parts relation differs from enkaptic intertwinements because in 
their being-a-part, all parts in the whole-parts relation share a structure which the whole 
determines. In other words, in contrast to the ordinary part-whole relation where the parts 
are dependent by their roles in the whole, enkaptic relations emphasize independence 
among diverse parts within the whole.  
Unlike part–whole relationships in which the part has no meaning apart from its 
whole (as with a person’s arm), Dooyeweerd stresses that in these enkaptic relationships, 
a degree of meaningful independence exists. In contrast to Kuyper, who focused more on 
each sphere’s independence and sovereignty from the state’s intrusiveness under God’s 
creation order, in fighting an increasingly dictatorial State demanding uniformity, 
Dooyeweerd’s applies his enkaptic theory, with emphasis on dependence in these 
relationships among different structures of society. He perceives this as Correlative 
Enkapsis (community–person).   
As explained earlier in this chapter, Kuyper notes that distinct types of social 
institutions exist, each possessing a divinely ordained nature and purpose. Each of these 
institutions, which qualify as associational structural pluralisms, have responsibilities and 
rights that are not to be consumed or consolidated by those of the other spheres. Chaplin 
asserts that although Dooyeweerd did not present a detailed statement regarding the 
principle of societal sphere sovereignty that Kuyper himself stressed, he captures 
concepts contributing to principled pluralism in the central principle of ‘legal sphere 
sovereignty.’116 G. J. Spykman, like Chaplin and Schmidt, notes that as Dooyeweerd 
                                                 
115 D. F. M. Strauss, ‘The Best Known but Least Understood Part of Dooyeweerd's Philosophy.’ 
<http://www. freewebs.com/dfmstrauss/Theory%20of%20Modal%20Aspects.pdf> [accessed 7 March 
2018], p. 2. 
116 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 186 
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expanded Kuyper’s concepts regarding sphere sovereignty, he developed his sphere 
universality concepts. Both sets of concepts are central to principled pluralism.117 
While Dooyeweerd stresses that God’s normative order of creation proclaims not 
only the differentiation of society and the State but also the distinct realm of individual 
freedom,118 he argues that a person’s interactions in diverse societal spheres manifests a 
plurality of worldviews.119 Later in this chapter, I not only expand on concepts regarding 
pluralism, I also present alternatives that Christian nonpluralists propose in relation to 
principled pluralism. Principled pluralism, I will argue, not only constitutes a credible 
antithesis to other types of pluralism, it surpasses them because, despite its limitations 
(historical, cultural, social and religious under Dutch context), this theory best fits the 
foundational commitment to ensuring religious freedom for all.  
 
2.3.4 Contemporary Considerations of Principled Pluralism 
2.3.4.1 Christian Concepts of Principled Pluralism 
James W. Skillen, who initially employed the term ‘principled pluralism’, also developed 
and expanded this concept at length.120 Jonathan Chaplin notes, ‘James Skillen has given 
the name ‘principled pluralism’ to […] Kuyper’s pluralist legacy.’121 Skillen explains 
that, among several other things, principled pluralism indicates that the State’s 
responsibility includes recognizing and protecting every individual as well as each valid 
human vocation, institution, and organization. Skillen terms this ‘structural pluralism.’ As 
most of a citizen’s social life is not characteristically political, neither the government nor 
the political community created many of the institutions and organized activities that 
citizens are involved in. Therefore, the reality of human associations and relationships 
that do not form subdivisions of the political community depicts part of the limit of the 
                                                 
117 G. J. Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position’, in God and Politics: Four Views on The Reformation 
of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1989), pp. 78–99 
(p. 75). 
118 Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd, p. 186. 
119 Harriet A. Harris, Fundamentalism and Evangelicals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 238. 
120 James W. Skillen. Recharging the American Experiment: Principled Pluralism for Genuine Civic Community 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1984). 
121 Jonathan Chaplin, ‘The Point of Kuyperian Pluralism’, Cardus (1 November 2013) 
<http://www.cardus.ca/comment/article/4069/ the-full-weight-of-our-convictions-the-point-of-kuyperian-
pluralism> [accessed 15 January 2014] para. 6 of 18. 
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State’s jurisdiction.122 Several strong Christian principles contribute to the foundation of 
principled pluralism. These include the following: 
1. Principled pluralism, rooted in Christian pluralism, expounds criteria promoting a 
specific stance regarding the ethical attitude the State should employ concerning 
the various religious affiliations of its citizens. Principled pluralism holds that in a 
religiously diverse society, instead of the State overtly promoting a belief system, 
its primary role includes demonstrating impartiality, and maintaining a public 
square equally open to contributions from its plural citizenry, which consists of 
diverse faiths. As noted earlier, Skillen perceives this as confessional pluralism.  
Based on the account of God’s creation and design recorded in Genesis, 
principled pluralism holds that all people live within a system of divinely 
designed life relationships.123 Kuyper refers to 1 Corinthians 15:23 regarding the 
diverse systems he identifies in sphere sovereignty.124 
2. Another Christian belief, also noted throughout the Bible, contributes to 
principled pluralism in that people do not acquire meaning and/or purpose in their 
individual identities but achieve it through associational pluralism or by being a 
part of a collective whole. This occurs within a plurality of communal 
associations that include spheres of activity ordained by God, such as family, 
schools, and the State.125 
3. The Christian concept of God-ordained spheres which, conjoined, constitute 
community life serves as yet another contribution to the foundation for principled 
pluralism. This principle also correlates with Mouw’s associational pluralism.126 
                                                 
122 Skillen, Good of Politics, p. 124. 
123 Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position’, p. 79. 
124Kuyper, Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial, p. 467: ‘[T]here are in life as many spheres as there are 
constellations in the sky and that the circumference of each has been drawn on a fixed radius from the 
center of a unique principle, namely the apostolic injunction ‘each in its own order’ from 1 Corinthians 
15:23[….] Just as we speak of a “moral world,” a “scientific world,” a “business world,” the “world of art,” 
so we can more properly speak of a “sphere” of morality, or the family, or social life, each with its domain. 
And because each comprises its own domain, each has its own Sovereign within its bounds.’  
125 Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position’, p. 79. 
126 Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position’, p. 79. 
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4. Another primary Christian principle that contributes to the foundation of 
principled pluralism holds that each person possesses the right to adhere to his/her 
beliefs and conscience. William Edgar explains: 
Principled pluralism demands and guarantees for everyone the right to follow the dictates 
of his/her conscience and belief. Moreover, it encourages people to advocate public 
policy positions shaped and influenced by those beliefs.127 
As these four principles demonstrate, the stance of principled pluralism expounds 
criteria promoting a specific stance regarding the ethical attitude the State should employ 
concerning the various religious affiliations of its citizens. 
2.3.4.2 Classifications of Pluralism Relating to Principled Pluralism 
Mouw and Griffioen, who have also contributed to establishing principled pluralism, 
credit Dooyewerd with not only bringing clarity to Kuyper’s neo-Calvinist perspective 
but also for contributing to the understanding of the theme of associational pluralism.128 
Following this section, I examine associational pluralism with two more of the three 
primary facets of pluralism that Mouw and Griffioen identify: contextual and directional 
pluralism. I also note two additional qualifiers that characterize each of these three types 
of pluralism: the terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative.’ 
  As Mouw and Griffioen set out to clarify societal structures, they identify the 
following types of pluralism: three distinctive classifications of pluralism which confirm 
that as Kuyper and Dooyeweerd note, no vacuum or absolute separation exists between 
the various societal spheres.         
 1.  Associational pluralism. This depicts the diversity of organizations and   
   institutions that make up human society: associations such as families, churches, 
   businesses, and so forth.       
 2.  Directional pluralism. This refers to the various visions of the appropriate life 
   to which people adhere: for example, being Christian, an atheist, or a hedonist. In 
   a sense, because the directions individuals take or the ideas to which they adhere 
                                                 
127 William Edgar, ‘The National Confessional Position’, in God and Politics: Four Views on the 
Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 176–99, ‘Questions Addressed to William Edgar’, in Appendix A, pp. 
279–84 (p. 283).  
128 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms & Horizons, p. 170. 
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   (worldviews/religions) are not autonomous, directional pluralism usually  
   presupposes associational pluralism.129      
 3. Contextual pluralism. This distinguishes general cultural contexts that reflect 
   the lives of large groups or communities of people. These contexts: for example, 
   being Hispanic, French, or South African, male or female,130 are much larger and 
   more encompassing than a distinct association and may manifest contrary  
   directional pluralisms within them. 
 
 Whether a person adheres to being an atheist, a Christian or a hedonist is almost 
always demonstrated in certain associational contexts, such as the family, the church, or 
other religious belief or nonbelief organizations or institutions, such as the school, the 
political party, and the State. Conversely, contextual pluralism refers to whether a person 
is identified as male or female, what race he/she is or what country he/she comes from. 
However, being American, French, Hispanic, Italian, or South African does not always 
necessarily assume associational or directional pluralism because these pluralisms are not 
contingent upon individual reasoning or choices.131 
 The presence of contextual pluralism does not of itself guarantee that 
associational or directional pluralism will be in fact respected by the state or other bodies. 
Culturally plural countries such as China, Iran,132 and even Israel, where one monolithic 
directional ideology or religion or a belief such as Communism, Islam, or Judaism is 
legally enshrined or promoted by the State as its national identity,133 can often be found 
                                                 
129 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms & Horizons, p. 170. 
130 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms & Horizons, p. 157. 
131 In contemporary times, when a nation-state or ethnicity (contextual pluralism) comparatively, 
exclusively identifies itself with one monistic social structure (associational pluralism) under a solitary 
worldview (directional pluralism), this endangers basic human rights and religious freedom of the minority 
group/s. These concerns exist where the State imposes one uniform, national ideological or religious 
identity for all its citizens, including in some Communist, Islamic, Buddhist, and even Jewish 
countries/states. See: General Assembly, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm> [accessed 
10 August 2017]. 
132 2017 Annual Report Overview, <https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2017%20 
Annual%20Report%20Overview.pdf > [accessed 10 August 2017]. The U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), as it has done since 1998, listed China as well as Iran as a CPC (country of 
particular concern), due to the State engaging in or tolerating serious violations of religious freedom, 
133 Lahav Harkov, ‘Israeli Ministers Approve Controversial Jewish State Bill’, Jerusalem Post (7 May 
2017) <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Ministers-approve-controversial-
Jewish-State-bill-489972> [accessed 10 August 2017]. 
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guilty of violating the universal principles of religious freedom and human rights. Some 
exceptions can be noted, for example, in a monolithic theocratic situation, as in Israel 
during Old Testament times, where ethnic Jews (contextual pluralism) were perceived as 
almost identical to religious Jews (directional pluralism) and associated with the relevant 
institutions, such as Jewish temples (associational pluralism). 
In addition to classifying pluralisms as associational, contextual, and directional, Mouw 
introduces two sets of distinctions for these that he terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative.’  
 Descriptive pluralism aims to emphasize a specific pluralism’s significance; there 
is no accompanying action. According to Mouw and Griffioen, descriptive pluralism 
serves to acknowledge a diversity, ‘a way of acknowledging [a pluralism’s] existence as a 
fact that is worth noting.’134 It simply indicates the mode of existence of the three noted 
types of pluralism. By contrast, the normative label of ‘pluralism’ can also be used to 
indicate a way to advocate for diversity.135 ‘Normative pluralism aims to act and argue 
for this pluralism as a good state of affairs.’136 It entails a preferred action or reaction, 
either defending or challenging a given type of pluralism. 
 Mouw and Griffioen label and explain the following three types of pluralism: 
1. Associational plurality is the plurality of human associations of many kinds 
naturally emerging in many societies. 
2. Directional plurality is the plurality of ‘spiritual directions’ or comprehensive 
doctrines present in contemporary societies. 
3. Contextual plurality is the plurality of cultural contexts in which 
associational and directional plurality appear.137 
 One concept from Kuyper’s work that Skillen refers to is called ‘confessional 
pluralism’ and matches the directional pluralism that Mouw and Griffioen identify. It 
refers to the principal spiritual orientation an association or institution maintains: the 
basic convictional structure which guides a group or sphere. Readily recognizable 
contemporary examples could include ‘a Christian trade union, a Buddhist environmental 
group, a Jewish school, an Islamic bank, a Catholic family.’138 The practices of some 
institutions or associations, even if not stated, for example, reflect their bond or 
                                                 
134 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 14. 
135 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons. 
136 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 18. 
137 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, pp. 13–19. 
138 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 19. 
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commitment to secular liberal beliefs, their founding faith base, or their commitment to 
science and technology. In addition, even though Kuyper did not clearly distinguish 
‘confessional pluralism’, which I note as comparable to directional pluralism, and 
although he did not identify another sector in civil society that Skillen later labeled 
‘structural pluralism’, this being comparable to the associational pluralism that Mouw 
and Griffioen designate, both evolved from Kuyper’s work. 
Skillen explains that the State’s jurisdiction is not unlimited but originates in the 
reality of associations and human relationships that do not epitomize sectors of the 
political community. He asserts that: ‘Doing justice to the multiple rights and 
responsibilities of persons and nongovernmental institutions is what we might say is 
government’s responsibility to uphold “structural pluralism.”’139 Additionally, Skillen 
refers to a subsequent kind of pluralism, which holds that the State should uphold what he 
refers to as ‘confessional pluralism.’ He draws from a reference in the Scriptures, as did 
Kuyper, who noted common grace in support of his sphere sovereignty, correlating with 
God sending rain and sunshine equally to those considered just and unjust. Skillen argues 
that the State should treat all citizens equally, not negatively discriminating against or 
providing superior privileges to anyone in relation to his/her religious beliefs. Skillen 
infers that confessional or directional pluralism should be a critical component of the 
State’s constitution.140 
 Each of the three types of pluralities or pluralisms, which Skillen identifies, 
referring to Mouw and Griffioen, may be further classified into the following six distinct 
categories. Mouw and Griffioen accordingly designated: 
1. descriptive contextual pluralism; 
2. normative contextual pluralism; 
3. descriptive directional pluralism; 
4. normative directional pluralism; 
5. descriptive associational pluralism; 
6. normative associational pluralism.141 
                                                 
139 Skillen, Good of Politics, p. 128. 
140 Skillen, Good of Politics, p. 135. 
141 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, pp. 17–18. 
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 Implementing this scheme, Mouw and Griffioen emphasize the differences 
between the indication of each type of pluralism and the normative action (for or against) 
for each. Of the six categories of pluralism, they conclude that Christians should endorse 
and affirm five, excluding ‘normative directional pluralism’, a position they charge with 
causing danger regarding ultimate relativism.142 Table 4 illustrates the six categories 
Mouw and Griffioen classify as well as related indications and their correlating stances. 
 
Table 4: Six Pluralisms and Approaches143  
      Pluralism    Indication Mouw’s and Griffion’s 
             Stance  
 
Descriptive associational pluralism Identifies a plurality of associations   
within which people live 
 
      Endorses and affirms 
        Normative associational pluralism Argues for a plurality of associations 
within which people live 
 
       Endorses and affirms 
        Descriptive contextual pluralism Classifies contexts and cultures            
within which people live 
 
       Endorses and affirms 
        Normative contextual pluralism Argues for a plurality of contexts and 
cultures within which people live 
 
       Endorses and affirms 
        Descriptive directional pluralism Denotes different views of life and values 
that people hold 
 
        Endorses and affirms 
       Normative directional pluralism Argues for different views of life 
and values that people hold 
Does not endorse or affirm   
because this causes 
danger regarding ultimate 
relativism 
   
 
 Mouw and Griffioen also note that the six facets of pluralism illustrated above not 
only depict diversity within a society but also denote six distinct approaches to its 
multiplicity. In addition, Mouw and Griffioen offer several questions to cultivate 
understandings relating to their characterizations of pluralisms and the relationships 
between contexts and directions. Questions they consider include: 
                                                 
142 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons. p. 19. 
143 Original table created from information provided by Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, pp. 
17–18. 
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 In what sense is the notion of a cultural context distinct from that of a directional 
vision? 
 And what role, furthermore, does associational diversity play in a proper 
understanding of differences within diversity?144 
According to Mouw and Griffioen, when contemplating a plurality of  
cultural contexts, some individuals may perceive that the situation is characterized by a 
diversity of directional perspectives. Diana L. Eck gives a further important insight in 
relation to directional pluralism. As pluralism dynamically seeks to cultivate 
understanding across differences, it represents more than tolerance. Eck notes that 
tolerance, ‘a critical public virtue, does not mandate that Christians and Muslims, Hindus, 
Jews, and ardent secularists know anything about each other,’145 only that they [may] 
stereotype other groups. On the other hand, pluralism involves an understanding of 
different beliefs/philosophies and encompasses the differences in beliefs/philosophies 
between people, even those which diverse religions demonstrate. Pluralism, also based on 
dialogue, not only involves speaking but also listening to reveal differences and common 
understandings regarding a person’s beliefs/philosophies.146 
 Eck perceives religious pluralism or directional pluralism to be a means of 
bringing individuals together and asserts that she believes a society increases its strength 
as citizens exercise their religious freedom.147 She stresses the need for one generation of 
free individuals to continue fighting to protect and ensure religious freedom and defend 
normative contextual pluralism. The war against religious freedom, or what Mouw and 
Griffioen would call ‘normative directional pluralism,’ will never end, Eck asserts.148 Eck 
stresses that in its diverse relationships, pluralism simultaneously creates challenges and 
enhances life as it compels individuals to choose between contending goals, obligations, 
principles, and virtues. 
                                                 
144 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 151. 
145 Diana L. Eck, ‘The Pluralism Project’, Harvard University (2016) <www. pluralism.org/pluralism/ 
what_is_pluralism> [accessed 21 February 2015]. 
146 Eck, ‘The Pluralism Project.’ 
147 Diane L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a ‘Christian Country’ Has Become the World's Most 
Religiously Diverse Nation (New York: HarperCollins, 2002) HarperCollins ebook. 
148 Diane L. Eck, ‘A New Religious America' Religious Freedom as a Human Right, Issues of Democracy 
(November 2001), 6, 1, pp 14–19 (p. 15).  
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 This raises the question whether one should endorse a normative directional 
pluralism. In response to this, Mouw and Griffioen endorse a ‘dialogical theocentrism’, 
which draws on the thought that despite the fall, Christians can and should learn a 
number of things from nonbelievers.149 To do this, Christians engage in dialogues with 
nonbelievers within the ontological common ground that, under one creation, the same 
sun shines its light on, and the same rain falls on, all. God shares his common grace in 
one human world, with both the ‘righteousness and the unrighteousness.’150 Based on this 
rationale, in addition to the four types of pluralism, associational and contextual in both 
descriptive and normative forms, Mouw and Griffioen, although with legitimate 
reservation on normative directional pluralism, endorse descriptive directional pluralism. 
In other words, their position is to endorse all but ‘normative directional pluralism’ which 
they charge increases the danger toward ultimate relativism.151  
 Ultimate relativism is not only the primary concern of advocates of Christian 
pluralism but also, to a great extent, of principled pluralism supporters. Mouw and 
Griffioen propose a key question: ‘Where /what is the common ground/standard for 
evaluating competing worldviews (diversity) without sinking into relativistic pluralism or 
normless pluralism?’152 Rick Simpson argues that Christian belief is not incompatible 
with pluralities in public life.153 I assert that followers of Christianity and other religious 
adherents do not have to abandon their exclusive truth proclamation for meaningful 
peaceful co-existence in the public square.  
 In order to accommodate the spirit of toleration, Tom Driver suggests the 
abandonment of strong religious truth-claims. He argues that unless Christians divest 
theological requirements (salvation and liberation) of conforming public behavior, 
Christians will fail to have hope of ridding the world of the remnants of formal political 
alliance between Church and State.154 If Driver’s point is true, however, then in 
                                                 
149 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, pp. 104–07. 
150 Matthew 5:45 (NIV). 
151 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 10. 
152 Mouw and Griffioen, Pluralisms and Horizons, p. 12. 
153 Rick Simpson, ‘Can a Faithful Christianity Embrace a Pluralistic Theology of Religions?’ ANVIL, 17, 2, 
(2000) <https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/anvil/17-2_109.pdf> [accessed 28 March 2018], pp. 109–18 (p. 
118). 
154 Tom E. Driver, Liberating Rites: Understanding the Transformative Power of Ritual (Boulder,  
CO: Westview, 1998).  
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restraining the full public expression of the core conviction of religions or no religions 
and its adherents, how can a democratic society effectively protect freedom of religion or 
belief for all in accordance with the international norms?     
 Baorong Duoyuan does not agree with Driver’s exclusive approach but shares 
some of his legitimate concerns. On the one hand, there might be a risk of religious 
intolerance and conflict if the State endorses or establishes one religion, or belief, or non-
belief over the other. On the other hand, there could be religious relativism if truth-claim 
religions are censuring themselves because of institutional and societal humiliation. 
Nevertheless, by the same reasoning, in order to guarantee religious freedom for 
all, Baorong Duoyuan endorses and affirms the need for the protection of normative 
directional pluralism by the State. By agreeing and adopting the rationale for dialogical 
theocentrism, not only for descriptive but normative pluralism, the State, under a 
constitutional structure, provides both the guarantee for religious freedom, as well as the 
highest level of fair mechanism for constitutional appeal if violations occur. Under 
Baorong Duoyuan, the State will treat every religion, or belief, or nonbelief system with 
impartiality. Baorong Duoyuan also guarantees that in a postcommunist democratic 
pluralistic society, the freedom for each of these can be manifested in public and private, 
equally and fairly.  
 I assert that even Christians should agree, at least in principle, to engage in 
humble dialogue with others without compromising the truth-claims as a crucial means to 
facilitate a covenant partnership with God and each other. Not doing so limits the ability 
of citizens with diverse beliefs to understand and communicate with each other. Under 
God’s common grace, at least as members of the free and equal citizenry in a democratic 
pluralistic civil society, the State, for the sake of protection of religious freedom for all 
citizens who are associated in different contexts or structures, should encourage each 
association under every context, religious or non-religious, to contribute to our pluralistic 
society’s common good. I endorse Mouw and Griffieon’s ‘dialogical theocentrism’ 
approach in both descriptive and normative directional pluralism by which they choose 
not to constrain those who do not share their views from expressing his/her other ideas 
but, instead, to deliberately engage them in dialogue in order to learn from nonbelievers. 
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Talking with and learning from others about different beliefs opens the door for a person 
to share his/her beliefs and increases understanding for both.  
 As noted earlier, Eck rightly asserts that pluralism depicts more than a tolerance 
which is ignorant of the other. As pluralism permeates more societies worldwide, states 
become increasingly heterogeneous and, in turn, citizens face pluralism and frequently 
incompatible identities, ideals, and interests.155 Inherent tensions within societies often 
increase – tensions relating to contrasting claims of ethnicity, gender, locality, and 
ideology as well as diverse religions, moral codes, and social spheres subject citizens to 
competing values and commitments. Consequently, public as well as private life spheres 
experience challenges correlating to increasing pluralism. As Bielefeldt emphasizes, 
states should facilitate an open arena where citizens can draw from their beliefs to 
formulate and express their political concerns and ideas in public discourses. In the next 
section, I examine ways in which those preferring theories of Christian nonpluralism 
would likely address tensions amid the diverse spheres of society, especially those 
between the State and religion. 
2.4 Critique of Christian NonPluralism under Religion–State Relationship 
During the lifetimes of Kuyper156 and Dooyeweerd as well as in the following century, 
numerous theologians and philosophers explored the issue of how to best address 
tensions amid the diverse spheres of society, especially those between the State and 
religion. On the one hand, under the influence of secularization and globalization, the 
State's role increasingly expanded, while on the other, the role of religion shrank 
significantly under the banner of religious privatization. Consequently, ensuing changes 
confronted religious freedom and endangered it in both democratic and non-democratic 
societies. 
                                                 
155 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (New York: Routledge, 
2002), p. 1. 
156 James W. Skillen, ‘4: Reformed …and Always Reforming?’ in Church, State, and Citizen: Christian 
Approaches to Political Engagement, ed. Sandra F. Joireman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
pp. 53–72 (p. 60). ‘Reformed Christians in many countries, including the United States, have acquiesced in, 
or actively promoted, the secularization of state and society as a consequence of their discomfort with state-
established churches. In doing so, Reformed and Presbyterian Christians have too easily bought into the 
Enlightenment’s arguments for the privatization of religion in order to develop a tolerant, secular, rational 
public square.’ 
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 While secularists have instigated attempts to exclude religious worldviews from 
any public discourse in the public square, some religious supporters have challenged 
religious freedom from the opposite direction through attempts to theocratize society 
under a solitary religious confession. Under the latter scheme, some groups, such as 
Islamic extremists, have implemented violent measures, including acts of terrorism, to 
achieve goals for their group’s version of theocracy. Concurrently, several Christian-
based views, including Christian Nation thought, Christian Reconstructionism, and 
theonomy argue for a theocratic structural design for society.157 
 Contrary to Kuyper’s assertion that the unrelenting goal of the people ought to be 
the demand of justice for all (justice for each life-expression), these contemporary 
combatant entities seek privileged ‘justice for us.’ Rather than complementing society’s 
pluralistic nature, these views tend toward a ‘monolithic’ orthodox rule of society, 
constraining freedom for diverse groups. 
2.4.1 Diverse Christian Views Relating to the State–Religion Relationship 
In the context of a post-Christian age within Western countries that have a Christian 
heritage but are facing increasing directional pluralism in society as well as growing 
secularization, Christian philosophers and theologians have offered multiple proposals. 
According to Bogue, ‘While theonomists believe that structural [associational and 
contextual] pluralism is biblical, we [theonomists] contend that confessional [directional] 
pluralism is not.’ Identifying these groups as Christian nonpluralists does not mean that 
they are all against any form of pluralism. For example, even theonomists would allow 
for both associational and contextual pluralisms. While some support a liberal line of 
thought, or the principled pluralism which this thesis supports, there are also Christian 
nonpluralist positions.158 These include:  
1. the Theonomic position (Greg L. Bahnsen);159  
                                                 
157 Spykman, ‘The Principled Pluralist Position.’ 
158 Carl W. Bogue, ‘The Theonomic Response to Principled Pluralism’, in God and Politics: Four Views on 
The Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 100–06 (p. 103).   
159 Greg L. Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position’, in God and Politics: Four Views on The Reformation of 
Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing 
Company, 1989), pp. 21–53.  
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2. the Christian American position (Joseph N. Kickasola) and;160 
3. the National Confessional position (William Edgar).161    
Despite minor differences between the three groups, the theonomic position,  
the Christian American position, and the National Confessional position oppose the 
normative directional pluralistic approach by the State. As noted earlier in this chapter, 
Mouw and Griffioen do not endorse normative directional pluralism due to the danger of 
ultimate truth relativism, a legitimate concern for any adherents of the absolute truth in 
the sphere of confessional religions. On pages 42, 44, and 55, I reference why I endorse 
the need for the protection of normative directional pluralism; nevertheless, I limit my 
endorsement in this study to the sphere of the State, without extending it to other spheres 
of society. In addition, contrary to principled pluralism, these groups choose to embrace a 
more theocratic society led by Christian worldviews.  
2.4.2 Christian NonPluralist Position Regarding the State–Religion Relationship 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am going to choose the theonomic position as 
representative of all three Christian nonpluralist positions, including the Christian 
American position and the National Confessional position. I believe that among their 
shared commitments to bring the State to conform with God’s laws as revealed in the 
totality of the Scriptures, theonomy has articulated the most systematic formula to 
support its position.162 Theonomism, also known as ‘dominion theology’, denotes rule by 
God’s law.163 This movement, which often replicates the theology that early New 
England Puritans observed, literally represents the law of God and maintains the State 
should continue to apply the social and judicial laws that God gave to biblical Israel. 
Theocracy differs from democracy, which literally represents ‘rule by the people’, and 
contrasts with the U.S. constitutional separation of State and religion.164 
                                                 
160 Joseph N. Kickasola, ‘The Theonomic Response to Christian America’, in God and Politics: Four Views 
on The Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and 
Reformed Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 150–57.  
161 Edgar, ‘The National Confessional Position.’ 
162 Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position’, p. 17.  
163 Encyclopedia of Religion in American Politics, eds. Jeffrey D. Schultz, John G. West, and Iain Maclean 
(Phoenix: Oryx, 1999), p. 244. 
164 Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position.’ Some mistakenly claim that if, as theonomists propose, the state 
implemented the social and judicial laws God gave to biblical Israel, citizens who failed to comply with the 
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 Bahnsen explains that theonomists reason that God’s laws – the Law of Moses – 
epitomize the supreme standard for contemporary civil affairs, except for considerations 
that the New Testament disavows.165 
 Theonomy alleges that God’s laws, revealed to Israel, the Old Testament nation, 
are still applicable. In a contemporary theonomic State, the legal system would subject 
adulterers, blasphemers, and rebellious children to the death penalty. The 
postmillennialism principle proclaims that even though it may not occur for centuries, 
Christians will ultimately govern society.166 
 Rather than agreeing with theonomy, which regards the role of civil government 
to be under the authority of the rule of God, principled pluralism proposes that the State 
operates as a constitutional democracy, embracing most forms of pluralism. If one 
religion only were to rule, Kuyper reasons, religion could develop tyrannical traits.167 By 
contrast, regarding the role of civil government being under the authority of the rule of 
God,168 the theonomic perception maintains that the ruler’s sphere of authority includes 
reproving evil, thus aligning the rule of the State with God’s laws. This stance asserts that 
only one religion rules. Although principled pluralists agree with theonomists in some 
areas, including that Christians should obey and support biblical guidelines in the realm 
of political life, they disagree with the one-religion rule of the theonomic position.169 
Presumably, they also do not believe that all biblical moral guidelines, fornication being 
wrong, for example, should be criminalised. 
In addition, in contrast to theonomists, principled pluralists, along with most  
                                                 
laws would be subject to Old Testament penal sanctions.  Those not understanding this sect allege 
theonomists support punishments for infractions to include but not limited to the execution of 
‘blasphemers, adulterers, homosexuals, and rebellious children.’ Bahnsen disputes this charge as the New 
Testament rejects this harsh punishment for these infractions.    
165 Paul G. Schrotenboer, ‘The Principled Pluralist Response to Theonomy’, in God and Politics: Four 
Views on The Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Scott Smith, pp. 54–60.  
166 Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position’, pp. 48–49.   
167 Uri Brito, ‘An Analysis of Kuyper’s Lecture: Calvinism a Life System’, Resurrectio et Vita (11 
December 2007) <http://apologus.wordpress.com/2007/12/11/ an-analysis-of-kuyper%E2%80%99s-
lecture-calvinism-a-life-system-part-2/> [accessed 13 January 2014]. 
168 Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position’, pp. 48–49.   
169 Gary Scott Smith, ‘The Principled Pluralist Response to National Confessionalism’,   
in God and Politics: Four Views on The Reformation of Civil Government, ed. Gary Scott Smith 
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 213–20. 
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Reformed believers, do not agree that Christians should observe the Old Testament civil 
laws as part of a continuing mandate. Instead, they are to follow the new covenant that 
Christ Jesus came to implement. Traditional Reformed theology accepts the division of 
Old Testament laws into three types: 
1. civil; 
2. ceremonial (or ritual); and 
3. moral laws.170 
 The transition from the covenant in the Old Testament to the new one following 
Christ has entailed discontinuity and continuity among these laws. As John Calvin puts it: 
We must attend to the well known division which distributes the whole law of God, as 
promulgated by Moses, into the moral, the ceremonial, and the judicial law, and we must 
attend to each of these parts, in order to understand how far they do, or do not, pertain to us. 
Meanwhile, let no one be moved by the thought that the judicial and ceremonial laws relate to 
morals. For the ancients who adopted this division, though they were not unaware that the two 
latter classes had to do with morals, did not give them the name of moral, because they might 
be changed and abrogated without affecting morals. They give this name specially to the first 
class, without which, true holiness of life and an immutable rule of conduct cannot exist.171 
 
 Calvin stresses the continuity of the moral law to believers in New Testament 
times:  
Now, as it is evident that the law of God which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of 
natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men, the whole of 
this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it alone ought to be the aim, the rule, 
and the end of all laws. Wherever laws are formed after this rule, directed to this aim, and 
restricted to this end, there is no reason why they should be disapproved by us, however much 
they may differ from the Jewish law, or from each other.172 
 
                                                 
170 Early church fathers, including Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Augustine, and others, attempted to classify the 
laws in the Old Testament and their implications to the New Testament into two parts. They distinguished 
between what we know as the moral law and the ceremonial/civil law and connected the moral law with the 
Ten Commandments. Thomas Aquinas, widely acknowledged as perhaps the first theologian who distinctly 
defended a threefold division of the law, classified these as moral, ceremonial, and civil law. His division 
portrays a ‘development from the division maintained in Augustine and other church fathers, in which the 
moral law is distinguished from the parts of the law that have passed away in the new covenant.’  
Subsequently, many reformers like John Calvin and the Westminster Divines also continued to adopt the 
viewpoint of the tripartite division of the law. As Calvin calls the threefold distinction ‘well known’, he 
attributes it to the ‘ancients.’ Although without offering an extensive biblical defense, Calvin provided an 
extensive deliberation on the implications and applications of the three divisions of the OT laws to NT 
believers. 
171 John Calvin, Institutes IV xx.14 ‘Of Civil Government’ <https://www.ccel.org/ccel/ 
calvin/institutes.vi.xxi.html> [accessed 24 March 2018]. 
172 Calvin Institutes IV xx.15.  
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Oliver O’Donovan argues that individuals should not only respect the laws of the 
community, they should practice and uphold its moral laws as well. They should also 
honor God’s moral authority.173 Wayne Grudem stresses that Jesus taught that the realms 
of ‘God’ and ‘Caesar’ distinctly imply freedom of religion and, therefore, today as in the 
past, all civil governments should protect each citizen’s freedom regarding the religious 
or any anti- or nonreligious faith they follow. ‘Caesar’ should not control the religious 
doctrines that individuals hold or how they do or do not worship God, for these belong to 
God, not the government.174  
I agree with Grudem that Christians in every State should support freedom of 
religion for all and oppose government attempts to have only one specific religion. 
Furthermore, (1) although principled pluralists and theonomists disagree regarding 
whether civil laws should be treated the same as moral laws, they agree that biblical 
moral laws are still valid. They maintain that as part of biblical continuity, Christians and 
Christian churches individually, as well as collectively, should observe and obey these 
moral laws; (2) in general, principled pluralists believe that Christians are called to obey 
moral laws in their faith and practices according to the New Testament. 
While not disagreeing with theonomists that the moral laws should be obeyed and 
practiced by individual Christians and institutional churches, principled pluralists 
disagree with theonomist and even some Reformed teachers about the mechanism for 
implementing the moral laws. In the history of the church, major disputes have arisen 
regarding whether the civil magistrate or the ecclesiastical authority should have the 
responsibility to enforce the moral law, and, if so, which part to enforce. Perhaps the 
most controversial dilemma concerns how to enforce moral law. These disputes have 
been manifested in the civil authorities’ treatment of doctrinal cult.175  
                                                 
173 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids, 
MI:  Eerdmans, 2001), p. 190. 
174 Wayne Grudem, ‘Why Christians Should Influence Government for Good’ (2016) <http://www.wayne 
grudem.com/> [accessed 10 May 2016]. 
175 A few schools of thought include: the full ecclesiastical enforcement approach, including use of coercive 
force by the Catholic Church’s authority in the Middle Ages; the Anabaptists’ belief that the church should 
involve noncoercive enforcement of any part of the moral law approach because they support total 
separation between church and civil magistrate, and believe that only the civil magistrate has no 
responsibility to involve doctrinal disputes; Calvin holds the view that both the church and the State have 
the responsibility to enforce all of the moral law codes, including cracking down on the doctrinal cults; 
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Some schools of thought suggest that while the civil magistrate does not act as a 
purely ‘neutral’ agent in a nonmoral or moral-less vacuum, neither should he/she act as a 
coercive enforcer of the moral law except for criminal activities such as stealing. As 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, true religious freedom will not be fully protected if 
the State prosecutes an individual or religious group for breaking a moral norm such as 
spiritual idolatry. If no public judicial statutes are violated, the State should stay away 
from interfering with the moral conduct of any religious or nonreligious citizen, 
institution, or organization. The responsibility for disciplining someone who contravenes 
a moral norm solely belongs to the sphere of different associations: for example, church, 
family, club, or business. Principled pluralism asserts that the primary role and authority 
of the civil government spheres, under God’s common grace, is not that of a moral law 
enforcement police officer. The principle of freedom of religion or belief is especially 
rooted in religious belief and conscience.  
Paul Marshall rightly stresses that the State does not hold the right to do anything 
it desires. ‘If following the principled pluralist perspective, with the State as an agent of 
God’s common grace, its authority, while limited, is charged with “the responsibility for 
maintaining an overall order of justice in a territory.” ’176 Constitutional law aims to 
regulate the State’s power and ensure that various spheres, including religious domains, 
retain their authority, do not encroach on the other’s domain, and that the relationships 
between authorities (whether within one sphere or across different spheres) conform to a 
just order. Although the conflict between the State and religion is the focus of the 
discussion in my thesis, I assert that when the State commits to ensuring justice for all, it 
will conversely protect and safeguard religious freedom for all.177 
I maintain that Christians in authority should protect the religious freedom of 
individuals with the same beliefs just as it should those with other religious beliefs and 
practices, including those adhering to different (denominational) interpretations. 
Christians in authority should also ensure religious freedom for those professing beliefs 
                                                 
modern Presbyterians and Baptists believe that as a matter of religious freedom, the State should have no 
role in doctrinal disputes, and the cult issue should be resolved within ecclesiastic authorities. 
176 Paul Marshall, God and the Constitution: Christianity and American Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowan & 
Littlefield, 2002), p. 61. 
177 Skillen. Recharging the American Experiment. 
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incompatible with biblical law and teachings. This religious freedom protection should 
even extend to those in conflict with or contrary to Christianity, including individuals 
believing and practicing cultic or pagan ‘religions.’ 
 In contextualizing principled pluralism, I expand on this posture and stress that no 
one religious or non or anti-religious belief should supersede another in a State. In 
addition to defending religious freedom based on biblical guidelines and ascertaining that 
obedience to God’s law supremely matters, I maintain that this freedom serves as a 
criterion to secure political and social freedoms as well as a deterrent to religious 
persecution. 
 As theonomy and other Christian nonpluralist theories essentially demonstrate 
bias against other religions and fail to protect the rights of all citizens, principled 
pluralists cannot support the theonomist perspective. I maintain that theonomists, 
subsequently, deny religious freedom for all. This fundamental difference between 
theonomy and principled pluralism, in that theonomy excludes other religious groups, 
reflects a primary reason why theonomy should not be adopted as a viable governance 
mechanism or theory in a pluralistic society. Theonomists who adopt and adhere to Old 
Testament laws deny religious freedom to other individuals practicing different 
religions.178 Proponents for political liberalism, a popular theory with a secular 
worldview I explore in the next chapter, ironically share a commonality with theonomy to 
some extent and, in effect, may also fail to protect religious freedom for all. As we will 
see, those supporting political liberalism could also prevent some theonomists from 
contributing to the political decision-making process in the public square, particularly if 
they deemed those professing theonomy as unreasonable. 
 Principled pluralists agree with certain points inherent in the theonomists’ 
religious convictions, and with the basic Christian doctrine. They acknowledge God’s 
sovereignty and concur that, ultimately, God remains in control.179 However, applying 
the theonomist viewpoint to society yields wrong conclusions. Not only does theonomy 
not support normative pluralism as part of the role of the State, in addition, unless 
instituted in a committed dictatorial environment, the theonomist view cannot be 
                                                 
178 Rawls supports this concept relating to political liberalism (expounded in Chapter 3). 
179 Bahnsen, ‘The Theonomic Position.’ 
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practicably implemented. Consequently, in a modern pluralistic society, theonomy, 
unlike principled pluralism, would fail to nurture religious freedom. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Contrary to theonomy, principled pluralism embraces social, cultural, and religious 
pluralism in most forms. In pursuit of religious freedom and ‘justice for all’, the 
principled pluralist philosophy can most coherently and consistently offer relief for the 
often-overpowering tension occurring in different structures of society. Principled 
pluralism, unlike theonomy, can help achieve true harmony among the various spheres 
and ultimately strengthen society as diverse groups function to work together as a free 
and equal society. 
As principled pluralism nurtures harmony amid societal spheres, it maximizes the 
protection of freedom of religion and implements justice for all faiths. This practice 
reduces the potential for religious wars and neutralizes the dilemma facing monopolistic, 
exclusive attempts by both secularists and theonomists to dismiss views that differ from 
their own. Under principled pluralism, the arrangements afford ‘not only negative 
liberties for individual adherents to diverse worldviews (the classical liberal version of 
religious freedom) but also positive liberties for diverse worldview-based 
associations.’180 Principled pluralism, which complements religious freedom for all, 
promotes the objective of using the public square within constitutional democracies to 
facilitate rather than frustrate the representation of deep diversity. 
 Principled pluralism will not only ensure the same public defense and equal 
protection for any believer within one religion and to those who belong to diverse 
confessional beliefs but also to nonconfessional individuals. Under the framework of 
principled pluralism, every citizen, no matter what his/her worldview, may manifest 
his/her faith freely and equally within different associations and in different contexts. 
My argument in this study primarily focuses on how the State should carry out its 
relationship to religions in order to best protect religious freedom for all citizens. Thus, I 
                                                 
180 Jonathan Chaplin, ‘The Full Weight of Our Convictions: The Point of Kuyperian Pluralism’, Comment 
Magazine, November 1, 2013, <https://www.cardus.ca/comment/article/4069/the-point-of-kuyperian-
pluralism/> [accessed 1 November 2016], para. 5 of 18.   
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conclude that the State should adopt the protection of the normative directional pluralism 
approach to demonstrate neither prejudice nor privilege for any type of religion or 
worldview. Although principled pluralism, a political theory closely compatible with 
normative directional pluralism, appears to best protect religious freedom for all, it still 
has limitations, mainly due to its overtly Christian orientation. In the next chapter, I point 
out that in contrast to principled pluralism, political liberalism, the most prevalent 
political philosophy practiced in nearly all contemporary Western democracies,181 fails to 
impartially and coherently protect directional pluralism. Political liberalism, as 
represented by John Rawls, inadvertently contradicts its claim to protect the freedom and 
equality of all citizens by proposing constraints upon public discourse about religion and 
even excluding some religious groups if they fail to meet Rawlsian criterion for public 
reasoning. 
In the following sections and chapters, I illustrate several points of contention 
relating to religious freedom that apply to principled pluralism as well as political 
liberalism, chiefly by examining the relationship between two types of ‘associational 
pluralism’, the State and religion and, second, by considering the field of public 
education. I validate my argument by demonstrating the inadequacy and failure of the 
protection of religious freedom within two cases of ‘contextual pluralism’: four Western 
liberal societies, and contemporary China. Thus, I later propose Baorong Duoyuan, a 
contextualization of principled pluralism, which is aligned with the intent of political 
liberalism to achieve civic harmony among diverse and sometimes conflicting 
comprehensive ideas to ultimately serve the wider common good. 
Contrary to political liberalism, which fails to adequately meet the requirements 
of pluralism, as I surmise in Chapter 3, but according to principled pluralism that I assert 
in this chapter, the State is bound to guarantee that all citizens can express their political 
opinions in public discourses, whether directly or indirectly derived from their religious 
convictions. As James W. Skillen rightfully proclaims, the true nature of religious 
freedom requires that the State does not have the right to determine limits of nor 
predefine religion.182  
                                                 
181 Chaplin, ‘The Full Weight.’ 
182 Skillen. Recharging the American Experiment, p. 119. 
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Chapter 3  
 
Public Reason in Light of Religious Freedom 
 
[E]very actual society … will normally contain numerous unreasonable doctrines                       
that are not compatible with a democratic society –                                                                            
[this includes] certain religious doctrines, such as fundamentalist religions 
…Unreasonable doctrines are a threat to democratic institutions. 
– John Rawls183 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I defined principled pluralism, introduced Kuyper and 
Dooyeweerd as early, primary proponents of this theory, and contrasted principled 
pluralism with various Christian nondirectional pluralist approaches. My research for 
Chapter 2 led me to conclude that although with a distinct Christian root and orientation, 
principled pluralism constitutes the most coherent, systematic contemporary political 
theory to guarantee religious freedom for all. In this chapter, I present and critique 
political liberalism, one of the popular, contemporary constitutional liberal approaches 
among democratic countries, concentrating my study on public reason. My rationale for 
choosing political liberalism to compare with principled pluralism relates to the main 
theme of my thesis: to formulate a theoretical model for China, which I identify as 
Baorong Duoyuan in Chapter 5, guaranteeing religious freedom for a postcommunist 
China in a projected Christianized and democratic future. The increasing influence of 
Rawls among younger Chinese liberal intellectuals today not only positions political 
liberalism as a conceivable way forward for China, it also makes Rawls’s political 
liberalism a viable opponent of principled pluralism and, therefore, dictates that a model 
of Baorong Duoyuan must engage with him.184 
                                                 
183 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, University of Chicago Law Review 643 (Summer 
1997) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600311> [accessed 10 February 2015] pp. 765–807 (p. 806). 
184 Baogang He, The Democratisation of China (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 2. 
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 Political liberalism most substantially articulated in recent times by the late John 
Rawls,185 a contemporary American political philosopher, unlike theonomist and 
programmatic secularist186 approaches, embraces directional pluralism to the extent that it 
can tolerate it. I maintain that if strictly implemented, political liberalism, like Christian 
nondirectional pluralisms, as I suggested in Chapter 2, will also fail to protect religious 
freedom coherently, sufficiently, and fully for all.  
 In Chapter 3, I initially examine the concept of liberalism, reviewing three distinct 
yet interrelated branches of this perception.187 I analyze aspects of constitutional  
liberalism, the only form of liberalism which deals with issues related to my topic of 
concern, the State–religion relationship as it relates to religious freedom.188 I also 
introduce political liberalism, which Rawls developed from constitutional liberalism. 
Despite its professed commitment to religious freedom, in the context of 
reasonable pluralism, political liberalism: (1) subtly camouflages concepts that restrain 
comprehensive worldviews, particularly religious worldviews, as demonstrated by its 
demand for the principle of religious self-restraint (PRSR),189 which places limits on 
religions being able to justify public policy; (2) further prescribes, under the filter of 
public reason,190 disallowing certain religions deemed unreasonable or irrational from 
participating in political discourse; and (3) implies, although not explicitly, the potential 
infringement of parents’ religious freedom by denying preferred religious education for 
                                                 
185 Gaus, ‘The Place of Autonomy….’  
186 Rowan Williams, Rome Lecture: ‘Secularism, Faith and Freedom’ (23 November 2006) 
<http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1175/rome-lecture-secularism-faith-and-
freedom>, para. 1 of 22. 
187 Robert Song, Christianity and Liberal Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 37. Song, 
a professor of theology and religion, identifies three branches of liberalism, ‘constitutional liberalism, 
classical economic liberalism, and welfare or revisionist liberalism.’ 
188 Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook 
Exchange, 2005), p. 24. ‘Constitutionalism […] is a legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis of 
arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will instead of law.’  
 189 Chris Eberle and Terence Cuneo, ‘Religion and Political Theory’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/n entries/ religion-politics/> [accessed 1 
December 2017]. I derive the principle of religious self-restraint (PRSR) from the doctrine of religious 
restraints (DRR), noted in Eberle and Cuneo (p.3) that restrains a citizen from supporting a coercive law if 
he/she does not believe a plausible secular rationale for that law exists.  
190 Rawls, Political Liberalism. Public reason stipulates the basic moral and political values that determine 
a constitutional, democratic government’s relationship to its citizens as well as their relationship to each 
other. It relates to how ‘the political relation [of free and equal citizens] is to be understood’ (p. 574).  
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some children according to their parents’ religion-based social and political 
convictions.191 
As I note throughout this study, restrictions and persecutions relating to religious 
freedom in China prove much more serious and oppressive than anything seen in Western 
liberal democracies. Nonetheless, in this chapter, I have chosen to focus on the three 
specific concerns regarding religious freedom expounded by Rawls’s political liberalism, 
noted in the previous paragraph. These include the PRSR, the filter of public reason, and 
the potential infringement of parents’ religious freedom. Although not necessarily 
implemented by the State’s coercive power, each of these three problematic points shows 
either: (1) an inconsistency; (2) an insufficiency; or (3) an infringement on religious 
freedom. In turn, these challenges to political liberalism contradict its claims to protect 
religious freedom.  
Ultimately, I conclude Chapter 3 by emphasizing that contrary to political 
liberalism, which restrains comprehensive religiously based arguments from contributing 
to public policy – even going so far as to contain certain religions and violate parental 
religious freedom regarding the choice for their children’s religious education – 
principled pluralism permits all groups, religious as well as nonreligious, to equally 
manifest their voices in both political and nonpolitical discourses. Regarding matters of 
constitutional decisions, especially related to the State’s coercive power, principled 
pluralism agrees with political liberalism in that certain political officeholders should 
exercise a proper degree of restraint when applying their comprehensive worldview-
based convictions.192 As noted in Chapter 2, principled pluralism, under a constitutional 
framework, guarantees the full spectrum of religious freedom not only for those who 
meet the criteria that Rawls’s proviso193 and public reason stipulate — but for all. 
                                                 
191 Joonas Pennanen, ‘Political Liberalism and the Preventive Containment of Unreasonable Beliefs and 
Behavior. Studies in Social and Political Thought’, Sussex (2015) 25 <http://journals.sussex.ac.uk 
/index.php/sspt/ article/view/34> [accessed 1 December 2017] pp. 191–208. 
192 Jonathan Chaplin, ‘Talking God: The Legitimacy of Religious Public Reasoning’ (London: Theos, 
2008). See pp. 58–76. Chaplin supports confessional candour, the precept that every view should be 
represented in public (p. 70). Chaplin proposes a posture of confessional impartiality in the State’s 
decision-making.  
193 Chaplin, Talking God. Rawls’s proviso requires that citizens support any religious reasons they present 
in public debate with arguments  that every other citizen will consider reasonable (p. 35). 
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3.2 Concepts of Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism 
Across and within scholarly discourses, the definition of liberalism draws on diverse 
concepts as well as presumptions regarding its core, meaning, and history.194 Although 
liberalism has become increasingly visible during contemporary times, it did not merit 
significant discussion as an intellectual tradition until the early twentieth century. 
According to Duncan Ivison, the roots of liberalism, a nineteenth-century development, 
extend from ‘the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European political discourse.’195 
By the early 1960s, liberalism had become a dominant force in Western political and 
social arenas. Kenneth Minogue, a theorist from the London School of Economics, 
describes liberalism as a single, continuing, extensive entity which encompasses most 
guiding beliefs of modern Western opinion.196 Ivison points out that despite liberalism’s 
significant history, records for the seventeenth and eighteenth century did not expressly 
acknowledge John Locke (1632–1704), 197 a British philosopher now often regarded as 
the ‘founding father’198 of liberalism. As the chief early liberal theorist of toleration, 
however, Locke serves as an example of liberalism relevant to religious freedom. 
 Locke’s social contract theory of limited government and pioneering work 
promoting religious tolerance proved central to liberalism. Karen Murphy asserts that 
Locke recognizes that justice (as a facet of liberalism) requires respect for an individual’s 
rights. These fundamental rights include life, liberty, and property; perceiving the State as 
guardian of an individual’s right to pursue his/her choice of religion and not promoting a 
                                                 
194 Judith Shklar, ‘Liberalism of Fear’, in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, ed. Stanley Kauffman 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 8–23 (p. 21). Shklar contends that throughout years of 
philosophical considerations and overuse, as humans have regularly shaped and then reshaped the meaning 
of liberalism to fit their purposes, the term appears to have become amorphous.  Consequently, Shklar 
notes, liberalism currently depicts ‘an all-purpose word, whether of abuse or praise.’ She characterizes 
liberalism as a political doctrine with ‘only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions necessary 
for the exercise of personal freedom.’ To avoid confusion throughout this section and the thesis, I, as 
Shklar does in her writing, consider liberalism to reflect a political doctrine, not a philosophy of life or 
partisan ideology. 
195 Duncan Ivison, ‘Locke, Liberalism, and Empire’, in Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, ed. 
Peter R. Anstey (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 86–105 (p. 94). 
196 Kenneth Minogue, The Liberal Mind (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2001). 
197 Ivison, ‘Locke, Liberalism, and Empire’, p. 94. 
198 Minogue, The Liberal Mind. 
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specific religion.199 In 1689, Locke argued for religious freedom on behalf of all religious 
adherents: 
[I]f Solemn Assemblies, Observations of Festivals, publick Worship be permitted to any one sort 
of Professors [i.e. religious people], all these things ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians, 
Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with the same Liberty. Nay, if we may 
openly speak the Truth, and as becomes one Man to another, neither Pagan, nor Mahometan, nor 
Jew ought to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth because of his Religion.200 
 Approximately three centuries later, this right which Locke highlights, that no one 
‘ought to be excluded,’ became integral to the fundamental elements of religious 
freedom. Other rights Locke supports include ‘the right to have or to adopt a religious 
belief, and the right to practice that religion without discrimination.’201 In the early 
formation of religious freedom, the State subjected freedom of religion to a method of 
legal oversight.  In domestic law and policy, however, freedom of religion evolved 
gradually. ‘The human right to religious freedom is a relatively recent invention, 
enshrined in human rights declarations and conventions that are less than, or little more 
than, 50 years in existence.’202 In the past, religious tolerance proved to be a luxury 
delegated to one or only a few groups. In contemporary times, the majority of regional as 
well as international declarations and treaties, as I note in Chapter 2, include a provision 
to protect religious freedom. 
 Despite attempts by some contemporary liberals to eliminate any theological 
assumptions from the history of liberalism, more contemporary research, as noted earlier, 
including that by David Marquand and several others, such as J. G. A. Pocock,203 Duncan 
Ivison,204 and Larry Siedentop,205 confirms that liberalism initially assumed a theological 
structure. Like Kuyper, Locke presumes the existence of an ordered cosmos where all of 
creation serves a purpose and all things must serve God’s implicit created purposes. Here, 
                                                 
199 Karen Murphy, State Security Regimes and the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief: Changes in 
Europe Since 2001 (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 15. 
200 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 
1983), p. 53. 
201 Murphy, State Security Regimes, p. 15. 
202 Murphy, State Security Regimes, p. 16. 
203 J. G. A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
204 Ivison, ‘Locke, Liberalism, and Empire.’  
205 Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (London: Penguin, 2015).        
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based on what Rawls deems as comprehensive reasonable religious views,206 Locke, as 
an example of constitutional liberalism relevant to religious freedom, delivers one of the 
earliest theories of justification for religious toleration. 207 Under the historical context of 
religious persecution by the State-sanctioned church in England, religious tolerance 
became a central outcry of liberalism in the United States. Liberalism initially set out to 
confront religious intolerance. It also served as a resistance to the displays of 
discretionary power, including ecclesiastical, by other institutional monopolies.208 At 
times, that intolerance resulted in multiple religious conflicts and wars, a primary 
motivation for Rawls to propose political liberalism. 
 As William Dunning, a political theorist during the early 1900s, noted, 
nineteenth-century liberalism, which basically means a democratic, human-centered, 
political structure, emerged to balance the monopolistic, ecclesiastical-controlled 
powers.209 
Fundamentally, nineteenth-century liberalism[’s…] ultimate aim was to break down the bars 
which excluded from political life the classes of people whose intellectual, social and economic 
significance was becoming unmistakably predominant. For its immediate aim, it demanded liberty 
and equality. 
 This nineteenth-century liberalism, which Dunning refers to – classical liberalism 
– contrasts with contemporary liberalism and relates to that which Locke supports. Ryan 
explains that classical liberalism focuses on the premise of limited government yet 
maintains the rule of law as it circumvents arbitrary and discretionary power. 
 Although the general secular worldview serves as the foundation for most 
contemporary versions of liberalism and its concepts, some liberal theorists disagree 
regarding the State’s relationship to religion.210 In the following section, I review three 
branches of liberalism with an ensuing focus on constitutional liberalism. As noted in this 
chapter’s introduction, constitutional liberalism embraces issues related to my topic of 
concern – religious freedom. 
                                                 
206 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 438. 
207 Edward Fesser, Locke (Oxford: One World Publisher, 2007), p. 159. 
208 Ivison, ‘Locke, Liberalism, and Empire.’ 
209 Duncan Bell, ‘What Is Liberalism?’ Political Theory (26 June 2014) <http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/ 
42/6/682> [accessed 3 April 2014]. 
210Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 21. 
Three areas of potential controversy include: (1) the appropriate boundaries of toleration; (2) the validity of 
the welfare state; and (3) the character (virtue) of democracy.  
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3.2.1 Branches of Liberalism  
Amid diverse complex and complicated concepts, the definition of liberalism remains 
elusive.  
 Song explains that constitutional liberalism, which I focus on in the next section, 
purposes to secure theoretical justification for practices encompassing the precept of 
limited government.211 Constitutional liberalism, which represents the earliest kind of 
liberal philosophy, relates to the liberalism of the American and French revolutions with 
a viewpoint opposing ‘arbitrary, personal, or unlimited power, to the possession of 
privileges by the few, and to the cramping demands of the feudal order.’212 Tayob notes 
that the initial core elements of constitutional liberalism213 included ‘government based 
on the rule of law, separation of powers, popular consent through representative 
assemblies, […], protection of the rights of property, and guarantees of freedom of the 
press and other liberties.’214 This liberalism embraces the most conspicuous 
contemporary defense of limited government. Figure 3 portrays three variations of 
liberalism. With the root system representing liberalism, constitutional liberalism depicts 
the trunk. Laissez-faire or classical economic liberalism (to the left), and welfare or 
revisionist liberalism (represented by the branch on the right), share the same 
commitments of constitutional liberalism. 
                                                 
211 Song, Christianity and Liberal Society, p. 37. This would include many or all of ‘effective restraints on 
the arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of power, constitutional definition of government powers, the rule of 
law, government legitimized by consent of the people, [and] maintenance of the rights of individuals’ (p. 
37). 
212 Song, Christianity and Liberal Society, p. 37. 
213 Abdulkader Tayob, ‘Islam and Democracy in South Africa’, Focus 62 (August 2011) 
<http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre> [accessed 11 March 2014]. ‘Constitutional liberalism emerged in the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, expounded in the writing of, among others, John Locke, 
Montesquieu, and the framers of the U.S. Constitution (particularly James Madison), and later in the work 
of such figures as Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill’ (p. 22). 
214 Tayob, ‘Islam and Democracy’, p. 22. 
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Figure 3: Three Branches of Liberalism215 
 Even though disputes between economic liberals and welfare liberals constitute a 
regular feature of contemporary political life, those on both sides will invariably be 
committed to a limited government and, almost as frequently, support some form of 
constitutional liberalism. Moreover, it can be argued that an overlapping range of 
                                                 
215 Original figure designed and created from information that Song published.  
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commitments exists among all three varieties of liberalism, which one may therefore 
interpret in terms of family resemblances. 
  Each of the three variations of liberalism noted in Figure 3 could conjoin a liberal 
worldview (characteristically anti-religious or secular). As some religious convictions 
prove compatible in principle with these three varieties of liberalism, they may also be 
aligned with theological commitments. Consequently, a certain amount of common 
ground enables some Christian pluralists like Chaplin216 and Skillen,217 to embrace 
liberalism. Nevertheless, as their primary concern regards the role of the State relating to 
economic, welfare, and constitutional principles, in themselves, these facets of liberalism 
are not as such intrinsically either secular or religious. 
 Of the three variations of liberalism, only constitutional liberalism primarily deals 
with the authority of the State regarding its relationship to religion under a given 
constitutional frame.218 Political liberalism and principled pluralism both presuppose 
constitutional liberalism and, in a sense, also develop diverse aspects of it with different 
orientations. Principled pluralism holds a Christian orientation while political liberalism 
takes a more secular liberal direction. As my primary concern for this thesis encompasses 
considerations of whether political liberalism or principled pluralism best serves to 
protect religious freedom, I now narrow my focus to facets of constitutional liberalism 
within which the need for the protection of normative directional pluralism serves as a 
point of contention. 
 
3.2.2 Constitutional Liberalism   
As noted in this chapter’s introduction, constitutional liberalism219 depicts the one form 
of liberalism which correlates with my topic of concern, religious freedom. Bounded by 
                                                 
216 Chaplin, Talking God. Chaplin notes that he uses this term in his article ‘Rejecting Neutrality, 
Respecting Diversity: From “Liberal Pluralism” to “Christian Pluralism,”’ Christian Scholar’s Review 
35, no. 2 (2006) pp. 143–75. 
217 Skillen, Good of Politics, pp. 90–95. 
218 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). 
219 One of three branches of liberalism portrayed in the next section. Rawls partially derived political 
liberalism from procedural liberalism. 
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constitutionalism or,220 at a minimum, operating under constitutionally guaranteed 
principles,221 this branch of liberalism seeks to find reasons for basic human rights, 
including freedom of religion.222 Nimer Sultany reports that various origins of 
constitutionalism emanate from three distinct societies, the United States, France, and the 
United Kingdom,223 which I survey later in this chapter. These cultures not only 
recognize but also implement the concept of constitutional liberalism 224 in diverse ways. 
 Although the precise forms of government under a democratic constitutional 
liberalism structure may vary, the protection of essential liberties, including religious 
freedom by a limited government depicts a common feature of each. Song explains the 
difference between constitutional liberalism and limited government and notes that in 
general, constitutional liberalism: 
 attempts to provide a theoretical justification for a set of practices clustered  
 around the principle of limited government, including most or all of the  
 following: effective restraints on the arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of power,  
 constitutional definition of governmental powers, the rule of law, government  
 legitimated plurality of religions and moral codes.225   
 
                                                 
220 Wil Waluchow, ‘Constitutionalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/constitutionalism/> [accessed 21 April 2015]. 
‘Constitutionalism […] often associated with the political theories of John Locke and the founders of the 
American republic, [maintains that] government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and that its 
authority or legitimacy depends at on its observing these limitations’ (para.1 of 1 in Introduction). 
Despite the preeminence of constitutionalism, no agreed definition exists for this term. Similarly, no 
universally agreed rights or values explicitly identify the term ‘liberalism’, ‘nor do academic sources 
specifically state ‘what counts as a liberal interpretation of application of fundamental rights. […To] a 
significant extent, liberalism is defined less by a set of fixed characteristics than by its struggle against 
illiberalism. Therefore, fully assessing constitutional liberalism proves challenging. The explanation by 
Wen-Chen Chang and colleagues, coupled with observations that Song makes, however, enhances the 
understanding of the concept. 
221 Gina Philogène, From Black to African American: A New Social Representation (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1999), p. 118. 
222  Rune Slagstad, ‘4. Liberal Constitutionalism and Its Critics: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber’, in 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp. 103–30. 
223 Nimer Sultany, ‘The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional 
Democracy and the Project of Political Justification’, <http://harvard crcl.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/03/Sultany-1.26.12.pdf> [accessed 2 January 2015]. 
224 Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), ‘Most 
modern constitutions, including those of most Middle Eastern, African, and Southeast Asian countries, 
contain some form of constitutional catalogue of rights, individual freedoms, formal equality, and 
procedural justice, including basic due-process rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and in 
some cases the right to privacy.’ As an embedded piece of legislation, a constitution advances the rule of 
law, ‘often in lieu of and at times in tandem with the rule of God’ (p. 73).  
225 Song, Christianity and Liberal Society, p. 37. 
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 According to Wen-Chen Chang and others., when a State and/or block of States 
implement(s) a secular liberal constitutional model, one may identify four pillars of 
constitutional liberalism regarding religion.  Chang and others explain that for a non-
religious State which maintains a rationalist worldview ‘that strives to be “neutral” 
toward towards religion’:226 
1. [T]here must be ‘a minimal threshold’ of institutional, organisational, and role 
differentiation between state and (organised) religion.227 In supreme 
constitutions or popular sovereignty, the state’s role in guaranteeing 
democratic rights receives respect because religion’s influence on state power 
is restrained. As a liberal state claims to be neutral regarding religions, it must 
ensure that it does not deliberately or extensively encourage or discourage 
belief or disbelief. 
2. [T]he constitution must guarantee freedom of conscience and the right to have 
or to reject religious belief (freedom from religion). 
3. [I]t must protect religious minorities from majorities. 
4. [I]t must guarantee to treat religions equally, ensure mutual tolerance, and 
secure freedom for religious groups from state regulation.228 
 The diverse emphasis and interpretations of these four pillars of liberal 
constitutionalism have contributed to centuries of controversies and heated debates229 as 
well as significant differences regarding the way the State relates to religion. Later in this 
chapter, I note several diverse expressions of constitutional liberalism with regard to 
religious freedom, reflected in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. 
Ideally, constitutional liberalism, under consensual, constitutionally decreed, legal 
guarantees, indiscriminately secures the individual’s fundamental rights, including his/her 
religious freedom. As the constitution empowers the State to protect the individual’s 
                                                 
226 Wen-Chen Chang and others, Constitutionalism in Asia: Cases and Materials (Portland OR: Hart 
Publishing, 2014) p. 861.  
227 Chang and others, Constitutionalism in Asia, p. 861. 
228 Chang and others, Constitutionalism in Asia, p. 861. 
229 Supreme Court of the United States, ‘The Court and Constitutional Interpretation’, <www.supreme 
court.gov/about/constitutional.aspx> [accessed 07 January 2015]. The Supreme Court serves as the final 
arbitrator regarding the interpretation of constitutional matters. 
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fundamental rights ‘in a well-ordered society’,230 this in turn would ensure common 
good. 
 According to Rawls, for a democratic, pluralistic society with diverse and even 
irreconcilable, yet primarily reasonable, comprehensive doctrines or views, liberal or 
illiberal, dominant in public and political discourse, it is impossible to reach an 
overlapping consensus without conflicts. 231 Consequently, Rawls proposes political 
liberalism as a political theory by which competing reasonable worldviews can work 
together under justice as fairness, via public reason. 
In its stance regarding basic political rights and liberties, Rawls’s political 
liberalism reflects a narrower version of constitutional liberalism, demonstrated by his 
discussion of steps for building a political conception of justice and constitutional 
consensus. Rawls formulates what he deems as the constitutional consensus, to portray ‘a 
constitution satisfying certain basic principles [which] establishes democratic electoral 
procedures for moderating political rivalry within society.’232 Thus, Rawls’s approach 
centers more on the political liberal conception of justice for the constitutional procedural 
system than a comprehensive social ideal 233  
 As I introduce and examine political liberalism, particularly Rawls’s concept of 
public reason, I commend his approach, which appears much more tolerant than that of 
his liberal predecessors regarding religious views in public discourse. His goal to explore 
the best liberal mechanism for a peaceful, democratic governing system which ensures 
freedom, or at least to the extent possible, a system not in opposition to any reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine, warrants recognition. Nevertheless, political liberalism may 
contribute to serious problems for religious freedom. I link these difficulties to three 
categories that I foreshadowed in this chapter’s introduction: the PRSR, the filter of 
public reason, and the potential infringement on parents’ religious freedom. These 
                                                 
230 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 35. 
231 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded. Rawls asserts that, ‘in an ideal overlapping consensus, each 
citizen affirms both a comprehensive doctrine and the focal political conception, somehow related’ 
(Introduction). In ‘The Idea of Public Reason Visited’, Rawls further notes, ‘When political liberalism 
speaks of a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of these 
doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, support a political conception of justice underwriting a 
constitutional democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion of reciprocity’ 
(p. 801).  
232 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 158. 
233 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 156. 
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challenging concepts correlate with the way in which the practices of political liberalism 
restrain, contain, and potentially infringe on or violate religious freedom for all – 
concerns I address in the forthcoming sections. 
3.3 Critique of Public Reason Related to Religious Freedom under 
Political Liberalism 
Rawls works on the premise that the historical origins of political liberalism lie in and 
after the Reformation, with extended controversies over religious toleration occurring in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.234 Rawls explains that religious wars contributed 
to the need for political liberalism and therefore stimulated its introduction: 
During the wars of religion people were not in doubt about the nature of the highest good, or the 
basis of moral obligation in divine law […]. The problem was rather: How is society even possible 
between those of different faiths? What can conceivably be the basis of religious toleration? For 
many there was none, for it meant the acquiescence in heresy about first things and the calamity of 
religious disunity. Even the earlier proponents of toleration saw the division of Christendom as a 
disaster, though a disaster that had to be accepted in view of the alternative of unending religious 
civil war. Thus the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) is the 
Reformation and its aftermath.235 
 
 Later, Rawls reiterates his point regarding the tensions between diverse religious 
truth claims and the role of the democratic State. He poses the question: ‘How is it 
possible for those holding religious doctrines, some based on religious authority, for 
example, the Church or the Bible, to hold at the same time a reasonable political 
conception that supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime?’236 
 Admittedly, in the history of the church (religion), injustices such as the conflicts 
and even bloody wars during the time of the Reformation regularly occurred in the name 
of one religion or denomination. Historically, from the Middle Ages to the Reformation, 
both theocratic and autocratic governments have applied their coercive powers to purely 
religious matters, such as peripheral doctrinal disputes and minor confessional 
differences. These have included, but have not been limited to, ways and means of 
                                                 
234 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, pp. xxiii–xxiv. 
235 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, pp. xxiii–xxiv. 
236 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 797 
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baptism, infant baptism, liturgy, etc. Great religious reformers have sometimes failed 
miserably to match the standard of religious freedom.237 Rawls rightly points out: 
Luther and Calvin were as dogmatic and intolerant as the church had been. For those who had to decide 
whether to become Protestant or to remain Catholic, it was a terrible time.238 
 Chaplin recognizes Rawls’s concerns with regard to conflicts related to religion 
and emphasizes that most people understand that some public manifestations of religion 
are troublesome, and some may even incite violence. Nevertheless, Chaplin argues, 
religion can contribute in positive ways to public life. Religion that intentionally aims to 
impact the public square basically serves as a healthy response to a ‘sustained 
marginalisation of religious speech and identity in certain western democracies.’239 It 
may also reflect as well as remind religious communities of the need to engage in public 
struggles for justice and religious freedom for all in a world where these appear to be 
eroding away. 
  From examining Rawls’s political liberalism as well relevant reviews, reports,240 
and reflections, I have garnered ample academic evidence, mirrored in the following 
three observations, to support my stance that political liberalism fails to coherently and 
sufficiently protect religious freedom for all. I will argue that: (1) it includes 
inconsistencies that restrain reasonable comprehensive worldviews, particularly religious, 
demonstrated not only by public reason but also by its demands for the PRSR and the 
proviso; (2) under the filter of public reason, through the process of reciprocity,241 it 
further prescribes the containment of certain religions deemed unreasonable or irrational, 
prohibiting their adherents from participating in political discourse; and (3) it implies 
potential infringement of parents’ religious freedom relating to their children’s education, 
especially religious education. I address these critical concerns in the following three 
subsections, expressly emphasizing public reason in light of religious freedom. 
                                                 
237 Great religious reformers such as Luther and Calvin. 
238 Rawls, Lectures, p. 7. 
239 Chaplin, Talking God, p. 20. 
240Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason.’ For the precision and clarity of my focus in this thesis, I primarily 
draw from this source. Rawls considered this article to be the statement of his view on public reason and 
political liberalism, especially regarding the compatibility of public reason with religious views (p. 437).  
241 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded. Rawls explains reciprocity as ‘the methodology of justifying 
political power with reference to principles acceptable to all those affected. The methodology  
begins with what we already share—with the reasons we are already presumed to find motivating—and 
uses what is shared to provide us with reasons to support and defend principles of political justice’ (p. 52). 
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3.3.1 Inconsistencies in the PRSR, the Proviso, and Self-Respect 
Rawls initiates his design of political liberalism based on his fundamental concern of 
what he perceives as inevitable social conflicts among different reasonable, yet 
irreconcilable, comprehensive doctrines. He stresses that ‘a basic feature of democracy is 
the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its 
culture of free institutions.’242 With reasonable yet conflicting pluralistic views as a 
normal reality, Rawls does not propose removing any religious or nonreligious views as 
long he deems them reasonable. Instead, he seeks to answer the question: ‘What kinds of 
reasons [may] they [those with diverse irreconcilable, comprehensive world views? ...] 
reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake?’ 243  
Rawls’s solution in political liberalism is to substitute the comprehensive doctrines of 
truth or right with the idea of political justice deliberated not by individuals as 
associational members drawing solely from their fundamental beliefs but through public 
reason as equal and free citizens. Further analysis of political liberalism’s mechanism of 
public reason, however, reveals inconsistencies that either fail to support or conflict with 
his stated goals.  
 
3. 3.1.1 Inconsistencies in the PRSR 
Rawls contends that to secure agreement ‘between citizens on political questions of 
justice in a democracy, [...citizens] must avoid controversial philosophical, moral, and 
religious questions.’244 Rawls admits this proves challenging: ‘[I]n a constitutional 
democracy, how can religious and secular doctrines of all kinds get on together and 
cooperate in running a reasonably just and effective government?’245 Rawls argues that 
even though citizens, as well as legislators and proponents of public policy, are of diverse 
religious and secular doctrines, when they apply the limitation of argument to public 
                                                 
242 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 439. 
243 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 440. 
244 Erin M. Cline, Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 
p. 75.  
245 John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
p. 616. 
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reason, these citizens can, especially in relating religious reasons to secular ones, work 
together for common good.246 Regarding public reason, I consider the following two 
questions worth exploring: (1) What is the nature and scope of Rawls’s public reason? (2) 
What distinguishes public reason from nonpublic reasons? 
 Rawls stresses that a citizen’s zeal to embody the whole truth in the political 
realm proves incompatible with public reason. He explains that the idea of public reason 
possesses a certain structure, and that for public reason to be plausible [‘applied to the 
background culture’], none of its following five aspects can be ignored.247 
1. the fundamental political questions to which it applies; 
2. the persons to whom it applies (government officials and candidates for public 
      office); 
3. its content as given by a number of reasonable political conceptions of justice;             
4. the application of these conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be  
     enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people; and                                            
5. citizens checking that the principles derived from their conceptions of justice  
     satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.248 
 
 Rawls essentially equates public reason to a critical criterion necessary to bind 
public, politically related affairs249 in a democratic society, in particular to various 
branches of government as well as political candidates and office holders. He assumes 
that as long as he/she supports a democratic constitutional regime, any citizen with 
comprehensive worldviews, religious or nonreligious, will endorse public reason.250 
Rawls attempts to separate what he terms ‘public political reason’ from ‘nonpublic’ 
reasons. 
The nature of public reason will be clearer if we consider the differences between 
it and nonpublic reasons. First of all, there are many nonpublic reasons and but 
one public reason. Among the nonpublic reasons are those of associations of all 
kinds: churches and universities, scientific societies and professional groups. […] 
Nonpublic reasons comprise the many reasons of civil society and belong to what 
                                                 
246 John Rawls, ‘Politics, Religion and The Public Good: An Interview with Philosopher John Rawls’, 
interview by Bernard G. Prusak, Commonweal 125, no. 16 (25 September 1998) 
<http://www.nlnrac.org/node/276> [accessed 2 November 2015]. 
247 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 452. 
248 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 441. 
249 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 220. 
250 Rawls, Political Liberalism Expanded, pp. 437–38. 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan 71 
 
I have called the ‘background culture’, in contrast with the public political culture. 
These reasons are social, and certainly not private.251 
Instead of contrasting public and private reasons, Rawls denies the existence of 
private reason.252 He categorizes reasons as public and nonpublic, with public reason 
belonging to political justice matters and nonpublic reasons including social and domestic 
reasons. In contrast to public reason that belongs to public political culture, social reasons 
concern different associations in a civil society that belong to the background culture. 
These may include religious institutions like churches, businesses, educational 
institutions, and other organizations.253 
 Although it is noteworthy that Rawls’s public reason would not exclude non-
public reasons, particularly religious reasons, from participating in all public political 
affairs in the public sphere, his arbitrary separation between public reason and nonpublic 
reasons (social, religious, familial) leads to great inconsistencies, especially in relation to 
how he perceives the role of religious reasons when it comes to justifying coercive 
laws.254 On the one hand, Rawls emphatically claims that political liberalism ‘does not 
aim to replace comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, but intends to be 
equally distinct from both and, it hopes, acceptable to both.’255 He pointedly proclaims: 
We try, so far as we can, neither to assert nor to deny any particular comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of truth and the status of values. Since we 
assume each citizen to affirm some such view, we hope to make it possible for all to accept the 
political conception as true or reasonable from the standpoint of their own comprehensive view, 
whatever it may be.256 
 
On the other hand, despite Rawls’ repeated insistence, as shown above, regarding equal 
treatment for both secular and religious comprehensive views, I assert that Rawls’ 
scheme of public reason indicates a preference for secular reasons over religious ones. 
Historically, this biased practice is known as ‘the doctrine of religious restraint’ (DRR). 
                                                 
251 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 220. 
252 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 220, fn. 256. 
253 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 220. Domestic reasons relate to authorities and orders within 
family relationships. 
254 Bailey and Gentile. In their defenses on Rawls’s behalf, Bailey and Gentile attempt to vindicate his 
barring religious and other comprehensive doctrines from the political arena. They argue that this exclusion 
‘need not render political reasonings objectionably indeterminate or narrow in scope; insofar as citizens’ 
shared conception of political authority provides a framework of considerations for reasoning’ (p. 8). 
255 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. xviii. 
256 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, p. 150. 
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257 Rawls admits that in his past, he leaned toward supporting a stringent version of the 
DRR which restrains citizens of a liberal democracy from appealing to religious reasons 
when deliberating about matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials.258 After he 
encountered repeated criticisms, however, Rawls modified his position to assert that 
although a citizen may appeal to religious reasons to justify coercive law, he/she may not 
base such an appeal solely on these reasons. 
 Although I created my original PRSR, by referencing the DRR, unlike the DRR, 
which prevents any appeal to religious reasons in support of a coercive law, the PRSR 
permits some religious reasoning259 and only restrains a citizen from supporting a 
coercive law if he/she does not believe that a plausible secular rationale for that law 
exists. The PRSR requires that a citizen reasonably believes that he/she will be prepared 
to provide reasonable secular rationale for each coercive law he/she supports in political 
discussions.260 Although the PRSR places fewer restrictions on the content of secular 
reasons which citizens can appeal to when they deliberate or support coercive laws, and 
even though Rawls reportedly reforms his position regarding the relation between 
coercive law and religious reasons, he continues to surmise that despite an agent 
appealing to religious reasons to justify coercive law, he/she cannot exclusively refer to 
religious motives. Rawls attempts to distance himself from the charge that public reason 
will exclude only religious reasons and certain ‘irrational’ sectarian doctrines to justify 
legislation in a democratic society and claims that political liberalism shows no 
preference for secular arguments over religious ones. He states, ‘these secular 
philosophical doctrines do not provide public reason. Secular concepts and reasoning of 
this kind belong to first philosophy and moral doctrine, and fall outside of the domain of 
                                                 
257 Eberle and Cuneo, ‘Religion and Political’. The DRR, a negative restraint, depicts a kind of reason that 
cannot justify a coercive law, a type of reason that citizens may not entirely rely on to support a coercive 
law. This negative constraint usually goes along with a permission. Citizens may not support coercive laws 
they believe to only have a religious rationale; however, they may support coercive laws that they believe 
have only a plausible secular rationale. Those advocating the DRR furnish reasons to support the idea that 
religious and secular reasons have this asymmetrical justificatory role (p. 3). 
258 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), (pp. li–lii; p. 247, fn. 36). Rawls calls this ‘the proviso’: reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines (and so religious reasons) may be offered ‘in public reason at any time, provided 
that in due course public reasons […] are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines are introduced to support.’  
259 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, pp. 465–66. 
260 Rawls, Political Liberalism (199)3, pp. li–lii, lecture 1, s. 2.3, pp. 13–14. 
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the political.’261 However, Rawls’s failure to address his public reason in the domain of 
political affairs through the lens of religious worldviews shows his inconsistency in his 
treatment of religious and secular reasons. After all, in the political arena, according to 
Rawls,262 secular reasons must be paramount. 
 The PRSR puts an undue burden on citizens who seek to live an existence 
integrated with religion. Chaplin notes, that if ‘ “evangelical public reasoning” can’t go 
out unchaperoned, Christian citizens will be compelled to veil it in the interests of 
consensus and acceptability. If they succumb to the obligation to offer justifying reasons 
in a secular public vernacular alongside any religious one’,263 this will undermine the 
authenticity of their religious reasoning.264 In further justifying the PRSR, Rawls warns 
of the potential danger of oppressive use of State power if religious reasoning is being 
used to justify a coercive law. ‘[C]ontinuing shared understanding on one comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use 
of State power [….] Call this “the fact of oppression” [….] We may mistakenly think 
there are exceptions for other [reasonable] comprehensive views [...]. [T]here are no 
exceptions.’265 Rawls terms this ‘the fact of oppression.’ 
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, an American Christian philosopher, 266 challenges Rawls’s 
assumptions and insists that each person, including Christians and other believers, holds 
the right to utilize religious reasons to debate and decide political issues. Again. 
Wolterstorff states that ‘there is no prospect whatsoever […] of all adherents of particular 
religions refraining from using the resources of their own religion in making political 
decisions.’267 He argues: 
I think it is appropriate in our liberal democracy for Christians, along with adherents of other 
religions, to make decisions about political issues on the basis of whatever considerations they 
find true and relevant. I also think it appropriate for them to cite those reasons in public 
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discussions and debates about those political issues. [Al]though not always, these reasons will be 
distinctly religious reasons – Christian, Jewish, whatever.268 
 Furthermore, as in Chapter 2 when I defined religious freedom, I note that a 
person’s freedom to manifest his/her religion cannot be separated from his/her 
deliberation (based on religion) regarding public political policy. This principle is 
preserved by (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); (2) Article 18(1) of 
the ICCPR269 (1966); and (3) the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 
November 1981. The concept of freedom of practice of religion, as national and 
international agreements repeatedly confirm, constitutes the most critical component for 
true religious freedom. Thomas F. Farr stresses that the concept of religious freedom 
includes the expression of religious convictions in public activities, including the right to 
peacefully ‘manifest one’s beliefs to others and the right to make religious and religiously 
based moral arguments in public policy debates.’270 In contrast with the PRSR, Rawls’s 
public reason appears to conflict with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Article 18 of the ICCPR because it restrains significant aspects of religious freedom. 
 Chaplin argues, and I concur, that for the sake of public good and ‘candour in 
representation’271 in civil society, it is absolutely legitimate for citizens who are religious 
to offer explicit religious reasons in both presenting public justifications for laws and 
voting for public policies. Nevertheless, instead of using the PRSR under Rawls’s public 
reason in the deliberative process of legislation, I agree with Chaplin that those citizens 
who are religious and who are also political office holders involved in actual political 
policy decision-making that involves coercive powers, should exercise a certain amount 
of caution and constraint.272 
 Wolterstorff and Rawls disagree regarding the value of religion in the public 
sphere; nevertheless, they appear to agree with the need for certain restrictions regarding 
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religions, particularly if those religious voices call for illegal activities, such as murder or 
violent actions. Rawls contends that the inclusion of religions in public conversations 
‘must adhere to the values of the public sphere and, indeed, implicitly do so in the very 
act of conversing.’273 Restrictions on religions that disrupt or endanger citizens in the 
liberal State must not only be established but also enforced. Clause 3 of Article 18 of the 
ICCPR specifically identifies the few occasions when a person’s freedom to manifest 
his/her religious beliefs may be limited: ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.’274 In those instances, the State must honor its obligation to the majority of its 
citizens to protect the ‘at risk’ institutions and values. 
 Although the restraint on religious freedom under the PRSR comprises a moral 
limitation rather than a legal coercive one, the bottom line still encompasses a critical 
question: How can political liberalism draw a clear, distinctive line between an 
individual’s public political participation and engagement based on the conception of 
political justice under public reason and his/her own or associations, for example, church 
or family religious and moral convictions, for nonpublic reasons? To a Catholic, either as 
a voter or a political officeholder or campaigner who believes in the teachings of both the 
Scriptures and the Pope on the issue of sanctity of life, the idea of this arbitrary 
separation (between political and deeply held religious convictions) will almost 
inevitably force an irreconcilable choice between a person’s inalienable integrated life 
identity as an individual and his or her vocational calling to serve in the public political 
sphere. 
In a sense, the proviso replicates a gag rule because it appears to openly 
discriminate in significantly stifling religious freedom of expression at a time when a 
person would present political views based on his/her religious convictions. While it 
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seriously compromises a person’s equality and freedom, this inconsistency in the proviso 
stands to accuse political liberalism of the very same ‘exclusivism’ it implements. 275 
 As I note in the introduction of this chapter, contrary to Wolterstorff’s stance, in 
which he stresses an existence that is integrated with religion, Rawls stipulates that by 
means of its demand for the PRSR, public reason under political liberalism can restrain 
comprehensive views, particularly religious worldviews, from being able to justify public 
policy. Even though official powers do not police the PRSR in any way and it does not 
need enforcement by State coercion or social stigma, nevertheless, the inconsistencies I 
note undeniably contradict Rawls’s initial commitment to both the equal treatment of all 
reasonable comprehensive ideas and religious freedom. Nonetheless, as it conflicts with 
the scope of religious freedom under international law, this constraint on religious 
reasoning prevents it from being fully or even partially manifested in political discourse. 
In the next section, I note that that even though political liberalism does not propose to 
totally silence the use of religious ideas in all public discourse, another of its primary 
mechanisms, the proviso, restricts religious voices by insisting that religious reason 
cannot serve as a public intellectual resource unless it conforms to its criteria. 
3.3.1.2 Inconsistencies in the Proviso 
Later in his life, Rawls accepted that religious believers are entitled to draw from and 
present religious reasons in political debate and that they may do this ‘at any time.’276 He 
explains that: 
I now believe and hereby revise political liberalism VI: 8, that reasonable such doctrines should 
be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a 
reasonable political conception, are presented. I refer to this as the proviso and it specifies what I 
now call the wide view of public reason.277 
 Despite the fact that Rawls has revised his account to leave space for religious 
reasoning for public discourse, nevertheless the proviso is still fundamentally debilitating 
for religious believers.278 Rawls’s proviso requires that ‘if citizens bring religious reasons 
into public debate, they must also find arguments which every other citizen will consider 
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reasonable – “public reasons.” ’279 When the content of the debate falls into the category 
of political justice, the secular reason driven by the proviso, under Rawls’s public reason, 
clearly enjoys preference over the religious reason. Furthermore, despite of Rawls’ 
reluctance to agree with Audi, who specifically favors secular reason over religious one, 
in explaining Audio’s definition of secular reason, Rawls found his proviso aligns with 
what Audi’s view as it: 
is roughly one whose normative force does not evidentially depend on the existence of God or on 
theological considerations, or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious 
authority.280 
[Rawls explains] This definition is ambiguous between secular reasons in the sense of a 
nonreligious comprehensive doctrine and in the sense of a purely political conception within the 
content of public reason. Depending on which is meant, Audi’s view that secular reasons must 
also be given along with religious reasons might have a role similar to what I call the proviso.281 
 Rawls asserts that the filter of the proviso depicts the only means by which 
reciprocal respect for citizens’ equal rights may be achieved.282 In due course, he insists, 
citizens will present reasons others can be expected to accept. Here, two questions arise 
that point out an additional inconsistency and problem: (1) Under Rawls’s mechanism of 
public reason, will the proviso satisfy the public justification of political affairs as both 
necessary and sufficient? (2) If the proviso fails to satisfy the public justification of 
political affairs as both necessary and sufficient, confirming this as an inconsistency and 
this inconsistency proves true, how does this then impact religious freedom? 
 In addressing how the proviso needs to be satisfied by citizens with 
comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, Rawls states, ‘When these 
doctrines accept the proviso and only then come into political debate, the commitment to 
constitutional democracy is publicly manifested.’283 This statement reveals that prior to 
any political debate, citizens adhering to comprehensive doctrines must first accept the 
proviso before they manifest their commitment to constitutional democracy in public. In 
other words, when a citizen engages with any issue of constitutional essentials and 
matters of justice, the proviso process will be satisfied as both necessary and sufficient. 
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However, in accepting three other forms of reasoning outside of public reason, namely 
declaration, conjecture, and witnessing,284 Rawls seems to suggest that the proviso may 
not be sufficient or absolutely required if arguments based on religion subscribe to the 
support of basic constitutional values. 
 According to Weithman, Rawls permits citizens to draw from their 
comprehensive doctrines without citing public reasons to support their positions if this 
does not cause others to question that they respect the authority of the public conception 
of justice. If no doubts arise, then the proviso will not be incited, and no public reason 
will be required; however, Weithman notes Rawls in stating: ‘the details about how to 
satisfy [the] proviso must be worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a 
clear family of rules given in advance.’285 He stresses that Rawls’s statement regarding 
the proviso presents challenges in interpretation: ‘provided that in due course public 
reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support 
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support.’286 Weithman notes 
Rawls’s reference to the ‘“provided that” clause as “the proviso” [and explains] “the 
difficulty with interpreting it lies in figuring out what he means by “in due course.” ’287 
Weithman also asserts that if Rawls had substituted the phrase ‘at the same time’ with ‘in 
due course’ in the proviso, it would require citizens to adopt and deliberate with public 
reason without exception. Instead, according to Weithman’s interpretation, citizens must 
do so only when they have good reason to believe the need for assurance exists.288 If the 
proviso fails to satisfy the public justification of political affairs as both necessary and 
sufficient, confirming this as an inconsistency, and this inconsistency proves true, how 
does this impact religious freedom? 
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 Weithman emphasises, and I agree, that Rawls does not totally prohibit arguments 
based on religion from public or political discussion. Citizens can draw from their 
religion as an intellectual resource in political argument. Yet, in the name of ‘civic 
friendship and citizens’ mutual reassurance,’289 the proviso still requires religious citizens 
to provide additional public justification to ultimately support their public policy. Rawls 
states that: 
[C]itizens of faith who cite the Gospel parable of the Good Samaritan do not stop there, but go on 
to give a public justification for this parable’s conclusions in terms of political values.290 
     Thus, instead of being eliminated or morally prohibited, the use of religiously-based reasons, 
nonetheless, is constrained.291 
  Weithman points that due to Rawls’ primary assertions constraining political 
arguments based on religion, his conditional stipulations on using religious or conviction-
based arguments in public debate deserve some praise. Nevertheless, political 
liberalism’s insistence that a citizen who draws from his/her religion to offer support for a 
specific position regarding a particular issue must comply with the proviso proves 
particularly problematic for religions, particularly for ensuring religious freedom.292 
According to Rawls: 
What’s important is that people give the kinds of reasons that can be understood and appraised 
apart from their particular comprehensive doctrines: for example, that they argue against 
physician-assisted suicide not just by speculating about God’s wrath or the afterlife, but by talking 
about what they see as assisted suicide’s potential injustices.293  
In explaining the proviso, Rawls notes the role a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine may hold in public reason, something I examine further later in this chapter: 
the content of public reason is given by the principles and values of the family of liberal political 
conceptions of justice […] To engage in public reason is to appeal to one of these political 
conceptions – to their ideals and principles, standards and values – when debating fundamental 
political questions. This […] still allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our  
comprehensive doctrine – [religious or nonreligious], provided that, in due course, we give 
properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said 
to support.294 
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 Rawls public reason’s stance on the filter of political liberalism’s proviso 
regarding religion reveals yet another inconsistency in his reasoning regarding freedom 
of religion. As it contradicts the scope of international definitions of religious freedom 
which I noted earlier, the proviso’s stipulations clearly conflict with this basic liberty and, 
simultaneously, place an undue, extra burden on religious expression in the public square. 
In general, from the perspective of religious freedom, although both the proviso and 
public reason portray more moral constraints than legal ones initiated more from societal 
persuasion than governmental coercive power, they still place an unreasonable qualifying 
burden on religions.295 Thus, I argue that in deliberating procedures and even in voting 
processes, unclear details regarding the proviso and other political liberalism restrictions 
regarding religious voices in the political realm, which I previously noted, demonstrate 
that no proviso should be imposed for any citizen. Nevertheless, I agree, as Chaplin 
deliberates,296 that certain cautious restraints may be warranted during times of legislative 
decision-making and the execution of coercive laws by actual office holders, religious or 
nonreligious alike. Later, I point out that, to a certain extent, principled pluralism agrees 
with political liberalism on this point. 
 As I note earlier in this thesis, Rawls’s motives in developing political liberalism, 
with the aim of avoiding religious wars, reflect concerns for securing a safe, orderly 
society.  I maintain, however, that on the merits of self-respect, as I relate in the next 
section, Rawlsian public reason and the proviso both fall short in protecting religious 
freedom for all. In the next section, I address inconsistencies from the perspective of self-
respect (according to the concept of public reason under political liberalism) that infringe 
on religious freedom and demonstrate disrespect for citizens who, according to Rawls, 
are to be considered ‘free and equal persons.’297 
3.3.1.3 Inconsistencies in Self-Respect 
Rawls asserts that, despite diverse religious and philosophical commitments, political 
liberalism can serve as an ideal mechanism for reaching agreements on fundamental 
political matters among free and equal citizens. As I explained in the previous section, he 
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also points out that when citizens in a well-ordered and pluralist society engage in public 
debate, they ‘must respect a duty of civility and offer reasons to one another in terms that 
all can reasonably be expected to endorse.’298 Referring to the word ‘respect’ in another 
sense, Rawls explains that public reason, first, ‘identifies the fundamental role of political 
values in expressing the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect 
between citizens regarded as free and equal.’299 In yet another instance, Rawls refers to a 
citizen’s self-respect thus: 
Self-respect is rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society capable of 
pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good over a complete life. Thus self-respect presupposes 
the development and exercise of both moral powers and therefore an effective sense of justice. The 
importance of self-respect is that it provides a secure sense of our own value, a firm conviction 
that our determinate conception of the good is worth carrying out. Without self-respect nothing 
may seem worth doing, and if some things have value for us, we lack the will to pursue them.300 
 Wolterstorff argues that Rawls’s methodology for political liberalism implies that 
appealing to public reason does not nurture self-respect or foster mutual respect between 
citizens but correlates with treating others with subtle yet serious disrespect.301 When 
Rawls establishes his form of public reason, for example, he claims to incorporate the 
idea that liberal democracy constitutes a system of fair cooperation over time. He fails to 
adequately identify such a system, however. According to Rawls’s explanation, this 
requires setting those who are ‘unreasonable’ aside. Those who are unreasonable, he 
asserts, are those ‘unwilling to honor, or even to propose […] fair terms of 
cooperation.’302 This infers that when citizens engage in political discourse regarding an 
issue of basic justice, ‘reasonable’ citizens can set reportedly ‘unreasonable’ individuals 
off to the side and dismiss the views of their reportedly ‘unreasonable’ compatriots.  To 
Wolterstorff, this promotes a particular concern: Instead of encouraging a system where 
all citizens are respected as free and equal, Rawls’s political liberalism presents the 
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paradoxical implication that following ‘the duty of civility’303 inevitably perpetrates 
injustice – and disrespect. 
Chaplin states that respect warrants citizens listening to each another on an equal 
basis, despite their different worldviews. ‘If we respect our fellow-citizens, we won’t 
ignore them, dismiss them as of no account, misrepresent them, slander them, or incite 
hatred against them (and there are laws against the latter two kinds of disrespect).’304 
Chaplin argues, and I concur, that when one citizen disrespects another’s reasons, he/she 
does not disrespect him/her. Instead of dismissing or ruling another person’s reasons ‘out 
of order’ prior to hearing them, a person demonstrates greater respect to their fellow 
citizens when he/she critically engages with their preferred political reasons in public 
forums. Likewise, one citizen shows another more respect when he/she offers them 
his/her genuine reasons for a policy than he/she would by presenting reasons he/she 
cannot completely identify with. In both scenarios, citizens validate each other. This 
depicts genuine civic reciprocity among free and equal citizens.305 
 Similarly, Wolterstorff asserts that using pressure or coercion to force someone to 
do something or to make them refrain from doing something is wrong unless: 
1. The agent respects the subject as free and equal. 
2. [T]he agent respects the subject as free and equal only if he has a good and 
irrefutable reason for believing that the subject is openly justified in agreeing 
with him so much so that pressuring him is likely to prove to be a good thing 
overall. 
3. [T]he agent, in applying the pressure, treats the person subjected to the
 pressure with due respect. 306 
Chaplin asserts that Rawls’s argument for the proviso subtly suggests a simple, 
almost sinister message. He interprets Rawls to infer, ‘to respect me as an equal, you 
have to speak in my language; if you lobby for policies based on reasons I can’t possibly 
agree with, you sweep my views aside and thereby diminish and disrespect me.’ 307 The 
underlying, disrespectful, assuming message appears to be, according to Chaplin, that 
‘“my” language is also “our” common language.’308 Chaplin unveils the inconsistency 
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and exclusive nature of Rawls’s argument in relation to reasons and respect as the 
following: 
1. A liberal democracy is based on the principle of political equality. 
2. Political equality means that citizens should adopt a duty of respect toward one 
another in political debate. 
3. The duty of respect requires that citizens only offer reasons for the public policies 
they advocate that everyone equally can find intelligible and acceptable in principle. 
4. Religious reasons can only be found intelligible and acceptable by some citizens, 
and indeed are repudiated by many. 
5. Therefore, religious reasons should not be employed to justify public policies. 
6. To employ religious reasons to justify a policy – to seek ‘justification by faith 
alone’ – is disrespectful and inadmissible.309 
 Catherine Audard contends that Rawls’s proviso discounts the value of the 
distinctiveness of citizens and, in turn, negates the respect and equality he professes for 
them.310 A person is not considered free and equal if an agent ignores his/her views 
because they draw on his/her religion. ‘Equal voice wins hands down over public reason 
in respecting one’s fellows as free and equal.’311 Wolterstorff suggests calling ‘the 
principle that citizens should respect each other as free and equal, the respect principle’, 
and labeling the maxim that citizens should ‘satisfy one or another version of the subject-
doxa condition when functioning as political actors, the public reason imperative.’ He 
then poses the dilemma of how a citizen can shift from the respect principle to the public 
reason imperative. Rawls’s notion of a public reason imperative, that to fulfill the respect 
principle, a citizen must satisfy one or an alternative version of the public reason, raises 
significant questions. The connection between public reason and mandated respect is not 
self-evident. According to Wolterstorff, in the matter of the political arena, Rawls’s 
political liberalism proves insufficient in self-respect because it does not encourage 
everyone to listen with an open mind to whatever reasons citizens offer for or against 
some political concern. Contrary to the disrespect perpetrated by political liberalism’s 
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restrictive filters, which exclude certain worldviews, each person’s voice deserves equal 
weight and inclusion in matters that affect him/her.312 
 As I point out in this section, despite its honorable aim, Rawls’s principle of 
respect according to his imperative public reason, will either fail to be implemented 
consistently or even worse, by contradicting his stated goal, it will stimulate disrespect. 
Respect serves as the key when convincing someone to do something or to refrain from 
doing it. It is impermissible, Wolterstorff insists, for the pressuring agent to fail to 
employ respect. ‘Not only must the agent treat the subject with due respect; he must also 
not treat anyone at all with less than due respect.’313 Respecting a person involves giving 
proper value to his/her wellbeing; however, respecting someone also includes 
acknowledging that each person has worth, that one person’s worth varies from that of 
another person, nor does it depend on the worth of another individual.314  Ignoring a 
citizen’s voice and removing him/her from the legitimation pool, as public reason under 
political liberalism does, disrespects him/her. If citizens are deemed incompatible with 
public reason, according to Rawls, they are subject to containment. As I show in the next 
two sections, the ensuing containment will inevitably either lead to insufficiently 
protecting or further eroding religious freedom. 
 
3.3.2 Insufficiencies under Containment  
In the previous section, I examined three primary inconsistencies relating to the concept 
of public reason under political liberalism. From the standpoints of the PRSR, the 
proviso, and self-respect, I pointed out that in a reasonable pluralistic society these 
inconsistencies will either conflict with Rawls’s stated goals or fail to protect religious 
freedom for all. In this section, I explore the justification for Rawls’s containment of 
those citizens or groups whom he deems as ‘incompatible with the essentials of public 
reason and a democratic polity.’315 I also examine the various approaches with regard to 
how to contain them. 
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3.3.2.1 Containment through the Filter of Public Reason 
Rawls’s political liberalism is designed to engage only with what he calls reasonable 
persons who affirm only reasonable comprehensive doctrines. According to Rawls, three 
primary features define a reasonable comprehensive doctrine: (1) it involves ‘an exercise 
of theoretical reason’; (2) it involves ‘an exercise of practical reason’; (3) it ‘normally 
belongs to, or draws upon tradition of thought and doctrine.’316 Based on the principle of 
justice as fairness, under a reasonable pluralistic society, only those reasonable persons 
holding reasonable comprehensive doctrines are able to reach an overlapping consensus. 
According to Rawls, the principle of justice as fairness entails two kinds of political 
values: political justice and public reason.317 
Public reason, a basic structure at the heart of Rawls’s conception of legitimate 
democratic government, reflects the rationale of reasonable citizens with regard to 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. This includes society’s basic 
structure as well as societal public policies.318 Rawls ‘develops the ideal of public reason 
to explain how, despite being divided over various moral, religious and philosophical 
comprehensive doctrines, liberal democratic citizens may nevertheless sustain themselves 
as a politically autonomous body politic capable of legitimately using coercion to enforce 
its legal order.’319 In other words, public reason can only be upheld by reasonable citizens 
who can support a constitutional regime that guarantees a stable democratic society. 
Reasonable citizens, according to Rawls, are those individuals who, when given 
assurance that others will likely do the same, are ready to propose principles and 
standards as fair terms of cooperation as well as being willing to abide by them. Those 
reasonable persons are prepared to discuss norms they perceive as reasonable for 
everyone to accept as well as ready to discuss the fair terms others propose. These norms, 
which Rawls summarizes as constitutional essentials and matters of justice, include: 
1. a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (such as those familiar 
from constitutional regimes); 
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2. assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
especially with respect to the claims of the general good and perfectionist 
values; and  
3. measures ensuring adequate all-purpose means for all citizens to make 
effective use of their freedoms.320 
 Reasonableness according to the capacity of public reason involves citizens 
desiring to control their lives in common, utilizing concepts each citizen can accept. 
Rawls stresses ‘that public reason provides the norms which citizens, judges, and public 
officials should follow when making claims about matters of justice.’321 Using the test of 
public reason, citizens can present political justifications to one another to solicit and 
provide support for laws and policies that affect them. 
 Rawls argues that, ‘reasonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political 
power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, 
though different from their own.’322 Following this reasoning, the question arises: What 
characteristics do unreasonable persons holding unreasonable comprehensive doctrines 
display? Rawls seems to suggest that three distinct characteristics define unreasonable 
persons: (1) those who hold unreasonable comprehensive doctrines; (2) those who refuse 
to operate under public reason; and (3) those who, when they hold political power, would 
use that power to suppress views that differ from their own.323 Thus, the unreasonable 
person or groups of people will most likely be found violating other citizens’ freedom of 
religion or belief. Rawls states: 
[P]eople are unreasonable in the same basic aspect when they plan to engage in cooperative 
schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even to propose, except as a necessary public pretense, any 
general principles or standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation. They are ready to violate 
such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow.324 
 In contrast, I note Rawls’s reasoning regarding reasonable persons in what he 
asserts here: 
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[R]easonable persons see that the burdens of judgment set limits on what can be reasonably 
justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. 
It is unreasonable for us to use political power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to 
repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable.325 
Consequently, Rawls prescribes containment to deal with those who hold 
unreasonable, illiberal comprehensive views that are incompatible with public reason. 
Although only a few paragraphs exist in which Rawls discusses the containment of 
potentially harmful, unreasonable political views using the specific term ‘contain,’ the 
following explicitly reveals his rationale on both his scope and purpose of containment. 
Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive 
doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and 
justice of society. 
And: 
That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a permanent fact of 
life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them – like war and disease – so 
that they do not overturn political justice.326 
 
In addition, Rawls explains: 
Of course, every society also contains numerous unreasonable doctrines. Yet in this essay I am 
concerned with an ideal normative conception of democratic government, that is, with the conduct 
of its reasonable citizens and the principles they follow, assuming them to be dominant and 
controlling. How far unreasonable doctrines are active and tolerated is to be determined by the 
principles of justice and the kinds of actions they permit.327 
 
From Rawls’s words, I conclude that the scope of containment covers both public and 
private spheres,328 while the purpose of containment includes maintaining the unity and 
political justice in a democratic society. 
Although Rawls does not present a scheme for implementing containment for 
‘unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines,’ and does not 
define or specify what he means by the term ‘contain,’ he notes several times that 
containing unreasonable views is necessary to ensure the stability of a liberal society. In 
the next subsection, I examine several approaches that political liberalism implements, 
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mechanisms not only to contain those unreasonable doctrines but also those who hold 
such doctrines, barring their ideas from entering public discourse. 
 
3.3.2.2 Containment by Declaration of Being Unreasonable or Irrational 
Rawls appears hesitant to restrict political speech for the sake of preserving democratic 
institutions and other basic freedoms,329 yet as I pointed out in the previous subsection, he 
still prescribes containment for certain individuals or groups who are deemed to threaten 
his political justice. Rawls notes several times that containing unreasonable views is 
necessary to ensure the stability of a liberal society, yet he fails to specifically explain 
how the method he envisages would be implemented to achieve this goal. In addition to 
Rawls neglecting to relate his definition for the word ‘contain’ or offer guidelines to 
distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable – two critical terms in political 
liberalism – he also fails to propose explicit ways for advocates of political liberalism to 
engage with ‘unreasonable’ people. Joonas Pennanen identifies three basic approaches 
which he derives from Rawls, regarding containment available through the framework of 
political liberalism:   
1. The nonengagement approach. In this approach, ‘voicing of illiberal ideas (or 
actions taken on such bases) is dismissed without arguing against those 
ideas.’330 From Rawls, one may presume that because he perceives some 
conceptions of society as irrational and unreasonable, one need not invest time 
or energy in arguing against them.   
2. The clear and imminent danger approach. This approach permits the 
suppression of illiberal doctrines and ideas that extend a clear and impending 
danger to security and/or stability. 
3. The preventive approach. This approach permits specific measures to be 
utilized and allows the State to implement certain measures to protect the 
liberal character of society even before a dire need arises.331 
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Regarding non-engagement, the first approach for containment that Pennanen 
identifies, the primary point stipulates that apart from the justifications which political 
liberalism asserts, no other or further justification ought to be presented in political 
discourse. Any ideas presented that do not align with the terms of political values that all 
reasonable citizens can accept in principle, such as those Rawls considers illiberal, are to 
be ignored or dismissed without any consideration or argument to counter them.332 
Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity will of course reject the 
very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be that of friend or foe, to those of a 
particular religious or secular community or those who are not; or it may be a relentless struggle to 
win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. 
The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public reason that 
belongs with democratic citizenship.333 
 
Rawls asserts that in public reason, ideas of truth or right based on comprehensive 
doctrines are replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as 
citizens.334 He insists that this step is essential for political liberalism to establish a 
political reasoning base that all citizens can share as free and equal. Dreben maintains 
that Rawls’s intent for this first containment approach relates to his perceptions of 
irrational and unreasonable doctrines in society and, 335 therefore, no need exists to invest 
time or energy in considering them. 
Pennanen explains that the second available approach for containment, that of the 
clear and imminent danger, correlates with what Rawls’s political liberalism would 
confirm when involved in the process of State coercion and containing illiberal ideas. 
This approach implies that liberal states may suppress illiberal doctrines and ideas from 
spreading only when they indicate the potential for ‘a clear and imminent danger to 
security and/or stability.’ 336 Rawls does not offer much information regarding his 
thoughts on the containment method; nevertheless, Pennanen argues that Rawls’s 
position parallels the clear and imminent danger approach. He explains that 
complications of insubordinate advocacy do not surface in a well-ordered society under 
ideal circumstances, and that Rawls perceives the right to free speech as being violated 
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only during extreme circumstances of constitutional emergency.337 These include 
imminent danger of political justice being overturned, and as Rawls states: 
 ‘the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid to proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.’ Observe that 
the proscribed kind of speech must be both intentional and directed to producing imminent lawless 
action as well as delivered in circumstances which make this result likely.338 
 The preventive approach, according to Pennanen, allows the most latitude 
regarding coercive actions of the State. This approach permits the State to take specific 
measures to protect the liberal character of society prior to any actual evidence of an 
urgent need for counter action. Pennanen argues that the reasoning behind this approach 
includes weeding out the plainly undesirable tendencies prior to them manifesting into a 
massive and potentially unresolvable dilemma.339 Rawls reasons regarding this measure:     
Thus as a matter of constitutional doctrine the priority of liberty implies that free political speech 
cannot be restricted unless it can be reasonably argued from the specific nature of the present 
situation that there exists a constitutional crisis in which democratic institutions cannot work 
effectively and their procedures for dealing with emergencies cannot operate.340 
Rawls’s statement implies that the State may only justify introducing restrictive 
measures regarding freedom of political speech when two conditions are met: (1) a liberal 
democratic institution becomes dysfunctional; and (2) the constitutional procedure to 
rectify the dilemma fails. A justification for preventive containment, according to 
Jonathan Quong, may be found in ‘the fundamental importance of normative stability in a 
well-ordered liberal society.’341 This basically means that when the liberal regime is 
threatened, the State can ‘permissibly restrict the actions of unreasonable citizens [as] it 
has a compelling moral reason to do so.’342 Quong further develops Rawls’s notion of 
containment in this regard. He lists three extremely compelling public reasons according 
to which certain basic rights of those considered unreasonable, who pose a real threat to 
the liberal democratic order, may be restricted.343 
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1. Politically active but unreasonable citizens ‘clearly pose more of stability 
threat, and so I think it is reasonable to suppose that the liberal state might need to 
apply a policy of containment more frequently to such groups.’344 
2. Restriction of basic rights may also accompany a threat to the realization of the 
capacity of justice,345 in which the inculcation of illiberal ideas impedes the 
formation of a moral and political identity in tune with the political conception of 
justice. 
3. In addition, containment may be necessary where citizens have been 
promulgated/inculcated to pursue unreasonable objectives. Although 
‘unreasonable persons have all the normal rights and liberties of citizenship, it 
turns out these rights do not protect them in the pursuit of unreasonable 
objectives’346 rendering the rights claims of unreasonable citizens invalid. 
Despite Rawls’s claims to welcome every comprehensive idea into the political 
justification arena through public reason, he may not fully subscribe to all three 
containment approaches which Quong expands. Nevertheless, Rawls’s ideas regarding 
containment may serve to silence religious voices in political discourse or exclude them. 
No matter whether containment measures consist of passive nonengagement means or 
active restrictions and preventions, those holding unreasonable doctrines will certainly 
insufficiently guarantee religious freedom for all citizens, whether reasonable or 
unreasonable. Moreover, Rawls’s weak definition of unreasonable doctrines makes some 
major religions, such as evangelical Christianity, susceptible to containment such that 
they might very well accept the ethical content of political liberalism.347 Furthermore, as 
Cass Sunstein argues, the danger of excluding dissenting voices from the discussion and 
decision-making may bring about group polarization through enclave deliberation348 – 
that is, people with quite moderate initial beliefs end up assuming more extreme positions 
when deliberating only with like-minded persons. 
Overall, Rawls’s notion of containment of unreasonable views will prove to be 
counter-productive because it might intensify threats to the liberal democratic order and 
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destabilize it, an outcome that political liberalism aims to avoid. As the risk of ‘excluding 
the unreasonable outside the society in a way that they would be no longer disposed in 
any way to see the benefits of political liberal society,’ 349 the containment approach 
would delegitimize political liberalism’s claim of inclusion. Consequently, this renders 
the liberal project of inclusion virtually impossible, a point I further illustrate in Section  
3.3.4.  
Although Bailey and Gentile assert that Rawls’s guidelines regarding public 
reason do not show he is suspicious of all comprehensive doctrines, particularly religious 
ones, or that he perceives religious political arguments as inherently destabilizing, I assert 
that Rawls’s containment of certain religious groups deemed unreasonable could also 
consequently infringe upon the group’s as well as the individual’s religious freedom –
namely, the freedom of religious manifestation in public. Justice Kennedy clearly stresses 
that religious freedom implies more than the freedom of religious belief. More 
importantly, the term also means ‘to express religious beliefs and to establish one’s 
religious (or no religious) self-definition in the political (emphasis mine), civil, and 
economic life of our larger community.’350 Contrary to Rawls’s approach of containment, 
like Wolterstorff, 351 I stress that the voices of all groups or individuals or individuals 
from all groups, religious or nonreligious, who adhere to a comprehensive doctrine, 
should be allowed to freely address issues of public concern. 
  Ronald Beiner surmises that under political liberalism, religious freedom is not as 
fully protected as Rawls proposes. ‘Rawls writes that “equal liberty of conscience […] 
takes religious truths off the political agenda.”’ 352 According to Beiner, one could 
construe the success of the seventeenth-century fight for liberty of conscience a major 
historical accomplishment. 
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 Prior to conducting a pointed critique of political liberalism in the light of 
religious freedom to clarify several misunderstandings and criticisms that Tom Bailey 
and Valentina Gentile also challenge, I address several of their concerns. These include 
Rawls being criticized for his handling of the feasibility of religious beliefs and accused 
of being exclusivist, perhaps suggesting that religion or religion-based reasoning have no 
role in any public discourse.353 
 
I agree with Bailey and Gentile that most of such criticisms  that they note are not 
fully justified. As they state in Rawls and Religion, Rawls’s ‘ “exclusion” of 
religions is extremely limited and qualified, such that he provides for an extensive 
accommodation of religions in political life, and the notions of “respect” and 
“consensus” on which his “exclusion” is based are much more subtle, open, and 
flexible than his critics suppose.’354  
In my finding that Rawls’s restrictions on citizens’ reasoning could not 
fully alienate religion from public discourse, I note that Bailey and Gentile outline 
and rebut six considerations that critics regularly present to discredit Rawls. 
Bailey and Gentile are right that Rawls limits his restriction on the use of religion-
based, public discourse to political constitutional matters, not primarily 
implemented through the State’s direct coercive power. Nevertheless, I perceive 
that overall, as a narrow political philosophy, Rawls’s political liberalism lacks 
the coherence, sufficiency, and inclusiveness necessary to protect religious 
freedom for all.355 Rawls asserts that his principles of justice are of more 
substantial value than purely procedural ones.356 Shane O'Neill explains that 
procedural liberalism, as a procedural framework of justice, responds to the fact 
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that individuals in Western democratic societies do not share comprehensive 
conceptions of the good. According to Selma K. Sonntag: 
Procedural liberalism as a school of political thought does not prescribe culture or community for 
the individual—it merely prescribes institutions that facilitate the autonomy of the individual to 
determine for herself ‘the good life’ and the acquisition of the necessary tools to achieve it. On the 
global level, this translates into an advocacy for universal human rights to be upheld by 
democratic institutions.357  
 I concur with Chaplin as he argues that Rawls’s political liberalism belongs to the 
family of procedural liberalism.358 Gerhard Wegner also appears to equate procedural 
liberalism to political liberalism as he asserts that ‘political (procedural) liberalism’359 
represents liberalism. Sebastiano Maffettone alludes to the same equation with 
‘procedural liberalism à la Rawls.’360  
Chaplin argues against Rawls’s negative stance regarding religion and proposes 
that as societies change and become more morally and religiously plural, instead of, as 
Rawls purports, an increasing consensus occurring in the political realm with regard to 
justifying reasons, a growing dissensus will occur.361 Instead of expecting a unanimously 
accepted set of secular political principles, Wolterstorff argues, ‘we must learn to live 
with a politics of multiple communities.’362 Whether motivated by religious or secular 
concerns, he stresses, citizens ‘need to reckon with, and indeed encourage, the practice of 
what might be termed “confessional candour” in political debate.’363 In a political culture 
defined by religious and secular world views, which often clash, rather than discouraging 
the verbalization of the deep convictions that lead individuals to take their stands on 
conflicting policies and stifling democratic debate, encouraging instead the confident 
declaration of competing justifying reasons, religious and secular, confessional candour 
opens the opportunity for critical, innovative, and perhaps even radical interventions that 
can challenge the tendency for liberal democracy to become complacent, conformist, or 
oppressed. 
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Chaplin explains that the objective of confessional candor, which he notes cannot 
be merely expressive, as the point of political debate does not entail a person indulging 
him/herself and publicly displaying his/her deepest convictions. Public debate should 
increase the level as well as expand the quality of political discourse. Although some 
perceive confessional candor to be disruptive, the willingness to face an adversarial 
stance within democratic debate contributes to mutual respect much better than adhering 
to political liberalism’s constraints.364 According to Chaplin, ‘the “normal” stance in 
most contexts of political debate will be to exercise confessional self-restraint.’365 
Decisions regarding if and when a speaker should exercise confessional restraint should 
not be dictated by a theory but determined by the one speaking, with some minimal 
agreement, nevertheless, on the principles which justify the representative democracy’s 
structures. Chaplin asserts: 
[W]hatever policy consensus will emerge from such structures may sometimes only follow a 
protracted, vigorous, potentially turbulent, even temporarily destabilising, exchange of justifying 
reasons. In the absence of a universal common ground of shared political reasons, and in the 
presence of an ever-deeper diversity of public faiths, this seems inescapable.366 
Rawls’s aim to avoid religious wars, as noted earlier in this chapter, as well as his 
quest to contain unreasonable doctrines, which he asserts threaten democratic institutions, 
reflect reasonable concerns. Contrary to Rawls’s reasoning and concerns for securing a 
well-ordered society, his public reason falls short in protecting religious freedom for all. 
What of political liberalism’s containment ploys to silence the voices of those with 
reasons considered incompatible with the public reason filter?367 I maintain that Rawlsian 
public reason falls short in protecting religious freedom for all in the following two major 
points: (1) the inequality (mentioned above) that contradicts political liberalism’s 
commitment to equality; and (2) the numerous ways in which Rawls’s ‘containment’ 
policy against those whose doctrines are deemed incompatible with the public reason 
filter in the name of arbitrarily set ‘reciprocity’ which Pennanen reveals. The doctrine of 
containment which Rawls proposed shows the exclusiveness and intolerance of the 
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‘intolerant’ in the political liberalism system. Thus, I conclude that political liberalism 
clearly constrains religious freedom for all. 
 Additional research on political liberalism and examination of Rawls’s ideas in 
relation to parents, their children, and education further raises questions regarding 
inconsistencies that infringe on religious freedom. Rawls’s reported respect for the family 
appears conditional, and as in the case of educational choice, violates the capacity for 
justice – contingent on fulfilling the capacity for justice. If education, even family 
education, does not fulfill the capacity for justice which political liberalism proposes, this 
implies the State can take on the role to ‘reform’ the family. 
3.3.3 Implied Potential Infringement of Parents’ Choice of Religious Education 
Rawls recognizes that the family constitutes a vital part of society’s basic structure, with 
its primary role serving as the foundation for the orderly creation and reproduction of 
society, securing the transfer of its culture to the next generation. He asserts that ‘citizens 
must have a sense of justice and of the political virtues that support political and social 
institutions [and that the] family must ensure the nurturing and development of such 
citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring society.’368As the family raises 
and cares for its children, Rawls states, it must also ensure their children’s moral 
development and education to help ensure they can later function in the wider culture. 
As we shall see, additional examination of Rawls’s concepts of political justice 
relating to parental choice regarding their children’s education, raises questions regarding 
the implied potential infringement of parents’ religious freedom. In the following two 
subsections, I explore Rawls’s rationale regarding State intervention in educational 
choices and how such interventions potentially violate parental religious freedom. 
3.3.3.1 Implied Potential Infringement via Children’s Religious Freedom 
Natasha Levinson asserts that Rawls does not impart much information on education, a 
dearth she perceives strange, because reasonable pluralism encompasses educational as 
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well as political achievement.369 Nevertheless, Rawls defines two moral powers critical to 
the education of children that he perceives as identifying individuals as ‘free and equal 
free persons.’370 
1. A sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public 
conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation. Given the 
nature of the political conception as specifying a public basis of justification, a sense of 
justice also expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to others on terms 
that they also can publicly endorse. 
2. The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good.371 
 Levinson recognizes that for Rawls, education’s goal must not focus on training 
children to become philosophically liberal. Nevertheless, under the parameters of 
political liberalism, it is essential that children learn about their rights as individuals 
under a democratic constitutional regime.372 When Rawls addresses one aspect of 
education connected with developing citizen virtues, he explains what education ‘entirely 
within the political conception’ means:373 
Observe here that we try to answer the question of children’s education entirely within the 
political conception. Society’s concern with their education lies in their role as future citizens, and 
so in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to 
participate in its institutions, in their being economically independent and self-supporting 
members of society over a complete life, and in their developing the political virtues, all this from 
within a political point of view.374 
 Regarding the State’s role in relation to the family, Rawls explains that political 
principles enforce vital constraints on the family as an institution, along with providing 
opportunities for each of its members, to guarantee its/their fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Political principles, however, do not directly apply to the internal life of a 
family.375 Rawls points out the differences between the perception of an individual as a 
citizen and his/her viewpoint as a family member and as a member of other associations 
in the following: 
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As citizens we have reasons to impose the constraints specified by the political principles of 
justice on associations, while as members of associations we have reasons for limiting those 
constraints so that they leave room for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to the 
association in question. Here again we see the need for the division of labor between different 
kinds of principles. We wouldn’t want political principles of justice – including principles of 
distributive justice – to apply directly to the internal life of the family. 376 
 Rawls stresses that the principles of distributive justice do not inform parents how 
to raise their children, and that they are not required to relate to their children according 
to political principles because these do not fit the familial realm.377 Rawls ascertains that 
parents will, within certain limits, adhere to some ‘concept of justice (or fairness) and due 
respect regarding their children.’ He stipulates, ‘Citizens must have a sense of justice and 
of the political virtues that support political and social institutions.’378 To facilitate this, 
the family must ensure their children’s moral development, as well as their education, so 
they will develop into citizens who not only possess a sense of justice but are also 
conversant with political virtues which sustain political and social institutions. These 
political virtues consist of two kinds of powers: (1) ‘their two moral powers (a capacity 
for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good)’; and (2) ‘the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers).’379 Rawls surmises that 
these ‘requisite minimum’ qualifications categorize fully cooperating members of society 
as free and equal citizens.        
            Rawls and political liberalism embrace certain values, including religious 
freedom, the equality of children as future citizens, and the value of the family in orderly 
procreation.380 In the following paragraphs, however, I challenge these claims as I 
critique the inconsistencies of and even contradictions inherent in them as they contribute 
to the potential infringement of parents’ religious freedom.  
Although Rawls specifies that the political virtues of political liberalism cannot be 
imposed on associational values or meshed with familial ones in a civil society, children 
are required to learn the political virtues to empower them to be ‘fully cooperating 
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members of society.’ 381 Rawls asserts that these qualities not only reflect the virtues of 
‘civility and tolerance,’ they mirror ‘reasonableness and the sense of fairness.’382 In turn, 
political liberalism stipulates that children’s education should include knowledge of their 
constitutional and civic rights to ensure they realize the existence of liberty of conscience 
in their society. It also specifies that parents should nurture their children to develop the 
capacity for a sense of justice so that, as adults, they become fully cooperating members 
of society. According to Rawls, parental choice for their children’s education should 
encourage political virtues so that as adult citizens they want to honor the fair terms of 
social cooperation with the principle of reciprocity.383 
Even though Rawls appears intent on protecting the autonomy of the family and 
categorizes it under the term of nonpublic domestic reason384 with internal nonpublic 
reason constraints, he asserts that, at times, the State has grounds for interventions. As I 
noted earlier, when education, including family education, fails to fulfill the capacity for 
justice that political liberalism requires, this implies the State can assume the role of 
‘reforming’ the family. Alluding to this potential, Rawls explains: 
Just as the principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as 
society’s future citizens have basic rights as such […] injustices bear harshly not only on women 
but also on their children; and they tend to undermine children’s capacity to acquire the political 
virtues required of future citizens in a viable democratic society. […] When the family [as in 
Mill’s day] inculcates habits of thought and ways of feeling and conduct incompatible with 
democracy […], principles of justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional democratic society can 
plainly be invoked to reform the family.385 
 Rawls advocates for such interventions to ‘reform’ the family if parents’ choice 
for their children’s education undermines their children’s development of the capacity for 
the moral powers required by the principles of political justice. In discussing education, 
Quong, using reasoning he developed from Rawls, suggests that as a result of parents 
asserting their right to educate and raise their children the way they perceive best, ‘even if 
the threat to normative stability is relatively low, there may still be good grounds for 
intervention.’386 Containment, a possible result of an intervention aimed at reform, may 
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ensue if political liberalism perceives the parents’ choice of education as a kind of 
illiberal one with the potential to harm their children’s ability to grow and exercise either 
of their two moral powers or their capacity for justice.387 I assert that this potential 
infringement on parental religious freedom, limiting and restricting the educational 
choices that parents may make for their children under the scheme of public reason, not 
only proves inconsistent with, but actively violates Rawls’s own stated values, 
particularly the religious freedom that he professes to support.388 
 
3.3.3.2 Potential Infringement via Capacity for Justice Education 
Rawls’s infringement of his stated value of religious freedom, revealed in his prescription 
for parental ‘reform,’ concomitantly possesses the potential to violate parental religious 
freedom that international laws stipulate. As I note in Chapter 2, Article 18(4) of the 
ICCPR states: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and 
moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.’389 
Bielefeldt390 further confirms that actions repressing parental choices for their children’s 
education may not only violate children’s freedom of religion or belief but also ‘the 
parents’ right to ensure an education for their children in conformity with their own 
convictions and in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.’391 In 
addition, Bielefeldt states other concerns relating to parents’ exercising their right to 
choose to educate their children in ways that conform with their own convictions, which 
Article 18(4) of the ICCPR enshrines.392 
 One concern involves school education, in which children ‘are exposed to 
religious instruction against their will or the will of their parents or guardians.’393 Other 
possible concerns include exerting pressure on children to participate in rituals and 
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ceremonies of other religions without the consent of their parents, pressure which at times 
has extended to punishing or assaulting students.394 
 Macedo argues that when parental choice for their children’s education involves 
insulating their children from diversity, it impedes their children’s level of awareness of 
alternative ways of life. Bielefeldt notes similar concerns, such as parents withdrawing 
their children from learning about other religions or children being forced to participate 
in religious practices that conflict with their own. According to Macedo, however, 
knowledge and awareness regarding diversity constitute a prerequisite of citizenship as 
well as a prerequisite for the ability to make basic life decisions.395 Macedo asserts that: 
The religious liberty of parents does not extend with full force to their children. […] I would 
concede the right to opt out of public schooling, but that right should be understood to be 
conditioned by a public authority to regulate private schools to insure [sic] that civic basics are 
taught. True enough, in most states private schools and home schooling are only minimally 
regulated, especially with respect to civic education. That states do not fully exercise their rightful 
authority, however, does not mean they do not have it. So while there is a (moral and 
constitutional) right to opt out of public schooling, there is no right to opt selectively out of those 
basic civic exercises that the state may reasonably require for all children.396 
 Macedo, like Rawls, appears to employ his words to suit his preferred intent. He 
states that diversity often indicates a great liberal resource, but then interjects a 
conflicting qualifier, ‘but not always.’ ‘There are religious and other forms of diversity’, 
he emphasizes, ‘that we have no reason to embrace or even accommodate.’397 Macedo 
concedes, nevertheless, that children whose parents have religious beliefs need lessons in 
tolerance, but they are not alone. He asserts that children whose parents advocate 
totalistic versions of liberalism and those whose parents are ‘evangelical atheists,’398 as 
well as children whose parents who hold other reasonable views, all need to learn 
political respect for fellow citizens. 
 Contrary to Macedo’s assertion, Goodman proclaims that efforts to instill values 
are not always coercive, dogmatic, and narrowing as political liberalism may appear to 
indicate those of parents with religious worldviews to be. Neither should parental choice 
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regarding religious education nor a curriculum designed to foster the aims and means of 
creative and critical thinking and consisting of components that constitute a wholesome 
and fulfilling life for well-rounded human beings be discounted or excluded from a 
child’s education.399 Even the lesser goals of becoming a good citizen or cultivating 
marketable job skills may be subject to condemnation as these include assumptions about 
human potential and worth. Goodman stresses that good schools contribute to making 
good citizens or valuable employees and that, typically, a good citizen means a law-
abiding one. He also notes that the goal in relation to Rawls’s stipulations regarding 
education does not actually stipulate providing a good education.400    
             Unlike Quong, I assert that parents should not be subject to containment or 
‘reform’ if they choose not to succumb to political liberalism’s aim for education, which 
primarily targets the development of a sense of justice and political virtues to support 
political and social institutions. Instead of parents relinquishing their freedom of religion, 
which encompasses their preference for their children’s education, a better goal for 
education would be to provide the best education possible for children. Such a goal 
would also embrace the unfettered freedom of parents to practice their internationally 
decreed right to choose an education for their children which complements their personal 
religious beliefs. I further address this issue relating to parents’ choice for their children’s 
education, especially religious education, in Chapter 4 as well as in Chapter 6. 
 
 
3.4 Public Reason and Religious Freedom Illustrated under Political 
Liberalism 
 
Although Western democracies broadly recognize the four pillars listed in Section 3.2.2, 
and basically agree on them, manifestations regarding State–religion relationships can 
sharply differ. Several diverse expressions can be noted in the following examples found 
in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The way the State should relate to 
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religion has stimulated centuries of controversies and heated debates401 as well as 
demonstrated significant differences in the way State–religion relationships have 
developed. Due to increasing pluralism in some countries, particularly in the United 
States, the once traditional connections between religion and the State402 as well as the 
accepted basis of the State–religion relationship have essentially changed.403 Jeroen 
Temperman notes that worldwide, State practices and perceptions of the apposite State–
religion relationship range from some states being explicitly secular to others appearing 
clearly religious, with yet others somewhere in between. International human rights law 
does not explicitly stipulate the parameters for the State–religion relationship, nor does it 
offer guidance on the relationship the State and religion must observe for compliance 
with human rights norms.404 
 
3.4.1 The United States 
The U.S. Constitution (1787), arguably405 perceived as a liberal constitution, embraces 
the four pillars of liberal constitutionalism regarding religion in its various 
amendments.406  The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1789), 
which guarantees freedoms relating to religion, also forbids Congress from either 
promoting one religion over another or restricting individuals from manifesting their 
religious practices. The amendment dictates: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’407 In addition, this 
constitutional amendment supports freedom of expression and pledges to protect the right 
both for citizens to freely verbalize their thoughts and to assemble in an amicable fashion. 
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These rights cannot be ‘surrendered, or waived by the holder/bearer of the rights.’408 
According to this amendment, human rights portray natural, inherent elements of the 
human personality; therefore, no entity (neither person nor government) can take these 
rights from another.  
The U.S. constitution, which has provisions concerning the nonestablishment of a 
State church, does mandate a kind of separation or wall between the State and religion.409 
Consequently, tensions often arise between those holding different worldviews on the 
degree of separation or height of the wall between the two, especially in the public 
square, as I note in two much-discussed U.S. Supreme Court rulings relating to the First 
Amendment and concerning praying and reading the Bible in school. In 1962, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Engel v. Vitale ‘that a school policy of reciting a nonsectarian 
prayer written by the New York Board of Regents was unconstitutional.’ 410 The 
following year, 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Abington Township School 
District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett, banning religious exercises, including prayers 
and Bible readings, in public schools.’411 The court’s ruling evoked a huge nationwide 
protest, primarily from evangelical Protestants and Catholics. Cardinal Spellman called 
the decision ‘a tragic misreading of our Founding Fathers.’412 According to Billy 
Graham, the decision reflected ‘another step toward secularism.’413 Thousands of U.S. 
citizens concerned about religious freedom, as well as individuals from churches and 
civic and religious organizations, wrote to the then U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, 
protesting against the Supreme Court ruling. Justice Potter Stewart, who cast the only 
dissenting vote, surmised that regarding religion, the ruling did not represent true 
neutrality but rather contributed to establishing a religion of secularism in the United 
States.414 
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 On 26 June 2017, Sam Hananel and Mark Sherman reported that the Supreme 
Court ruled in another controversial case which involved the Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Missouri, appealing against the rejection of its 2012 application for a State 
grant for funds to cover the cost of applying a soft surface to its preschool playground. 
The justices overturned the State’s decision with a 7–2 vote. ‘Chief Justice John Roberts 
said for the court that the State violated the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment by 
denying a public benefit to an otherwise eligible recipient solely on account of its 
religious status.’415 Justice Sonya Sotomayor, as well as several liberal civil liberties 
groups agreed, however, argued that the ruling contradicts the longstanding commitment 
of the US to separation of church and State. This dispute vividly reflects the distance that 
may exist between the church and State in a civil society, particularly in the United 
States.  
As one of the many establishment clause litigations, the case in which Judge Roy 
Moore, of Etowah County, Alabama, determined to keep the Ten Commandments 
hanging on his courtroom wall similarly mirrors the distance between the church and 
State. Ronald Bruce Flowers reports that in 1980, prior to this incident, the court declared 
in Stone v. Graham it unconstitutional to post the Ten Commandments in public school 
classrooms. In 1998, Judge Roy Moore of Alabama countered legal challenges after he 
refused to remove the plaque presenting the Ten Commandments displayed in his 
courtroom. After running for and being elected to the position of Chief Justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, Judge Moore, who became known as the ‘Ten Commandments 
candidate,’ arranged for a stone monument weighing 5,200 pounds with the Ten 
Commandments etched on it to be crafted and then delivered and positioned in the lobby 
of the Alabama judicial building. 416 Ultimately, Flowers recounts: 
A federal district court, on Establishment Clause grounds, ordered him to remove 
the monument. He refused – and the story made national headlines. When the court had the monument 
removed, earnest believers (in both the Ten Commandments and Roy Moore) rallied on his behalf. Finally, 
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Judge Moore was removed by Alabama legal authority from his position on the state Supreme Court. He 
asked the US Supreme Court to review his case. It did not.417 
At times, fierce battles by the ideological right and left in the United States 
regarding decisions oscillating between the ‘Free Exercise Clause’ and the 
‘Establishment Clause’ stimulated confusion, concerns, and controversies. The two noted 
U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the first relating to the First Amendment regarding prayer 
and reading the Bible in school, the second being the ruling regarding Ten 
Commandments, reflect a sample of the division between and the passion of both sides. 
Legal cases such as these also illustrate how public reason under political liberalism 
manifests insufficiencies, inconsistencies, and potential infringement of religious rights, 
revealing that political liberalism will fail to protect religious freedom for all.418 
Principled pluralism, as I argued in chapter 2, and contrast with political liberalism in the 
next section, mandates State impartiality toward all religions. Instead of ruling out all 
prayers or displays of religious symbols like statues of the Ten Commandments in any 
pubic-funded space, principled pluralism will accept and welcome prayers and symbols 
from all faiths or beliefs—if the State conducts these activities in a non-compulsory way 
and does not show favoritism toward one religion or belief. This practice will not only 
decrease religion-State tensions, it will also increase the level of religious freedom for all.  
3.4.2 France 
Like the United States, France does not establish, nor does it subsidize any religion 
(Article 2 of the 1905 law).419Article 2 of the 1958 French constitution reflects a 
perceived ideal of constitutional liberalism: 
France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure  
the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or  
religion. It shall respect all beliefs.420 
                                                 
417 Flowers, That Godless Court, p. 178. 
418 Hypothetically, regarding what Baorong Duoyuan adherents would decide for the Ten Commandments’ 
case by the Supreme Court: I would argue, using a bottom-up approach,that the Supreme Court should 
allow biblical Ten Commandments, as well as other historical symbols from different religious traditions to 
exist in the court building. A level-down approach would argue to remove all symbols of religious nature 
from public spaces. 
419 Decherf, ‘French Views of Religious.’ 
420 Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen (eds.), Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 294. 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan 107 
 
 The understandings of the United States and France in relation to freedom of 
religion, however, differ dramatically, and during 1998 this gap expanded when both the 
U.S. Congress and the French government passed legislation that reflected conflicting 
goals for religious freedom. In the United States, the IRFA redefined the rule of the State 
at the international level and levied potential sanctions on countries convicted of violating 
religious freedom. The National Assembly in France, however, created a governmental 
task force, the Inter-Ministerial Mission against Sects (MILS), to monitor cults 
considered dangerous.421 The role that France assumes regarding religion appears 
contradictory. On the one hand, the constitution professes that it protects religious 
freedom.422 On the other hand, as laws relating to religious symbols demonstrate, the 
State also fulfills the role of policing religious practice. 
The French stance of attributing equality to each religion also routinely 
contributes to the State confronting religious challenges. To some, the French posture 
appears questionable when the State adopts the role of policing religious practices.423 
Most of the increasing clashes between the French government and religion are deeply 
rooted in the State’s assertion of advancing secularism in the public square. 
In France, when the State polices religious practices in the name of ‘radical 
neutrality,’424 this inevitably fuels even more conflict within a specific religion and 
among different religions. For example, conflicts in France in relation to the wearing of 
religious symbols intensified amid State policing. A 2004 French law prohibits Muslims 
from covering their faces in public places, a religious practice of Muslim women.425 
Another law, which the French parliament approved in 2010, prohibits individuals in 
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France from wearing headscarves and other religious symbols in public schools.426
 In Paris, during July 2013, rioters destroyed dozens of cars and police arrested at 
least ten individuals after officers completed an identity check on a Muslim woman 
wearing a symbol of her religion, a niqab, or full-face veil.427 Approximately 250 
protesters hurled stones at police who fired teargas into crowds, attempting to disperse 
them. Four hundred other individuals protested in Paris, torching cars, bins, and bus 
shelters. The day after the protests, rioters burned twenty more vehicles in the 
surrounding area. This kind of culturally based428 rioting, motivated by religion, confirms 
that even in a liberal, democratic, republic society, the French agenda of State secularism 
can neither ensure true harmony nor guarantee religious freedom for all as it claims. 
3.4.3 The United Kingdom 
Unlike the United States and France, the United Kingdom has not adopted a single 
constitutional document encompassing freedom of religion.  Nevertheless, its government 
legislated the 1998 Human Rights Act, which according to information Chang et al. 
present, suggests that the State employs a secular liberal constitutional model.429 The 
United Kingdom’s principal legislation, however, ‘guarantees’ freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion and prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.’430 
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Restrictions regarding religion in the United Kingdom431must align with democratic 
principles and the law as well as be necessary to ensure public order and safety. 
Regarding an individual’s freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 9 of the 
United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act (1998) states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.432 
 Although the State and religion are deemed distinct entities in the United 
Kingdom, with their relationship reportedly indicative of bounds regarding State 
involvement in religion, the State performs some theological interventions, although 
subtly, in religious matters. For example, twenty-six bishops of the Church of England sit 
in the House of Lords.433 At the beginning of each daily meeting, bishops, known as the 
Lords Spiritual, read prayers. In addition, they actively engage in the life and work of the 
upper house. Despite the United Kingdom’s stance, tensions have arisen in relation to 
religious extremists and, at times, threaten both the United Kingdom’s national security 
as well as community cohesion. Consequently, along with the question as to whether 
religious faith can continue to be treated as a purely private matter,434 the State has had to 
confront debates and conflicts 435 regarding the integration of U.K. Muslims who, at 
times, look to Sharia law rather than British law.436 
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Religious education illustrates another area of contention between the State and 
religion in the United Kingdom. On the one hand, the United Kingdom projects the 
stance of religious freedom for all. On the other, the State does not as a matter of course 
allocate equal benefits to other religions as it does to the Church of England. The United 
Kingdom’s State-recognized437 church, the Church of England, enjoys more privileges 
than other religions. 
In England, the Church of England connects to the State in numerous ways: For 
example, part of the national curriculum in State-run schools includes ‘Christian’ 
education, though this does not mean that they are obliged to follow instructions from the 
Church of England.438 Conflicts in relation to the State selectively financing only certain 
religious schools surface within the various religious communities. This unequal 
treatment of specific religions, the Muslim faith, for example, appears to indicate a State 
bias favoring Christian religions. During the 1990s, although State-funded Christian 
schools operated, the State repeatedly denied funding for independent Islamic schools. 
By 2004, Muslim communities protested, charging the State with religious prejudice. 
Consequently, the State initiated funding for four Islamic schools. The Department for 
Education and Skills now routinely allocates funds to help Islamic schools, provided they 
move to the State sector.439 The ongoing controversy regarding this practice provides yet 
another example of the potential inherent tension in the relationship between the State 
and religion in a liberal constitutional model. 
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439 J. Christopher Soper and Joel S. Fetzerl, ‘Religious institutions, church–state history, and Muslim 
mobilization in Britain, France, and Germany’, <http://ces.ufl.edu/files/ReligiousInstitutionsChurch 
State_030609.pdf> [accessed 25 January 2015]. Unlike France, in England, school authorities permit 
females to wear religious head coverings in colors that conform to their school uniforms. 
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3.5 Political Liberalism Contrasted with Principled Pluralism 
3.5.1 Regarding the State–Religion Relationship 
As one among numerous spheres in society, according to principled pluralism, the State 
does not hold sovereignty and supremacy over the other spheres. Part of the role of the 
State includes maintaining equality between the various societal spheres, including its 
own. According to Schmidt, the State ‘has an obligation to enforce mutual respect for the 
boundary lines separating the different spheres of authority whenever a conflict arises 
between areas or when one sphere steps over its boundary of authority into the domain of 
another.’440 Schmidt points out that another responsibility of the State involves 
preventing authorities within a specific sphere from using their power to act unjustly 
toward relatively powerless individuals within that sphere. To regulate the State and 
ensure it remains within its rightful realm, citizens utilize means of both constitutional 
law and representative government.  Carl H. Esbeck’s thoughts align with 
principled pluralism as he exposes the essence of the differences between political 
liberalism and principled pluralism regarding the reported neutral stance of the State 
regarding religion. According to Wolterstorff, the dominant interpretation of the State’s 
neutrality which he terms the separation interpretation (of the First Amendment in regard 
to the religion-State relationship), widely adopted by liberals, asserts that the government 
should not in any way advance or hinder any religion.441 Instead of this type ‘neutrality’ 
role of the State, Wolterstorff proposes a nuanced concept of government’s affirmative 
impartiality. Regarding the religion or irreligion of various groups, this impartiality 
interpretation contends that nothing a State says or does demonstrates an absence of its 
impartiality. Impartiality does not require that the government carry out polices which 
align with the convictions of all citizens, however, the governmental requirement 
mandates that the State does not resolve to render support to any religion or irreligion.442  
 Whenever the State can attain one of its lawful purposes without breaching the 
beliefs of a religion or irreligion, it must do so. Affirmative impartiality entails a positive, 
forward State role as it requires the State to plainly stand for something deemed valuable, 
                                                 
440 Schmidt, ‘The Principled Pluralist’, p. 136.  
441 Robert Audi, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious 
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442Audi, and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public, p. 149. 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan 112 
 
and to also support common good for both religion and irreligion. The State is not to side 
with the secular worldview, feigning neutrality. Wolterstorff illustrates his point by 
pointing out different results around the controversy of government’s aid to schools based 
on religious orientation. The impartiality position states that ‘if the state aids any schools, 
it must aid all schools, and aid them all equitably—no matter what their religious 
orientation, if any.’ However, the separation position based on the State’s neutrality claim 
says the state’s public funding is ‘to aid no school whose orientation is religious.’443 
Furthermore, Esbeck argues that political liberal variances are theologically rooted in a 
secular worldview and that despite contrary claims, the State’s neutrality claim proves 
invalid. 
A person’s religious presuppositions travel with him wherever he is whatever he is doing in life. 
This total unity, it is said, exists not only within each individual but also at corporate levels, 
including government institutions. Government cannot be dualistic, for it too holds a 
Weltanschauung or worldview. The deduction follows that state neutrality is not only impossible 
and thus a myth, but worse, it is a ploy calculated to use the state as an instrument for advancing 
philosophies that are antithetical to Christianity. In short, the argument concludes, either the state 
favors Christianity or it favors an opposing philosophy. There is no neutral ground.444 
 
 In such instances exemplifying tensions between religion and the State, one 
observation may safely be made. Esbeck stresses that: ‘The oft-lamented tensions 
between church (religion) and State are not all bad. Rather, the presence of tension is 
symptomatic of something healthy.’445 While working through the conflicts, each power, 
church (religion), and State, sharpens and offsets the other. This tension helps confirm 
that the church, although a relevant part of the world, yet not being so worldly, does not 
align with the aims of State. 
 As Rawls downplays the importance of the role of religion in societal institutions, 
he makes his goal of achieving the liberal ideal of social harmony and peace 
unsustainable. Institutions such as the family, schools, church (religion), and businesses 
merit as much significance as the State, simultaneously serving as instruments for the 
individual development of freedom and justice. Although the goals of Rawls’s political 
liberalism may conflict with principled pluralism, as Esbeck notes, the tension between 
                                                 
443 Audi, and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public, p. 76. 
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the two spheres portrays rather a healthy relationship, even according to this liberal 
concept of the separation of church (religion) and State. 
 Regarding Rawls’s reasoning in relation to intolerance, which transmutes to 
religious freedom, he admits concern relating to what he terms a practical dilemma:  
Even if an intolerant sect should arise, provided that it is not so strong initially that it can impose 
its will straight away […] it will tend to lose its intolerance and accept liberty of conscience. […] 
Of course, the intolerant sect may be so strong initially or growing so fast that the forces making 
for stability cannot convert it to liberty. This situation presents a practical dilemma which 
philosophy alone cannot resolve.446 
 While Rawls stresses the importance of justice as fairness in political liberalism, 
he admits that an injustice may be acceptable, even if unfair, under one condition: when a 
perceived danger exists that a greater injustice could occur. ‘[A]n injustice is tolerable 
only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice.’447 Rawls does not specify 
what conditions would merit an acceptable injustice. This may include some religions or 
religious groups deemed as unreasonable or intolerant. Rawls appears to indicate it to be 
permissible to entrench the religious liberty of perceived dangerous groups that appear 
potentially disruptive in the existential, institutional stability if they are unable to be 
transformed to become tolerant. This, according to Rawls, would be to avoid whatever 
greater injustice may threaten the tolerant groups. Rawls would reason that it would not 
constitute a problem to tolerate this lesser injustice to the perceived dangerous and 
potentially disruptive groups. 
 This logic leads to the conclusion that for Rawls’s public reason under political 
liberalism, maintaining social stability surpasses the concern for religious freedom. Rawls 
also contends that ‘generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in 
philosophy only ridiculous.’ 448 Rawls does not specifically identify such errors. He 
appears to suggest that intolerant religions reflect errors in religion and, in turn, pose 
much more of a potential danger to society than any error or absurdity that a part of any 
philosophical theory might mirror. The massive terror and atrocities which tens of 
millions experienced in the twentieth century, including religious individuals, because of 
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adopting Karl Marx’s philosophy, proves Rawls’s comparison to be both empirically 
wrong and theoretically invalid. 
 Although the Rawlsian theory includes the concept of toleration as part of justice 
and accordingly, ‘the principles of justice give reasons for tolerance,’ this question 
remains unanswered: What attitude should society demonstrate toward the intolerant? In 
his discussion on whether to tolerate the intolerant, Rawls proposes a principle of 
conversion to liberty of conscience, for the sake of institutional stability.449 Based on this 
concept, if an intolerant sect appears in a well-ordered society through the conversion to 
liberty process, once that intolerant religious group or sect loses its momentum of growth 
and influence in society, it will be transformed into a tolerant group. 
 Instead of discussing ethical principles on constraint or limitations of the principle 
of tolerance, Rawls shifts the discussion to the practical consideration of the level of the 
threat. Raphael Cohen-Almagor points out that rather than an argument contingent on the 
level of the danger, the issue of tolerance constitutes a matter of moral principle, noted 
not as practical, but ethical.450 Rawls pursues a line of argument that avoids the 
philosophical issue: What to do when an intolerant religious sect has taken a solid 
stronghold in certain society or if a group grows too influential to covert to liberty of 
tolerance? The essence of this question may be considered a constraint on tolerance and 
liberty. Instead of specifically addressing this challenging concern, however, Rawls 
remains vague. He fails to offer a clear-cut solution and instead stresses that this situation 
presents a practical dilemma that philosophy needs help to resolve. 
 On a positive note for Rawls, Joseph Grcic stresses that his utilization of the veil 
of ignorance to exclude information on religion does not minimize the significance of one 
basic idea that principled pluralism acknowledges that the State does not have the right to 
determine what constitutes true religion. ‘Excluding information about a certain subject 
matter such as religion does not mean Rawls thinks this subject is unimportant but only 
that it is not relevant at this level for determining justice.’451 According to Grcic, the 
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exclusion of information regarding a citizen’s religion mirrors Rawls’s way for protecting 
freedom of religion because this promotes a better understanding of how religion fits into 
a just society. 
 As I noted in Chapter 2, Kuyper initially championed principled pluralism’s basic 
ideas, the concepts that Cornelis Van Dam as well as the Center for Public Justice in 
Washington support. Unlike political liberalism, which contends that although excluded 
from the public political forum, religion can be the basis of individual political 
conviction, principled pluralism welcomes religion into the public political environment 
with few restrictions. As Van Dam stresses, I agree that: ‘Within certain limits, such as 
the need to restrain evil, all religions must be treated alike and be given the same freedom 
and opportunities.’452 Also, contrary to political liberalism, which promotes secularism 
over religion, principled pluralism reasons that the government cannot favor one religion 
over another or enforce, for example, the religion of secularism in society. 
 Principled pluralists contend that all of God’s creation including the political 
sphere not only needs but awaits redemption. The political realm, according to the 
Reformed tradition, needs to be redeemed ‘neither no more nor no less than any other 
sphere of human activity.’453 Principled pluralists believe God continues to work His 
redemption in this present-day world and argue that Christians should engage in political 
activity. 
 
3.5.2 Disorder in Rawls’s Well-Ordered Society 
Rawls’s portrayal of a well-ordered society reveals the arbitrary nature of his stated goal 
for political liberalism, which is to achieve a utopian society, as far as is feasible. Rawls 
argues that within a well-ordered, reasonable pluralistic democratic society, through the 
filter of public reason based on’ justice as fairness,’ reasonable citizens with reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and ideas reach overlapping consensuses.  In the semi-utopian, 
fictional setting, arbitrators further demand that reasonable religious adherents conduct 
their political discourse by passing through the proviso process. The well-ordered society 
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that Rawls envisages promotes the good of its members. In this made-up society, I 
maintain that contributions to the public square mandate that any public communication 
aligns with secular argument and do not contain any input that might be deemed 
unreasonable, irrational, or religious. Rawls admits the well-ordered society does not and 
has never existed, saying that ‘existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered in this 
sense.’454  According to Rawls, a public conception of justice effectively regulates a well-
ordered society, that is, a society in which: 
1. everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of 
justice; and  
2. the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these 
principles.455 
 In the hypothetical well-ordered society, Rawls states that conditions of moderate 
scarcity exist. These include ‘reasonable beliefs (on which to ground the public 
conception of justice), generally accepted methods of inquiry, fundamental and divergent 
individual aims and interests supporting claims on the design of social institutions, 
various opposing and incompatible basic beliefs, and so on.’456 Rawls stresses that he 
incorporated all the features defining a well-ordered society into the description of the 
original position,457 conditions he perceives as recognizably reasonable. Citizens arrive at 
these conditions through the course of questioning themselves to ascertain what kind of 
society they might prefer to live in. 
 Although Rawls concedes that even though conditions he developed for a well-
ordered society may appear reasonable to him and other political liberals, they may 
appear less than clearly reasonable to makers of constitutions. He additionally concludes 
that existing societies cannot satisfy the entire set of conditions that a well-ordered 
society needs.458 Grcic agrees with Rawls that some (including himself) will disagree 
with the basis on which Rawls  draws  for implementing his ideas for developing a 
society into a well-ordered system of social cooperation.459 Rawls presupposes that in the 
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well-ordered society of political liberalism, illiberal and intolerant religions will 
ultimately cease to exist.460 This summation appears to indicate that a society cannot be 
well ordered unless religions, such as those that mandate the suppression of other 
religions, as well as those ‘religions that insist on religious establishment, or that demand 
the adoption of a certain comprehensive conception of the good by the whole society,’461 
figuratively speaking, have died out.462 Rawls does not address the issue regarding what 
should be done with such religions in a well-ordered society but argues that a well-
ordered society will also be a stable one. 
 Hill also stresses that Rawls’s unrealistic concept of a well-ordered society, 
particularly as published in A Theory of Justice, constitutes a serious problem. Even 
though Rawls revised his 1971 theory of justice in 1975 and again in 1999, he does not 
abandon it. As his work in Political Liberalism (1993) reveals, Rawls starts to stress that 
in contemporary constitutional democracies like the United States, disagreements with 
regard to rudimentary issues, such as abortion and morals, can threaten a society’s 
stability. Rawls fails to show that negative consequences will transpire if a society does 
not stabilize in the sense he proposes.463 
 Rawls’s notion of a well-ordered society constitutes part of what he classifies as 
full compliance.464 He fails to identify how society arrives at this destination,465 however. 
For example, in regard to intolerant religions not highlighted in a well-ordered society, 
the question of their demise arises. Rawls presumes these religions have died out and 
states that the rudimentary institutions of a just society ‘inevitably encourage some ways 
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of life and discourage others, or even exclude them altogether.’466 More questions ensue, 
including: (1) What does ‘discourage’ mean in this context? (2) ‘[W]hat does it mean to 
exclude certain ways of life altogether?’467 Rawls does not answer these two questions. 
He points out that even in a well-ordered society, the State may need to utilize its 
coercive powers to help ensure the stability of social cooperation. 
 Andy Blunden challenges the validity of Rawls’s claim that in a well-ordered 
society, most citizens not only accept but know that most other citizens accept the 
identical principles of justice.468 Rawls asks how can a society ‘which is made up of all 
kinds of people, with all kinds of beliefs and all kinds of interests, agree with and support 
governing principles?’469 In that a person must explain him/herself in a way that will 
seem reasonable to people who may not share his/her beliefs, the explanation must also 
be acceptable to those who share the same beliefs. Here, Rawls’s reasoning appears 
flawed. Hill also stresses that in ‘this optimal society the principles would generally be 
the same throughout the society and would be enforced by the State.’470 Rawls’s ideal 
well-ordered society would putatively exemplify a government at its best, with every 
citizen supposedly agreeing with and supporting the governing principles. The State 
would also, in principle, effectively institute only those principles. 
 André Van de Putte suggests that Rawls’s proposed ideal of a political 
community, one with the same comprehensive doctrine uniting all, does not exist, even in 
a society devoid of violent and unreasonable people.471 In any society, including Rawls’s 
hypothetical ‘well-ordered’ one, comprehensive doctrines prove too diverse to function 
as public frames of reference. The resolutions which principled pluralism offers, 
particularly the level-up approach to allow diverse comprehensive doctrines, including 
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religious ones, in the public square,472 can ultimately work to advance the common good 
and justice for all in actual constitutional, democratic societies. 
 While Rawls may disagree with principled pluralism, he utilizes an elaborate way 
to serve as the foundation for public good and the equal distribution of justice with filters 
for reason and rationality. Shaun P. Young notes that Rawls’s filters include terms such 
as ‘reasonable persons,’ ‘reasonable doctrines,’ ‘reasonable citizens,’ and a host of other 
‘reasonable’ entities.473 Blunden argues that Rawls does not aim to pursue social good but 
instead seeks to discover a marginal overlapping consensus on principles of justice, a 
quest some consider admirable. Blunden questions whether reasonable pluralism proves 
sufficient for laying the basis of a stable and well-ordered system of social cooperation in 
which people could pursue their own ideas of the good within their own associations and 
communities. 
 Although a political liberal, Rawls agrees with principled pluralist proponents 
regarding democracy that it aligns with the concept of a limited, public-interest State. 
Similarly, regardless of principled pluralism’s differences to political liberalism, this 
theory concurs with Rawls’s fundamental ideas that ‘in the public political culture of a 
democratic society, citizens are free and equal, and that society should be a fair system of 
cooperation.’474 Despite diverse religious and philosophical commitments, political 
liberalism can formulate an overlapping consensus on fundamental political matters 
among religious and other groups holding comprehensive doctrines. As numerous 
reasonable interpretations of equal, free, and fair coexist with a myriad of other 
associated words and concepts, interpretations of fundamental ideas conflict at times. 
  
3.6 Conclusion 
My examination of public reason under Rawls’s political liberalism in the light of 
religious freedom demonstrates that, to a large degree, political liberalism fails to 
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adequately and fully protect religious freedom for all. I found this illustrated in the 
experiences of several western democratic countries, where major elements of political 
liberalism under public reason have significantly impacted the treatment of religions in 
the public square. Contrary to political liberalism, which routinely restrains the 
expression of certain religious and comprehensive views regarding political issues, 
research confirms that principled pluralism welcomes all groups to equally participate in 
the public square.  In contrast to political liberalism, under a democratic constitutional 
framework, principled pluralism not only pledges to protect religious freedom but also 
resolves to foster political environments favorable to citizens’ personal and public 
freedoms, contextually, associationally, and directionally. 
 Principled pluralism, born and initiated in a cultural backdrop of predominantly 
Judeo-Christian societies, may also successfully fit into a more mature, pluralistic 
democratic civil society. In considering the historical, cultural, religious and social 
complexities in countries like China, I maintain that a contextualized version of 
principled pluralism presents the best available option to ensure the protection of 
religious freedom for all. While Rawls’s political liberalism restricts certain religious 
voices and the views of citizens who do not meet its biased criteria of public reason, 
principled pluralism argues for the indispensability of the role of religion with 
governmental impartiality toward all religions as well as anti- or nonreligions. 
 In addition to presenting and expounding on Rawls’s political liberalism in the 
light of religious freedom, I specifically focused my critique of public reason under 
political liberalism and found that research confirms Rawls’s theory repeatedly fails to 
fully protect religious freedom for all due to: (1) inconsistencies in the PRSR, the 
proviso, and self-respect; (2) its prescription of containment through the filter of public 
reason toward comprehensive doctrines deemed unreasonable or irrational; (3) the further 
manifestation of the deficiency cited in (2) in that it implies the potential infringement of 
parents’ religious freedom through limitations relating to children’s religious education, 
including a mandate for parents to ensure their children’s education nurtures their 
development of the capacity for a sense of justice. 
 In one sense, Rawls’s reasons for proposing political liberalism for developing a 
normative principle appropriate for producing the constitutional foundations of a 
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democratic society appear admirable. As he seeks an appropriate conception of justice to 
specify fair terms of social cooperation amid free and equal and reportedly fully 
cooperating citizens of society,475 Rawls argues that political liberalism fosters a well-
ordered system of social cooperation. Although political secular liberalists claim they try 
to avoid being arbitrary and exclusive, and despite Rawls’s potentially admirable intent, 
they exclude doctrines that they perceive as unreasonable. In turn, the proponents of 
political liberalism fail to provide solid, reasonable grounds for their rationale. 
 Amid a barrage of negative repercussions relating to Rawls’s political liberalism, 
his embrace of pluralism merits respect. Compared to some of his traditional liberal 
colleagues and predecessors, Rawls’s concern for social stability, particularly his 
progressive view regarding tolerating religious-based arguments in public debate, 
although delimited by the proviso process, also deserves recognition.  
 As I show in this chapter, political liberalism not only holds a covert anti-religious 
bias, it impedes religious freedom for all. If systematically implemented, political 
liberalism will, in a sense, create further discrimination against religions. When the State 
systematically employs Rawls’s political liberalism, this society will unlikely reach its 
goal of being well ordered, the goal that Rawls envisages. Unless public justice is equally 
and impartially guaranteed and distributed by a fair, democratic, constitutional State, 
increasing clashes, as demonstrated in contemporary democratic countries, such as the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom, will occur among citizens with diverse, 
sometimes conflicting worldviews. 
 As it offers fewer restrictions regarding religion in the public square, the 
application of principled pluralism demonstrates the potential to serve as a reasonable 
alternative to political liberalism to help stabilize society as well as help maintain and 
protect religious freedom. Nevertheless, despite the numerous advantages a society may 
experience under principled pluralism, at this present time, the political situation and 
State in China do not match the paradigm that Western, culturally based, Christianity-
oriented, principled pluralism offers. Principled pluralism does not fit the traditional 
standard of either a mature pluralistic democratic society or a compete theocracy. 
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 As the principled pluralism theory emphasizes Christianity and supports 
governmental impartiality toward religions, it offers the potential to stimulate tension 
between new historical, cultural, and social complexities in countries like China. 
Although Rawls’s political liberalism may have some appeal to a limited number of 
Chinese intellectuals and scholars, especially within the dissident circle, his theory of 
legitimization of government authority based on justice and freedom does not 
theoretically fit the overall needs of countries such as contemporary Communist China.476 
According to Samuli Seppänen, ‘In contrast to Rawls, Chinese mainstream scholars do 
not argue that personal freedom, autonomy and equality ought to inform conceptions 
about governmental legitimacy.’477 Nevertheless, as political liberalism has not 
consistently fully protected religious freedom in the liberal Western world, it would not 
adequately work to promote the same in China. 
 Although principled pluralism offers more potential to help stabilize China’s 
pluralistic society, it cannot be mechanically imposed on this ‘Country of Concern.’478 A 
contextualized, customized version of principled pluralism could best serve China as a 
means to help alleviate religion-based tensions and, simultaneously, encourage religious 
freedom for all. While keeping its authoritative political ruling, China’s contemporary 
stance, arguably with limited but increasing pluralism in economic, cultural, and religious 
sectors, confirms that a new paradigm should be developed. The proposed model could 
best serve the need to protect religious freedom for all by contextualizing the traditional 
model of principled pluralism without falling into the inconsistencies and conflicts of 
political liberalism. In my next chapter, I explore ways in which religious freedom is 
exemplified in the field of education and how a modified version of principled pluralism 
applies to religious freedom in religious education. 
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Chapter 4 
Political Liberalism and Principled Pluralism            
Related to Religious Freedom in Public Education  
4.1 Introduction 
A myriad of concerns regarding religious freedom include the use or display of 
religious symbols in public space being policed or handled, as well as the degree of 
permission the State allocates to different institutions based on religious affiliation. 
For example, a church can discriminate in its hiring practices if the rationale is based 
on religious conviction. A dilemma arises, however, regarding how much regulation a 
State may impose on an institution or a business. For example, based on religious 
convictions, how much can a business be permitted to discriminate in its hiring policy 
or employment practices without violating liberal constitutional essentials such as 
equality and free choice? An even more prominent issue routinely surfaces in 
contemporary society, concerning the inclusion of religious education in the field of 
government-funded education. As the arena of education, especially taxpayer-funded 
education, serves as a vital thermometer for measuring the degree of religious 
freedom for parents and their child/ren, I have chosen this issue as a case example of 
the State-religion relationship vis-a-vis political liberalism and principled pluralism.  
 In the previous chapter, I examined public reason under Rawls’s political 
liberalism in light of religious freedom and claimed that political liberalism repeatedly 
fails to fully protect religious freedom for all. In contrast to political liberalism, 
principled pluralism nurtures political environments favorable to religious freedom 
for citizens. In this chapter, I initially define public (State) and private (non-State) 
schools as well variations in between and explain differences among them, evidenced 
in funding, curriculum, management and religious education. I then examine the five 
approaches that diverse states have adopted for implementing religious education. I 
compare these education models and note ensuing tensions and conflicts within four 
selected countries and their corresponding stances regarding RE in public-funded 
schools.       
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 Peter L. Berger disagrees with those who project that the secularization of the 
world would increase from the nineteenth century.479 Thomas G. Walsh notes that 
numerous intellectuals and social scientists, who have assumed secularization 
theory,480 conclude religion will naturally and progressively wither away as humans 
develop over time. If this projection proves to be true, then the public demand for 
religious education would understandably be further diminished. However, as Berger 
found, from the latter part of the nineteenth-century to contemporary times, a broader 
resurgence of religion also suggests a process of desecularization.481 Berger argues, 
‘The world today, with some exceptions […], is as furiously religious as it ever was, 
and in some places more so than ever. This [… indicates] that a whole body of 
literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled “secularization theory” is 
essentially mistaken.’482Amidst contemporary conflicting contentions regarding 
religion and its status in the world, in the context of more pluralistic religious and 
cultural societies, the demand for the inclusion of religious education in the public 
education system has, in fact, dramatically increased.  
 The diverse reasoning regarding the State’s aim for education, particularly 
religious education, as well as conflicting perceptions of its application, contribute to 
engendering conflicts between the State and religion. On the one hand, as I concluded 
in Chapter 3, political liberalism’s approach to education overemphasizes the role of 
the State in the name of creation of future citizens with a capacity for justice. 
                                                 
479 Thomas G. Walsh, ‘Religion, Peace and the Post-Secular Public Sphere’, International Journal on 
World Peace, 29, 2 (June 2012), Introduction section (para. 3 of 92). Walsh asserts that even though 
religion has frequently contributed to conflict and violence, more substantially it has ‘served to advance 
the cause of peace in many profound and substantial ways, including its calls for practices such as non-
violence, restraint of acquisitiveness, forgiveness, reconciliation, and just-war theory.’ Walsh 
proclaims: ‘If we attribute the discounting of religion’s role in public affairs to the European 
Enlightenment, and that intellectual and social movement’s legacy, as expressed in Marxism, 
Darwinism, scientific reductionism, positivism, methodological atheism and secularization theory, it 
may be said that the widespread denial of religion’s significance is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating 
back only a few hundred years.’ Walsh explains that secularization depicts that as ‘rationality, science, 
modernization and the exposure to pluralism unfold’ (Walsh, ‘Religion, Peace’, Introduction section, 
para. 15 of 92), religious worldviews will become recessive. 
479 Secularization theory which originated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Walsh, 
‘Religion, Peace’, Introduction section, para. 8 of 92). 
480 Secularization theory originated in the 19th and early 20th century (para. 8 of 92) in Walsh, 
Religion and Peace section. 
481 George Padmore, History of the Pan-African Congress (London: Hammersmith Books, 1963), pp. 
130–34. 
482 Peter L. Berger, ‘The Desecularization of the Global World: An Overview’, in The Desecularization 
of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. ed. Peter L. Berger (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 1–18 (p. 2). 
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Although in itself an honorable goal as agreed by BD, nevertheless, this tactic 
potentially infringes on parents’ religious freedom by justifying State intervention, 
even as far as nonpublic education is concerned. On the other hand, adherents of 
principled pluralism defend the legitimacy of educational choice so that diverse 
education models, including a certain degree of religious education, may be made 
available to even State-funded, private-sector managed schools. Most principled 
pluralist adherents also acknowledge that the state has a duty to provide, as well, a 
‘secular’ public system483 alongside others. Although concerns from both adherents 
of political liberalism and principled pluralism, seemingly opposing sides, appear 
legitimate, I assert that the resolutions to diverse conflicting perceptions cannot be 
obtained by a secularized public education system for the former (political liberalism) 
nor can the traditional sectarian education model be restored as a viable solution. I 
assert that principled pluralism provides a better option, though not without flaws. As 
I conclude in Chapter 3, principled pluralism could provide a more consistent, 
sufficient foundation for religious freedom than political liberalism when it comes to 
addressing conflicting views about religious education in government-funded 
schools.484 
4.2 Religious Education in State-funded Public Schools     
Just as the word ‘education’485 defies a universal, concrete definition, methods for 
implementing the educational process vary. Johann Friedrich Herbart486 (1776–
                                                 
483 Ashley Rogers Berner, Pluralism and American Public Education: No One Way to School (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 37, note 47.  
484 This refers to basic education for children before they attend college.  
485 Srinibas Bhattacharya, Foundations of Education (Darya, Ganj, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & 
Dist, 1996), p. 5. Bhattacharya notes that education evolves from the Latin term ‘educare’ which means 
to ‘bring up[,] to foster, to lead.’ Leading or bringing up a child in the way he should go also alludes to 
Proverbs 22:6, which encourages those who educate or train a child, with the intent to instill the right 
values in him/her (ESV). 
486 Nel Noddings, Philosophy of Education (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), p.20. ‘An early advocate 
of scientific methods in education, [..] Teachers must prepare students for new material by bringing to 
consciousness relevant experiences students have stored in the apperceptive mass. Then teachers and 
students can go on to shape the new material so that it is deposited accurately and is accessible for 
future use. [Herbart’s] method is highly cognitive and emphasizes the activity of the teacher more than 
that of the student.’  
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1841)487 and Friedrich Wilhelm August Froebel488 (1783–1852),489 prominent 
philosophers of education, promoted diverse2 methods in their approaches to 
education. Nevertheless, they agreed regarding the definitive goal or purpose of all 
education – developing moral character. Herbart believed that teaching methods 
should be designed to match the way minds work.490 Froebel utilized the metaphorical 
approach and considered kindergarten to depict a garden where children develop, 
grow, and bloom.   
 Teaching methods as well as the types of education systems for children also 
vary. I am focusing on the public education system, considering implications of both 
political liberalism and principled pluralism for government-funded schools relating 
to public education. I address the pedagogical question: How can religious education 
best be implemented in government-funded, increasingly secularized schools without 
violating the State’s impartiality to any religion while simultaneously protecting 
religious freedom for all?  
 
4.2.1 Schools in Four Liberal States   
Internationally, depending on the designs of educational institutions in different 
countries, the classification of schools varies sharply. For instance, in the United 
States, private and public schools differ in multiple ways; however, their sources of 
funding portray the primary difference between them. The U.S. Department of 
Education reports that the U.S. government provides funding per student for public 
schools. As private schools do not receive government funding in the United States, 
and rely solely on tuition cost to support their school, they typically charge tuition for 
each student.491 However, as I will demonstrate in the following sections, this kind of 
classification and application totally differs from the Dutch school system because 
most private schools in Netherlands, like the American public schools, receive 
government funding. Moreover, various funding sources under different 
                                                 
487 Norbert Hilgenheger, ‘Johann Friedrich Herbart’, Prospects: The Quarterly Review of Comparative 
Education, 23, 3–4 (1993), pp. 649–64 (p. 649). 
488 Noddings, Philosophy of Education, ‘[I]nfluenced by Rousseau, [Froebel] is best known as the 
father of the kindergarten’ p. 21. 
489 V. R. Taneja, Educational Thought and Practice (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt., 1995), p. 
122.  
490 Noddings, Philosophy of Education, p. 20.  
491 U.S. Department of Education Office of Innovation and Improvement Office of Non-Public 
Education, State Regulation of Private Schools (2009) <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm 
/choice/regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf> [accessed 23 April 2015]. 
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classifications of schools will determine if the administration of the school with be on 
a national or local level, as well as whether the government or a nongovernment 
agency designs and controls the school’s curriculum, Furthermore, in contrast to the 
consensus of accepting religious education in purely privately funded schools, 
including homeschools, the degree of allowance or tolerance of religious education 
under various countries’ school systems can differ dramatically.  In turn, the 
differences regarding children’s access to religious education could serve as a major 
indicator of religious freedom in a State.   
In the following sections, I outline the school classifications of each of the 
four selected countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the 
Netherlands. I then point to different funding sources, the role of government and 
nongovernment sectors in curriculum design, and school management under different 
school systems. I also present an account of how each type of school in each country 
deals with religious education. 
 
4.2.1.1 Schools in the United States 
The general educational system in the United States includes, public, charter, non-
public (includes parochial and private schools), and home schools. American and 
international law attribute the primary responsibility for the education of children to 
their parents – not the State. Nevertheless, since the inception of the U.S. Republic, its 
cities and States have primarily provided public schooling, which has led to various 
levels of contemporary governments functioning as primary educators for U.S. 
citizens. In the United States, though the federal government contributes almost 10 
percent to the national education budget, education is primarily the responsibility of 
state and local governments. Subsequently, its curriculum and management are 
primarily designed and controlled by government through local school districts. Thus, 
every state has great control over what is taught in its schools and over the 
requirements that a student must meet, and it is also responsible for the funding of 
schooling. In most states, the public education system is further divided into local 
school districts, which are managed by a school board representing the local 
community.492   
                                                 
492Antonella Corsi-Bunker, ‘Guide to the Education System in the United States’ (University of 
Minnesota, n.d.) <https://isss.umn.edu/publications/USEducation/2.pdf> [accessed 18 March 2018]. 
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Charter schools, in contrast to public schools, receive funding from both 
government and nongovernment sources, including individuals. While charter schools 
follow public schools’ curriculum, they are managed though an independent, 
individual board of directors, rather than a local school district board. The private and 
parochial schools obtain funding from individuals, religious institutions, and grants 
from charitable organizations but do not receive any government funding. The 
management of nonpublic and home schools, including school administration and 
curriculum design, are totally autonomous, and therefore free of interference from 
both federal and local governments.        
Religious education in public-funded schools has been controversial for 
decades. Currently, religious education is not permitted in public or charter schools 
but may be taught in nonpublic and home schools. In the United States, most 
elementary and secondary private schools are religiously- oriented, with religious 
education permitted in their curriculum.       
 In home schools, instead of sending their children to a school facility for their 
education, parents teach their child/ren at home. Many parents who send their children 
to private schools primarily do so to preserve their religious values.   
 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the case of Abington 
School District v. Schempp in 1963 that banned religious exercises, prayers and Bible 
readings in public schools, the controversy over the rights and freedom for religious 
education in public school has continued. One major concern regarding that ruling – 
forbidding these religious exercises in public schools in the name of anti-
establishment of religion – the State, in essence, confines the free exercise of religion 
into private spheres, and promotes secularism to fill the vacuum in the public square. 
As Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart noted in his dissent of that case: 
If religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed in 
an artificial and state-created disadvantage[...]. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus 
is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of 
secularism, or at least, as governmental support of the beliefs of those who think that religious 
exercises should be conducted only in private.493 
 
While I share the concern expressed by the ‘Majority Opinion’ regarding the 
protection of religious pluralism for all citizens, that ruling may have gone too far. I 
reason that some religious education is warranted in public schools. Even though 
                                                 
493 Terry Eastland, Religious Liberty in the Supreme Court (Washington: Ethics and Public Policy, 
1993), p. 59. 
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Justice Tom Clark, author of ‘Majority Opinion’ in that case, appeared to insist that 
public education should be secular-orientated, he acknowledged the fundamental 
value of learning about religion for students’ pedagogical and civility building 
purposes. Bruce Grelle argues that ‘the Supreme Court sought to make it clear that 
learning and teaching about religion in the public schools is perfectly consistent with 
constitutional principles.494According to Justice Clark:  
[…] it might well be said that one’s education is not complete without a study of comparative 
religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It 
certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study of its literary and historic qualities. 
Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible and of religion, when 
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected 
consistently with the First Amendment.495 
 
In the United States, two concerns exist in relation to religious education and 
their associated responses. Religious groups who desire to maintain the integrity of 
their faith primarily align with the first concern, traditionally recognized as ‘free 
exercise.’ As they strive to avoid State endorsement of any religion, adherents of both 
classical liberalism and political liberalism align with the second concern, known as 
‘nonestablishment.’ Scott A. Merriman explains that two clauses exist in the First 
Amendment: (1) the free exercise clause, which protects the free exercise of religion; 
and (2) the establishment clause, which refers to protection from any government-
established religion.    
As numerous courts and leaders have argued that if the State and religion were 
to oppose, or to exhibit indifference to each other, they will be promoting one blatant, 
massive misunderstanding regarding the doctrine of State–religion separation. This 
kind of overt application of separation between religion and state in the education 
field has positioned parents with strong religious affiliations in jeopardy. It 
disadvantages these parents economically by unfairly coercing them into paying an 
excessive amount of tuition. Even though these parents previously contributed to 
public education expenses through tax payments for their children’s private school 
education, they are penalized if they choose to engage their children’s education in 
alignment with their own religion or religious tradition. Moreover, I would argue, as 
stated in Chapter 2, that by banning religious education in public and charter schools, 
                                                 
494 Bruce Grelle, ‘Religion and Public Education in the United States Politics, Ethics, Law, Pedagogy 
in Religion and Public Education in the United States and Germany (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2007), eds. Dagmar Pruin, Rolf Schieder, and Johannes Zachhuber, pp.77–90 (p. 81). 
495 Abington v. Schempp, Digital History ID 4087, <http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_ 
textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4087> [accessed 18 March 2018] para. 3 in Section III. 
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the U.S. educational system could be found violating, to a certain extent, the 
international norms regarding parents’ religious freedom.  According to these 
standards, the State has an obligation to facilitate parents’ choice for their children’s 
education according to their religious preference. 
Therefore, to best protect religious freedom for all, and increase dialogues and 
civility, as well as economic equality among all faiths and adherents in the public 
education system, I propose that religious education proves both necessary and 
needed in the public education environment. Table 5 portrays four types of schools in 
the United States, as well as their funding source, curriculum, management, and 
attitude toward religious education. 
 
Table 5: Four Types of Schools in the United States and their Attributes.496 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Schools in the United Kingdom 
The first type of school I note in this section, the most usual form of school in the 
United Kingdom, are community schools or State schools. Other schools include faith 
schools, free schools, academies and faith academies, and private schools.497 State 
schools, controlled by the local council, and funded by the government, must follow 
the U.K. national curriculum. In State schools, religious education is integral to the 
curriculum.    
                                                 
496 Original table created from research undertaken for this subsection. 
497 Types of Schools, <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school> [accessed 3 December 2017]. 
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Faith schools, the second type of school I single out, must also adhere to and 
follow the national curriculum. Religious education is also fundamental to the 
curriculum in faith schools; however, these schools can choose the material they teach 
in religious studies. Faith schools may have different admissions criteria and staffing 
policies than State schools;498 nevertheless, anyone can apply for a place in them. 
 The United Kingdom funds ‘free schools’, the third type of school that I 
examine but the local council does not manage them, nor does the State require these 
schools to follow the national curriculum. Free schools run on a not-for-profit basis, 
retain more control over finances, conditions for staff and their pay, the school 
schedule, and school terms. ‘They’re ‘all-ability’ schools, so can’t use academic 
selection processes like a grammar school.’499 Religious education is permitted in 
these schools. The following groups can set up Free schools:    
     
 charities, 
 universities, 
 independent schools, 
 community and faith groups, 
 teachers, 
 parents, and 
 businesses.500 
 
A governing body, independent from the local council, manages academies, 
the fourth type of school that I observe in the United Kingdom. These schools can 
follow a different curriculum than the U.K.’s national curriculum. These government-
funded independent schools, managed by an academy trust which employs the 
school’s staff, can also establish their own terms and times. However, they must 
adhere to the same rules as other State schools regarding admissions, special 
educational needs, and exclusions. ‘Some academies have sponsors such as 
businesses, universities, other schools, faith groups or voluntary groups. Sponsors are 
responsible for improving the performance of their schools.’501 Faith academies have 
their own admissions process, and may be partially government funded, and are also 
                                                 
498 ‘Faith Schools’ in Types of Schools, <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/faith-schools> [accessed 
3 December 2017]. 
499 ‘Free schools’, in Types of Schools, <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/free-schools> [accessed 3 
December 2017]. 
500 ‘Free schools.’ 
501 ‘Academies’, in Types of Schools, <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/academies> [accessed 3 
December 2017]. 
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exempt from teaching the national curriculum and differ from nonfaith academies as 
they implement their own admissions processes.502 Religious education is permitted in 
nonfaith academies and integral in faith academies.     
 Private schools, the fifth type of school noted in this section, also known as 
‘independent schools,’ are not funded by the government. Private schools charge fees 
for students to attend, but the pupils do not have to follow the national curriculum.  
These schools must register with the government. Some private schools specialize in 
educating children with special educational needs. The Office for Standards in 
Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted), the Independent Schools 
Inspectorate, and the School Inspection Service, government agencies, inspect private 
schools regularly.503         
 Suzanne Newcombe asserts that English law, applicable in two U.K. nations, 
England and Wales, does not mandate the separation of State and religion. Nor, even 
with the establishment of the Church of England, does the legislation of these nations 
offer any distinct provision for the State to recognize a group as a religion. In each of 
the four nations of the United Kingdom, although the law requires that every child 
receives full-time education, parents may opt to educate their children in church/faith 
schools, in independent schools, or at home.504 Newcombe explains that parents of 
most 5–16-year-olds in the United Kingdom register their children with a ‘maintained 
school’, supported by public funding. The local education authority oversees and 
reports the schools’ standards to Ofsted to ensure that schools comply with 
legislation.505  
Newcombe notes that some religious schools in the United Kingdom hesitate 
to include teachings about faiths that differ from their own. In many U.K. schools, as 
teachers often report feeling insecure in sharing information about this critical, 
frequently controversial subject, religious education does not merit a high rating. An 
Islamic school incident in 2011 reflects that the United Kingdom appears to promote 
religious freedom in the State’s education system.506 The incident began with Ofsted 
carrying out an inspection at the Institute of Islamic Education in Dewsbury in 2011. 
                                                 
502 Types of Schools. 
503 ‘Private Schools’, in Types of Schools, <https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/private-schools> 
[accessed 3 December 2017]. 
504 Newcombe, ‘Religious Education.’ 
505 Newcombe, ‘Religious education.’ 
506 Lewis, ‘Between Lord Ahmed.’ 
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This gave rise for concerns, however, when, despite the school’s practice of isolating 
students from outside influences and threatening to reprimand any students interacting 
with children other than Muslims, Ofsted rated the school as ‘good.’ Such a school 
ethos led to students who reportedly excelled in understanding their own beliefs not 
being able to understand or empathize with individuals from faiths and backgrounds 
that differed from their own. 
The concern for potentially teaching or indoctrinating students for religious 
extremism, as well as the lack of understanding of other religions, particularly in 
Islamic homogeneous schools, prompted some citizens to call for governmental 
intervention on privately funded school curriculum and management. Jack Straw, a 
former Home Secretary, warned that just as Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, or Christians must 
respect U.K. values, schools with many Muslim students must also do likewise.507 
While I believe the U.K. government and the public have a legitimate interest in 
combating religious extremism and promoting citizenry virtues for national security 
protection, I assert that the proposed solution will not be sufficient nor necessary.  
 The proposal will be insufficient in solving the controversy because of the 
difficulty in defining ‘British values.’  While some British officials list values such as 
‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of 
those with different faiths and beliefs,,508 no historical unified national consensus 
seems to exist. ‘British values are necessarily a work in progress. Defining them is in 
fact about setting out how we want to be now, or what we could achieve if we put our 
minds to it. They’re [...] subject to change, very much part of politics.’509 Moreover, 
even if assuming that we knew what these British values were, it would never be 
enough to prevent radical violent extremists and terrorists ‘in our midst from wanting 
on occasions to kill their neighbours on God's behalf.’510    
                                                 
507 Laura Clark, ‘Muslim Schools Must Respect British Values, Declares Jack Straw as Birmingham 
MP Admits there is a “Trojan Horse” Plot by Extremists’, Daily Mail (London), 22 April 2014, 
<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2609332/Islamic-school-hardliners-confiscated-Easter-
eggs-pupils-head-Ofsted-takes-charge-inquiry-Muslim-Trojan-Horse-plot.html> [accessed 13 
December 2017]. 
508 Department for Education and Lord Nash, ‘Guidance on Promoting British Values in Schools 
Published’, 27 November 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting- 
british-values-in-schools-published> [accessed 21 March 2018]. 
509 David Shariatmadari, ‘What are British values? You asked Google – here’s the answer’, Guardian, 
3 February 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/03/what-are-british-values-
google#comments> [accessed 21 March 2018]. 
510 Linda Colley, ‘British values, whatever they are, won't hold us together’, Guardian, 17 May 2006 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/may/18/comment.britishidentity> [accessed 21 
March 2018]. 
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 Therefore, instead of imposing any new government curriculum into the 
privately funded religious school, I believe that the U.K. government should increase 
religious education on diverse religions and beliefs in public-funded schools. Doing 
this would likely decrease controversy or discontent among some religious faithful 
who could perceive any new imposed syllabus as government intrusion into religious 
freedom for them. It could also encourage those faith-based schools, especially 
homogeneous religious-based ones, to voluntarily engage in civil dialogues with 
different faiths or religious traditions for developing common good and citizenship. 
 Table 6 reflects differences between five different school types in the United 
Kingdom and identifies sources by which they are funded, the curriculum for the type 
of school, the management source, and the attitude the school holds toward religious 
education. 
Table 6: Five Types of U.K. Schools and their Attributes.511 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Schools in France 
Three types of schools in France, which I note in this section, include State or public 
schools, State-funded and controlled private schools, and privately funded schools. 
                                                 
511 Sanchez, ‘Just What IS A Charter.’  
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State schools, which the government funds and runs must follow the government 
curriculum. The center or government strongly controls the first kind of school I 
introduce, the highly centrailized State schools. The government manages these 
schools in the areas of curricula, financing, and organization, as well as in standards, 
teacher recruitment, and training. The government determines the structure of schools 
in the different regions and controls the overall rules that are used to direct these 
schools. Religious education is not taught in public schools in France. No subject is 
specifically devoted to the study of religion in public schools, and any teaching 
covering religion in subjects such as history, French or philosophy must be purely 
informational.512 
Two types of private schools exist in France: (1) those contracted to the 
French government, State-funded and controlled private schools; and (2) those that 
are noncontracted to the French government, privately funded schools. State-funded 
and controlled private schools, the second type of school I explore in this section, 
‘adhere to the terms and conditions of their contract with the government. In 
exchange, the State pays their teaching staff. Local authorities fund these 
establishments to the same extent as state schools.’ 513  
Privately funded schools, the third type of school I examine in this section, are 
not funded or managed by the State but must register with the Ministry of 
Education.514  Privately funded schools are subject to government inspections not only 
of their teaching but their management. All staff in these schools ‘must possess the 
required qualifications. The teaching provided must comply with French education 
law and meet minimum standards of knowledge.’515 Although a recognized secular 
State, which characterizes faith schools as private establishments, France typically 
allocates financial support for certain religious institutions. The State provides 
government funding ‘to offset the cost of private schooling. Regarding funding and 
management, nonpublic schools have the following options: 
                                                 
512 R. Jackson, ‘Is Diversity Changing Religious Education? Religion, Diversity and Education in 
Today’s Europe’ (2009) <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2931/1/WRAP_Jackson_ Jackson_Nordic_ 
2009_chapter1-2154.pdf /> [accessed 18 March 2018], p. 20.  
513 ‘Education’, Welcome to France. <https://www.welcometofrance.com/en/education> [accessed 19 
March 2018], Different Types of Schools section.  
514 Expatica, ‘Schools in France: State, Private, Bilingual and International Schools’ (2017) 
<https://www.expatica.com/fr/education/French-education-schools-in-France_476645.html> [accessed 
29 November 2017]. 
515 ‘Education’, Welcome to France.  
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1. to continue completely independent of government intervention, subject to  
   employing qualified teachers;  
2. to be absorbed into the national public education system;  
3. to accept government requirements as to curriculum and testing in  
      exchange for staff salaries (contrat simple); and  
4.  to accept, in addition, some government control over pedagogy and the  
      selection of teachers, in exchange for operating expenses as well as salaries 
    (contrat d'association).516  
 
 Some private (faith) schools, for example Catholic schools and most 
elementary schools, which have limited funding needs, choose the contrat simple, 
number 3 above. Many secondary schools which  have higher operating costschoose 
the contrat d'association, number 4 above. ‘Schools receiving funds from the contrat 
d'association must demonstrate that they have a distinctive character or philosophy 
not catered to in the public system.’ 517 Private schools not religiously orientated 
usually decide to remain independent of government intervention; nevertheless, they 
receive a stipulated amount of public funding under an alternate law.  
 Myriam Hunter-Henin warns that even though the French government 
recognizes particular rights for schools under the right to religious freedom, the 
understanding as well as legal standing of these rights may vary as different 
individuals routinely subject them to diverse interpretations. Because of the French 
law on the Separation of the Church and State, France created the Department of 
Religions (Bureau Central des Cultes) to oversee religious organizations. This body 
controls the finances and ‘oversees the maintenance and the use of religious public 
assets.’518 This bureau registers ‘religious organizations’ and grants certain benefits 
and legal privileges like tax exemption and the right to receive donations and 
legacies.519 The French Republic reports that as it guarantees freedom of religion, it 
does not recognize or support any specific religion. France not only represents the 
solitary State in Europe that does not claim an official religion, it does not provide 
funding for its churches, nor does it provide religious education in its schools.520  
                                                 
516 ‘Indicator 45: Source of Funds for Education: What is “Public” and “Private” Education’, National 
Center for Education Statistics <https://nces.ed.gov/pubs/eiip/eiip45s1.asp> [accessed 19 March 2018]. 
517 ‘Indicator 45: Source’. 
518 Véronique Altglas, ‘French Cult Controversy at the Turn of the New Millennium: Escalation, 
Dissensions and New Forms of Mobilisations across the Battlefield’, in The Centrality of Religion in 
Social Life: Essays in Honour of James A. Beckford, ed. Eileen Barker (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 55–68 (p. 61). 
519Altglas, ‘French Cult’, p. 61. 
520 Palmer, The New Heretics. 
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Since attacks by radical Islamists in January 2015, which killed 241 people, 
France’s education minister introduced the secular teaching of religious facts to 
emphasize moral and civic education in schools as well as to promote respect for 
freedom of speech and opinion.521 As France has highlighted the problems that the 
growing ignorance of young people regarding religion has posed, in 2002, Régis 
Debray wrote to the French minister of education: 
[T]he teaching of ‘religious facts’ (fait religieux) clearly establishes the fact that the 
disappearance among many young people of any reference to religious culture prevents them 
from understanding an essential part of their own heritage, as well as the contemporary 
world. Ignorance and a lack of cultural reference cut young people off from their own roots 
and create problems for them in acquiring certain fields of knowledge. More importantly, it 
lays the foundation for intolerance and prejudice. Teaching about religions and other 
convictions, together with the broader objective of intercultural and citizenship education for 
young people, should play a very important role in reversing this trend.522  
 
 In the past, rather than providing religious education for students attending 
State schools, the French appear intent on inoculating citizens from the threat to 
freedom that new religious movements or cults may wield. As France considers pupils 
to be public beings once inside the school setting and that religion should be confined 
to the private realm,523 the State’s method for ‘teaching’ (emphasis mine) religious 
education, I contend, portrays a mixture of the separatist and secularist approaches.  
I agree with Debray regarding the value of religious education being adopted in State 
schools, not only in France but in all States. Confronting ignorance of religion with 
facts through religious education can help the State strengthen religious freedom for 
all, no matter the type of school.                              
 Registration fees for parents of students attending private schools may be 
considered expensive. Nevertheless, funding for private schools has become 
increasingly public and under the association contract, totals approximately the same 
as fees in the public sector. Xavier Pons, Agnès Van Zanten, and Sylvie Da Costa 
point out that ‘the State subsidises teachers, curriculum, organization of diplomas, etc. 
and [… local authorities have charge of] the school premises, classroom equipment 
and school meals. The funding by local authorities often allows private schools to pay 
                                                 
521 AFP, ‘France Treads Fine Line Teaching Religion in Secular Schools’, Digital Journal, 20 October 
2017 <https://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/france-treads-fine-line-teaching-religion-in-secular-
schools/article/505522> [accessed 29 November 2017]. 
522 Luce Pépin, Teaching About Religions in European School Systems Policy Issues and Trends 
(London: Alliance Publishing Trust, 2009), p. 10. 
523 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom.  
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the salaries of non-teaching members of staff.’524 In addition, although principal 
municipalities are not obliged to fund private primary schools under the simple 
contract, they increasingly do so. In primary education, municipalities also pay fees 
for students who study in private schools outside the city.     
 Table 7 portrays differences between schools in France, relates sources of the 
schools’ funding as well as the kinds of curriculum for each type of school. It also 
lists the management source, and the attitude the school holds toward religious 
education. 
Table 7: Four Types of Schools and Attributes in France.525 
 
School 
Classification 
 
 
Funding 
Source 
 
Curriculum 
 
 
Management 
 
 
Religious 
Education 
 
State or public 
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Not Permitted 
State-funded 
private Schools  
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Not Permitted 
Privately funded 
schools 
 
NonGovernment 
 
NonGovernment 
 
NonGovernment 
 
Permitted 
 
 
4.2.1.4 Schools in the Netherlands  
In this section, I present four types of schools in the Dutch education system.  
These include public, private, international, and home schools. The Netherlands fund 
public schools, the first type of school I examine. The Dutch government also 
finances private schools, the second type of schools I explore. These schools rank on 
an equal basis with public schools. Nevertheless, given the central government’s 
direct financing of private schools' expenditure on the same basis as schools governed 
by municipalities, they are not as independent as private schools in most other 
                                                 
524 Xavier Pons, Agnès Van Zanten, and Sylvie Da Costa, ‘The National Management of Public and 
Catholic Schools in France: Moving from a Loosely Coupled Towards an Integrated System?’ 
Comparative Education, Taylor & Francis (Routledge) (2015) 51, 1, pp.57–70 (p. 61). 
525Sanchez, ‘Just What IS A Charter.’  
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countries.526 Because state grants assist private schools, their number surpasses public 
schools. 527 As the State’s funding also encompasses religious schools,528 this 
contributes to decreasing differences in student characteristics.529 Conversely, the 
number of Dutch children who attend private schools remains high.  
 All state-subsidized schools in the Netherlands must follow government rules, 
which includes using the State’s mandated curriculum. For both public and private 
schools, the State directly pays the salaries of teachers, funds schools’ educational 
buildings, and absorbs other school costs. The State also covers all expenses for 
management and administration of the schools. The primary difference between 
public and private schools is that, under certain prescribed conditions, only the latter 
may deny enrolling any prospective pupils. Moreover, private schools, unlike public 
schools, may charge fees for extracurricular activities. 
The 2016 report published by the Centre for Civil Society summarized the 
following details about schools in the Netherlands:   
A central provision of the Dutch Constitution is that all schools, public and independent, are 
funded on an equal basis if they observe statutory regulations. These include having a 
minimum of 260 students, licensed teachers, and a school plan with attainment targets 
approved by the government-appointed school inspector. The Dutch education system is made 
up of three major types of schools: public schools, Catholic or Protestant independent schools 
and non-denominational independent schools. Each of these groups of schools has national 
organizations for parents. This produces a large degree of school choice in the Netherlands, 
one of the education system’s primary strengths. Independent schools are very popular, and 
two-thirds of government-funded schools are independent. Teachers in both public and 
independent schools are paid according to the same salary scales.530 
 Religious education in public and private schools in the Netherlands is 
described as both self-evident and controversial.531 Paul Vermeer notes that: On the 
one hand, religious education portrays an integral part of the curriculum in most 
schools in the Netherlands, while on the other hand, some students consider religion 
                                                 
526 Paul Vermeer, ‘Religious Indifference and Religious Education in the Netherlands: A Tension 
Unfolds’, <Theo-Web. Zeitschrift für Religionspädagogik 12 (2013), H.1, 79-94> p. 79. 
527 Pépin, Teaching about Religions, p. 15. 
528 Vexen Crabtree, ‘Faith Schools, Sectarian Education and Segregation: Divisive Religious Behavior 
(UK Case Study)’ (2010) <https:// www.human religions.info/faithschools.htm> [accessed 12 October 
2016] last para. in Section 9. The British understanding of a religious-orientated private school 
correlates to perceiving the school to reflect a religious-orientated environment, like that of a seminary. 
Crabtree appears to suggest that religious-orientated private schools in the United Kingdom may 
encompass the potential for religious extremism and indoctrination. 
529 Belfield and D’Entremont, ‘Catholic Schooling.’ 
530 Centre for Civil Society, ‘Best Practices in Regulation of Private Education’, 
<http://ccs.in/sites/default/ files/research/research-best-practices-in-regulation-of-private-
education.pdf> [accessed 19 March 2018], p. 11. 
531 Pépin, Teaching about Religions, p. 19. 
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to increasingly be out of date and irrelevant.532 This negative situation reportedly 
evolved from the tension between the following two ‘facts’ regarding the position of 
religious education in Dutch schools:  
1. Dutch society is becoming a secular society, while religious education is 
confessional. As a result, the aim of religious education increasingly conflicts 
with the religious background of students. 
2. Separate religious education classes form part of the curriculum only in 
religiously affiliated schools and are permitted as a legitimate expression of 
the school’s religious identity. The state, therefore, imposes no general 
educational aims […regarding] religious education.533 
 
       No national syllabus, nor curriculum, nor any general, nor any professional or 
educational requirements exist for teachers of religious education classes. Neither  
has the school inspectorate assessed or evaluated the quality of religious education 
classes. Basically, the status of religious education dramatically differs from any other 
public or private schools’ classes. Except for funding teachers’ salaries, the Dutch 
State does not appear to actively involve itself in any related, religious education 
rapport. 
 Dutch private faith schools enjoy full liberty on religious education to 
students. The Dutch State allows religious schools to create their own curriculum and 
implement teaching aids that complement their religious principles. Each primary 
school curricula includes the subject ‘teaching world religion and worldviews 
(teaching about religion),’ 534  This subject, introduced in 1985, aims to increase 
tolerance in Dutch society. 
 The Ministry of Education funds Dutch International Schools, the third type of 
school that I note in this section. These schools align with the structure of the the 
Dutch educational system; however, the Dutch government does not cover fees that 
International Schools charge for students.  International Schools use English as the 
medium to teach their international curricula and are subject to inspections by the 
Dutch authorities. Because the Dutch International schools are allied with regular 
                                                 
532 Paul Vermeer, ‘Religious Indifference and Religious Education in the Netherlands: A Tension 
Unfolds’, <Theo-Web. Zeitschrift für Religionspädagogik>, 12 (2013), H.1, pp. 79–94 p. 87. 
533  Vermeer, ‘Religious Indifference and Religious’, p. 79. 
534 Henk Pol, ‘Religious education in Dutch schools.’ <http://mmiweb.org.uk/eftreold/reeurope/ 
netherlands_2013.pdf> [accessed 19 March 2018], p. 1 
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Dutch schools, to qualify for admittance, a student must comply with one of the 
following three stipulations: 
1. The student has a non-Dutch nationality and has a parent who is working in 
the Netherlands (or in a Dutch border region) for a temporary period; 
2. The student has Dutch nationality and has lived and gone to school abroad for 
at least two years because a parent was stationed abroad; 
3. The student has Dutch nationality and has a parent (with whom the student 
will be living) who will be stationed abroad within two years and for at least 
two years. This must be certified by a written statement from the parent’s 
employer.535 
 
 As in Dutch public and private schools, ‘confessional religious education’536 
in international schools is optional. Confessional religious education, a form of 
religious education, primarily aims to cultivate religious commitment to one particular 
faith,537 or, in other words, ‘to strengthen a “student’s belief in a particular religious 
tradition.” ’538 
 The Dutch government does not recognize homeschooling, the fourth type of 
school I examine. Furthermore, as the ‘Compulsory Education Act (Article 2, 
Paragraph 1) states, school attendance is mandatory’539 for children from the age of 5 
until the age of 16,  and parents and others who homeschool children face challenges 
those who homeschool in other countries may not encounter. The State may issue a 
religious exemption, however, for compulsory education. Home schools do not use 
government curriculum, nor do they receive any government funds. Teaching 
religious education in home schools is contingent on the educator’s discretion.  
 The subtle restriction on homeschooling in the name of  the State’s 
compulsory education raises concerns as it potentially poses a religious freedom issue. 
                                                 
535 Robert Westlake and Kees van Ruitenbeek, Dutch International Schools Annual Report, 
<http://www.dutchinternationalschools.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Dutch-International-Schools-
Annual-Report-2016.pdf> [accessed 20 March 2018], p. 4. 
536 Pépin, Teaching about Religions, p. 19  
537 Zdenko Kodelja, ‘Religious Education and the Teaching about Religions’, 
<https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-DG7VU9DH/e59ad208-3759-4776-a5e5-
e8d2b7bd18e4/PDF> [accessed 20 March 2018], p. 253. 
538 P. R. Hobson and J. S. Edwards, Religious Education in a Pluralist Society (London: Woburn Press, 
1999), pp. 17-18.  
539 Ruth Ploeger, ‘Homeschooling in Europe’, <https://europe.stripes.com/education/homeschooling-
europe> [accessed 22 March 2018] 
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Michael S. Merry and Sjoerd Karsten examined Dutch homeschooling and whether it 
restricts liberty. They present ‘[the following] three prominent concerns that might be 
brought against homeschooling’: 
1.  It aggravates social inequality;  
2.  worsens societal conflict;  
3.  works against the best interests of children.540 
 
Merry and Karsten argue that per the definition of homeschooling, this type of 
school does not constitute infringement. Instead of basing homeschooling cases on 
conjectures about hypothetical privatizing effects that reportedly threaten to consume 
social cohesion, good citizenship or autonomy, they should be based on evidence. 
Unless unmistakable evidence arises that a child’s wellbeing is being breached, 
restricting a legitimate liberty to choose homeschooling from an array of reasonable 
educational options depicts an injustice.541 Merry and Karsten stress that unless the 
government’s concerns are sufficient to substantiate an intervention to ensure the 
fundamental, as well as the best interests of children, or by State oversight on safety, 
deciding to homeschool seems congruent with any significant analysis of the liberty 
for one to follow his/her conscience. 
In terms of government funding for religious education in both public and 
private faith schools, the Dutch education policy displays more consistency to 
international religious freedom standards than the other three countries I surveyed in 
this section. However, I agree with Merry and Karsten regarding their concern 
relating to the potential infringement of religious liberty for students and parents who 
choose homeschooling. I recommend that instead of passively issuing exemptions for 
compulsory education to homeschoolers, the Dutch government should follow the 
model which the U.S., French, and U.K. governments have adopted. This would be 
acknowledging the full legitimacy of the homeschooling system with minimal State 
interference, unless otherwise enshrined under international norms on religious 
freedom. I assert that the State should protect the freedom of parents to choose the 
                                                 
540 Michael S. Merry and Sjoerd Karsten, ‘Restricted Liberty, Parental Choice  
and Homeschooling’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 44, 4 (2010), pp. 497–514 (p. 497).  
541 Merry and Karsten, ‘Restricted Liberty, Parental’, p. 511. 
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type of education they deem will best benefit their children in accord with their 
religious convictions or preference. 
 Table 8 lists the classifications of schools in the Netherlands, funding sources, 
curriculums, managements, and determinations toward religious education.  
 
Table 8: Four Types of Schools and their Attributes in the Netherlands.542 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
542 Original table created from research undertaken for this subsection. 
 
School 
Classification 
 
Funding 
Source 
 
Curriculum 
 
 
Management 
 
 
Religious 
Education 
 
Public 
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Government 
 
Not permitted 
 
Private 
 
Most are 
government 
funded, but                 
some are                
subsidised 
Government funded 
and contracted to the 
State; use government 
curriculum.                
Nongovernment funded 
and not contracted to 
the State; 
may use non-
Government 
curriculum. 
Government funded 
and contracted to the 
State; managed by 
the government.                
Nongovernment 
funded and not 
contracted to the 
State; managed by a 
nongovernment 
body. 
Not permitted in 
government-
funded schools 
and those 
contracted to the 
State.               
Permitted in non-
government 
funded schools 
and those not 
contracted to the 
State. 
Bilingual, 
international, and 
foreign 
 
Most are 
government 
funded, but                 
some are                
nongovernment 
funded 
Government funded 
and contracted to the 
State; use government 
curriculum.                
Nongovernment funded 
and not contracted to 
the State; 
use nongovernment 
curriculum. 
Government funded 
and contracted to the 
State; managed by 
the government.                
Nongovernment 
funded and not 
contracted to the 
State; managed by a 
nongovernment body 
Not permitted in 
government-
funded schools 
and those 
contracted to the 
State.               
Permitted in non-
Government 
funded schools 
and those not 
contracted to the 
State. 
 
 
Home schools 
 
Non-
government 
 
 
Nongovernment 
 
Nongovernment 
 
Permitted 
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4.2.1.5 Reflections on the Dutch Education Model 
As shown in the previous section, no other State noted equates with the less rigid 
separation yet more organic partnership of Church and State, than that which 
characterizes the Dutch model. Unlike the United States and France, the Netherlands 
provides for the exhibition of religious symbols, identities, and expressions in public, 
including school settings. In the Netherlands, no wall of separation doctrine exists as 
in the United States, nor is there any semblance of the French secular political nature 
in the Dutch Constitution. Maussen also notes that in the Netherlands: 
 Religious free exercise rights are also guaranteed by other legal regulations.These include not 
only constitutional articles, such as the articles on freedom of education and freedoms of association, 
but also general laws, such as the Public Manifestations Act of 1988 (protecting the right to the church 
bell ringing, the call to prayer, and Catholic processions for example).543 
 Although the Dutch education system initially evolved as a system in which 
Christianity was dominant, over time544 it has expanded to become more inclusive of 
other religions. In the contemporary Dutch education system, it appears that the State 
now establishes and oversees criteria for religious education.545 The State does not 
discriminate regarding funding for schools as it supports both State and religious 
schools. Consequently, this contributes to all students being able to achieve equally 
and the fact that the Netherlands funds all schools no matter what their ethos supports 
a more balanced educational environment. This, in turn, permits the Netherlands to 
provide a setting in which diverse religions can operate. Such a situation better 
addresses issues that could likely stagnate in a State with less religious freedom. 
 In addition to gleaning edifying practices from the Dutch, education systems 
can replicate positive concepts from the Toledo Guiding Principles.546 The Advisory 
Council of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Panel 
of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, with other experts and scholars, 
developed approaches to teaching about religions and beliefs in public schools in the 
participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). These principles help students develop an understanding of the diverse roles 
that religions hold in the contemporary, pluralistic world and are intended to offer: 
                                                 
543 Maussen, ‘Religious Governance in the Netherlands’, para. 13 of 42. 
544Arnold, The Popular Education, p. 204. 
545 Belfield and D’Entremont, ‘Catholic Schooling.’ 
546 ODIHR Advisory Council of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Toledo Guiding Principles 
on Teaching About Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights: Warsaw, 2007). 
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practical guidance for preparing curricula for teaching about religions and beliefs and 
preferred procedures for assuring fairness in the development of curricula. The starting point 
is the understanding that teaching about religions and beliefs is not devotionally and 
denominationally oriented. It strives for student awareness of religions and beliefs, but does 
not press for student acceptance of any of them; it sponsors study about religions and beliefs, 
not their practice; it may expose students to a diversity of religious and non-religious views, 
but does not impose any particular view; it educates about religions and beliefs without 
promoting or denigrating any of them; it informs students about various religions and beliefs, 
it does not seek to conform or convert students to any particular religion or belief.547 
 The Toledo Guiding Principles reiterate the value of religious education as one 
critical component to help protect religious freedom for all. Ideally, the religious 
education these principles encourage, like that which principled pluralism promotes, 
will establish positive boundaries for the State without sacrificing boundaries between 
the State and religion. 
 
4.2.2 Sanctioned Methods for Teaching Religious Education 
The trend to include religious education in public schools gives rise to a question 
which resounds across international headlines: Should RE be allocated a more 
prominent position in contemporary education, especially public education?548 If so, 
how can this demand best be met without risking the erosion of the boundary between 
the State and religion? In response to this query, I stress that to safeguard religious 
freedom for all, a goal that both political liberals and principled pluralists agree on, 
religious education should constitute an essential part of any education system, 
particularly in contemporary public education. In this subsection, I turn to examine 
five approaches to teaching religious education.     
 The term ‘religious education,’ like the word ‘education,’ cannot be 
specifically and precisely defined. Peter Schreiner considers religious education to 
constitute ‘any kind of religious teaching in public or private school, not in families or 
in the organisations of the faith communities.’549 Peter Tait, headmaster of Sherborne 
Preparatory School, stresses the need to implement teaching to cultivate morality550 
                                                 
547Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom. 
548 Joanne M. Marshall, ‘Religion and Education: Walking the Line in Public Schools’, Phi Delta 
Kappan, 85, 3 (2003), pp. 239–42.  
549 Peter Schreiner, ‘Religious Education in Europe’ (2005), Oslo University 
<https://www.comenius.de/themen/Religionsunterricht_Religionspaedagogik/Religious_Education_in_
Europe_Situation_Developments_2009.pdf> [accessed 1 December 2015] p. 3. 
550 Peter Tait, ‘We Should be Teaching Morals and Ethics in our Schools’, The Telegraph, 11 March 
2015 <https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/education/ educationopinion/11463380/We-should-be-teaching-
morals-and-ethics-in-our-schools.html> [accessed 15 December 2015]. 
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and help young people learn to consider behaviors and issues not merely according to 
typical contemporary measures of success but, instead, according to moral measures. 
 If the education of youth does not include proper ethical considerations, Tait 
stresses, as self-interest surpasses the quest for public good, the State faces the risk of 
society becoming increasingly fragmented, disjointed, and unstable. According to 
Tait, for young people to transition into adults who respect the rule of law, educators 
need to teach them about how to make moral choices. Educators need to help children 
obtain a value system as a base for their decision-making. This will help counter the 
prevalent negative mindset in many individuals who see breaking the law as 
acceptable if they do not get caught.  
 Teachings relating to morality are also needed to help achieve the ‘common 
good.’ The concept of common good, as I note in Chapter 2, complements Kuyper’s 
considerations of sphere sovereignty. The term also evolves from both religious and 
secular roots and dates back not only to Catholicism, Islam, Judaism, and 
Protestantism, but even the U.S. constitution, which proclaims that government 
should promote ‘the general welfare.’ Karen Chan describes common good as: 
the mutual and communal flourishing of many persons who live and act virtuously together in 
a community. The common good of a group or community will vary according to the 
members of the community, their needs, their goals, etc. Since there is no concrete definition 
of the common good, there is no set formula for reaching the common good.551  
 
 In the pursuit of cultivating morality and common good, Byrne reports that 
internationally, states typically implement one of the following three sanctioned 
approaches to implementing religious education. He identifies these classical methods 
as ‘ “learning into [also known as religious instruction],” “learning about,” and 
“learning from” religion.’552 Each teaching style possesses unique traits, yet they also 
simultaneously manifest overlapping characteristics. The ‘approaches tend to have 
different emphases on the role of the learner, the function of education, and the 
potential of dissent.’553 Ahdar and Leigh identify two additional kinds of approaches 
to RE that characterize attitudes which different states may implement toward 
                                                 
551 Karen Chan, ‘The Common Good and the Virtuous Political Leader’, in The Common Good: 
Chinese and for American Perspectives. eds. David Solomon and P.C. Lo (Notre Dame, IN: Springer, 
2014), pp. 221–42 (p. 14).  
552 Cathy Byrne, Religion in Secular Education: What in Heaven’s Name Are We Teaching Our 
Children? (Boston, MA: Brill, 2014). 
553 Byrne, Religion in Secular Education, p. 16. 
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religious education: the separatist approach and the extreme secularist approach.554 I 
consider these two approaches as well. 
 
4.2.2.1 Learning into Religion  
In the first of the three approaches to religious education which Byrne identifies, the 
process of learning into religion or religious instruction, students receive instruction in 
a single formative religious tradition. This approach seeks ‘to grow a member of a 
faith into that particular religious tradition by developing beliefs and practices that 
create membership.’555 Sometimes identified as ‘indoctrinatory,’ learning into models 
are also referred to as ‘confessiona,l’as Ahdar and Leigh allude to them,556 or 
‘enfaithing.’557 According to Ahdar and Leigh, religious instruction proposes to instill 
or develop religious beliefs in the learner. ‘The confessional approach was often 
associated with a formal link between an established religion and the State or at least 
with societies with a clear majority religion.’558 A minority of European countries, 
including the United Kingdom, continue to implement this partisan approach.  
  In addition to sending their children to a school using the religious instruction 
approach for faith-based reasons, some parents may also send their children to such a 
school due to concerns regarding safety. Joseph G. Kosciw and others report that 
research regarding U.S. students found that approximately 16.3 percent of students 
surveyed ‘reported feeling unsafe at school because of their religion, and students 
who identified their religion as something other than a Christian denomination (e.g. 
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu) or who said they did not have a religion were more likely to 
feel unsafe at school for this reason.’559 However, there is a question as to whether 
religious schools, including those using the religious instruction approach, prove 
better for students in regard to safety and academic quality than public schools.560 
                                                 
554 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, p. 267. 
555 Byrne, Religion in Secular Education, p. 16. 
556 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom. 
557 Byrne, Religion in Secular Education, p. 16. 
558 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom in, p. 267.  
559 Joseph G. Kosciw and others, The 2011 National School Climate Survey, The Experiences of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our Nation’s Schools (New York: Gay, Lesbian & 
Straight Education Network, 2012), p. 20. 
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 At times, the learning into religion approach to religious education, delivered 
by State-recognized religious providers, may routinely exclude nonreligious 
perspectives,561 and perhaps exclude other religions. Political liberals usually 
acknowledge religious instruction as an acceptable approach for private schools, but 
not permissible for public ones. Principled pluralists agree with political liberals as 
they perceive the learning into approach to be appropriate for private schools.  
  Adherents of political liberalism express concern that the religious instruction 
approach to religious education may stimulate tensions in the private school setting if 
the instruction becomes coercive. Regarding public school settings, they insist that 
religious instruction contradicts the principle of neutrality regarding conceptions of 
what constitutes the common good. Real dangers exist in the religious instruction 
route, as evidenced in Northern Ireland, where religious schooling has reinforced 
sectarian divides.562 Principled pluralists support the right for religious or non-
religious groups to utilize the religious instruction approach to religious education. 
However, they recognize the concerns of political liberals about coercion in both 
private and public schools, particularly if it has negative repercussions. 
 
4.2.2.2 Learning About Religion  
In a second approach to religious education, learning about religion, a stance which 
Adhar and Leigh distinguish as reported State neutrality, the school aims to present 
the major religions to students without indicating any preference for one over another 
and without instilling belief in any religion. Ahdar and Leigh stress that when 
educators confine religious education in schools to facts about religions – for 
example, the content of a religion’s primary beliefs and doctrines, and information 
about noteworthy figures, events, and practices – objections to religious education in 
schools prove invalid.563 Nevertheless, as noted previously, some religious groups 
may question ‘whether true neutrality is possible or object to the implicit pluralism 
towards religions or to specific non-confessional pedagogical approaches towards 
religious education.’564 Robert Jackson argues that with regard to religious issues, as 
                                                 
561 Byrne, Religion in Secular Education. 
562 Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means: Peace Politics in Northern 
Ireland (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 
563 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom. 
564 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, p. 267. 
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every State’s history conditions its religion, in a sense, the State cannot be entirely 
neutral.565 
 On the opposite end of the spectrum but still supporting religious freedom, 
Annie Laurie Gaylor (1955–2015), founder of the Freedom from Religion Foundation 
(FFRF), acknowledges that devotional instruction and religious exercises dramatically 
differ from academic instruction or learning about religion.566 The following stance, 
which Gaylor published replicates that which principled pluralism supports regarding 
religious education – that even atheists should have a voice: 
Most social studies and geography classes already study the religious affiliations of an area, 
and some of their identifying tenets. US students should not grow up in ignorance of the world 
religions. But by the same token, nor should they grow up in ignorance of the world’s dead 
religions, or the fact that the nonreligious and nonadherents are among the largest segments of 
the world, when it comes to religious identification. Today in the United States fully one in 
five adults and one in three young persons identifies as ‘nonreligious.’567 If we’re going to 
teach religion in the public schools, we must ‘teach atheism’ as well.568 
 
The FFRF reports that it works as a voice for atheism, agnosticism, and 
skepticism as well as acting as a watchdog for the State church to challenge incidents 
it considers infringements of what it perceives as the constitutional principle of State 
and church. The FFRF reports as one of its successes the fact that the Bienville Parish 
Schools in Arcadia, Louisiana, will no longer permit Gideons to distribute Bibles to 
students. After members of the Gideons physically placed a Bible on each student’s 
desk in a particular grade, the FFRF reported this as a constitutional violation. In a 
letter to Superintendent William Britt, Staff Attorney Sam Grover wrote: ‘When a 
school distributes religious literature to its students, or permits evangelists to 
distribute religious literature to its students, it entangles itself with that religious 
message.’569  
                                                 
565 Robert Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education and Plurality: Issues in Diversity and Pedagogy 
(New York: Routledge Falmer, 2004), p. 14. 
566 Annie Laurie Gaylor, ‘The Dangers of Religious Instruction in Public Schools’, Religion & Politics, 
7 January 2014 <http://religionandpolitics.org/2014/01/07/the-dangers-of-religious-instruction-in-
public-schools/> [accessed 13 December 2017]. 
567 Emma Green, ‘American Religion: Complicated, not Dead.’ The Atlantic Monthly, 12 May 2015. 
Green cites statistics that contradict those Gaylor presents. The Pew Research Center finds that the 
number of Americans not participating in any religion totals approximately 23 percent of the 
population. Only a small number of this particular group profess to be atheists (3 percent) or agnostics 
(4 percent). 
568 Gaylor, ‘The Dangers of Religious Instruction’, para. 7 of 8. 
569 Freedom from Religion Foundation, ‘Students Spared More Bible Distributions’, 
<http://ffrf.org/legal/other-legal-successes/item/25093-students-spared-more-bible-distributions-
october-19-2015> [accessed 18 December 2015]. 
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 Even though I empathize with Gaylor’s legitimate concerns, nevertheless, I 
disagree with her approach to stop the supply of bibles to students. If the FFRF truly 
subscribes to international religious freedom norms as listed in chapter 1, I assert that 
it would avoid that kind of approach (level down). Instead of removing the access to 
these Christian literatures for all students, likely because of their ‘offensive’ nature to 
Gaylor’s constituents, namely atheist, agnostic and skeptics, the FFRF should ask the 
school district to provide opportunities to make diverse represented belief literatures 
and other faith traditions accessible to students. Therefore, a better approach would be 
‘let-a-hundred-flower-blossom’ approach (bottom-up); supporting teachings about all 
religions in public schools, including those worldviews which Gaylor represents. 
 Byrne notes that the learning about religion approach as a stance of State 
neutrality primarily aims to educate students with regard to religion and diverse 
religious beliefs.570 This knowledge-focused, student-driven, ‘bottom-up’ approach 
perceives education to be a tool for the student to use, employing questions, 
interpretation, and reflection to augment his/her understanding of religion. According 
to most political liberalists, if religious education must be integrated into the public 
school, the learning about religion approach proves ideal. 
 Principled pluralists differ from political liberals regarding the exclusion of 
religious education in the public-school environment as they consider religious 
education as necessary not only in private but also in public schools. They agree with 
political liberals, nevertheless, that the learning about religion approach proves best in 
both school environments because learning about other religions may help enhance an 
individual’s understanding of the beliefs of those practicing a religion that differs 
from his/her own.571 In addition, the individual who understands the facts and facets 
of the religious beliefs of divergent religious groups will more likely be open to 
communicating with them. In turn, this can promote community camaraderie and help 
decrease tensions between religious and nonreligious groups. 
4.2.2.3 Learning from Religion 
In a third alternative approach to religious education, which Byrne describes as 
learning from religion,572 teachers typically implement a phenomenological approach. 
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The concept of learning from religion initially linked with the domain of affective 
‘feeling.’ Although the aim for this method includes facilitating an empathetic 
approach to different religions by enhancing the students’ understanding of diverse 
religions, Ahdar and Leigh stress that this method does not attempt to instill religious 
beliefs in the students nor, contrary to learning about religion, does it simply share 
information about diverse religions. In this approach, students experience traditions 
and practices of other religious groups as they reflect upon and may even replicate 
some of these by enacting them. During the experiential exchanges, particularly when 
different religious practices seem offensive, religious as well as humanist students or 
their families may find this approach difficult.573    
 Learning from religion differs from religious instruction in that it engages the 
students as they reflect on their analyses of religions and then relate their 
understanding to their subjective experiences and interests. Instead of simply relating 
facts to students about a certain religion, educators will engage students in an 
experiential activity. For example, one assignment could involve the students drawing 
a picture of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane when darkness falls with directives to 
portray features to reflect how they perceive Jesus to be feeling. It is interesting to 
note that the label some school systems assign for this unit of work, Being Human, 
could be considered negative to a student not choosing to participate due to religious 
beliefs or prejudices.574    
 Byrne suggests that the possibility exists for some educators to use this 
approach to validate adherence to a specific religious tradition. Nevertheless, as this 
method aims to enable students, not control them, students may amass numerous 
opportunities to learn from the religions which instructors introduce. In time, this 
approach has evolved into ‘an existential and an applied ethical emphasis which is 
evaluative. […It] asks: What are the ethical and moral bases of religions and belief 
systems?  And how might they be useful in social action?’575 The combination of the 
learning about and learning from religion approaches may best answer the latter 
question as time reveals not only how the learner engages in society but even more 
significantly, his/her perception regarding religious freedom for all religions. 
                                                 
573 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom in. 
574 ‘Level 1 Examples’, RE: Online (2013) < http://www.reonline.org.uk/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Level-Examples-1-and-1-2.pdf/> [accessed 15 December 2015]. 
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4.2.2.4 The Separatist Approach 
The rationale for the separatist approach, the fourth approach which Ahdar and Leigh 
relate, maintains that the State should strictly separate itself from religious education 
and delegate this responsibility to the parent. The absence of State engagement from 
religious education could contribute to some children who are not part of a religious 
group – as well as those who have parents not concerned about religious edification – 
not receiving any religious education. ‘[O]thers, at best will only learn about their 
own religious tradition or, at worst, may be uncritically indoctrinated in 
misperceptions or stereotypes of other religions.’576 The separatist approach, 
segregating religious education from the school syllabus does not automatically 
denote religious neutrality. Some may argue that contrariwise, the deliberate omission 
of religious education, in contrast to other subjects in the curriculum, sends a 
powerful message that religion does not significantly matter.    
 Some religious groups may challenge this concept as well as disagree with 
explicit pluralism in religious education and perceive both as hostile, considering 
these methods to undermine religious education within the child’s family or their 
religious group. ‘A separatist approach attempts to avoid these pitfalls by maintaining 
a strict separation between the state and religious groups – leaving religious education 
to the latter and to parents, outside state schools.’ 577 In the sense that religious groups 
are equidistant from the classroom, all religious groups receive equal treatment. 
Separatism may reinforce segregation in societies divided on religious lines. 
 
4.2.2.5 The Secularist Approach 
A secularist approach to teaching religious education, the fifth method of religious 
education which Ahdar and Leigh note, strives to dynamically endorse what those 
adhering to this stance perceive as negative consequences of religious conviction.578 
Some secularists may even deliberately strive to disparage the influence religions may 
exert on children.  
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 Although secularism generally endorses the separation of the State from 
religion, not all secularists disparage every aspect of religion. Some scholars contend 
that based on the degree of separation between the State and religion, two factions of 
secularism exist: (1) ideological or radical secularism; and (2) moderate secularism. 
Tariq Modood contends, ‘Two modes of activity are separate when they have no 
connection with each other (absolute separation); but activities can still be distinct 
from each other even though there may be points of overlap (relative separation).’579 
According to Modood: 
it is possible to distinguish between radical or ideological secularism, which argues for an 
absolute separation between state and religion, and the moderate forms that exist where 
secularism has become the order of the day, particularly Western Europe, with the partial 
exception of France.580 
 As Modood points out, the approaches of secularism are not uniform. The 
distinction between the stance of radical or ideological secularism and moderate 
secularism toward religious education appears contingent on the attitude regarding the 
preferred degree of separation between the State and religion. Radical secularism 
reflects an anti-religion position as it basically advocates for the absolute separation of 
any religion from State affairs and supports the concept of total dominance of 
secularism in any public space. Part of the agenda for ideological secularism also 
seems to be policing religion in the public square.       
 Moderate secularism, based on the view of relative separation of religion and 
the State, differs from ideological secularism as it allows room for the State and 
religion to interact while the ideological approach does not. In the field of education, 
moderate secularism would tolerate some teaching about religion in public schools 
while radical secularism would advocate for the total ban of any religious education.   
 Superficially, the position that radical secularism assumes appears similar to 
Gaylor’s stance and may appear to be fair. The promotion of absolute or radical 
secularism, nonetheless, as Gaylor’s FFRF movement seeks to promote, fails to 
protect religious freedom for all. Radical secularism’s extreme approach, like that of 
theonomy, which I rejected in Chapter 2, advocates the very narrow route of adopting 
only one religion. While ideological secularists advocate for secularism with no 
relationship between the State and religion, theonomy as I point out in Chapter 2, 
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proposes that only one religion should reign in the public square. Both ideological 
secularism and theonomy mirror a similar scenario and stimulate the same adverse 
effect: failure to protect religious freedom for all. 
 In a sense, I empathize with the position of moderate secularism because, like 
principled pluralism, it promotes a relative separation of the State and religion. This 
approach reflects Kuyper’s theory, which I also introduced in Chapter 2. Even though 
Kuyper contends that each sphere is to maintain sovereignty, nevertheless the diverse 
spheres, with dynamic interactions, particularly between the church [religion] and the 
State, organically interrelate. Likewise, as overlap occurs between the State and 
religion in the moderate secularist approach, I concur with some aspects of moderate 
secularism, particularly when it acknowledges the benefits of religious education. I 
absolutely disagree with extreme ideological, militaristic secularism being the only 
ideology in the public square. This approach not only prohibits religious education in 
public schools, it represents no freedom for other religions. 
 Even though secularism has increased in power and scope throughout various 
parts of the world, Modood points out that in most of Western Europe, symbolic links 
between the State and facets of Christianity remain. Modood stresses that this 
indicates that ‘a historically evolved and evolving compromise with religion are the 
defining features of Western European secularism, rather than the absolute separation 
of religion and politics.’581 According to Ahdar and Leigh, in any part of the world 
where the State promotes ‘a form of official secular humanism in State education […, 
this] represents a non-neutral and comprehensive ideology which is actively hostile to 
religion.’582 When the State implements other types of control of religious liberty, as 
have a number of former Communist countries including Central Asian republics and 
China, this reflects secularism as hostile. Table 9 depicts the responses of political 
liberalism as compared with principled pluralism to the five approaches to religious 
education. 
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Table 9:  Five Approaches to Religious Education583 
 
Political Liberalism                  
 
Principled Pluralism  
                          Public   
                   Schools584               
    Private                                                                 
  Schools585 
 
Public
                           Schools               
      Private     
     Schools 
Learning 
into 
Religion 
No,                         
not permissible 
 
Yes,  
acceptable 
Learning into 
Religion 
No, not 
permissible  
Yes, 
 appropriate 
 Learning 
from 
Religion 
No, because 
some religious 
practices offend 
Yes, 
acceptable 
 
Learning 
from 
Religion 
Yes, 
conditionally 
acceptable 
Yes,  
appropriate 
Learning 
about 
Religion 
 
Yes, conditionally Yes,  
appropriate 
Learning 
about 
Religion 
Yes, 
conditionally 
acceptable 
Yes,  
appropriate 
Separatist 
Approach 
 
Yes, preferred Yes,  
preferred 
Separatist 
Approach 
 
No,  
not appropriate, 
fails to protect 
religious 
freedom 
No,                             
not appropriate 
or acceptable 
Secularist        
Approach 
 
Yes, conditionally, 
re moderate 
secularists 
No,                              
not acceptable re 
ideological or 
radical secularists 
Yes,  
appropriate 
re moderate 
secularists; 
permissible re  
ideological or  
radical 
secularists 
Secularist 
Approach 
 
Yes,  
conditionally, if 
aligned with 
moderate 
secularism  
No,  
if aligned with 
radical 
secularism 
No,                            
not appropriate 
or  
acceptable 
 
 
4.2.3 Legal Framework for Religious Education   
The attitudes and policies of the State, as well as its legal framework for, and 
associated regulations concerning education, particularly the role of religious 
education in both public and private education systems, reflect the nature of 
the State–religion model.586 In this chapter, as I am presenting an overview of 
the education systems587 implemented in the United States, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, I establish the international legal framework 
for religious education in this subsection. Also, in addition to giving a 
description of the general education system in each of the four States I 
                                                 
583 Original table created from research undertaken for this subsection. 
584 The term ‘public school’ encompasses any State-sponsored educational institution. 
585 The term ‘private school’ encompasses privately funded educational institution. 
586 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom. 
587 Some terms, such as ‘charter school,’ are not universally defined and subject for interpretation in 
different countries. 
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examine in Chapter 4, I point out the extent that the State permits religious 
education in them. 
 
 First, rights relating to religious freedom and religious education are enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and have been incorporated 
into U.K. law. Marion Maddox reports that the ECHR588 (Article 2 of Protocol No. 
1)589 specifically protects the exercise of religious freedom in compulsory education 
as it states: ‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the rights of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions.’590 
 Second, rights, which the ECHR acclaims, align with those in the International 
Bill of Human Rights as well as with ensuing resolutions that propose to protect 
religious freedom. In addition to the internationally proclaimed, guaranteed 
protections for the practice of a person’s religion or belief, the United Nations ideally 
aims to establish standards for human rights.591 Nevertheless, since international as 
well as State legal mechanisms attempt to enshrine and safeguard religious education 
for children, the criteria for the implementation of these standards remain open to 
each State’s interpretation. 
 The interpretation of State and international legal guidelines which occur in 
the State–religion relationship frequently correlates with the State controlling 
education to advance its political goals. Peter G. Danchin submits that a ‘strong 
negative identification of church and State (for example, in States that are hostile to or 
persecute religious groups) correlates with low levels of religious freedom.’592 Peter 
                                                 
588 ‘Details of Treaty No. 009: Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’, in Council of Europe 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm> [accessed 1 February 2015]. 
589 Marion Maddox, Taking God to School: The End of Australia's Egalitarian Education? (Crows 
Nest NSW, AU: Allen & Unwin. 2014).   
590 Peter G. Danchin and Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities’, in Protecting the Human Rights of Religious 
Minorities in Eastern Europe, eds. Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. Cole (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), pp. 192–221 (p. 196). 
591 United Nations, ‘Protect Human Rights’ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-
human-rights/> [accessed 13 December 2017]. 
592 Peter G. Danchin, ‘Religion, Religious Minorities and Human Rights: An Introduction’, in 
Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe, eds. Peter G. Danchin and 
Elizabeth A. Cole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 3. 
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Danchin and Lisa Forman note that the ECHR decrees guidelines for the State when it 
describes how education and teaching should be carried out.593 To help ensure that 
education and teaching conform to parents’ religious preference, the ECHR states, 
‘the state shall respect the rights of parents to ensure such education and teaching in 
conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.’594 At times, 
despite international guidelines, such as those the ECHR presents, domestic laws of 
various states as well as the bodies enforcing them may not consider that the concept 
of teaching religious education in public schools portrays a positive practice. 
Applying the philosophy of principled pluralism to the field of education best equips 
the State with regard to facilitating the most effective State–religion relationship 
model for meeting citizens’ educational needs. 
 In the following section, I examine the education models implemented by four 
liberal states and compare them with the international legal framework. I note several 
tensions and conflicts within these countries’ education systems and how they 
contribute to these states failing to adequately protect religious freedom for all. 
 
4.3 Education Models Implemented by Four Liberal States 
Philip Lewis reports that in the European Union, every constitution includes 
principles of freedom and nondiscrimination. The specific approaches European 
countries implement to interpret and apply  to these ideologies primarily depend on 
historical traditions regarding the State–religion relationship.595As interpretations of 
the constitution with regard to religious freedom contribute to components 
determining the implementation of religious education and as such interpretations 
may, in all probability, differ from one country to another, similarly, the treatment of 
religions, manifested in State–religion relationships, may also vary. In presenting a 
sample of the education systems in the United States, the the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands to illustrate numerous diversities in this field, I examine 
                                                 
593 Danchin and Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence’, p. 196. 
594 Council of Europe, ‘Details of Treaty’ No. 009: Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2017) 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm> [accessed 1 February 2015]. 
595 Philip Lewis, ‘Between Lord Ahmed and Ali G: Which Future for British Muslims?’ in Religious 
Freedom and the Neutrality of the State, eds. W.A.R. Shadid and P. Sj. Koningsweld (Paris: Peeters 
Publishers, 2002), pp. 129–44. 
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whether the education systems these states have implemented appear to accommodate 
or complement religious freedom or have proved hostile toward it. 
 
4.3.1 The Education System in the United States 
As part of teaching Christian values,596church-controlled schools in early townships in 
America during the 1720s stressed morality.597 J. E. Tiles points out that now, as in 
times past, measures for morality598 may differ not only within a State but also 
between individuals and over time. Similarly, teachings in education vary; 
nevertheless, they appear to mirror the direction that leaders aim for a State to travel 
or navigate, as well as reflect certain societal goals.599 Consequently, decisions that 
State leaders make as well as the ensuing consequences from resolutions regarding 
education, in particular religious education, not only inadvertently affect the social 
health of a country, its current position in the international scene, and future 
generations, they diametrically impact religious freedom. 
 J. M. Powis Smith points out that in 1924, because the church initially 
dominated education in the Western world,600 religion maintained a primary position 
in the educational realm. Although education of young people in the United States 
began to progressively transition from the church to the State during the 1820s and 
1830s, during this time, the public elementary and secondary schools as well as State 
colleges and universities basically endorsed Christian education. Harold J. Berman 
notes that the Presbyterian minister who served as president of the University of 
North Carolina, founded in 1795, ‘insisted on regular attendance by students at 
religious worship and on orthodox religious instruction.’601 Berman notes that even 
                                                 
596 J. Hillis Miller, ‘VI: Religion in a State University’, in American Education and Religion: The 
Problem of Religion in the Schools, ed. F. Ernest Johnson (New York: Institute for Religious and 
Social Studies, 1952). 
597 Lawrence J. Walker and others, ‘Reasoning about Morality and Real-Life Moral Problems’, in 
Morality in Everyday Life: Developmental Perspectives, eds Melanie Killen and Daniel Hart (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). pp. 371–405. Walker and others explain that because 
morality relates to a person’s basic way of life and values it constitutes a fundamental and pervasive 
component of human functioning. 
598 J. E. Tiles, Moral Measures: An Introduction to Ethics, West and East (London: Routledge, 2000), 
p. 2. 
599 Bhattacharya, Foundations of Education. 
600 J. M. Powis Smith. ‘The Church and Education’, The Journal of Religion, 4, 1 (January 1924), pp. 
46–59. 
601 Harold J. Berman, ‘Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State’, in Articles of Faith, 
Articles of Peace, eds. James Davison Hunter and Os Guinness, pp. 40–53 (p. 45). 
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the seventeen State institutions of the 246 colleges and universities established in the 
US prior to1860 required students to regularly attend religious services.  
 According to Francesco Cordasco, the significance of religious education 
started to decline with the inception of public education and State-sponsored 
educational institutions in the United States, coupled with the trend of increasing 
secularization.602 Carl L. Bankston and Stephen J. Caldas,603 as well as John A. 
Ether,604 point out that the focus for religious education transitioned from the old 
social order with its religious intonations to a new social order that addressed cultural 
diversity and cultural pluralism. Religious education changed from emphasizing a 
community’s religious convictions to passing on information to not only develop 
students’ intellectual skills but also cultivate their identities. 
 John M. Hull reports that historically, in line with principled pluralism, the 
U.S. Constitution, a founding American document, aims to promote religious freedom 
for all, limit the State’s control over religion, and designate the separation of State and 
religion.605 The separation of State and religion, the principle which the Supreme 
Court surreptitiously imposed, contradicts the design America’s Founders desired for 
the United States as it simultaneously positions the State in a formidable stance 
against religion.606 The commonly accepted myth that religion should be totally 
separated from education erroneously relates to the role of religion in education as 
well as to the State–religion relationship.607 
 The court first applied the First Amendment’s religious liberty clauses to the 
states during the 1940s. At this time, the separation of church and State became a 
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principle of constitutional law. Michael J. Sandel reports that, ‘In Cantwell v. 
Connecticut (1940), the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated both 
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the Bill of Rights, and “rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”’608 Sandel 
further notes: 
In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947), the Court gave the 
establishment clause a broad interpretation and emphasized, for the first time, Jefferson’s 
‘wall of separation between church and state.’ 609 
 Although controversy encompasses the principle regarding the ‘wall’ between 
the State and religion, designating that government must remain neutral toward 
religion, Sandel reports that this ruling is seldom challenged. In early townships in 
America during the 1720s, prior to the ‘erection’ of the Jeffersonian ‘wall of 
separation’, as the Church formed the central core of the community, religion 
constituted an integral element in the lives of frontier people. Princeton in New Jersey 
reflects one example of a prestigious university that emerged from the Log College, 
an early American school with Christian roots. Christian preachers and church 
affiliations founded the majority of America’s oldest universities, including Brown, 
Dartmouth, Harvard, King’s College (now Columbia University), Rutgers, and 
Yale.610 When the Puritans established Harvard University in 1636, the universities 
adopted ‘Rules and Precepts’ which assert: 
Let every student be plainly instructed, and earnestly pressed to consider well,the main end of his life 
and studies is, to know God and Jesus Christ which is eternal life and  therefore lay Christ at the 
bottom, as the only foundation of all sound knowledge and learning.611 
Similarly, the stated goal for Yale College, founded 1701, concurs with that of 
Harvard.  Both universities stress that the critical objective of the student’s study 
encompasses them knowing God in Jesus Christ. One of Princeton’s founding 
statements boldly proclaims allegiance to the Christian faith, ‘Cursed is all learning 
that is contrary to the Cross of Christ.’612 In 1954, the United States, under the 
leadership of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, confirmed its belief in the principles 
by which America’s Founding Fathers established its educational system. At this 
                                                 
608 Michael J. Sandel, ‘Freedom of Conscience or freedom of Choice?’ in Articles of Faith, Articles of 
Peace: The Religious Liberty Clauses and the American Public Philosophy, eds. James Davison Hunter 
and Os Guinness (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1990), pp. 74–92 (p. 80). 
609 Sandel, ‘Freedom of Conscience’, p. 81. 
610 Leon G. Stevens, One Nation under God: A Factual History of America’s Religious Heritage (New 
York: Morgan James, 2013). 
611 Stevens, One Nation under God, p. 122. 
612 Stevens, One Nation under God, p. 122. 
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time, the words, ‘Under God,’ reflecting the goals establishing Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton, were added to America’s Pledge of Allegiance. However, during this time, 
court decisions began to challenge America’s religious freedom, particularly in the 
field of education. 
Despite the religious foundation of the United States, the education system in 
America no longer reflected the Christian principles and character which founded it.  
At best, Panichas surmises, the status of education in the United States appears 
problematic. 613 At worst, as indicated by Gaylor, the U.S. education system had 
shifted from ‘freedom of religion’ to ‘freedom from religion.’ The attitude of those 
implementing policies for education appeared to reflect the state of contemporary 
chaos and confusion corrupting the education system.614 Charles H. Wesley explains 
that one misunderstanding, the doctrine of State–religion separation, does not indicate 
that the State and religion are to oppose or exhibit indifference to each other.615 
Haynes argues that another contemporary fallacy posits that the U.S. Constitution 
mandates that public schools must maintain ‘neutrality’ on religion. Neutrality, as I 
argued in Chapter 3, proves elusive. Nevertheless, religious impartiality by the State, 
in the sense that it does not demonstrate preference for one religion over another or 
permit secularism to reign over religion, portrays the best promise for religious 
freedom for all.616 
 Stephen Macedo recounts a court ruling regarding a complaint filed against 
U.S. public schools in 1983, Mozert v. Hawkins, which illustrates an example of the 
State’s bias. In his verdict regarding the Mozert case, Chief Judge Lively defends the 
public school’s authority to teach values ‘essential to a democratic society,’ 
including toleration.617 According to Lively, schools may ‘acquaint students with 
a multitude of ideas and concepts,’ if they avoid direct ‘religious or anti-religious 
messages.’618 During the Mozert case, ‘ “born again” Christian families against the 
                                                 
613 Panichas, ‘Remedying the Ills.’ 
614 Panichas, ‘Remedying the Ills.’ 
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local school board in Hawkins County, Tennessee,’619 objected to their children being 
exposed to readings which reportedly included mental telepathy, futuristic 
supernaturalism, occultist references, and sources teaching man as God. Ultimately, 
Chief Judge Lively ruled in favor of the authority of the public school. As long as 
public schools do not specifically promote religions or anti-religious information, 
Judge Lively decreed: 
   The lesson is clear: governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious 
beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise. An actual burden on the profession or 
exercise of religion is required. 
   In short, distinctions must be drawn between those governmental actions that actually 
interfere with the exercise of religion, and those that merely require or result in exposure to 
attitudes and outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion.620 
 Macedo reportedly argues for a political liberalism with backbone.621 He 
maintains that political liberalism coincides with a type of civic liberalism he 
perceives in a number of facets concerning education. He defends a type of civic 
liberalism that would be based on a limited range of public principles and reasons but 
with broader and deeper implications than those inherent in political liberalism. This 
type of civic liberalism would encompass characteristics and capacities common to 
citizens in general without constraining their religious viewpoints. 
 Based on the needed teaching on civic and religious tolerance in public 
schools, both principled pluralism and Baorong Duoyuan would align with the decree 
in Chief Judge Lively’s case, as well as with Macedo’s viewpoint. However, if the 
school will help accommodate the concerns of parents with evangelical faith; 
allowing children to equally access related teachings about their religion in that same 
school, principled pluralism and Baorong Duoyuan would more sensibly line up with 
the international religious freedom standard to children’s rights for religious 
education. 
                                                 
619 In Mozert v. Hawkins, the ‘families charged a primary school reading program with denigrating 
their religious views, both in its lack of religious “balance” and in the uncommitted, evenhanded nature 
of the presentations. The complaint was, in part at least, not so much that a particular religious claim 
was directly advanced by the readings but that the program taken as a whole exposed the children to a 
variety of points of view and that this very exposure to diversity interfered with the free exercise of the 
families’ religious beliefs by denigrating the truth of their particular religious views (Parent Vicki Frost 
said that “the word of God as found in the Christian Bible ‘is the totality of my beliefs’”)’ (Macedo, pp. 
470–71). 
620 Mozert v. Hawkins at 1542. 827 F.2d 1058, ‘Bob and Alice Mozert […].’ 
621 Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education, p. 473. 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            163 
 
 
  This type of civic liberalism approach, Macedo emphasizes, often replicates 
the approach John Rawls suggests in Political Liberalism. He notes that although 
public schools must not only refrain from teaching anti-religious or religious 
messages, they can teach toleration and other values necessary for living in a 
democratic society. Schools ‘may teach “civil tolerance,” which is the notion that “in 
a pluralistic society we must ‘live and let live.”’622 According to Macedo, essentially, 
public schools can teach that every religion is ‘the same in the eyes of the State, not 
that they are all the same in the eyes of God.’623 I assert that religious education as 
included in compulsory education should encourage the exchange of ideas relating to 
religion, including diverse conceptions of truth. 
 Bruce Grelle stresses that in the United States, because State and local 
governments fund and administer the operation of public schools, the schools must 
maintain ‘impartiality’ toward religion. Grelle notes that although private and 
parochial schools may endorse religious beliefs and practices, public schools cannot 
do so due to the ‘no establishment clause.’624 The school prayer cases, noted in 
Chapter 3, illustrate the U.S. Supreme Court stance on this prohibition of school-
sponsored religious exercises, including devotional Bible reading and organized group 
prayer.  
 The Center for Public Justice maintains that the government should focus on 
maintaining provisions for public equity to guarantee that every child can fairly access 
a quality education; first, the government needs to treat citizens equitably, then apply 
the same principle to their rights in relation to religious freedom. At this point in 
history, as Panichas warns, indoctrinators, reformers, and social engineers often 
perceive education as a social science. Many visualize learning and teaching goals as 
prospects for translating into programs of social expediency. In turn, they thwart 
remedies for restoring educational norms and balance.625 
 Even though the U.S. Constitution has not historically been hostile toward 
religion, contemporary court decisions regularly increase State control over education. 
The ensuing decreases in religious freedom promote an even greater separation of 
                                                 
622 Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education’, p. 473. 
623 Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education’, pp. 473–74. 
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State and religion. Observers of the current educational method of teaching in U.S. 
public schools would likely perceive this contemporary tactic to reflect the secularist 
stance, what Ahdar and Leigh describe as a model actively antagonistic to religious 
faith.626 Consequently, I contend that as the education system in the United States 
aligns more with the secularist than the separatist method, it does appear hostile to 
religious freedom. I maintain that the method of religious education that the United 
States currently adopts, which the Mozert case reflects, depicts the secularist 
approach.                              
4.3.2 The Education System in the United Kingdom 
A myriad of religious schools exists in the United Kingdom. Even though this State 
does not have recorded a Bill of Rights to ensure rights relating to religious education, 
nevertheless, freedom of religion and of religious expression are well protected.627 
Prior to the nineteenth century, to the extent of education’s availability, the Church of 
England predominantly controlled schools in England, one of the four countries in the 
United Kingdom. Since WWII,628 a substantial multireligious presence has existed. 
Robert Jackson notes that until the late 1950s, civic, moral, and religious education in 
England appeared interrelated. In the atmosphere ‘of moral and social renewal 
following the Second World War, […the UK even] saw religious—interpreted as 
“non-denominational” Christian instruction as the basis of morality and citizenship, 
and as an integrating principle for all education.’629 
 Hunter-Henin reasons that stipulations regarding religious worship mirror the 
prevalence of religion in the United Kingdom. The State mandates that schools in 
England and Wales, even if not religiously characterized, must host an act of worship 
each day.630 In addition, in both England and Wales, the law prescribes a broadly 
Christian character, ‘for the act of daily worship and for the content of religious 
education classes.’631 If the State did not offer the premise of freedom of choice for 
students to opt out of daily worship or religious education classes, this could 
                                                 
626 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom. 
627 Charles J. Russo, ‘Analysis and Recommendation’, in International Perspectives on Education, 
Religion and Law, ed. Charles J. Russo (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 207–31 (p. 209). 
628 Hull, ‘The Contribution of Religious.’ 
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conversely give rise to charges from religious minorities that the State violates their 
freedom of or from religion. Consequently, in many legal contexts, the State regards 
religious organizations as identical to secular organizations and, therefore, subjects 
both to identical civil laws and tax assessments (e.g. in terms of charitable status).632  
 In the past, as the United Kingdom aligned with the State Church’s Erastian 
system, the State deemed religious education to constitute its responsibility. As the 
secularization of State institutions increased, the State’s approach to the teaching of 
religion progressively turned into one of condoning nondenominational religious 
education.633 Although the State collaborates with the religious community in the 
United Kingdom at times regarding some activities relating to religious education, the 
State continues to control, organize, and manage religious education. In State schools 
only, State institutions not only control the selection, appointment, training, and 
discharge of teachers, they also determine the remuneration teachers receive.  
 Robert Long and Paul Bolton explain that the State requires that students 
receive nondenominational religious education. 
Religious Education (RE) is compulsory for all pupils in local authority maintained schools 
aged 5 to 16 years unless they are withdrawn from these lessons by their parents. They are not 
obliged to give a reason, and the school is expected to comply with the request.634 
 
 In addition to schools in England and Wales hosting an act of worship in 
education, they must introduce citizenship education into their national curriculums, 
including those of faith-based schools. Jackson notes that these two states require 
pupils to examine Britain’s nature as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. For 
example, ‘students must “study” the origins and implications of the diverse national, 
regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for 
mutual respect and understanding […].’635 The following portrays ways that the 
European Parliament seeks to promote education about religion: 
    
1. Schools will step up the teaching about religions as sets of values 
towards which young people must develop a discerning approach, 
within the framework of education on ethics and democratic 
   citizenship. 
                                                 
632 Newcombe, ‘Religious Education’, p. 376. 
633 Hull, ‘The Contribution of Religious’, p. 11. 
634 Robert Long and Paul Bolton, ‘Faith Schools in England: FAQs’ (House of Commons Library, 
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2. Parliament will promote the teaching of the comparative history of 
diﬀ erent religions, stressing their origins, the similarities in some of their 
values and the diversity of their customs, traditions, festivals, […etc.] in 
schools. 
3. Parliament will encourage the study of the history and philosophy of 
religions and research into those subjects at university, in parallel with 
theological studies. 
4. Schools will co-operate with religious educational institutions to introduce 
or reinforce, in their curricula, aspects relating to human rights, history, 
philosophy and science. 
5. Educators will avoid – in the case of children – any conﬂict between the 
State-promoted education about religion and the religious faith of the 
families, to respect the free decision of the families in this very 
      sensitive matter.636 
 
 In the United Kingdom, more than 20 percent of pupils in the maintained 
sector attend State-funded faith schools, while the private sector includes many 
prestigious Christian foundations. Lewis notes that the ‘private sector – “public 
schools”’ include many prestigious Christian foundations.637 Also, according to 
Lewis, as all State schools ‘must teach religious education,’638 this discipline extends 
to influence other parts of society. Consequently, religious education can potentially 
not only counter or slow irrational, expressions of intolerance toward diverse religions 
but may also complement religious freedom after students complete their formal 
education.  
4.3.3 The Education System in France 
Following the hostility that the 1789 French Revolution demonstrated toward religion, 
the trend in France has been toward refraining from teaching religion in State 
schools.639 Although the French Revolution shaped the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man,640 which ‘guaranteed unlimited freedom of “opinion” ([…] and “belief”), […] it 
included the proviso […that would] become highly problematic for France’s so-called 
sectes two centuries later. This proviso in Article X was, “ne trouble pas l’ordre 
publique” (they should not disturb the peace).’641 Although this dubious, frequently 
discussed article did not define which specific individual rights could share in the 
                                                 
636 Europe. Council of, Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly Documents 1999 Session (First part, 
January 1999) Volume I (Strasbourg: Counsel of Europe Publishing, 1999), p. 2. 
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cooperative expression of religiosity, it basically annihilated the absolutist model of 
ultimately converting Catholicism into an instrument of the State as France’s national 
religion that Louis XIV had envisaged. Had this plan materialized, the education 
system in France at that time would have been under the control of the Catholic 
Church. 
 Rather than Catholicism becoming France’s national religion and in control of 
French education, revolutionaries guillotined numerous clerics and confiscated 
properties the Catholic Church owned. Susan J. Palmer recounts that after the 
insurgents pillaged the French cathedrals, they set them on fire. Later, they ‘tried to 
establish a cult of the “Goddess of Reason” or the “Goddess of Liberty.” ’642 ‘La 
France moderne’,643 which evolved from the revolutionaries’ conflict with 
Catholicism, what Palmer describes as ‘the philosophy of secularism […which 
varied] in tone from anticlericalism to antitheism,’644 continues to define the French 
State. It also strongly affects France’s secular stance regarding compulsory education. 
 Prior to France transitioning into a radical secular State, Matthew Arnold 
recounts that in 1861, France permitted the display of one significant religious symbol 
in public schools: the crucifix. He states, ‘Conspicuous were the crucifix and the bust 
of the Emperor – the indispensable ornaments of French public schoolrooms.’645 
Arnold further describes the public schools during this time in history as decidedly 
religious: 
First, then, with respect to a question which meets every system of education upon the 
threshold – the great question, shall it be secular, or shall it be religious? The French system is 
religious; not in the sense in which all systems profess to be more or less religious, in 
inculcating the precepts of a certain universal and indisputable morality: it inculcates the 
doctrines of morality in the only way in which the masses of mankind ever admit them, in 
their connection with the doctrines of religion. I believe that the French system is right.646 
   
 Contrary to the existing French system, which Arnold commends, during 
1902, Émile Combes, then premier of France, passed a law which prohibited any 
person from any type of religious order from teaching students in State schools.647 
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Palmer reports that on 9 December 1905, after Combes no longer held a State 
position: 
 the Law on the separation of church and state made provisions for France to  ensure 
freedom of conscience, to guarantee the free practice of religion, and to  
 prevent any interference of religions in state matters (or vice versa).648 
 
 The French Constitution of 1958 proclaims two principles which found the 
State’s education system, (1) secularism (laïcité), and (2) educational freedom which 
leads to the protection of alternative forms of education.649 According to these 
principles: 
1. Secularism (laïcité), also mentioned in the article L. 141-1 of the French  
 code of education [states]: ‘the Nation guarantees equal access of children 
  and adults to instruction, training and culture: the organisation of a free
 and secular education at every level is a State duty.’ This principle implies
 the secular nature of teaching, curriculum, staff and school premises and
 the optional character of religious teaching in private schools. But it also
 requires that the State is neutral towards religion and that public education
 must not be developed at the expense of religious instruction; hence for
 instance the obligation for the State to keep one day free during the week
 for parents who would like to provide their children with religious
 instruction.  
2. The second principle is educational freedom leading to the protection of     
     alternative forms of education such as private education but also home      
schooling. Article L.151-3 of the French code of education therefore states 
that primary and secondary schools can be public or private, the former      
being financed by the State and local political authorities, whereas  
particular actors or associations support the latter.650  
Following the 1959 Debré Act, which provides funding for most of the private 
schools which contract with the French government, a significant segment of the 
student population in France attends private schools.651 Religious education is not 
permitted in State-funded and controlled private schools.  
 Despite numerous attempts to reform the Debré Act of 1959, it remains the 
legal reference for French education, and attempts to reconcile the above two 
somewhat contradictory principles in three ways:  
1. The act (re)asserts the founding principles, yet to some extent reformulates 
them: ‘The State must provide an education to all children according to their 
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aptitudes “with equal respect for all beliefs.” ’652 The State must also protect 
the educational freedom of private schools which abide by official norms. 
2. Private schools may possibly sign a contract with the State. The two kinds of 
contracts include the ‘simple contract’ and the ‘association contract.’ 
According to these contracts, private schools must comply with specific State 
requirements and the schools must preserve their ‘specific character.’ In 
addition, the private schools’ activities must not affect the transmission of the 
national and secular curriculum.  
3. The State only recognizes a type of private school (not private education) 
which frames activities by specific contracts and official texts.653 
 Except for Alsace-Lorraine, France presents a leading example of a country 
which does not offer any form of religious teaching. Nevertheless, even though 
French public schools do not offer any specific courses pertaining to religions, 
teachers can reference religions in particular disciplines, including the arts, 
geography, history, language, and philosophy. ‘In secondary schools, parents or 
students can ask for the creation of a chaplaincy and, with the authorization of the 
school authorities, the chaplain can teach religion on the school premises to the 
students who want to receive this teaching.’654 The State explicitly forbids the 
designated chaplains from teaching extracurricular classes on religion during 
designated school hours.         
 Although a recognized secular State which characterizes faith schools as 
private establishments, France typically provides financial support for certain 
religious institutions.655 In France, religious freedom may appear blurred due to 
distinctions in a school context that contrast freedom of conscience and freedom of 
thought. Hunter-Henin explains that freedom of thought ensures the right to 
independently reexamine beliefs received from family, as well as social groups. 
Freedom of conscience along with its constituent’s freedom of religion and freedom of belief 
guarantees diversity of belief in society and the freedom to express those beliefs. 
 This way a person can freely adhere to these beliefs, adapt them or turn away from them 
to something else. Naturally, this is a conceptual distinction and clearly daily life produces 
constant disharmony between these two freedoms. 
 But the perspective is not the same and the French view school as the perfect institution 
to teach future citizens to exploit their faculties of reason and to help them exercise freedom of 
thought.656 
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 The French government decided to highlight the distinction between freedom 
of conscience and freedom of thought as illustrated in the previous paragraph and 
support individual freedom by banning conspicuous displays of religious symbols657 
in State schools. As noted in Chapter 3 of this study, France took a calculated risk 
regarding the question of religious symbols when it passed a law prohibiting students 
and teachers from wearing conspicuous ones at school, particularly the burqa. Ferrari 
points out that a correlating link exists between the contemporary prevalent secular 
conception of France’s national identity and certain legal and political choices. The 
attitude of educating students ‘to the values of laïcité and shielding them from the 
competing values upheld by religions [….] explains the exclusion of the teaching of 
religion from the school curriculum, [and also] the prohibition of 
of wearing religious symbols in school.’658 Hunter-Henin argues that some Western 
countries could construe the French law forbidding individuals from wearing the 
burqa in school settings as a State endeavor to indoctrinate citizens and could perceive 
this ban as contrary to France’s professed support of freedom of conscience659 – both 
in and away from compulsory education. 
 Chelini-Pont regards the dispute concerning the wearing of the burqa in public 
as reflecting France’s inclination to equate the State’s neutrality with containment of 
religious expression in the public sphere. According to Chelini-Pont: 
The dispute revolves around a fundamental ideal of the French republic: laïcité. Although the 
concept of laïcité defies a precise definition, it embodies the constitutional principle of the 
state’s neutrality. As President Jacques Chirac stated, laïcité ‘is at the heart of (the French) 
republican identity.’ Laïcité strictly calls for a state that is free from an official or exclusive 
religion; however, this freedom is commonly understood in France as an absence of religious 
expression in the public sphere. The constitutional principle of laïcité, which permits state 
neutrality (comparable to the American separation of church and state), differs greatly from its 
perceived meaning among citizens and the government officials who use the idea to 
instinctively oppose one’s right to manifest religious conviction in the public sphere. It is 
often said by Frenchmen that laïcité allows religion only in the private sphere.660   
 The French education system, which appears to mirror the need to protect 
citizens from the threat to freedom that many new religious movements have posed, I 
surmise, qualifies France as obstinately hostile to religious freedom. 
                                                 
657 Kramer, ‘Taking the Veil.’ 
658 Ferrari, ‘Religious Freedoms’, p. 211. 
659 Hunter-Henin, ‘Introduction’, pp. 5–6. 
660 Chelini-Pont, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, para. 2 of 4 in ‘Introduction.’ 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            171 
 
 
4.3.4 The Education System in the Netherlands 
Even though education in the Holland of 1861 remained Christian, the term 
‘Christian’ could have more appropriately been identified as ‘moral’. Arnold argues 
that: 
 [T]hose ‘who gave it the name of Christian were careful to announce that by Christianity they 
meant “all those ideas which purify the soul by elevating it, and which prepare the union of citizens in 
a common sentiment of mutual good will;” not ‘those theological subtleties which stifle the natural 
affections, and perpetuate divisions among members of one commonwealth.’ They announced that the 
Christianity of the law and of the state was ‘a social or lay Christianity, gradual transforming society 
after the model of ideal justice;’ not ‘a dogmatic Christianity, the affair of the individual and the 
Church. 
  
  
 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Dutch educational 
system confronted political challenges relating to public and private schooling. To try 
to resolve these concerns, in 1917 a constitutional provision inaugurated the principle 
of ‘freedom of education,’ and stipulated that the State would fund all schools. The 
State does not discriminate between public and private, religious and secular, but 
provides funding equally, on a per pupil basis.661 To complement family values, the 
freedom of education constitutional clause endows parents with the constitutional 
right to enroll their children in a State-funded school.662 This funding extends to 
parents uniting to establish a new school. In addition, schools enjoy considerable 
operational autonomy – despite the State funding of most school costs. Parental 
choice conjoined with school autonomy has been the basis of the Dutch education 
system for almost a century. 
 Parental choice continues in the Netherlands663 as, irrespective of geographic 
location, State law permits Dutch parents to choose the school they prefer for their 
children. Nevertheless, education choice for children closely coincides with their 
parents’ voting patterns, as well as connects with the parents’ social activities, and 
their club and union memberships. Belfield and D’Entremont explain that this is to the 
detriment of school quality being considered in educational choice. This, in turn, 
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could have influenced the introduction of the Dutch regulation to try to ensure quality 
for all that states that all State-funded schools in the Netherlands ‘must adhere to 
curriculum goals, which include attainment targets and instructional hours specified 
by law, as well as published performance outcomes.’664 Belfield and D’Entremont 
also point out that, additionally, the Netherlands exerts more control over its private 
schools than the United States.        
  
 At times during the twentieth century, the Netherlands has been criticized for 
its role as one of the most tolerant states in the world.665 During the twenty-first 
century, the clear pragmatism this State demonstrates in religious matters and the 
Dutch method for teaching religious education merits consideration by other 
countries. ‘Dutch students outperform students in many other developed countries on 
such international tests as the Program for International Student Assessment and the 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Survey.’666 In addition, the 
education system which the Netherlands implements contributes to this country 
ranking among the highest in the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund scale of children’s wellbeing. 
 In constitutional terms, the Netherlands melds into the classification as a 
system of ‘non-establishment’ or ‘separation’; nevertheless, this does not imply that 
the State adheres to or supports a strict separation model regarding its State–religion 
relationship.667 Although the Netherlands should be classified as a system of ‘non-
establishment’ or ‘separation’ in constitutional terms, ‘the State does not have or 
implement a strict separation model. No equivalent of the “wall of separation” 
doctrine as in the US exists in the Netherlands, nor does the State demonstrate 
France’s “secular nature.” ’ 668 The Dutch employ a less rigorous model as they permit 
religious expressions, symbols, and identities in the public realm. Public authorities 
demonstrate the acceptance of religions in the way they relate to diverse faith-based 
activities and organizations. The State also guarantees the right to free exercise of 
religion through diverse legal regulations. 
                                                 
664 Belfield and D’Entremont, ‘Catholic Schooling’, Schools in the Netherlands section (para. 6 of 6). 
665 Roney, Culture and Customs. 
666 Fiske and Ladd, ‘The Dutch Experience’, para. 4 of 5 in ‘Introduction.’ 
667 Belfield and D’Entremont, ‘Catholic Schooling.’ 
668 Marcel Maussen, ‘Religious Governance in the Netherlands: Associative Freedoms and Non-
Discrimination after ‘Pillarization.’ The Example of Faith-Based Schools’, Geopolitics, History and 
International Relations, 6, 2 (2014), paras. 7–8 of 2 in ‘In Search of “the” Dutch Model’section.   
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4.4 Critique of Religious Education in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands 
Macedo questions whether exposure to diverse religions might in part interfere with 
religious freedom or if a liberal State can legally make public schooling conditional 
on parents’ consenting that the State can expose their children to diversity that 
conflicts with familial beliefs.669 As noted earlier in the Mozert case, Chief Judge 
Lively denied that this practice constitutes a legitimate threat and argued, ‘Exposure 
to something does not constitute teaching, indoctrination, opposition or promotion of 
the things exposed.’670 I n this section, I present a critique of religious education in the 
four different states I have examined.  
 
4.4.1 Religious Education 
As it amounts to privileging one religion (Christianity in a nondenominational 
manner) over others in public institutions, the United Kingdom’s law making 
Christian religious worship compulsory in State schools does not appear compatible 
with the core of principled pluralism. This practice, as a principle of the U.K.’s State-
religious education, not only constitutes a violation of religious freedom and civic 
equality, but also potentially compromises the State’s impartiality. Nevertheless, as I 
previously noted, in practice, the U.K. schools allocate freedom for parents to 
withdraw from the mandated worship services. Also, in some areas, schools with 
predominantly different faiths than Christianity, like Islam, also have the liberty to 
observe their own religious worship services. The U. K. demonstrates the tendency to 
include rather than exclude diverse religions in considerations of religious education. 
This contrasts with both France and the United States, as both these countries 
construct a wall of separation to distance the State–religion relationship. The French 
base their model for the State–religion relationship on the presumption that for a 
country to maintain social cohesion, the majority of its citizens must share a 
homogeneous set of either religious or secular values.671 The belief that this type of 
                                                 
669 Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education’, pp. 468–96. Mozert v. Hawkins involved a 1983 complaint by 
‘born again’ Christian fami lies  against the local school board in  Hawkins County, Tennessee. 
The families charged a primary school reading program with denigrating their religious views, 
both in its lack of religious ‘balance’ and in the uncommitted, evenhanded nature of the 
presentations (p. 470). 
670 Macedo, ‘Liberal Civic Education’, p. 472. 
671 Ferrari, ‘Teaching Religion’, p. 210 
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uniformity constitutes an outdated past legacy, not compatible with a contemporary 
multicultural and multi-religious society, inspires the pattern for the model of the 
State–religion relationship. 
 In part, this perception conveys the idea that the U.K. pattern evolves from the 
State’s recognition that it cannot succeed in forging its citizens’ identities. 
‘Consequently, it gives up this claim, limiting itself to providing the legal framework 
necessary for the peaceful coexistence of different individuals and groups in a plural 
society.’672 Ferrari asserts that, therefore, the primary task for the United Kingdom’s 
State–religion relationship includes stimulating and maintaining elements in society 
that create and nurture citizen engagement, solidarity of the State, and personal 
responsibility.673 
 Educators in the United Kingdom primarily present religious education 
through a stance of reported State impartiality – the religious education approach. 
This differs from ‘the French teaching of no religion.’674 In the United Kingdom, the 
State focuses primarily on religious plurality. Teachers educate students about ways 
they can know and understand the diverse religions practiced there. 
 By contrast with the British approach, a recent example of the French attitude 
can be found in the incident in August 2016 when French police officers forced a 
Muslim woman on a beach in Nice to remove some of her clothing as part of the 
French city’s controversial ban on the burkini, causing international protests. Ruwan 
Rujouleh reports, ‘there’s a danger that France no longer looks any different from Iran 
or any other theocratic State, where religious police patrol the streets, monitoring 
women in public places, and checking whether or not they are following the rules.’675 
Currently, the United Kingdom accepts new religious movements more readily than 
does France.676 
 Lewis reports that all E.U. countries include principles of freedom and non-
discrimination in their respective constitutions. The specific approaches these 
countries follow to interpret and apply these ideologies primarily depends on 
                                                 
672 Ferrari, ‘Teaching Religion’, p. 210. 
673 Ferrari, ‘Teaching Religion’, p. 210. 
674 Ferrari, ‘Teaching Religion’, p. 210. 
675 Ruwan Rujouleh, ‘Burkini Bans: Why France is Giving Iran a Run for its Money’, CNN 
International, 25 August 2016 <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/25/opinions/burkini -ban-
france-theocracy/index.html> [accessed 28 August 2016].  
676 Ferrari, ‘Teaching Religion’, p. 210. 
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historical traditions regarding the State–religion relationship.677As the interpretations 
may differ from one country to another, similarly, the treatment of diverse religions as 
well as the implementation of religious education may also vary.   
 The concern of how best to balance religious freedom for all regarding 
compulsory education at the same time incorporating the liberal ideal of equality and 
nondiscrimination presents a common challenge that the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands have all appeared to encounter. Perhaps the 
various international mechanisms which enshrine the two ideals of religious freedom 
and equality intrinsically contradict each other in the context of a contemporary, 
increasingly pluralistic society. For example, when a religion, denomination, or other 
type of worldview manages a school, an impasse arises.678As administrators maintain 
equality for those students and teachers who adhere to different or perhaps even 
oppositional religious and worldviews, they must simultaneously preserve the 
school’s freedom to demonstrate its religious faith. 
 The perception confirming the need for the State to designate room for 
religion in education evolves from two basic freedoms: (1) the freedom of religion; 
and (2) the freedom of education. The freedom of religion entails, among other things, 
the right to manifest one’s religion ‘in public and in private’ and ‘in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.’679 Schools may be perceived as the institutional 
environment in which the freedom to communicate and transmit religious views to the  
religious expression and freedom of conscience needs to be respected. 
 The State cannot directly inculcate only certain religious views or require that 
students participate in specific acts that their religious convictions forbid, nor can it 
mandate that they affirm or profess beliefs contrary to their own. Freedom of 
education entails the right of groups and individuals to found and manage State or 
independent primary and secondary schools aligned to their peculiar religious, 
philosophical, or pedagogical principles. This freedom also includes the freedom of 
parents to select the school they prefer for their children.680 According to Haynes, 
                                                 
677 Lewis, ‘Between Lord Ahmed.’ 
678 Kevin Nichols, ‘Chapter 7: Roots in Religious Education’, in Priorities in Religious Education: A 
Model for the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Brenda Watson (Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis Inc., 1992), pp. 
113–23. 
679 Council of Europe, ‘Details of Treaty No. 005.’679 
680 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law,’ Yale L.J., vol. 111, 2 (2001) 
<http://www.yalelawjournal.org/essay/veil-ofignorance-rules-in constitutional-law> [accessed 
February 4, 2015]. p. 399. 
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even though discrepancies exist in the implementation of religious education, 
empowering students to learn about different faiths and diverse ways to understand 
the world enhances their education and equips future generations to better appreciate 
the need for religious freedom for all. 
4.4.2 Principled Pluralism and Education 
Research by Ahdar and Leigh as well as my subjective experiences and 
communications strikingly confirm that the most intractable disputes between 
believers and nonbelievers concern the education and upbringing of children.681 
Diverse perceptions exist not only concerning how and by whom children should be 
raised but also extend into concepts regarding what students should be taught in 
school regarding the origin of the world, about religions, and customs intrinsic to 
dissimilar religions within various States. 
 Ensuing issues relating to religious education include but may not be limited 
to the appropriateness of teachings as to whether the bodies of religious adherents 
may be mutilated and whether males and females should be segregated in educational 
settings, as conservative Islam mandates. Arguments regarding teachings to be 
included in religious education may also include contemporary debates regarding 
concepts defining life: for example, at what point in the biological development of an 
embryo can one speak of a life which cannot morally be terminated.682 According to 
Rawls’s political liberalism, these formidable issues require and should be primarily 
limited to the guidance of reasonable persons. On the other hand, principled pluralism 
contends that challenging issues in religious education demand considered 
contributions from those subscribing to a variety of religious beliefs. 
 Vivian T. Thayer argues the study of religion in compulsory education can be 
dangerous. In her discourse against religious education, Thayer poses the question: ‘Is 
study about religion really education at all?’683 She concludes that because ‘the 
distinction between the structure and the function of religion, in its application to 
education’, does not prove satisfactory, religious education can cause more harm than 
                                                 
681 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, p. 271. 
682 Raymond J. Devettere, Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics: Cases and Concepts, 3rd 
edn (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010). 
683 Vivian T. Thayer, ‘II: An “Experimentalist” Position”, in American Education and Religion: The 
Problem of Religion in the Schools, ed. F. Ernest Johnson (New York: Institute for Religious and 
Social Studies, 1952), p. 16. 
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good.684 Additionally, Thayer argues, as discussions regarding religion demonstrate 
the potential to transition into explosive subjects, students cannot examine these 
matters critically or objectively as they can other themes. Rawls’s political liberalism 
appears to support this unsatisfactory stance, while principled pluralism, contrariwise, 
encourages the examination of information that may challenge students to confirm the 
validity of their personal beliefs. 
 Some political liberals, like Thayer, argue that religion belongs in the private 
domain along with other biased theoretical preferences and not in rational public 
life.685 From examining several dilemmas confronting education, particularly religious 
education, I propose that one approach to religious education, specifically principled 
pluralism, would encourage religious education in any education system. Through the 
study of religions, students can, as they should, freely examine and choose the 
religion they prefer on its merits, provided they can make their choice without the 
imposition of any compulsory measures. 
 Liam Gearo argues against Thayer’s stance of firmly opposing any religious 
education. Gearo’s observation that religion is politically prioritized in education 
demonstrates a key difference of understandings between the two, regarding both the 
goal of education and the role that religion demonstrates during the education process, 
positive in the case of Gearo.686 These two different perceptions also reflect dissimilar 
concerns regarding the potential impact of religion. 
 The different stances which Gearo and Thayer present regarding religious 
education stimulate a question: Does Rawlsian political liberalism agree with Thayer 
and deny that any value evolves from religion in the education system? I reason that 
Rawls would instead more likely agree with Gearo. In general, political liberalism 
appears suspicious of religion’s role in public affairs and, therefore, may not favor 
using religion as a direct, dominating, comprehensive doctrine for public policy 
making. However, if an overlapping consensus under a constitutional framework 
allows for the practice, political liberalism may not necessarily oppose an educational 
curriculum which includes students studying about religions as subjects. The concepts 
founding principled pluralism do, in fact, support offering opportunities for students 
                                                 
684 Thayer, ‘An “Experimentalist” Position’, p. 28. 
685 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, p. 51. 
686 Liam Gearon Masterclass in Religious Education, Transforming Teaching and Learning (New 
York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013). 
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to obtain knowledge regarding diverse religions. In turn, the mutual understandings 
that students gain of those practicing religions different from their own will likely, in 
time, serve to help them better ensure their own religious freedom in the world’s 
increasingly plural milieu. 
 Two extreme views have frequently been evidenced in the increasingly plural 
context in which religious education exists.  One viewpoint, fundamentalism, may be 
construed as the attempt to withdraw from cultural and religious obscurities by 
copiously recognizing only one position and truth. With this approach, teachings in 
religious education reinforce one solitary, designated religious truth. 687 As I 
maintained in previous chapters, when individuals endorsing theonomy and other 
fundamentalist religious approaches adopt this tactic, they consequently discard the 
value of other religions. 
 The second extreme view, relativism, adheres to the approach of political 
liberalism. This viewpoint deems religious education as either unnecessary or argues 
that it rather belongs to pedagogical, comparative religious studies; devoid of any 
inherent truth value. 688 Inevitably, as fundamentalism and relativism disavow 
religious identities and thwart discourse capabilities, both approaches will impede 
religious freedom for all. 
 In its opposing stance to fundamentalism and relativism, principled pluralism 
encourages dialogue among as well as between diverse religious identities. From the 
principled pluralism perspective, religious education not only serves as a conduit for 
purification of religious truth from one religious identity, it also creates opportunities 
for students to enhance their abilities to evaluate religious truths.689 Following their 
exposure to religious education that capsulizes diverse religions, students can more 
freely make sound judgments in choosing or rejecting partial or whole religious 
truths. 
  The solution for resolving tensions among the diverse truth claims should not 
arbitrarily embrace and employ fundamentalist approaches such as theonomy. Nor 
should the solution abruptly reject the existence of the truth in an agnostic, relativistic 
                                                 
687 Friedrich Schweitzer, ‘Chapter 15. Religious Education. Identity and Faith in (Post-)Modernity: 
More than a Biographical Approach? A Personal Attempt at Finding the Red Thread in my Academic 
Work on Religious Education’, in On the Edge: (Auto)biography and Pedagogical Theories on 
Religious Education, ed. Ina ter Avest (Notre Dame, IN: Springer, 2013), pp. 163–74 (p. 170). 
688 Schweitzer, ‘Religious Education.’ 
689 Schweitzer, ‘Religious Education.’ 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            179 
 
 
claim such as political liberalism. To best protect religious freedom for all, no matter 
how extreme one may perceive a religion, as long as the religious adherents operate 
and manifest their religion under legal norms, their religion merits protection. 
 In contrast to the dangers of both the religious fundamentalists’ exclusivism 
and the ideological secularists’ relativism, I propose that principled pluralism 
provides the best, most consistent and most coherent political philosophy in securing 
religious freedom for all. I also stress that for the State to maintain freedom of religion 
for all, it must match its method for implementing religious education to align with 
principled pluralism. Otherwise, this misapplication of or failure to apply methods to 
educate young people regarding diverse religions will ultimately break freedom. 
Unless the State implements principled pluralism, education will inevitably run into 
conflict. This will routinely occur primarily due to favoritism, or inconsistencies in 
practices regarding religious diversity and religious education.690 
 Principled pluralism also advocates for boundaries; not, however, the same 
restricting constraints that political liberalism proposes. Political liberalism, as per 
Rawls’s directives noted in Chapter 3, will certainly refuse to welcome any form of 
education about certain religions if any of them may be deemed as ‘irrational and 
mad.’ 691  As a consequence, Rawls’s perceptions regarding constraining certain 
religions from appearing in the public square contradict principled pluralism’s 
commitment to religious freedom. 
 Principled pluralism, unlike political liberalism, will welcome religious 
education in both public and private settings. Principled pluralism recognizes religion 
as an inherent component of human beings and an inalienable part of the fabric of any 
organic pluralistic society as principles of religious freedom for all. Therefore, 
religious education proves vital for inclusion in compulsory education to contribute to 
a future generation who will know how to better help ensure religious freedom for all. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
As noted at the start of this chapter, religion in education is a contemporary global 
political priority.692 In this chapter, I have examined how religious education 
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complements a State, its educational system, and the potential for its future generation 
to maintain religious freedom. Additionally, I surveyed the schools and educational 
systems in four liberal states,693 the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
the Netherlands. I also noted whether the methods these states use complement or 
constrain religious freedom. In addition, my examination of State policies not only 
contributes to the illustration of principled pluralism as applied to education regarding 
religious freedom, it simultaneously alludes to the significance of my evolving, 
modified version of principled pluralism, Baorong Duoyuan. 
 In Chapter 5, as I progress toward contextualizing a model of principled 
pluralism to address China’s need for full religious freedom, I examine historical and 
contemporary trends and challenges to religious freedom in China. Ultimately, I 
introduce Baorong Duoyuan as a contextualized model of principled pluralism in 
China and present a demonstration of its application to China as it relates to religious 
freedom. 
 
                                                 
693 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, p. 296. 
  
 
 
Chapter 5 
Principled Pluralism Contextualized:                                            
Toward Baorong Duoyuan 
 
Let a hundred flowers blossom 
and a hundred schools of thought [resonate…].694 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I reasoned that to safeguard religious freedom for all, a goal that both 
political liberalism and principled pluralism endorse, religious education695 should 
constitute an inseparable part of any education system, particularly contemporary 
public education. After I examined the five approaches that diverse countries have 
adopted to implement religious education, I compared the education models within 
public schools in four Western countries and discussed several ensuing controversies 
and conflicts thereof. I also noted the corresponding stance that each State holds 
regarding religious education. Initially, in Chapter 5, I review several constraints on 
religious freedom in China under the traditional State–religion model and examine 
contemporary challenges to religious freedom under the CCP’s State–religion model. 
I then relate the inherent unjustifiability of the CCP’s current religious policy in 
principle as well as its unsustainability in practice. In this chapter I also point out that 
if, as several scholars predict, China becomes ‘Christian(ized)’ in the future and the 
State transitions into a democracy, Baorong Duoyuan could prove to best suit the 
projected new China. 
 As the political, economic, cultural, and religious conditions in China are not 
yet as they would be under a democracy, I consider whether, and if so, under what 
conditions Baorong Duoyuan could help promote, protect, and preserve religious 
freedom for all. As I noted in Chapter 1, the Chinese term, which translates to 
‘inclusive pluralism’ in English also correlates with the theme that the introductory 
                                                 
694 See: ‘Roots of Chinese Humanism’, in Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedia Britannica (2018) 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/ Chinese-philosophy#ref171469> [accessed 24 March 2018], paras 
2–3 of 10. ‘The Contention of a Hundred Schools of Thought (Baijia Zhengming) […] known as the 
Golden Age of Chinese philosophy’ because a broad range of thoughts were discussed freely.   
695 The umbrella of religious education encompasses several approaches for its implementation, five 
which I discuss later in this chapter. According to Cathy Byrne and to Ahdar and Leigh, these include: 
(1) learning into religion (also known as religious instruction); (2) learning about religion (also known 
as reported state neutrality); (3) learning from religion; (4) the separatist approach; and (5) the 
secularist approach. 
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quotation for this chapter reflects – to let each religion (flower/school of thought) 
resonate or speak freely in the public square. 
 After explaining the general conditions for Baorong Duoyuan in China – 
pluralization and democratization – I rule out the inclusion in my study of numerous 
components relating to political liberalism and principled pluralism. I then draw 
several positive considerations from both these rival theories to design and develop 
Baorong Duoyuan for consideration in China’s projected pluralistic, Christianized, 
democratic environment. 
 Ultimately, even though my research reveals that principled pluralism rather 
than political liberalism more closely depicts the intent of Baorong Duoyuan to 
protect religious freedom for all, nevertheless, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, 
neither principled pluralism nor political liberalism can adequately and sufficiently 
ensure citizens’ religious freedom in the way that international standards stipulate. 
Consequently, I present BD as a proposed foundation for religious feedom in a post-
communist, democratic China. At the end of this chapter, I assert that Baorong 
Duoyuan’s theoretical foundation not only counters challenges to religious freedom, it 
also encompasses the potential to help harmonize interrelations between different 
worldview orientations, some which I note in the following sections. 
 
5.2 Challenges for China Regarding Religious Freedom 
In Chapter 1, I note that the pattern of State supremacy and official orthodoxy has 
continued in China under a Communist State which dictates that religions must 
operate under the religious policies of the CCP. Although China’s constitution 
declares that citizens of China shall enjoy ‘freedom of religious belief,’696 and despite 
its guarantee of this proclaimed freedom, the State still regards any religious activities 
conducted outside the CCP’s policies as not only heterodox in ideology but also as 
implying abnormal and, in turn, illegal activities.697 Any religious groups outside the 
                                                 
696 Article 36 of the Constitution of the PRC states: ‘Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy 
freedom of religious belief (Beijing, PRC: Foreign Language Press, 1982) 
<http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html> [accessed 10 May 2015]. quite a lot of 
this is in the body of your text later on: do you need to quote it all here? 
697 Daniel H. Bays, A New History of Christianity in China (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), p. 
191. 
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CCP’s approved and sanctioned list698 therefore become subject to persecution699 and 
potential legal prosecution.700 
 Throughout China’s history of diverse dynasties, the political structure of 
imperial authoritarianism has routinely challenged religious freedom for Chinese 
citizens. Ensuing conflicts and clashes between ruling authorities and religion in 
China have persisted throughout most of the imperial era and extend into 
contemporary times.701 Currently, amid ongoing reports of prosecution and 
persecution of certain religions and in attempts to justify its renunciation of religious 
freedom, the CCP regularly claims that hostile foreign forces use religions to 
permeate Chinese society to win over the population. 
 
5.2.1 Religious Freedom under China’s Traditional State–Religion Model 
Jonathan Chao, a renowned modern Chinese church historian, confirms that the 
relationship between the State and religion in China has traditionally been one of 
supremacy of the State over religion.702 Since the first group of Nestorian703 Christian 
missionaries arrived in China in AD 635, challenges to religious freedom in China 
have repeatedly erupted in the form of conflicts and clashes between dynasties and 
                                                 
698 Jason Kindopp, ‘Fragmented Yet Defiant: Protestant Resilience under Chinese Communist Party 
Rule’, in God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church–State Tensions, eds. Jason Kindopp 
and Carol Lee Hamrin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 122–48 (p. 124). 
World religions like Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam are considered 
‘heterodox’ in relation to Marxist ‘orthodoxy,’ but may conduct their religious activities so long as 
such activities are under the supervision and control of the State.  
699 Even those on the approved list, however, were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976). See Kindopp, ‘Fragmented Yet Defiant.’ 
700 All groups outside the CCP’s list are declared illegal; nevertheless, some are tolerated while those 
designated as ‘evil cult’ groups are subject to legal prosecution. See Kindopp, ‘Fragmented Yet 
Defiant.’ 
701 In the history of Christianity in China, three brief periods transpired when church and State enjoyed 
relative harmony. The Nestorians experienced broad acceptance in China for 210 years until 
annihilated in AD 845 after heavy persecution against Buddhism by the Confucians in political power 
during the Tang Dynasty (618–907). The second peaceful period occurred when the Jesuit missionary 
Matteo Ricci (1552–1600) moved into China in the late sixteenth century, after which Catholicism 
flourished for nearly a hundred years. The last period of harmony was between 1911 and 1949, from 
Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionaries establishing the Republic of China to the CCP taking power in mainland 
China. See Jonathan Chao, ‘The Gospel and Culture in Chinese History’, in Chinese Intellectuals and 
the Gospel, eds. Samuel Ling and Stacey Bieler (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1999), pp. 10–17. 
702 Jonathan Chao, Church and State in Socialist China, 1949–1988 (London: The Oxford Center for 
Mission Studies, 1989), p. 8. 
703 Andrew C. Ross, A Vision Betrayed: The Jesuits in Japan and China, 1542–1742 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1994). The Nestorian Christians, merchants and missionaries from the 
Nestorian Church of Mesopotamia, arrived in China in 635 during the Tang Dynasty (AD 589–845). In 
845, the Emperor Wu Zong, a strict Confucian, ferociously attacked all monastery-based religious 
organizations. The Nestorians did not survive the imperial purge. 
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religions.704 After the first Protestant missionary, Robert Morrison (from the London 
Missionary Society), reached Canton, China in 1807, however, the conflicts between 
the Christian church and the State escalated. Similarly, until China accepted 
Catholicism in 1844,705 Catholics suffered nearly 150 years of suppression as China 
determined to portray this religious group as a foreign heterodox sect. 
 Some Chinese have alleged that the Gospel came into China with the forces of 
Western colonial pressure.706 This impression intensified in 1858 when China lost the 
Second Opium War. The signing of the resulting imbalanced Treaty of Tianjin, 
however, included a ‘toleration clause’ that granted foreign missionaries the right to 
share the Christian faith in the State.707 This significantly contributed to the Chinese 
regarding Christianity as a foreign religion (yang jiao) that had invaded the territory 
of traditional Chinese religions.708 
 In traditional China, prior to the rule of the CCP, from the seventeenth century 
until the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911,709 most dynasties esteemed 
Confucianism710 as the imperial orthodoxy. After Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, a professing 
Christian, founded the Republic of China in October of 1911, ending the imperial 
system of China, however, Chinese citizens enjoyed a short-term period of real 
                                                 
704 Jonathan Chao, ‘The Gospel and Culture in Chinese History’, in Chinese Intellectuals and the 
Gospel, eds. Samuel Ling and Stacey Bieler (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1999), pp. 9–24.  
705 M. Searle Bates, ‘Church and State in Traditional China’, unpublished paper, seminar on modern 
China, Columbia University, November 1967, p. 13. 
706 Yang Zhong, ‘Between God and Caesar The Religious, Social, and Political Values of Chinese 
Christians’, Problems of Post-Communism, 60, 3 (May–June 2013), DOI: 10.2753/PPC1075-
8216600303, pp. 36–48 (p. 37). 
707 Ka-che Yip, ‘China and Christianity: Perspectives on Missions, Nationalism, and the State in the 
Republican Period, 1912-1949’, in Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire, eds. Brian Stanley 
and Alaine Low (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 132–43 (p. 135). 
708 Ying Fuk-tsang, 'Mainland China’, in Christianities in Asia, ed. Peter C. Phan (Malden, MA: Wiley    
Blackwell, 2011) pp. 149–72 (p. 150). 
709 Bays, A New History of Christianity. ‘The “Common Program” approved by the CPPCC was in 
effect China’s constitution until 1954, when the NPC approved the first formal constitution. The 
Common Program, which was the foundation enabling establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, 
contained provision for the “freedom of religious belief for all religious believers”’ (p. 161). 
710 Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
pp. 32–83. Confucius taught that although meticulously observing ancient rituals proves critical, having 
a sincere heart and a devoted spirit proves to be even more significant: ‘For if a person lacks 
humaneness (ren) within, then what is the value of performing rituals?’ Confucius also held a holistic 
perception of a person and stressed that if one observed ways a person acted, scrutinized his motives 
and his tastes, then the person could not conceal his/her real character from others. Later, Dong 
Zhongshu assumed a primary role in developing a comprehensive Confucian doctrine (based on the 
concept of mutual responsiveness between Heaven and humans), adapting Confucianism to the new 
culture of the Han. Confucianism transitioned from a moralistic system to ‘a universalistic and holistic 
view providing inescapable sanctions for the deeds of men and the ordering of society, and a place in 
the cosmos for the imperial system.’  
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religious freedom for the first time in the country’s history.711 Wu Zongci confirms 
that in 1912, the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China’s guarantee of 
freedom for each citizen’s religious belief proved to be a precedent for rulings relating 
to the State–religion relationship.712 Zhang Hua similarly notes that, ‘Throughout 
Chinese history, multiple religions co-existed, but the policy of religious freedom was 
proposed for the first time in history in 1912. Therefore, the stipulation on religious 
freedom in the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China had landmark 
significance.’713 Due to the total submission to imperial rule by numerous groups 
outside the imperial orthodoxy, including Buddhists and the traditional Chinese folk 
religions,714 most dynasties typically tolerated them. Some dynasties deemed certain 
religious groups as disloyal and rebellious to the imperial power, however, and 
persecuted or eradicated groups like White Lotus,715 the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom,716 and Catholics who refused to practice Chinese ancestor worship.717 
 Chao reports that prior to 1911, the dynasty transmitted and enforced 
Confucian orthodoxy through the education system and the civil service examination 
system.718 Although the State tolerated other systems of belief considered 
                                                 
711 US Department of State, ‘The Chinese Revolution of 1911’, in Office of the Historian 
<https://history.state.gov /milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev> [accessed 24 January 2016]. 
712 Wu Zongci, The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China and its Origins (Taipei: 
Zhongzheng Bookstore, 1978), p. 29. 
713 Zhang Hua, ‘The Beginning of the Religious Freedom Policy in the Republic of China’, 
<http://www.pacilution.org/english/ShowArticle89d7.html?ArticleID=3128> [accessed 12 January 
2018] para. 1 of 5 in ‘Part I: Freedom to Believe in Religion had Landmark Significance’ section.  
714Thomas David DuBois, Religion and the Making of Modern East Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). Chinese folk religions combine a mixture of ancient ancestor worship with 
elements of Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and the worship of certain deities. 
715 In the mid-twelfth century, the White Lotus society began as an association of clergy and laymen, 
who sought to attain rebirth in the Pure Land. These individuals were ‘committed to vegetarianism, 
abstinence from wine and killing.’ See Julia Ching, Chinese Religions (London: MacMillan, 1993), pp. 
214–15. 
716 In the 1850s, Christian missionary writings in southern China contributed to the ‘Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom’, which not only included bits of Judeo-Christian theology but also claimed divine revelation, 
egalitarian ideals, and communal sharing of property. In the 1840s, after followers armed themselves 
for protection, they defeated a series of armies the State sent to oppose them. In 1864, several million 
individuals died when the CCP ultimately exterminated this religious group, which they considered as 
revolutionary ‘proto-socialists’ deluded by their religion. See Religion in a Changing World: 
Comparative Studies in Sociology, ed. Madeleine Cousineau (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 155. 
717 Lawrence R. Sullivan, Historical Dictionary of the People’s Republic of China (Lanham, MD: 
Scarecrow Press, 2007). 
718 Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity, the Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese 
Antiforeignism, 1860–1870 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 3–60. See also Arthur 
Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 65–85. 
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‘heterodox.’719 nevertheless, with this affirmation of Confucian orthodoxy, the CCP 
implemented codes of law and increased government controls to reduce the influence 
of religious groups to a level of socio-political insignificance. In turn, the constant 
propaganda of Communism stimulated an anti-Christian movement in 1922, with the 
State regularly criticizing Christianity and implicating Christians as the imperial arm 
of the West. 
 To counter this religious oppression, numerous Chinese church leaders 
established Chinese indigenous churches. Nevertheless, Christian Meyer reports that 
after the robust anti-religious and anti-Christian movement (generally dated 1922–
1927) gradually subsided, ‘local popular religion and popular redemptive societies 
remained subject to persecution […, while the] issue of national identity, which had 
played a role in the anti-imperialistic attacks against Christianity […] was of 
continued significance in the 1930s as part of nation-building.’720 From 1921 to 1934, 
many early CCP leaders perceived religion as a barrier to science and thought that it 
would eventually dissipate as technology advanced. Vincent Goossaert and David A. 
Palmer report that some CCP leaders even argued that humans created gods and that 
Christianity constituted721 an imperialistic tool. On the other hand, several State 
leaders admitted that religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Islam, and 
Christianity positively impacted humanity.  
 In their efforts to control certain religions, despite sporadic positive 
admissions about religion in general, CCP officials would regularly infiltrate religious 
groups and try to manipulate members. Prior to 1949, as Chao observed, the State 
developed yet another system of control to contain religious expansion, utilizing 
religious leaders who worked for the Board of Rites to strictly monitor the activities 
of religious groups.722 The State also outlawed other sectarian groups, considering 
them to be dissenters and potential rebels and, hence, often suppressed these 
individuals by force. During the Dynastic period, the current emperor determined 
                                                 
719 C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 
180–217. 
720 Christian Meyer, ‘How the “Science of Religion” (zongiiaoxue) as a Discipline Globalized 
“Religion” in Late Qing and Republican China, 1890–1949 – Global Concepts, Knowledge Transfer, 
and Local Discourses’, in Globalization and the Making of Religious Modernity in China: 
Transnational Religions, Local Agents, and the Study of Religion, 1800–Present, eds. Thomas Jansen, 
Thoralf Klein, and Christian Meyer (Leiiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2014), pp. 297–341 (pp. 319–20). 
721 Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
722 Chao, ‘History of Christianity’, p. 22. 
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which religions to promote as well as the religions that the State would tolerate, 
control, or suppress. Figure 4 depicts the State–religion relationship throughout the 
Dynastic period. 
 
Figure 4: State–Religion Relationship in Dynastic China723 
 
 On 4 January 1949, ten months prior to the establishing of the PRC, the 
People’s Government of North China used two categories of the CCP’s ideologies to 
ban religions, accusing them of being sects and secret societies and claiming that they 
economically exploited and psychologically manipulated Chinese citizens. The 
Chinese government summoned religious leaders and advised them ‘to turn 
themselves in to the authorities and to repent if they wanted to avoid a harsh 
punishment. Meanwhile, the ordinary followers, who had been “fooled” by the 
reactionary societies, were ordered to withdraw from these associations and to cease 
any activity if they wanted to avoid being prosecuted.’724 The State promised rewards 
to these individuals if they provided information regarding groups with plans to 
sabotage government procedures. This period reflects increasing challenges to 
religious freedom under the CCP’s State–religion model in China, which I note in the 
next section. 
                                                 
723 Figure created and designed from information I retrieved from numerous references, including Chao 
‘History of Christianity’, Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question, and Yang, Religion in 
Chinese Society. 
724 Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question, p. 148. 
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5.2.2 Challenges to Religious Freedom under the CCP State–Religion Model 
On 1 October 1949, when the CCP established the PRC, the Party designated atheism 
as the State’s primary, official ideology.725 Despite reasons for challenging the 
concept that atheism could legitimately be regarded as a type of religion,726 
Communism and atheism both aim to weaken the influence of traditional religion.727 
Yang argues that throughout CCP schools inside China, as well as via internal 
circulars and intermittent propaganda campaigns, CCP theoreticians have reinforced 
atheism as a Marxist orthodoxy.  
 After the Communist Party gained power over China in 1949,728 the State 
banned religion between 1966–1979.729 Daniel H. Bays stresses that Chinese religious 
history after 1950 basically appears as ‘tightly intertwined with the theme of State and 
Communist Party control, interference, and repression.’730 During the periods of land 
reform (1950–1954) and collectivization (1954–1979), popular religions reinforced 
traditional social concepts which aligned with community solidarity and autonomy. 
Mickey Spiegel reports that as Communists wanted to integrate collectivized 
communities into a socialist economy and polity, this contributed to the CCP 
intensifying attacks on religions.731       
 Document No. 6, issued by the State Council in February 1991, reinforces the 
major document outlining China’s religious policy, Document No. 19, which the 
Party Central issued in March 1982.732 Despite China’s proclamation of religious 
freedom, which basically translates to being ‘free to believe and free not to believe, 
free to believe in this religion or that religion; within a religion one is free to choose 
                                                 
725 Chao, Church and State. 
726 Nina Weiler-Harwell, Discrimination against Atheists: A New Legal Hierarchy among Religious 
Beliefs (El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly, 2011), p. 110 
.727 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 58. 
728 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999). 
729 Amy Patterson Neubert, ‘Prof: Religious Trends in China Fueled by Government Restrictions’, in 
Purdue University News Service, 1 December 2011 <http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/research 
/2011/111201YangChina.html> [accessed 3 January 2018]. 
730 Daniel H. Bays, ‘A Tradition of State Dominance’, in God and Caesar in China: Policy 
Implications of Church–State Tensions, eds. Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 25–39 (p. 34). 
731 Mickey Spiegel, China: State Control of Religion, eds. Sidney Jones and Jeri Labor (NewYork: 
Human Rights Watch, 1997), section IV, pp. 17–36. 
732 Spiegel, China: State Control. 
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his sectarian differences and is free to move from unbelief to belief and vice-versa’,733 
this freedom does not extend to Chinese citizens. The CCP’s concept of freedom of 
religion, for example, does not include freedom of propagation outside approved 
places designated for religious activities, nor does it include the right to establish 
churches according to a person’s religious convictions.734  
 In January 1994, the State Council issued Decrees No. 144 and Decree No. 
145 governing religious activities among foreigners in China (No. 144)735 and the 
requirement which subjects religious groups (No. 145)736 to State registration. In time, 
the State implemented numerous other legal ordinances enforcing the State 
requirement for registration. Since April 1996, for instance, the State intensified its 
campaign effort to ‘make religion compatible with socialism,’ to enforce registration, 
and to terminate all religious activities not approved by registration.737 Jinghao Zhou 
notes that the CCP carried out the policy of ‘monitoring and regulating all 
religions,’738 with the intent of ostracizing Chinese religious organizations from 
                                                 
733 In his detailed interpretation of Article 36, Li Weihan, former Minister of the CCP’s United Front 
Working Department, the CCP’s chief religious policy-making body, states, ‘Every citizen has the 
freedom to believe in religion, and also the freedom not to believe in religion. Within a particular 
religion, every citizen has the freedom to believe in this or that sect.” See Beatrice Leung, and William 
Liu, Chinese Catholic Church in Conflict: 1949–2001 (Boca Raton, FL: Universal-Publishers, 2004), 
p. 21. This basically means that as long as they supported the CCP, monks, Taoists, priests or pastors 
would be considered friends of the State. The CCP’s policy of religious freedom appears to be only a 
political ploy. 
734 Spiegel, China: State Control. 
735 Provisions on the Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of the 
People’s Republic of China. Decree no. 144 of the State Council signed by Premier Li Peng, 31 
January 1994 <http://www.amitynewsservice.org/page.php?page=1143> [accessed 20 November 
2015]. 
736 Jinghao Zhou, Chinese vs. Western Perspectives: Understanding Contemporary China (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2013), p. 141. 
737 The policy initiatives were set forth by Jiang Zemin, China’s president and Chinese Communist 
Party secretary-general in November 1993 at a national conference on United Front work. At the 1996 
Fourth Plenum of the Eighth National People’s Congress, Premier Li Peng echoed the same themes. He 
cited Document No. 19 of 1982, The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our 
Country’s Socialist Period, which offered a corrective to the Cultural Revolution policy of severe 
repression by advocating the cooptation of believers that they might serve socialist construction, and 
Document No. 6 of 1991, Circular from Party Central and the State Council Concerning Certain 
Problems in Further Improving Religious Work. The latter was the first to mention adaptation, the first 
to espouse registration as a key supervisory mechanism, and the first to address the practical realities of 
implementing policy. Li Peng also referred to two 1994 sets of government regulations, No. 144, 
Regulations on the Supervision of the Religious Activities of Foreigners in China, and No. 145, 
Regulations Regarding the Management of Places of Religious Activity. On 1 March 1997, at the 
opening of the National People’s Congress, Li Peng again made reference to the need for religious 
groups to adapt to socialist society. 
738 Jinghao Zhou, China’s Peaceful Rise in a Global Context: A Domestic Aspect of China’s Road Map 
to Democratization (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 173. 
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foreign influence. This effort contributed to China’s contemporary State–religion 
relationship, which I examine in the next section. 
 
5.2.3 State–Religion Relationship under Communist China 
As noted earlier, China considers religious activities practiced outside of State control 
or outside patriotic organizations to depict heterodoxy in ideology and to constitute 
‘illegal religious activities,’ subject to prosecution, or a form of legalized persecution. 
Although the CCP considers the Three-Self Movement to serve as a distinct tool for 
the State to control Chinese Christianity,739 Philip Yuen-sang Leung reports that 
missionaries planted the roots of the concept prior to Communist control, hoping to 
unite Chinese Christians. The movement also intended to arouse nationalism and 
patriotism among this group.740 
 Currently, the Chinese government requires that the Three-Self Movement not 
only must accept the CCP’s leadership but that each church must register with the 
State. Those conducting individual religious activities must report these to the Three-
Self Movement’s local committee. Religious leaders must also report all religious 
activity locations to the provincial Bureau of Religious Affairs. In addition, every six 
months, each religious group must submit a written report of events to a special 
committee of the State. The State categorizes activities of house churches that refuse 
to register with the State as well as the practices of those religions conducting their 
activities outside the Three-Self Movement, as ‘illegitimate religious activities.’741 As 
China regularly labels numerous organized house churches that actively engage in 
evangelistic expansion as ‘cultic groups,’ these consequently become the State’s 
primary targets.742     
 Under the CCP’s rule in China, the pattern of State supremacy and official 
orthodoxy persists. Any religion must adhere to legal State ordinances and operate 
                                                 
739 Zhou, China’s Peaceful Rise. 
740 Philip Yuen-Sang Leung, ‘Conversion, Commitment, and Culture: Christian Experience in China, 
1949–99’, in Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), pp. 87–107. 
741 M. E. Sharpe, Chinese Law and Government (Abingdon: T & F Informa, 2003), p. 5. 
742 Numerous reports confirm religious persecution in the PRC, including material published by: 
Amnesty International: Asia Watch Committee (U.S.), Freedom of Religion in China (Washington, 
D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 1992); Richard C. Bush Jr., Religion in Communist China (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1970); and Ho Kai-lin, Laogaiying zhong de taianju erleu [Children of God in the 
labor camp] (Taibei: Guangqi Press, 1990). 
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within CCP religious policies. As the State seeks to propagate its own official 
orthodoxies, namely Marxism, Leninism, and the Thought of Mao, it only endorses 
these religions.743 The CCP considers all other ideologies and beliefs to be 
heterodox.744 According to Jason Kindopp: 
The apparatuses of control include the United Front Work Department of the Party, the 
Religious Affairs Bureau of the state, and ‘patriotic religious organizations.’ Church activities 
that are conducted within this sphere of control are called ‘normal religious activities’ and are 
given legal status. Only eight major patriotic religious organizations are allowed to operate 
legally under the CCP’s control.745 
 
 At times, State leaders assert that alien religions plan to subvert the Party’s 
rule.746 The following, for example, depicts China’s explanation for banning the Falun 
Gong movement: 
 Li Hongzhi fabricated the so-called Falun Gong by copying some qi gong747 
 practices and adding a lot of superstitious beliefs and ravings. Li propagated 
  the explosion of the earth and the doomsday fallacy to fool the public. These 
 concepts have already resulted in physical and mental injuries and even death 
 of people, undermining social stability. Falun Gong bears [a] strongr esemblance to heterodox    
groups like Branch Davidian in the United States and Japanese Aum Doomsday Cult […]. Falun Gong 
organization, advocating malicious fallacies, has put people’s life at risk and wreaked havoc on
 society.748 
 
 Yang reports that in 1999, after China banned Falun Gong as an ‘evil cult’ (xie 
jiao), the State jailed the religion’s core leaders. In October 1999, following the 
primary crackdown on Falun Gong, the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee adopted the Legislative Resolution on Banning Heretic Cults. This offered 
a sense of legitimacy to the clampdown on Falun Gong and other qigong or cultic 
                                                 
743 After the Fifteenth National Congress of the CCP, the CCP added the Thought of Deng Xiaoping. 
744 Kindopp, ‘Fragmented Yet Defiant.’ 
745 These comprise: China Taoist Association, the Buddhist Association of China, the Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches of China, the National Christian Council of 
China, the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the Chinese Catholic Bishops College, the National 
Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, and the Islamic Association of China. For 
more about this issue, see Beatrice Leung, China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing 
Religious Activity (Hong Kong: Lingnan University, 2005), p. 11. The other two initiatives include: (1) 
wholly and correctly implementing religious freedom policy; (2) using legal means to strengthen 
administration of religious affairs. See Ye Xiaowen, ‘Shiji Zhijiao zhongjiao gongchuo de Sikao’ 
[Reflections on the religious work at the change of millenium] Zhongguo Zhongjiao [Religion in 
China] 20, 1 (2000), pp. 4–9. 
746 ‘President Xi urges China's Religions to Shun Foreign Influences’ (21 May 2015) 
<http://www.ucanews. com/news/president-xi-urges-chinas-religions-to-shun-foreign-
influences/73636> [accessed 20 November 2015]. 
747 Qigong, also spelled Chi-Kung, depicts the study and practice of cultivating vital life force through 
numerous techniques which include breathing, posture, meditation, and guided imagery. See Peng Her, 
‘Qigong’, in Taking Charge of Your Wellbeing (07 July 2014), University of Minnesota, <http://www. 
takingcharge.csh.umn.edu/ explore-healing-practices/qigong> [accessed 9 February 2016]. 
748 ‘Definition of “Religion,”’ in International Law, Legal Information Institute, Cornell University 
(2003) <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/international_law> [accessed 12 March 2015] p. 199.  
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groups. Yang further notes, ‘In the following years provincial governments issued 
numerous temporary or draft ordinances and administrative orders aimed at 
controlling religious groups. Eventually these administrative orders were consolidated 
into the State Council’s Regulations of Religious Affairs that took effect on 1 March 
2005.’749 In many reported cases of false allegations by the Chinese government to try 
to validate attacks on certain religions, the evidence produced fails to support the 
charges. 750   
 Elizabeth H. Prodromoummai maintains that it appears at times, as with Falun 
Gong,  that the focus of the State does not necessarily confirm that it recognizes a 
reported religion as legitimate. Instead, the focus of the State could mean that the 
attitude the State assumes toward the targeted reported religion encompasses 
unsubstantiated charges against the group.751 
 I maintain that the attitude and understanding which China’s contemporary 
ruling powers adopt towards religious freedom continue to contribute to challenges to 
religious freedom, just as in the past under China’s traditional State–religion regime. 
Nevertheless, Chinese national religious affairs leaders maintain that their 
requirement that any religion must adapt to CCP religious policies does not 
necessitate the changing of fundamental beliefs.752 Since the 1990s, when President 
Jiang Zemin launched his campaign on managing religions, one of the three basic 
strategies regarding religion includes the goal to ‘make religion adaptable with 
socialism.’753 One could question, however, how religion can adapt to a philosophy 
                                                 
749 Fenggang Yang, ‘5: Oligopoly Dynamics and the Triple Religious Markets in China’, in The Future 
of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, ed. Allen D. Hertzke (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp. 128–56, (p. 137). 
 750 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, ‘Chinese Government 
Outlaws Falun Gong’, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t263446.htm> [accessed 25 July 
2017]. 
 751 Elizabeth H. Prodromou, ‘Protecting Religious Freedom Abroad’, Harvard International Review, 1 
July 2011 <http://hir.harvard.edu/protecting-religious-freedom-abroad/> [accessed 12 September 2016] 
para. 3 of 3 in introductory section. 
752 Prodromou, ‘Protecting Religious Freedom.’ Also, see: ‘Legal Protection of the Freedom of 
Religious Belief’ <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/Freedom/f-2.htm> [accessed 9 February 2016]. 
‘Religion should be adapted to the society in which it is prevalent. This is a universal law for the 
existence and development of religion. Now the Chinese people are building China into a modern 
socialist country with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese government advocates that religion should 
adapt to this reality’ (para 6 of 7). 
753 The other two initiatives are: (1) wholly and correctly implementing religious freedom policy; (2) 
using legal means to strengthen administration of religious affairs. See Ye Xiaowen, ‘Shiji Zhijiao 
zhongjiao gongchuo de Sikao’ [Reflections on the religious work at the change of millenium] 
Zhongguo Zhongjiao [Religion in China] 20, 1, (2000), pp. 4–9. 
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that, at its core, holds that Marxism will lead to the eventual demise of all religions; a 
philosophy which asserts that ‘Marxism is incompatible with any theistic 
worldview’?754 Regarding the goal of the CCP’s campaign to conform religions to 
communist protocol – CCP scholar Luo Shuze states: 
 by religion adapting itself to the socialist society, we mean that with the establishment of the socialist 
society, religion must adjust itself with corresponding changes  in theology, conception, and 
organization. We require religious believers politically to love the motherland, support the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party, adhere to the socialist path, and act within the constitution and laws 
of the land [….] It is necessary, through the patriotic religious groups and personages, to expound and 
interpret the religious doctrine and canon in such a way as to be in the interests of socialism, andi 
nspire and guide the religious believers gradually to modify their negative ways detrimental to national 
development and social progress.755 
 
Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank point out that in its efforts to convince 
diverse religions to adapt and modify their ways to match the interests of the CCP,756 
China holds a long tradition of regulating organized religion. One Human Rights 
Watch representative pointedly summarizes the nature of the CCP’s crusade: ‘the 
government defines what adaptation is required and by what religion, to the point that 
religions sometimes have to change or modify their teachings and practices to suit the 
political objectives of the CCP.’757 In early 1990, CCP elder statesman Chen Yun 
expressed concerns relating to the control of religion in a letter he wrote to former 
PRC President, Jiang Zemin: 
Recently I have looked at some materials concerning the increasingly serious problem of 
religious infiltration, especially the increasingly rampant practice of using religion as a cloak 
to carry out counterrevolutionary activities. I feel deeply disturbed. Using religion to win over 
the masses – especially young people – has always been a favourite trick of both our domestic 
and foreign class-enemies. This is the bitter lesson of several of the communist-led countries 
that recently lost power. Now is the time for Party Centre to deal vigorously with this matter. 
We must ensure that it cannot become a destabilising factor.758 
 
                                                 
754 Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 49. 
755 Luo Weihong, Christianity in China, trans. by Chengming, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 
2004), supra note 16, § III, 1. 
756 Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, ‘Making Religion, Making the State in Modern China: An 
Introductory Essay in Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, 
eds. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 1–21. 
Timothy Brook, ‘Chapter 2: The Politics of Religion: Late-Imperial Origins of the Regulatory State’, in 
Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China, eds. Yoshiko Ashiwa 
and David L. Wank (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 22–42. 
757 Spiegel, China: State Control, p. 8. 
758 Tony Lambert, ‘The Present Religious Policy of the Chinese Communist Party’, Religion, State & 
Society, 29, 2, 2001 <https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/rss/29-2_121.pdf> [accessed 20 November 
2015] pp. 121–29 (p. 124). 
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 Luo Weihong stresses that the CCP requires Chinese religions to reconstruct 
their theological views. Attempts to reach this goal involve government officials 
aiming at ‘expounding the basic belief of Christianity in light of China’s situation and 
culture.’759 In 1998, the CCP advised Chinese Christians to renounce ‘conservative 
and negative factors,’760 which Communist officials deemed ‘cynical, illiberal, 
irrational, and anti-humanity theological ideologies.’761 Bishop Ding Guangxun 
promotes one fundamental element of conflict between the independent church and 
the government, the State’s use of the Three-Self Movement 762 and Chinese Christian 
counselors763 in its quest for control.764 Government officials specifically praised 
Bishop Ding for his contribution of combining ‘Christian belief with [the CCP’s 
version of] reality to form a theory that is both rational and transcendent.’765 Ding’s 
distinctive theology encompassed ‘justification by love,’ however, instead of 
‘justification by faith.’ Bishop Ding also incorporated the Chinese ‘human nature is 
good’ ideology in his thinking as well as the suggestion of God’s acceptance of some 
CCP martyrs into heaven.  
 Weihong reports that the CCP considered Bishop Ding’s concessions in 
religion to constitute part of an encouraging constructive theology.766 This scenario 
reflects the way that the unofficial house church believers view most ‘official,’ 
seminary-trained clergy (those not a part of the genuine believing community) – as a 
                                                 
759 Weihong, Christianity in China, p.133. 
760 Weihong, Christianity in China, p.133. 
761 Weihong, Christianity in China, p. 133. 
762 National Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China, ppp 
(2017) <https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/ national-committee-of-three-self-
patriotic-movement-of-the-protestant-churches-in-china> [accessed 5 December 2015]. Note: the CCP 
established its rule in 1949, and the government positioned the Three-Self Patriotic Movement to 
oversee Protestant churches in China. The idea of a ‘three-self’ church included it becoming self-
supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating, analogous to church finances, administration, and 
evangelism, respectively. 
763 The CCC purposed to unite (Protestant) Christians and promote a self-governing, self-supporting, 
and self-propagating church in China. See Philip L. Wickeri, Reconstructing Christianity in China: 
K.H. Ting and the Chinese Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015). 
764 Lambert, The Resurrection of the Chinese Church, p. 281. 
765 Weihong, Christianity in China, pp. 136–37. Accordingly, Ding’s book entitled Collected Works of 
Ding Guangxun was published in 1998 and distributed within the Three-Self Movement churches and 
seminaries as the textbook for this theological adaptation construction movement. In one of the articles, 
Ding uses a rhetorical question, asking how our loving God could be so narrow-minded and intolerant 
such that CCP’s martyred heroes, comrades Lei Feng and Zhang Side, for example, who have done so 
many good deeds for the people, ended up in Hell. See K. H. Ting, God Is Love: Collected Writings of 
Bishop K. H. Ting (Colorado Springs, CO: Cook Communications Ministries International, 2004), p. 
621. 
766 Weihong, Christianity in China, p. 135. 
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highly politicized product of the program of adaptation.767 The position of Xi Jinping, 
China’s current president, further reveals the ideology of the CCP that its work should 
be to align the hearts and minds of citizens to the CCP. In 2015, the Associated Press 
reported President Xi to state, ‘We must manage religious affairs in accordance with 
the law and adhere to the principle of independence to run religious groups on our 
own accord. […] Active efforts should be made to incorporate religions into socialist 
society.’768 This attempt to more completely control religion mirrors one critical point 
of my argument regarding the dearth of challenges to religious freedom in China. 
 
In addition to the CCP’s attempts to restructure and eliminate religion, Zhou 
chronicles the fact that China utilizes criminal laws to minimize religious influences 
on society and restrict religious freedom. For example, on 1 July 1979, the Fifth 
National People’s Congress adopted the Criminal Law regarding religions. Article 99 
of this ruling states: ‘Those organizing and utilizing feudal superstitious and secret 
societies to carry out counter-revolutionary activities will be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than five years.’769 Document No. 19, issued on 31 March 
1982, provides another illustration. In this statement of religious policy, the CCP’s 
central committee conveyed the warning that religion must not interfere with 
education, marriage and family life, or politics. Figure 5 depicts the State–religion 
relationship in contemporary China which contributes to the continuing conflicts and 
challenges relating to religious freedom for all.  
                                                 
767 Li Xinyuan, Yi Ge Bu Xin Pai de Biaoben: Ding Guanxun Jinzuo Pingxi (Chicago, IL: Christian 
Life Publisher, 1999). 
768 ‘President Xi Jinping Warns Against Foreign Influence on Religions in China’, Guardian, 
20 May 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/21/president-xi-jinping-warns-against-
foreign-influence-on-religions-in-china> [accessed 25 July 2017] paras. 3–4 of 11. 
769 Zinghao Zhou, ‘Religious Education in China’, in The Routledge International Handbook of 
Religious Education, eds. Derek Davis and Elena Miroshnikova (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 76–
83 (p. 78). 
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Figure 5: State–Religion Relationship in Contemporary Communist China770 
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China embraces the State’s aim 
to focus efforts on socialist modernization by adhering to Chinese-style socialism.771 
Ultimately, the State hopes to transition China into an affluent and dominant socialist 
country with significant culture and democracy. Conversely, China’s contemporary 
State–religion relationship, which aligns with CCP practices, proves 
counterproductive to the State’s reported intents. As the CCP imposes constraints on 
genuine religious believers, this approach will inevitably lead to further worldview 
clashes. In the next section, I point out that restrictions the State imposes on religious 
freedom, restrictions bound by the religious policy the CCP implements, vividly 
affirm that policy to be unjustifiable and unsustainable. 
 
5.3 CCP Religious Policy – Unjustifiable and Unsustainable 
In Chapter 1, I noted that the CCP promotes atheism as China’s dominant ideology. In 
addition, as noted earlier, in promoting atheism, the State’s current CCP policy, which 
guarantees ‘freedom of religion’ for its citizens, however, ultimately proves 
                                                 
770 Original figure that I developed and designed from research. 
771 Translated in The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5: ‘The state upholds the 
uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system. No law or administrative or local rules and 
regulations shall contravene the constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and 
public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law. 
All acts in violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated. No organization or individual 
may enjoy the privilege of being above the Constitution and the law.’ 
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unjustifiable in principle. Instead of adhering to its own or international 
‘guidelines’772 regarding the protection of religious freedom, China consistently exerts 
pressure on numerous religions. During a national conference on religious affairs held 
4 June 1958, Li Weihan clearly articulated the true intention of the CCP’s religious 
policy: 
The freedom of religious belief policy is a revolutionary motto. We have adopted this motto 
and must enlarge its revolutionary content to end feudalism, and prevent exploiting classes 
from forcing others to believe in religion. If we thoroughly implement this motto, believers 
will gradually change from believing in religion toward non-believing. In short, the freedom 
of religious belief policy is our Party’s basic policy towards religion. We can adopt only this 
policy, not any other policy.773 
 Although this source dates back almost fifty years, Yang reports that the intent 
of the CCP appears to be to prevent the spread of religion. In the early 1990s, in 
addition to attempts to decrease the influence of foreign political entities utilizing 
religion for their own ends, Chinese authorities increased their efforts to stop the 
infiltration of foreign religious organizations. Yang points out that in recent years the 
CCP has increasingly invested more resources into controlling religions and 
intensifying atheist propaganda.774 
 According to Human Rights in China (HRIC), a Chinese nongovernmental 
organization, as of mid-2014, in direct contrast to the true intention of the CCP’s 
religious policy as attested by Li, China has aligned with the following six UN human 
rights treaties, listed by order of ratification:   
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against  
 Women; 
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; 
3. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment; 
4. Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
5. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; 
6. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.775 
                                                 
772 Beatrice Leung and William T. Liu, Chinese Catholic Church in Conflict: 1949–2001 (Boca Raton, 
FL: Universal Publishers, 2004), p. 22. 
773 Li Weihan, ‘Guangyu minju gongzhuo zhong jiao wenti’ Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti 
(Beijing: Renmin Publishing, 2004), pp. 520–81. 
774 Yang, ‘Oligopoly Dynamics.’ 
775 Human Rights in China, ‘UN Treaty Bodies and China’, in Human Rights in China 
<http://www.hrichina.org/en/un-treaty-bodies-and-china> [accessed 10 February 2016]. ‘Although 
China signed on to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on October 5, 
1998, it has yet to ratify it. As such, China is not yet bound to the specific provisions of the ICCPR.’ 
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 As of February 2016, no change of status has transpired regarding these 
treaties in relation to China. In addition to China’s façade of allocating support for the 
above six UN human rights treaties, other reasons for my conviction that the CCP’s 
religious policy model is unjustifiable in principle regarding protection of religious 
freedom include the following: 
1. the State fails to adhere to its own or international guidelines regarding 
freedom of religious belief; 
2. a contradiction exists between the principles of China’s constitution and 
religious regulations, including Party- or State-issued secret documents; 
3. a contradiction exists between China’s signed pledges and those signed 
though unratified international obligations regarding human rights and 
religious freedom protections. 
  A major contradiction exists within China’s constitution between the State’s 
constitutional guarantee of freedoms and the CCP’s autocracy rule, embedded in the 
preamble of the constitution in the rule of law or rule by law. Another contradiction is 
that the CCP designated certain groups as exempt from religious freedom, including 
members of the CCP, Communist League, and Young Pioneers, and military service 
personnel and civil servants. An additional contradiction is that the CCP also 
legitimized religious discrimination in employment by excluding nonatheistic 
citizens.776 
 Considering these contradictions, I question how the State’s philosophy can be 
justifiable when it routinely and robotically contradicts itself. My rationale for arguing 
that the CCP’s religious policy model proves unsustainable in practice regarding 
China protecting religious freedom includes the following reasons: 
1. China currently experiences a critical dilemma regarding its inability to
 enforce specific laws. Although unregistered religious organizations are
 considered illegal in status, the State must tolerate most of these groups
 because the CCP cannot jail the millions of dissidents belonging to them. 
2. Conflicts of interest exist between central and local government due  
                                                 
776 ‘World Report 2014: China Events of 2013’, in Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet> [accessed 22 August 2016]. 
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to tension between the central government’s goal for political control and 
local government’s desire to maintain economic development and social 
stability. 
3. Controls on religion, such as suppressing the religious freedom of
 minorities, will neither protect national security nor fight religious
 extremism or terrorism. Instead, these efforts have proved
 counterproductive by further fueling and aggravating more tensions and
 conflict: for example, crackdowns on Tibetan faithful and Uighur
 Muslims,777 accusing some of inciting rebellion and charging them on
 counts of separatism and terrorism. The banned Falun Gong’s international
 fight,778 despite a bloody crackdown by the CCP, is another
 counterproductive example in relation to religious freedom in China. 
 Considering the myriad of blatant conflicts in relation to the CCP’s attempts to 
control religion, I question how the State’s practices can be sustainable when the 
interpretations and enforcement of laws prove unstable as they are subject to diverse 
understandings by numerous officials, which in turn nullifies attempts to sustain them. 
I concur with Leonard Leo and Don Argue and argue that ‘China’s policies fly in the 
face of abundant evidence suggesting that the way to create more peaceful, 
prosperous, and stable societies is not by repression, but through freedom.’779 Instead 
of the CCP strengthening its control of religion, I foresee the likelihood that the State 
will weaken its quest as it continues to deny religious freedom for its citizens. In the 
following sections, I further argue against the justifiability in principle and 
sustainability in practice of the CCP’s current religious policy. The research noted 
earlier in this study indicates that neither the CCP’s current religious model nor the 
designs of political liberalism or of theonomy protect religious freedom for all in 
China. 
                                                 
777 Sui-Lee Wee, ‘U.N. Official calls China’s Crackdown on Uighurs “Disturbing,”’ Reuters, 11 March 
2015 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-un-xinjiang-idUSKBN0M723520150311> [accessed 29 
February 2016]. 
778 ‘China’s Policies toward Spiritual Movements’, House Hearing, 111 Congress, 18 June 2010 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010) <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg57902/html/CHRG-111hhrg57902.htm> [accessed 29 February 2016]. 
779 Leonard Leo and Don Argue, ‘The Huffington Post—Confronting China’s Failure on Religious 
Freedom’, in United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
<http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/op-eds/the-huffington-post-confronting-chinas-failure-religious-
freedom> [accessed 29 February 2016] para. 8 of 12. 
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5.3.1 Unjustifiability in Principle of the CCP’s Religious Policy Philosophy 
Communist conceptions of religions have ranged from ‘the opium of the people’780 to 
‘feudal superstition,’781 to anti-progressive,782 to their being the foremost obstacles to 
the party achieving its goal of radical reorganization. In Document No. 19783 under 
the heading, ‘Religion as a Historical Phenomenon in The People’s Republic of 
China,’784 the CCP defines religion as follows: 
Religion is a historical phenomenon pertaining to a definite period in the development of 
human society. It has its own cycle of emergence, development, and demise. Religious faith 
and religious sentiment, along with religious ceremonies and organizations consonant with 
this faith and sentiment, are all products of the history of society. The earliest emergence of 
the religious mentality reflected the low level of production and the sense of awe toward 
natural phenomena of primitive peoples.785 
 CCP officials routinely renounce charges which condemn or challenge the 
CCP’s religious policy and argue that the State protects religious freedom for Chinese 
citizens. As I recounted earlier, however, despite China’s repeated claims of the 
State’s reported policy of ‘freedom of religion’ for its citizens, the CCP promotes 
atheism as China’s dominant ideology while it persecutes certain religions. In 
addition, as the State simultaneously breaches the ICCPR, the philosophy of its 
religious policy proves unjustifiable. The adjective, ‘justifiable,’ indicates the 
condition of being ‘valid, legitimate, warranted, well-founded, […] just, reasonable; 
defensible, tenable, [or] supportable.’786 I find that in the CCP’s attempts to crack 
down on certain religious beliefs or groups, like Protestant house churches, Falun 
Gong, and Vatican-associated Catholics suspected as nonloyal to China’s 
authoritarian control, the State’s policy fails to protect religious freedom for all.787
                                                 
780 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, On Religion (Mineola, NY, Dover Publications, 2012), p. 42. 
781 Yoshiko Ashiwa (ed.), Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern 
China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 40. 
782 Klaus Larres (ed.), A Companion to Europe since 1945 (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2014). 
783 The State still subscribes to Document No. 19 philosophy to manage religious affairs in China. 
784Asia Watch Committee (U.S), Freedom of Religion in China, p. 44.  
785 Asia Watch Committee (U.S), Freedom of Religion in China, p. 44. 
786 Christine A. Lindberg, Oxford American Writer’s Thesaurus (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 501. 
787 Although China presents itself as a benevolent State that desires to propagate human rights 
throughout the world, the State does not apply a number of its international human rights commitments 
to its domestic realm. Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese administration abolished the 
‘reeducation through labor camps,’ where the State used inhumane and indefinite detention to punish 
political and religious dissidents. Basically, China has failed to honor its international commitments. 
See Gabriella Armato, ‘Ratifying without Resolve’, Berkeley Political Review, 1 April 2016 
<http://bpr.berkeley.edu/2015/04/01/ratifying-without-resolve/> [accessed 2 February 2016]. 
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 This inherent contradiction in the CCP’s religious policy philosophy in that it 
fails to defend religious freedom implies that said policy is not justifiable, hence its 
unjustifiability in principle. In addition to the reasoning I present supporting the 
unjustifiability in principle of the CCPs religious policy, contrary to its own 
proclamations regarding religious freedom, the policy bans foreign missionary work. 
The government also refuses to recognize any religious entities that foreign 
administrators appoint, including the Vatican. As the State routinely declares any 
unregistered religious groups as illegal,788 I contend that these practices provide even 
more grounds to support my argument that the CCP’s religious policy philosophy 
proves to be inherently unjustifiable. 
 Eric Hyer explains that the fact that Communist Party members cannot choose 
a theist belief also contradicts the CCP’s proclamation of freedom of religious belief. 
Hyer stresses that ‘while the constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
recognizes the right to believe or not believe in religion, there is no provision 
protecting the “free exercise of religion.” ’789 Hyer further explains that religious 
practice in China is governed by the ‘three-self’ (sanzi) regulations: 
Self-governance (no external leadership or authority is recognized), self-support (no foreign 
financial support is allowed) and self-propagation (proselytizing by foreigners is forbidden). 
     These regulations impose restriction on Chinese religious organizations that are counter to 
the UN Declaration [Article 6] that calls for the freedom to ‘solicit and receive voluntary 
financial and other contribution from individuals and institutions,’ to ‘train, appoint, elect or 
designate […] leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief,’ 
and to ‘establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters 
of religion and belief at the national and international levels.’ 
     The ‘three-self’ regulations are restrictions on the ‘free exercise of religion’ and limit the 
interaction of China’s religious communities with their co-religionists around the world.790 
 Even though the ‘three-self’ regulations reveal the opposite to be true, Chinese 
authorities continue to argue that the State protects religious activity, provided the 
State regulates that activity and it remains within what officials decree as normal 
religious activity. As Stephen Uhalley Jr. points out, when the State deems an event or 
activity as outside the official’s perceived normal range, Chinese law will fail to 
                                                 
788 ‘President Xi urges China's religions.’ 
789 Eric Hyer, ‘The Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion: Observing the UN Declaration on 
Religious Tolerance and Non-Discrimination.’ Talk prepared for ‘The East-West Dialogue: A Call for 
Action’ (Roundtable 3: Universal Values, Religion and Human Rights), held 23–24 October 2006 in 
Barcelona, Spain, organized by Casa Asia, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 
Generalitat de Catulunya, and Ajuntament de Barcelona, 
<http://www.casaasia.es/dialogo/2006/esp/hyer.pdf 
> [accessed 29 February 2016], p. 2. 
790 Hyer, ‘The Establishment and Free’, p. 2. 
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provide full guarantees of religious freedom.791 I assert that the State’s record of 
regularly persecuting persons practicing ‘illegal’ religions, which consequently 
invalidates CCP claims that it defends religious freedom, reveals a fourth 
confirmation of the unjustifiability in principle of the philosophy sustaining the CCP’s 
religious policy. 
   
5.3.2 Unsustainability in Practice of the CCP’s Religious Policy Philosophy 
Currently, the CCP routinely utilizes authoritarian, coercive, and militaristic measures 
to enforce the State’s religious policy. Yongnian Zheng argues that China cannot 
effectively sustain these types of tactics long term. This lends support to my first point 
regarding the unsustainability in practice of the CCP’s religious policy model. 
According to Zheng, ‘With growing foreign interests, global capitalism has an 
increasingly great incentive to push the transformation of the CCP and to lead the 
CCP in a “right direction.” A new system which can guarantee the rule of law and 
protect human rights will be more sustainable and effective.’792 John P. Synott 
explains that something being sustained embraces the understanding that the entity 
can be upheld, kept alive, kept from falling apart, and that it will hold because of 
having a sound base.793 Despite not being sustainable, some of the CCP’s public 
statements regarding freedom of religious belief appear promising, such as the 
following, recorded in Document No. 19:794 
What do we mean by freedom of religious belief? We mean that every citizen has the freedom 
to believe in religion and also the freedom not to believe in religion. S/he has also the freedom 
to believe in this religion or that religion. Within a particular religion, s/he has the freedom to 
believe in this sect [—] or that sect. A person who was previously a nonbeliever has the 
freedom to become a religious believer, and one who has been a religious believer has the 
freedom to become a nonbeliever.795
 
 Even though the words in Document No. 19 appear to align with the 
international norms recorded in UN treaties, they do not clearly specify religious 
                                                 
791 Stephen Uhalley Jr., ‘Burdened Past, Hopeful Future’, in China and Christianity Burdened Past, 
Hopeful Future, eds. Stephen Uhalley and Xiaoxin Wu, Introduction, pp. 3–10 (p. 7). 
792 Yongnian Zheng, ‘Can the Communist Party Sustain its Rule in China?’ in Power and Sustainability 
of the Chinese State, eds. Keun Lee, Joon-Han Kim, and Wing Thye Woo (New York: Routledge, 
2009). pp. 186–210 (p. 206). 
793 John P. Synott, Global and International Studies: Transdisciplinary Perspectives (Victoria, AU: 
Cengage Learning Australia, 2004), p. 34. 
794 Fenggang Yang, ‘A Research Agenda on Religious Freedom in China’, The Review of Faith 
& International Affairs, 11, 2 (6 July 2013), 6–17. 
795 Yang, ‘A Research Agenda’, p. 7. 
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practice and organization. David Little points out that some suggest discrimination is 
not a particularly serious form of ‘religious persecution.’796 Nevertheless, an 
abundance of evidence confirms that certain discriminatory practices, particularly 
those that affect a person’s right to support him/herself and his/her family adversely 
affect an individual. Yang contends that contrary to freedom of religious beliefs, 
‘the CCP members must be atheists and unremittingly propagate atheism. In other 
words, the CCP members are excluded from holding this constitutional right of 
PRC citizens and must be committed to atheism.’797 Throughout China, citizens 
who aspire to gain a position in leadership or hold a position in public service have 
to denounce religion and profess atheism.798 Although this stipulation proves 
impossible for the State to enforce,799 I contend that the fact the CCP mandates 
atheism for Chinese citizens who serve in particular positions shows its base to be 
unsound and reflects my second point, which argues that the CCP’s stated religious 
policy proves unsustainable in practice. 
 Vivienne Shue’s argument mirrors the third reason I offer for the 
unsustainability of the CCP’s religious policy model in practice, that the CCP 
perceives diverse religious practices and demonstrations of religious beliefs as serious 
threats to the Chinese regime. The CCP’s perceptions evoke State repression of 
certain religions as well as persecution of individuals charged with illegal practices.800 
The logic of the State’s legitimation routinely transforms most popular religions into a 
challenge to the CCP’s authority. In turn, this continues to perpetuate a cycle of 
religions challenging the State and the State in turn repressing them. Shue points out 
that despite religions challenging the State’s repression, only a negligible number of 
protests relating to CCP practices have occurred. There have been ‘no major social 
                                                 
796 David Little, ‘Chapter 1: Religious Minorities and Religious Freedom: An Overview’, in Protecting 
the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe, eds. Peter G. Danchin and Elizabeth A. 
Cole (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 33–57 (p. 55).  
797 Yang, ‘A Research Agenda’, p. 7. 
798 ‘BBC 中组部：离退休干部党员不能信教、参加宗教活动’ [Organizational Department of the 
Communist Party of China: Retired cadres and members must abide by the rules do not believe in 
religion], 5 February 2016 <http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2016/02/160205_china_ 
retired_officials_ party_rule> [accessed 10 February 2016].  
799 Yang notes that the Chinese Spiritual Life Survey in 2007 reveals that approximately 84 percent of 
CCP members and 85 percent of the public reported they hold some religious beliefs and/or participate 
in some religious practices. 
800 Vivienne Shue, ‘Legitimacy Crisis in China?’ in State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, 
Contention, and Legitimation, eds. Peter Hays Gries, and Stanley Rosen (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 24–49. 
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movements, no sustained movement of popular opposition from workers, migrants, 
poor farmers, women, students, intellectuals, ethnic minorities, or environmentalists. 
No opposition movement, that is, until […] Falun Gong.’801 
 Although individuals and religious groups with grievances against the Party 
remain voiceless and subject not only to prosecution but persecution by the State, ‘the 
mutual religious stimulation that results from congregational worship, using the 
particular rites and practices of each religion’802 stimulates empathetic feelings that 
unite diverse religious individuals with each other. As religious followers meet 
regularly, they strengthen each other’s faith and, in time, will likely gain a stronger 
voice to support my fourth stance regarding the unsustainability in practice of the 
CCP’s religious policy method – the CCP cannot physically control millions of 
religious adherents. 
 Li claims that in the midst of China’s dilemmas relating to religious freedom 
that have contributed to international concerns, the State would do well to consider 
permitting more freedom of religious beliefs. 803 Li also contends that authorities 
should consider practices that Freedom House, an international human rights 
organization, has suggested.804 These include opening conduits such as public 
hearings and town meetings that would permit Buddhists, Catholics, Muslims, 
Protestants, and other religious adherents to express their concerns and offer 
suggestions. I agree with Li that this State effort could help ease some of the tension 
and contribute to cultivating a sense of harmony between the State and religious 
groups.          
 I also agree with Yang as he argues that contemporary globalizing works to 
counter the CCP’s quest to eradicate religions in China and asserts that heavy State 
regulation cannot exterminate religion.805 I contend that the efficacy of State power in 
the types of tactics which the CCP currently implements to fight against religious 
freedom will ultimately fail as religious groups and believers continue to challenge 
the CCP’s contemporary religious policy, ultimately realizing its unsustainability in 
practice.         
                                                 
801 Shue, ‘Legitimacy Crisis’, p. 25. 
802 Religion under Socialism in China, trans. Zheng Xi’An, ed. Luo Zhufeng (Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1991), p. 107. 
803 Li, Civil Liberties. 
804 Li, Civil Liberties. 
805 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society. 
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 Many CCP officials reportedly believe that international subversive forces 
employ religion to ‘Westernize’ and ‘divide’ China. As Beatrice Leung explains, ‘The 
CCP believe that through the pluralization of religious questions, “dark forces” could 
be trying to politically pluralize China as a means of subversion.’806 This erroneous 
perception leads to convictions contrary to research that supports the premise that 
religious freedom promotes more positive relationships between the State and 
citizens.807 
 Chris Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover argue that religious freedom significantly 
contributes to positive social outcomes. Seiple and Hoover stress that this human 
freedom energizes religious groups to increase their participation in civil society. 
Religious freedom may also help reduce conflicts in society, may lessen grievances 
that religious groups hold toward governments and other citizens, and may ultimately 
enhance State security.808 Despite the CCP’s misguided concerns and ensuing efforts 
relating to religions and religious freedom, statistics reveal a revival of diverse 
religions in China. In turn, this trend complements religious pluralism, one critical 
condition for my Baorong Duoyuan model. Nevertheless, the tyrannical rule of one 
party, the CCP, clearly controverts another general condition for BD, democracy with 
government rule determined by free elections. In the next section, I assert that the 
potential for BD as a viable option to protect religious freedom for all in China will 
likely emerge during the foreseeable future. 
5.4 Pluralism and Constitutional Democracy: Potential for BD  
 In addition to arguing against the justifiability and sustainability of the CCP’s current 
religious policy, research noted in this study indicates that neither the CCP’s current 
religious model, nor that of political liberalism or theonomy can protect religious 
freedom for all in China. The following summarizes five defects in the Chinese 
current system relating to the principles of religious freedom that principled pluralism 
endorses and enshrined by international norms as noted in Chapter 2.  
                                                 
806 Beatrice Leung, ‘The Catholic Church in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Dilemma in Church–State 
Relations’, in Uhalley and Wu, China and Christianity: Burdened Past, p. 307. 
807 Chris Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover, ‘14: Religious Freedom and Global Security’, in The Future of 
Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, ed. Allen D. Hertzke (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp. 315–30 (p. 325).  
808 Seiple and Hoover, ‘Religious Freedom’, p. 325. 
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1. China permits only a limited freedom for its citizens to exercise ‘the 
freedom of religious belief’ and only a limited number of these 
individuals may gather and worship in government-approved religions. 
Members of the CCP, Communist League, and Young Pioneers, and 
military service personnel and civil servants are forbidden to have 
freedom of religious belief or to change their belief. These citizens are 
permitted to believe only in atheism. Moreover, as I mentioned in the 
previous sections in this chapter, certain religions, quasi-religions, and 
folk religions or beliefs, which are designated as ‘evil cults’ as I noted 
earlier, including Falun Gong’s spiritual movement and other groups, are 
totally banned and no citizen may legally believe in them.809 Members of 
these groups are subject to severe legal prosecution and persecution. 
2. No Chinese citizen has the true freedom to manifest his/her religious 
belief in any public setting, either as an individual or in a community 
setting with others. Only certain aspects of government-approved patriotic 
religions are allowed to be practiced in government-designated venues 
and they must be administered by government-certified clergy in 
government-designated areas at State-designated times. 
3. Government-approved patriotic religious organizations are fully 
controlled and partially managed by the Communist Party and its 
government agencies. Approved religious personnel are also strictly 
controlled by the relevant agencies of the atheistic CCP and the 
government. 
4. Religious citizens do not have the freedom to participate in political 
affairs, such as essential public policy making. Neither can they actively 
engage in some public services, nor can they act freely according to their 
religious convictions. 
5. Some religious education may be tolerated locally and practiced privately 
but, in general, no religious education is allowed in any public or private 
education system. As prescribed by law, in the name of the non-
                                                 
809 Jamie Fullerton, ‘China bans religion for communists’, The Times, 20 July 2017 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-bans-religion-for-communists-bqd80zhn9> [accessed 1 
December 2017] para. 1 of 4 in Introduction. ‘China’s estimated 85 million members of the Communist 
Party have been warned that they are not allowed to have religious beliefs, and that those who do will 
be punished.’ 
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interference of China’s education sector, the CCP enforces the ban of 
religious education. 
 These five major defects demonstrate either a great violation of or major 
contradiction to religious freedom and further confirm the need for Baorong Duoyuan 
for a pluralistic, Christianized, democratized future China. In lieu of the development 
of BD, however, I contend that principled pluralism currently constitutes the best 
option for protecting religious freedom in Western democratic societies. As I 
expounded in Chapter 2, principled pluralism grew out of a historically Christian-
orientated culture in the Netherlands, where a social and cultural pluralist society 
under a democratic, constitutional government had evolved. Therefore, as I mentioned 
in previous chapters, principled pluralism, due to its inherent Christian heritage that is 
explicitly noted in the constitution of the Netherlands, China, both currently and in its 
foreseeable future, 810 would likely reject principled pluralism in its basic format as an 
option for the State’s constitutional foundation. Furthermore, due to this theory’s 
inherent Christian heritage, explicitly noted in the constitution of the Netherlands, 
China would likely reject principled pluralism in its basic format as an option for the 
State’s constitutional foundation.       
 If my proposition that principled pluralism in its generic format will fail to 
meet Chinese acceptance proves true even with China’s increasing Christianization, 
then the ensuing dilemma arises to determine what theory could best potentially meet 
China’s demonstrated need for remediation of the CCP’s philosophy and practices 
regarding religious freedom. Consequently, this deficiency gives me the opportunity 
to present the potential for my contextualized model of principled pluralism for 
China, Baorong Duoyuan.        
 In an increasing pluralistic society in China, with hundreds of worldviews and 
religions flourishing and competing, I propose that Baorong Duoyuan would prove to 
be the best option for protecting religious freedom for all in China. The concept of 
religious freedom, which I allude to throughout this study, does not only refer to 
freedom for the numerous recognized religions, it also includes protection for atheists, 
secularists, agnostics, and even nonreligious people, as well as anti-religious 
                                                 
810 Allen D. Hertzke, ‘Introduction: Advancing the First Freedom in the Twenty-First Century’, in The 
Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, ed. Allen D. Hertzke, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 3–30 (p. 13). 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            208 
 
 
individuals and groups. The scope of religious freedom under Baorong Duoyuan 
applies to citizens both in their individual roles and in the community with others,811 
not only to ensure the freedom of religious belief in private but to also extend that 
freedom to include the practice and manifestation of a person’s belief publicly. 
 In developing the name for the theory which this study presents, Baorong 
Duoyuan, I considered a line from a Chinese poem.812 This line, ‘Let a hundred 
flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought [resonate…].’813 reflects the 
ancient adage of ‘contending of a hundred schools of philosophy’ in the Warring 
States period (ca. 476–221 BC).814 Each word in this line carries a rich meaning. 
Hang-li Zeng maintains that Chinese poetry encompasses ‘beauty in three aspects,’ 
and that in translating Chinese poetry into English, translators should attempt to retain 
the original beauty of the poem in meaning, sound and form.815 Translating Baihua 
Qifang (百花齐放), the word Bai translates to ‘one hundred’, Hua to ‘flower’, and 
Fang to ‘bloom.’ In this context, based on equality, one hundred flowers blossom 
simultaneously. The Chinese poem with the first line, ‘Let a hundred schools of 
thought contend’ marked the start of the Hundred Flowers Movement, a brief political 
campaign in which Mao Zedong deceived citizens with reassurances that they could 
freely speak to prompt them to verbalize their thoughts. This ploy concluded, 
however, with Mao betraying the principle of equal voices in the public realm.816 
Contrary to Mao, ‘All of the Hundred Schools arose in response to practical 
conditions [6th–3rd century BCE]. Their philosophers were either government 
                                                 
811 Benjamin W. Redekop, Enlightenment and Community. Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and the Quest for a 
German Public (London: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000), p. 223. This contrasts with the Enlightenment. 
812Although poetry does not merit a serious status in the West, particularly in the last two hundred 
years, in China, as Chinese ancient poetry holds a prominent place of respect, citizens honor ancient 
Chinese poets and still read poetry regularly. See Annie Wu, ‘Chinese Poetry’, in China Highlights 
<http://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/culture/chinese-poetry.htm> [accessed 8 February 2016]. 
813 ‘Roots of Chinese’, paras 2–3 of 10. 
814 Shiao-ling Yu, ‘Politics and Theatre in the PRC: Fifty Years of Teahouse on the Chinese Stage’, 
Asian Theatre Journal, 30, 1 (2013), pp. 90–121. 
815 Hang-li Zeng, ‘A Brief Analysis of the Classical Poetry Chinese–English translation: From the 
perspective of “Beauty in Three Aspects,”’ Sino-US English Teaching, 7, 2 (February 2010), pp. 52–
58. Zeng stresses that of the three aspects regarding Chinese poetry, beauty in meaning, beauty in 
sound, and beauty in form, beauty in meaning proves most significant. Beauty in sound retains second 
place in terms of significance, with beauty in form in the third position. Zeng maintains that translators 
should attempt to reproduce the three beauties simultaneously. In addition to meaning and sound, 
translators should consider the original rhythm of the poem. 
816 Gilbert King, ‘The Silence that Preceded China’s Great Leap into Famine’, in Smithsonian.com, 26 
September 2012 <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-silence-that-preceded-chinas-great-
leap-into-famine-51898077/#yM3RgTSshzWACBQA.9> [accessed 28 January 2016]. 
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officials or scholars, traveling from one feudal state to another and offering ideas for 
social reform.’817 My rationale for the reasoning of one hundred flowers blossoming 
diametrically opposes Mao’s devious intent. Baorong Duoyuan advocates for the 
principle of equal voices in the public square. In the next section, as I examine the 
basic conditions necessary for Baorong Duoyuan – pluralism and democracy – I note 
signs appearing to indicate that in the future, China may be transitioning toward being 
open to Baorong Duoyuan.  
 
5.4.1 The General Conditions for Baorong Duoyuan     
The CCP’s existing practices conflict with two critical components necessary for 
Baorong Duoyuan: (1) the protection of normative directional pluralism; and (2) 
participatory democracy. Until these dual elements materialize in China, the CCP’s 
practices will continue to sabotage religious freedom for all and prohibit full liberty of 
individual opinions and voices. As China does not profess either directional pluralism 
or participatory democracy at this point, and as Baorong Duoyuan requires intangible 
yet critical entities, the control of the CCP mirrors the reality that the Party’s leaders 
would currently negate any consideration of Baorong Duoyuan. Nevertheless, the 
next section reveals that even though the Chinese government continues to reject free 
elections, which is a requirement for democracy,818 and despite China not yet 
displaying sufficient pluralization,819 the citizenry landscape of China appears to 
reflect some signs of transforming to match the likely conditions for this criterion. 
The rapid associational and directional religious pluralism along with the projected 
process of Christianization which potentially leads to Chinese democratization will 
provide a solid foundation for Baorong Duoyuan to be implemented. 
5.4.1a Pluralization in China  
China, like many countries, has never experienced true diversity of religions, or 
pluralism, but has sustained religious oligopoly. ‘In religious oligopoly, the State 
allows more than one religion to operate legally, but other religions are banned and 
                                                 
817 ‘Roots of Chinese’, paras 2–3 of 10. 
818 Jinghao Zhou, ‘The Role of Chinese Christianity in the Process of China’s Democratization.’  
American Journal of Chinese Studies, 13, 1, April 2006 <https://www. jstor.org/stable/44288819> 
[accessed 6 February 2016] pp. 117-36. 
819 Zhou, ‘The Role of Chinese Christianity.’ 
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subject to repression.’820 Yang reports that approximately 20 percent821 of the 195 
independent states822 in the world qualify as pluralistic, with a few more countries 
ranking as monopolistic. ‘The majority of the countries, almost 58%, such as China 
are more or less oligopolistic. […] This global fact of religious oligopoly makes it 
necessary to rethink and reconstruct theories of church-State [State–religion] relations 
and religious change within society.’823 Amid ongoing debates about religious 
pluralism, Yang identifies a group of three words related with the same root (plur-) – 
plurality, pluralization, and pluralism – to expand on the concept of pluralism which I 
introduced in Chapter 2 of this study: 
 plurality (diversity) describes the status or degree of religious  
 heterogeneity within a society; 
 pluralization is the process of increasing plurality within a society; 
 pluralism refers to the social arrangements favorable to a high or
 increased level of plurality.824 
 Even though the CCP permits multiple religions to operate, as noted earlier, 
the State maintains rigid, restrictive regulations on religions and suppresses 
unorthodox or factional religious movements. Albert points out that even amid reports 
of some progress related to freedom for Chinese citizens, the CCP increasingly 
appears to promote Chinese faiths and ideologies, like Confucianism and Buddhism, 
while State officials also pressure unregistered Christian believers and organizations 
to convert to the beliefs and practices of officially recognized religious bodies.825 
According to Yang, the CCP not only promotes the beliefs and practices of China’s 
preferred religions and pressures citizens to conform to them, the State also employs 
marketization of some of the religions it controls. For example, this State ploy, such 
as initiated in Beijing, experiences success evolving from the leader’s personal skills 
                                                 
820 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 168. 
821 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 166. 
822 ‘Independent States in the World Fact Sheet’, in U.S Department of State 
<https://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm> [accessed 4 January 2018]. 
823 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 166. 
824 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 168. 
825 Albert, ‘Christianity in China’, para. 2 of 3 in section entitled ‘Chinese Buddhism and Folk 
Religions.’ 
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in marketing his ‘brand’ of Buddhism.826 Nevertheless, this promotional practice does 
not constitute pluralization. 
 Yang notes that a State’s legal structure or the absence of it appears to 
constitute a critical component of whether a State is pluralistic. To implement and 
maintain a successful pluralistic legal structure that legitimizes religious freedom and 
complements plurality, the following two considerations must be met: 
1.  intellectual understanding and a level of social consensus that 
 legitimizes and justifies both an individual freedom of religion and group 
equality of religions; 
2. civic organizations in the civil society that keep in check and balance the 
State agencies and religious organizations.827 
 Richard Weitz points out that even though the Chinese political system has 
undergone progress in becoming more democratic, the State still imposes severe 
restrictions to minimize political pluralism.828 Pluralism,829 which I examined in 
Chapter 2, differs from political pluralism as the latter promotes liberty as the most 
vital political value. Citizens best attain political pluralism when the State’s power is 
not concentrated at one point as in China but dispersed and distributed. Chinese 
citizens do not have political pluralism, yet in the sense that they can sometimes 
verbalize their discontent, although infrequently, with local policies without being 
punished, they have reportedly experienced some minimal improvements in their 
rights. Weitz reports, however, that the Chinese government ‘continues to deny 
Chinese citizens basic civil and political rights such as the ability to vote in free and 
fair elections or avoid arbitrary and excessive punishment at the hands of abusive 
                                                 
826 James A Beckford and Jay Demerath, ‘Case Studies from Around the World’, in The SAGE 
Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, eds. James A. Beckford and Jay Demerath (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2007), pp. 631–34 (p. 631). Government leaders recognize that marketing 
State-controlled brands of religion that have the support of wealthy overseas supporters as well as, 
critically, the backing of political authorities, enhances a community’s potential to generate economic 
wealth from tourism and the ‘heritage’ business. 
827 Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, p. 168. 
828 Marcel Wissenburg, Political Pluralism and the State: Beyond Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 
2009), p. 38.  
829 Jeffrey Wattles, ‘What is Pluralism?’ (Kent, OH: Kent State University, 2002) <http://www. 
wabashcenter.wabash.edu/syllabi/w/wattles/mdiverse.htm> [accessed 22 January 2018] para. 1 of 2 in 
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public officials.’830 In turn, this prevents China from moving into the democratic 
mainstream.831     
In a society qualifying as a part of the democratic mainstream, one that has 
diverse cultures and groups, that society will less likely show preference for one 
group over another. Regarding a society’s development, Han Zhu contends pluralism 
symbolizes the fact that considerable progress has occurred and argues, ‘On the 
surface, a pluralistic society appears noisy and restless and without consensus. 
However, such a society will reach a final dynamic balance through its contradictions 
and in the end, a society full of different views and opinions.’832 I agree with Zhu’s 
summarization that a pluralistic society proves to be healthier and safer than an 
oligopolistic State like China, intent on leaning only toward and recognizing one side 
– atheism. 
 Albert notes that, in some ways, the development of pluralism, particularly 
directional pluralism, one critical condition for religious freedom, a stipulation that I 
perceive as mandatory for Baorong Duoyuan, appears promising in China. Despite its 
dictatorship during the past thirty plus years, since China has started to cautiously 
open up to the outside world, the State is reportedly transitioning into a more 
pluralistic society.833 While some in China strive for pluralism, however, others try to 
resist or sabotage it.834 The separation of church and State, an innovation which the 
United States  initially experimented with, mirrors one significant trigger for 
pluralization. Nevertheless, Yang’s study of the development of pluralism in the 
United States as an example confirms that if pluralization proves to constitute the 
general trend of development in China, over time, it will win over the resistance. For 
the general conditions in China to be suitable for the potential of Baorong Duoyuan to 
be apparent, however, China must not only be in the process of becoming but be 
pluralistic. In the next section, as I examine religious pluralization in China, I note 
how the State’s strict regulations regarding religion created the black, red, and gray 
markets in religion. 
 
                                                 
830 Richard Weitz, Global Security Watch—China (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013), p. 6. 
831 Weitz, Global Security Watch, p. 6. 
832 Han Zhu, ‘China’s Pluralistic Revolution’, in China.org.cn, 26 May 2013, trans. by Li Jingrong. 
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5.4.1b Religious Pluralization: China’s Religious Market – Red, Black, and Gray 
Part of directional pluralism encompasses the flourishing of diverse religious 
worldviews. Yang contends that, ironically, the CCP desires to suppress religion, and 
the State’s strategies to impose strict regulations regarding religious freedom have 
contributed to unique classifications in China’s religious market. The restrictions have 
unexpectedly created three different colored markets in the State’s religious system: 
black, red, and gray. Yang explains: 
 A red market of religion includes the five legal religions which the CCP 
approves: Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism (also Daoism), Islam, and 
Protestantism under the label of patriotic associations. The red market also 
consists of religious activities, believers, and organizations. Yang notes, 
‘Alternatively, this may be called the “open market,” because the religious 
exchanges are carried out openly.’835 
 Certain religions that the State banned created a black market and these 
operate in secret or underground. Although illegal, the black market of 
religion, which the State officially banned, includes religious activities, 
believers, and religious organizations.836 
 The gray market consists of legally ambiguous groups and activities. Yang 
explains that ‘A gray market of religion consists of all religious and 
spiritual organizations, practitioners, and activities with ambiguous legal 
status. They can be perceived as both legal and illegal or neither legal nor 
illegal.’837 
Yang stresses that the gray market, which proves difficult to identify, includes: 
1. illegal religious activities which legal religious groups practice; and 
2. religious or spiritual practices that individuals or groups do not 
manifest in religion but in culture or science.838 
 Ironically, according to Yang, when the State’s regulations regarding religion 
become more restrictive and suppressive, the gray market grows larger. ‘When 
religious needs cannot be met in the open, red market, and the risks are too high in the 
illegal, black market, many people would seek what they need in the gray market.’839 
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 Amy Patterson Neubert notes that two examples of the gray market include: 
(1) when a State-approved religion distributes pamphlets outside a church or temple, 
or (2) when individuals practice spiritual beliefs that originate from nonreligious 
sources. ‘For example, qigong, which is a series of breathing techniques and exercises 
rooted in health, has followers that connect it to Buddhism and Taoism and, therefore, 
add a religious dimension. Another example is a Christian church offering Sunday 
school to children.’840 Historically, even if the religion merits legal status, the CCP 
regards teaching religion to children as constituting an illegal practice. 
 In 2007, regardless of the CCP’s constraints on religions, China reports that 
several tens of millions of individuals profess Buddhism, five million citizens profess 
Catholicism, approximately 10 million people claim Taoism, 21 million individuals 
profess Islam, and 23 million people profess Protestantism.841 Yang contends that 
these numbers prove to be greater and notes that one recent survey reveals that 
approximately 85 percent of Chinese admit to either practicing certain religious rituals 
or have some supernatural beliefs.842 The CCP’s efforts to regulate religions will not 
reduce religion or religious practices, he stresses but ,instead, will create the triple 
religious market. According to Yang, ‘If 85 percent of the Chinese population is at 
least open toward supernatural beliefs or participating in religious practices, but only 
small minorities have been recruited into either the government-approved religions or 
the underground ones, there exists a huge gray market with hundreds of millions of 
potential religious consumers.’843 Chinese citizens may not formally participate in 
religious organizations so openly when the State imposes militaristic regulations; 
nevertheless, they will engage in other forms of religiosity which will not only persist 
but likely increase. 
 Yang agrees that the ambiguous nature of a gray market in a severely 
regulated society like China will potentially contribute to a section of that society 
whose members will increase in number. These characteristics counter the intent of 
the CCP and make their goal to regulate religions impossible to achieve.844 Amid the 
CCP’s losing battle to annihilate religions, I note that although religious adherents 
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regularly experience persecution, their increasing number will further religious 
pluralism in Chinese society. As I consider this possibility in the next section, I also 
examine David Aikman’s prediction that as China progresses in becoming 
Christianized, in time, it will become known more as a Christian than an atheistic 
State.845 
 
5.4.2 China Projected to Become a ‘Christian(ized)’ Democracy 
He Guanghu suggests that some of the CCP’s negative attitudes toward religion may 
be slowly yielding to more positive ones as the Party has recognized the trend of 
religious pluralism occurring in China. In his speech to the Party’s Seventeenth 
National Congress, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao similarly indicated this potential 
when he stated: ‘We should draw upon the positive contributions of religious 
believers and leaders in the development of the economy and society as a whole.’846 
Although some contend that Jintao’s statement generally reflects a manifestation of a 
shift in the Party’s policy toward religion, I agree with Guanghu that it simultaneously 
further validates the intricate relationship between religious studies and China’s social 
development.847  
 Although research has only recently begun to measure and report the impact 
that Christianity has exerted on China and projects for future decades, Yang foresees 
the Christianization of China as inevitable. According to Nora Berend, the meaning 
for the ‘Christianization’ of a State848 can range from the acceptance of Christianity to 
the practice of the religion to a myriad of implications, interpretations, and inferences. 
For the purposes of this study, Christianization relates to Aikman’s prediction that 
Christians will eventually total at least 20 percent of China’s population.849 In the 
China that Aikman envisions, the State emerges with Christianity as a primary 
                                                 
845 David Aikman, Jesus in Beijing: How Christianity is Transforming China and Changing the Global 
Balance of Power (Lanham, MD: Regnery Publishing, 2012). 
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worldview, depicting an international superpower. As it achieves Christianization, 
Aikman foresees China investing efforts to provide an environment that supports 
rather than seeks to eradicate religious freedom for its citizens.850 
 Contrary to reports noted earlier in this study regarding the rise of secular 
humanism and the demise of religions, two major religions, Islam and Christianity, 
are the fastest-growing contemporary worldviews.851 Both Yang and Aikman foresee 
this transformation and point out that: 
 between 1950 and 2010, the number of Christians in China increased from 
4 million to 67 million; 
 by 2030, China is projected to have some 225 million Protestant Christians, 
a figure similar to the entire Christian population today in the United States; 
 the experience of Christians in South Korea and the United States indicates 
that it is reasonable to expect the growth will continue at least until it 
reaches 30 percent of a population projected to reach 1.4 billion in the next 
15 years.852 
 Figure 6 by Yang reflects the increasing number of Christians in China from 
1900. 
 
Figure 6: Increasing Number of Christians in China853 
                                                 
850 Jintao, ‘Full text of Hu Jintao’s report.’  
851 Miroslav Volf, ‘A Voice of One’s Own—Public Faith in a Pluralistic World’, in Democracy and the 
New Religious Pluralism, ed. Thomas Banchoff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 271–
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852 Yang, ‘The Other Chinese Miracle’, para. 7 of 9 in the introductory section. 
853 Fenggang Yang, ‘Miraculous Numbers’ in ‘Cracks in the Atheist Edifice’ (1 November 2013) 
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In agreement with Yang and Aikman, Bryne contends that in the future, China 
will become Christianized in the sense that its base of Christians will dramatically 
increase. Likewise, Yang and Volf project that future conditions appear encouraging 
for the continuing development of a social background in China that is favorable for 
the State to increase its Christian base, I surmise, as Aikman, that if the Christian 
worldview does dominate China’s political and cultural realms, then the 
democratization process will conceivably occur. A democratic China with a prevalent 
Christian base will more likely embrace the potential for the application of Baorong 
Duoyuan, a contextualized version of principled pluralism. In the next section, as I 
examine the potential for China to become a democracy amid and despite ongoing 
religious persecution, we shall see that a close correlation exists between 
Christianization and the democratization of a State. 
 
5.4.2.1 Christianization of China 
Several authoritarian and totalitarian governments, including the CCP in China, have 
routinely opposed Protestantism and the prospect of democracy for the State. Contrary 
to the contention of Zeng Chuanhui who perceives Protestantism to only constitute a 
noticeably irrelevant religion in China,854 G. Wright Doyle argues that Protestantism’s 
‘history; indigenous leadership; contextualized literature; rapid growth; geographical 
distribution; numerical strength; social impact; self-propagation; and official status’855 
confirm that Protestantism constitutes a primary Chinese religion. Doyle also stresses 
that China’s formal recognition by the government of Protestantism as one of five 
State-approved religions affirms its status. 
 Yang reports that according to the 2007 Chinese Spiritual Life Survey, 85 
percent of China’s population were affiliated with some type of religious practice and 
belief. Many of these individuals practice various folk religions while the survey 
identified approximately 18 percent as Buddhists. Although it is difficult to determine 
definite numbers due to CCP penalties for religious membership, research confirms 
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estimates that reveal each year since 1980 Christians have experienced more than 10 
percent compounded growth. With Christians currently experiencing the most 
significant growth, they currently comprise between 5–10 percent of the 
population.856 
 The Christian Institute reports that Christianity may even be spreading and 
infiltrating the CCP. 857 As Christians engage more actively in society, instead of 
hiding, government officials reveal concerns that the increased visible presence of 
Christianity will affect loyalty to the State. Rodney Stark concludes that in addition to 
the significant contemporary and predicted increases in Christianity, research reveals 
an extensive awakening for numerous other religions. Stark asserts, ‘Buddhism and 
folk temples seem to be thriving. As for Christianity, even if we ignore the plethora of 
wildly exaggerated membership claims, the conversion of between 36 to 72 million 
Chinese is truly remarkable in so short a time.’858 The growth of Christianity has not 
only included the deprived Chinese, many of the affluent members of Chinese society, 
including key members of the CCP,859 have professed Christianity. 
 Albert notes that China has experienced a significant growth in Christianity 
since the 1980s and reports: 
There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches 
which range in size from small to large ceremonies in unidentified churches. In 2010, the Pew 
Research Center estimated that there were sixty-seven million Christians in China, roughly 
five percent of the total population. Of these, Pew estimated that fifty-eight million were 
Protestant, including both state-sanctioned and independent churches. The Beijing-based 
Chinese Academy of Social Science’s estimate is far smaller, tallying twenty-nine million 
Christian believers.860 
 Consequently, the growth and condition of contemporary Chinese Christianity 
leads Aikman to contend that Christianity may successfully permeate national life and 
culture within future decades in China. Yang reports that Aikman qualifies his 
prediction regarding China being in the process of becoming Christianized, explaining 
that he [Aikman] does not foresee all Chinese, or even the majority becoming 
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Christians. According to Aikman, ‘[A]t the present rate of growth in the number of 
Christians in the countryside, in the cities, and especially within China’s social and 
cultural circles, it is possible that Christians will constitute 20 to 30% of China’s 
population within three decades.’861 
 Philip Jenkins further confirms that Christians hold a pivotal role in China and 
that combined results from the Templeton and Pew materials support the concept of 
the Christianization of China. In 2011, Jenkins reports that the number of Chinese 
Christians in China totaled approximately 65 to 70 million, nearly 5 percent of the 
State’s population. Despite the unassuming number, ‘Those 65 or 70 million 
Christians outnumber the population of major nations like France, Britain, or Italy and 
the level of Christian commitment is awe-inspiring.’862 Jenkins foresees Christianity 
experiencing a phenomenal worldwide boom in the future.863 The Christian Institute 
similarly reports that ‘Chinese officials say that there are between 23 and 40 million 
Christians in the country. However, other estimates indicate that there are between 60 
and 120 million believers.’864 Despite State oppression and persecution, the increasing 
number of Christians may exceed the number of CCP members.865 
 Albert argues that with the number of Christian believers significantly 
increasing, the religious revival that has appeared to be in progress in China over the 
past four decades866 confirms that a Christianized China seems inevitable. Some 
estimate that by 2030, China may have the world’s largest population of Christians.867 
I anticipate that, ultimately, as the number of Chinese Christians increases, lives 
changed for the better will confirm the difference religion makes. The Christianization 
of China will help transform the country into a civil society which embraces 
associational, contextual, and directional pluralisms and which fosters respect for the 
rule of law and the cherishing of fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom, 
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essentially advancing democratic values. In turn, this transition, the democratization 
of China, as the next section further reveals, will provide fertile ground for China to 
implement Baorong Duoyuan. 
 
5.4.2.2 Democratization and Liberalization in China 
Although the relationship between religion and democracy appears ambiguous,868 
nevertheless, the intimate relationship between Christianity, particularly 
Protestantism, and modern democracy proves less disputable among scholars. Steve 
Bruce concludes: ‘Protestantism has been causally implicated in the development of 
democratic polities and civil liberties and in many particulars the causal connection is 
the unintended consequence.’869 Samuel P. Huntington also notes the existence of a 
continuing relationship between democracy and Protestantism in which the latter 
offers a certain doctrinal and institutional foundation to oppose political repression.870  
   Protestant Reformers, such as John Calvin, Martin Luther, and John Knox, as 
well as the Puritans in England, and their views on the nature of the State–church 
relationship during the Reformation and afterward, have been credited with the 
establishment of the beginning of constitutional democracies in both Western Europe 
and the American colonies. Calvin and others held the ‘view that both church and 
state are directly ordained by God with neither subordinate to the other and neither 
entitled to control the other.’871 Because both State and church are ultimately 
responsible to the authority of God’s transcendent law, the Reformers leave room for 
citizens to resist tyranny when a civil government violates God’s law. After surveying 
five governments, Calvin’s Geneva, Huguenot France, Knox’s Scotland, Puritan 
England and Colonial America, from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, 
regarding the emergence of liberty in the modern world, Douglas K. Kelly notes the 
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influence of Calvin and Calvinism. Kelly credits Protestantism, particularly the 
Calvinist branch, with playing an instrumental role in the establishment of 
constitutional democratic governments: 
The American system drew from [… the Protestant Calvinist] view [which] contributed much 
to the American establishment of consent of the governed, covenant or constitutional 
limitations of all civil power and all institutions, being seen in terms of God’s transcendent 
law, checks and balances of power in the political and legal structure, liberty of conscience, 
and the inalienable right to resist tyranny, no matter how powerful or legal its pretensions.872 
 
 The question arises regarding the relationship between Christianization and 
democratization in China’s context. To what extent could the increasing 
Christianization of China, even under the current Communist regime, accelerate its 
democratization? Huntington quotes ‘a 1960s study which suggested that in 91 
countries […], the greater the proportion of Protestants the higher the level of 
democracy.’873 Due to the relatively small percentage of the Christian population in 
China and the Chinese government’s restrictions on Christians public participation, 
however, some scholars, including Chuanhui, appear to dismiss the possibility that a 
relationship between Protestant Christianity and democracy exists. Others, like Bruce, 
argue, however, that Protestantism proves pertinent to democracy in China. From both 
theological and historical points of views, at a minimum, there is a correlation 
between the two. This suggests that the Christianization of China might well lead to a 
process of democratization. Christianization can help lead China to become a 
democracy.         
 Alec Ryrie asserts that as the current minority of Chinese Protestantism 
increases in number, they will become more visible and contribute to China 
transitioning into a democracy. According to Ryrie: 
Post-Mao Chinese Protestantism, for all its growth, [has] remained remarkably invisible. 
Before 1949, a far smaller Protestant population had a much higher profile. Until recently, 
religious communities were entirely excluded from the public square, and even TSPM 
churches were discreet or entirely unseen. Yet growing numbers and confidence have made 
the invisibility trick harder and less urgent. Since 2000, the old dream of ‘Back to Jerusalem’ 
has resurfaced, and unregistered churches have begun trying to carry the Gospel into China's 
western provinces. The change became unmistakable after an earthquake struck Sichuan 
province on May 12, 2008, killing more than eighty thousand people. In the chaotic aftermath, 
many of the first responders came from churches and made no secret of the fact. Since then, 
Chinese Protestants have become increasingly prominent in human rights campaigning. 
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Rumor has it that a third or more of China's embattled human rights lawyers are now 
Protestants.874 
 
 Aikman contends that China is currently ‘in the process of becoming 
Christianized’875 and stresses that Chinese democratization will not occur without 
Chinese Christianization. He insists that the Christian movement constitutes part of 
political liberalization,876 just as Albert points out, even under the current oppressive 
environment. With the increase in the number of Christian human rights advocates 
and lawyers, some party members have expressed concerns that Christianity could 
serve as a tool to influence China and constitute a unifying force to challenge the 
CCP’s authority. 
 Yuan Zhiming, an atheist for thirty-six years who became a Chinese 
filmmaker and Christian activist, explains that the democratization of a State depicts a 
movement with the principal goal of attaining majority rule with popular free and fair 
elections.877 In an interview with Ian Johnson, Zhiming said, ‘If just 25 percent of 
Chinese became Christians, then China would be really different. The spirit of 
communism would be broken.’878 Zhiming additionally contends that a State cannot 
have human rights or democracy without Christianity879 and that democracy ‘is not 
merely an institution nor simply a concept, but a profound structure of faith. […] The 
root of democracy is the spirit of Christ.’880 Although Zhiming concurs with 
Aikman’s prediction for the Christianization of China, Aikman ponders the potential 
for China to implement a viable democracy if the State continues to experience 
massive corruption, a major concern regarding the CCP. Nevertheless, Aikman agrees 
with Zhiming that for its basic health, China must ultimately become democratic.881 
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 Cheng Li asserts that under the communist regime China’s transition to 
democracy (not Western but universal) is likely to be incremental.882 According to 
Catharin E. Dalpino, the process of liberalization, which can occur in the context of a 
long-standing political system, constitutes ‘a loosening of control by an authoritarian 
regime without the intention to move immediately toward a democratic transition.’883 
While modern history shows that not all democracies nor democratization processes 
relate to Christianity or Christianization, nevertheless, to a certain degree, an active 
Christian movement provides an integral component of political liberalization. At a 
minimum, Christianization offers much-needed moral social conditions, as well as 
institutional support against tyranny and dictatorship for a State transitioning to 
democratization. Therefore, a plausible correlation appears to exist between 
Christianization and the political liberalization process.   
 Zhou concludes that no Chinese democratization can emerge without 
cooperation from and coordination by the Chinese Christian community. According to 
Zhou, religious freedom and democracy constitute two critical criteria for founding 
contemporary democratic societies.884 I agree with Zhou that Chinese Christianity can 
serve to help build both a pluralistic and moral society as part of an overall healthy 
civil society that a democratic China needs.885 For example, in contrast to the rigid 
constraints the CCP enforces, Christianity can reflect an optimistic lifestyle example 
for the Chinese people. The Christianization process can also contribute to common 
good for all.          
 Zhou lists three preconditions necessary for Christianity to engage in a more 
robust role in the process of democratization for China. I assert that the following 
three prerequisites that Zhou notes are necessary for the State to transition to 
democracy: 
1. the separation of the government from the CCP and of religion from the
 government/CCP; 
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2. religious believers holding the right to assume public office; 
3. the establishment of a pluralistic culture.886 
 If the government/CCP interferes with religious affairs, Chinese religion cannot 
become an independent force to influence Chinese society and politics. Currently, 
Communist Party members fill every important post in China. The CCP’s constitution 
stipulates that all Party members must be atheists. As religious believers do not 
qualify for central positions in the public square, religions in China are unable to 
directly influence Chinese politics at the policy-making level. Jayoti Das and 
Cassandra E. DiRienzo emphasize that evidence confirms greater press freedom, 
which influences politics, contributes to a more peaceful nation.887 China’s 
restrictions regarding freedom of press and media, however, counter this 
consideration as, in turn, they constrain religious freedom and the influence of 
religion. The Chinese government strictly controls reporting, which affects even the 
popular media as well as television, radio, and newspapers.888 Like Zhou, I also argue 
that Chinese religious believers should be allowed to freely express their beliefs 
through public media, including television, radio, art, literature, film, journalism, and 
other public forums. 
 Wing Thye Woo reports that the State recently admitted the need to improve its 
governance and that some CCP officials agreed, particularly regarding religion. The 
State declared that its most important task is to build a harmonious society 
(designated a democratic society under the rule of law).889 Albert reports that Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao, former Chinese leaders, believed Buddhism helped bolster the 
image of China’s peaceful rise and, in turn, supported its growth. This effort 
contributed to the ‘CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society”’.890 I suggest that 
China’s changing political and religious climate, which evolves from a dearth of 
                                                 
886 Zhou, China’s Peaceful Rise. 
887 Jayoti Das and Cassandra E. DiRienzo, ‘Conflict and the Freedom of the Press’, Journal of 
Economic and Social Studies, 4, 1 (2014), pp. 91–112. 
888 Chin-Chuan Lee, Chinese Media, Global Contexts (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 100. 
889 Wing Thye Woo, The Challenges of Governance Structure, Trade Disputes and Natural 
Environment to China’s Growth, Studies & Analyses No. 349 (Warsaw: Center for Social and 
Economic Research, 2007). 
890 Albert, ‘Christianity in China’, para. 2 of 3 in section entitled ‘Chinese Buddhism and Folk 
Religions.’ 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            225 
 
 
positive CCP ideology and a faith vacuum in the State, could serve as a conduit for 
democracy, to complement religious freedom for all in China. 
 Bijian Zheng, reportedly one of China’s leading thinkers on ideological 
questions, recognizes that China needs help from the rest of world, a world which, in 
a sense, the State alienated itself from. 891 Zheng also acknowledges that the CCP 
needs to make some adjustments in its quest for ‘a peaceful rise’. I find it particularly 
pertinent that despite China appearing to be open to change in some areas, research 
supports Zheng’s admission that the relationship between the CCP and organized 
religion remains volatile and conflicted.892 I agree with Merle Goldman, who 
proposes that the democratization of China may eventually transpire not merely 
because of changes that force the State to change but also, perhaps, because of the 
necessity to change.893 Goldman further contends that: 
 with a much larger, more pluralistic society, and with a more entrenched Leninist structure, 
[it] may take much longer for China to democratize than the several decades it took Taiwan and South 
Korea. Nevertheless, the possibility of the emergence of some form of democracy in China in the first 
half of the next century is not unrealistic.894 
 Yang additionally connects the democratization of China with religious 
freedom as he argues that until more Chinese elites better understand and appreciate 
the true concept of religious freedom, further democratization in China will not likely 
occur and may even prove to be impossible. He also asserts that the organized design 
of State–religion relations, the comprehension of the religious freedom concept, and a 
civil society that maintains the dynamic balance prove vital to religious freedom.895 
Yang stresses that religious freedom arguably constitutes ‘the first freedom in a 
constitutional democracy, that is, it comes first before the other freedoms and may 
serve as the basis or wellspring for other freedoms.’896 When aligned with the 
philosophical intent of international agreements, the positive results that follow the 
implementation of religious freedom complement a country’s economic development 
and social order. 
 In previous sections of this chapter, I described the CCP’s repressive religious 
policy as neither justifiable in principle nor sustainable in practice. Despite the 
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number of defects under the current CCP system against religious freedom, confirmed 
in news reports and scholarly research, I found increasing pluralism in China, 
including religious pluralization. Simultaneously, as the projection of Christianization 
in China likely leads to accelerated democratization and pluralism, especially 
directional pluralism, the progress of democratization also provides the necessary 
conditions to implement a contextualized version of principled pluralism, namely 
Baorong Duoyuan.  
 In this section, I argued from both statistics and scholarly research that the 
projected rapid expansion of Christianity in China will plausibly lead to China’s 
Christianization. If this projection materializes, based on both the extensive studies 
about the relationship between Christianization and subsequent democratization, 
especially the role of Protestantism in Europe and America,897 and similar experiences 
in Asia, such as South Korea, most scholars conclude that even if marginally, 
Christianization serves a significant role in democratization. In the next section, as I 
establish my Baorong Duoyuan model for China with the purpose of protecting 
religious freedom for all, I stress that in addition to democracy, although with 
different orientations, as I pointed out in previous chapters, political liberalism and 
principled pluralism share another essential element, liberal constitutionalism. 
 
5.4.2.3 Constitutional Democracy with Chinese Characteristics for Baorong Duoyuan 
According to what I noted in previous chapters, a democratic society with an 
extensive degree of pluralism is a precondition for both political liberalism and 
principled pluralism to operate. Steven Michels contends that for a State to be 
considered a democracy, it only has to meet two criteria, ‘universal suffrage and 
competitive elections.’.898 In Abraham Lincoln’s formulation, ‘Democracy is the 
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’899 In a simpler 
demarcation, Tibor R. Machan explains that in many parts of the world, democracy 
similarly reflects the concept of majority rule put into practice after citizens make 
their preferences known through the procedure of voting.900    
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 Machan’s point stimulates the following question: How would the 
fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly religious freedom, of all citizens, 
especially for those minorities and seemingly insignificant religious groups, be 
adequately protected without risking a majoritarian dictatorship if democracy merely 
functioned with majority rule under free elections? In other words, under what kinds 
of principles would citizens in a democratic society exercise their votes as justifiable 
and legitimate, especially on coercive matters related to minorities? Furthermore, how 
could potential damages to the rights and freedoms of minorities and other 
marginalized groups be remedied or reversed if damaging legislative items are voted 
on and passed by a majority vote? The answer: when democracy conjoins with 
constitutionalism, under which both fundamental rights and freedoms are enshrined 
with guaranteed mechanisms of constitutional reviews and other judicial due 
processes when any rights and freedoms are violated. As Rawls points out, a citizen’s 
‘exercise of political power [by his/her vote] is proper and hence justifiable only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution.’901 
 The constitution of a State serves as the definitive source of legal and political 
order for a nation-state system and, basically, establishes the rules for that State as it 
constitutes the government, organizes the State, and structures the basis for 
representation of and participation by the people. Other than in the United States, 
constitutional failure depicts the norm for most States. Despite numerous, diverse 
crises that the United States has survived, particularly the Civil War, the U.S. 
Constitution has endured for more than two centuries. In contrast, according to Tonja 
Jacobi, Sonia Mittal, and Barry R. Weingast, most national constitutions do not even 
last two decades.902 As the ‘median country faces violent political change about once 
every eight years, […] these changes are often accompanied by changes in 
constitutional arrangements.’903 According to Abdurrahman Bapir, the basic rights of 
a constitution encompass two distinct categories: 
1. civil rights, which ensure public influence over political decision making, 
and; 
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2. civil liberties, which protect individuals against the illegitimate use of 
coercion. The fact that these rights are today mostly codified and 
recognized by states does not mean there are no challenges surrounding 
them.904 
 Contemporary states typically adhere to one of the three following 
constitutional forms: 
1. absolutist constitution; 
2. legislative supremacy constitution; 
3. liberal constitution. 
 With an absolutist constitution, rulers are considered the law. They can change 
and produce the meta-laws. This type of constitution does not prove significant as 
those in power weaken it. In the legislative supremacy constitution, the legislature can 
adjust and modify the constitution.905 Liberal constitutionalism, also known as ‘new 
constitutionalism,’ which I introduced in Chapter 3, refers to written constitutions that 
contain a charter of rights and mechanisms to protect those rights. Bapir notes that a 
liberal constitution seeks to institute mechanisms to separate powers and to position 
checks and balances on governmental powers to protect fundamental human rights.906 
 In some countries, including China, where no constitutional tool such as 
‘judicial review’ exists, rights which the constitution stipulates may not wield any 
power. 907 In addition, abuses of constitutions as well as misinterpretations of their 
meanings may veto the power of the constitution and negate rights of citizens. 
 China’s written constitution occupies a position somewhere between the 
absolutist constitution and the legislative supremacy constitution. It may have rights 
charted within it, but, nonetheless, this constitution lacks a mechanism to protect 
those rights. Contrary to the basic liberal constitutionalist principle where a 
mechanism of checks and balance exists among the diverse functions of government 
to restrain and limit the State’s power among its executive, legislative, and judiciary 
branches, China reflects a ‘Party-State’ ruling system where the constitution remains 
                                                 
904 Abdurrahman Bapir, ‘Understanding Liberal Constitutionalism: Judicial Review, Protection of 
Rights and Constitutional Norms During Emergencies’, in Academia <https://www.academia.edu. 
/9449606/ Understanding Liberal_ 
Constitutionalism_Judicial_Review_Protection_of_Rights_and_Constitutional_ 
Norms_During_Emergencies> [accessed 15 January 2016] p. 5. 
905 Bapir, ‘Understanding Liberal Constitutionalism.’ 
906 Bapir, ‘Understanding Liberal Constitutionalism.’  
907 Bapir, ‘Understanding Liberal Constitutionalism.’ 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            229 
 
 
subject to constant change according to the Party’s wishes. No mechanism exists to 
either enforce the constitutional rights or to remedy the damages to those rights when 
violated. 
 When the PRC gained control of China, officials made a point of inserting the 
freedom of religious belief clause into the Chinese constitution. Yang explains that in 
1949 the CCP’s temporary constitution of the ‘“Common Program of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference” states that the citizens of the PRC have 
the freedom of religious belief. This was also adopted in the 1954 Constitution by the 
First National People’s Congress.’908 In 1975, however, during the Cultural 
Revolution, even though the CCP retained the clause stating freedom of religious 
belief, the party affixed the phrase ‘freedom of atheist propaganda’ to the constitution. 
Nevertheless, under Communist rule, China has not appropriated its constitution as 
the foundation of law regarding religious freedom for its citizens. Although 
government officials propagate China’s constitution as the State’s fundamental basic 
law, due to the nature of China’s one-party State system, the will of the CCP 
supersedes the constitution’s authority. 
 Accordingly, amidst frequent political turmoil in mainland China, the CCP 
continues to retain the freedom of religious belief clause in the constitution. Eric R. 
Carlson, like Yang and others, points out that as the CCP utilizes an intricate system 
of legal procedures and enforcement actions to meticulously supervise religion and 
religious activities, the State routinely subjects specific religions to repression and 
tries to eradicate them. Even though China enacted its latest constitution in 1982 to 
provide for ‘freedom of religious belief’ and protect ‘normal religious activities,’ the 
party does not define either phrase.909 Yang contends that one concern regarding the 
adoption of religious freedom in the constitution or basic law may relate to the need 
for most of China’s citizens as well as the elites to mutually understand the principle 
of religious freedom. The underdeveloped civil society, however, does not offer the 
essential cultural and social support to uphold this principle.   
 The United States ratified the First Amendment to the Constitution in 1791 
regarding religion. This amendment states that Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion nor any prohibiting the free exercise thereof. This legal 
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arrangement of religious freedom includes disestablishment (no State religion) and 
deregulation (no prohibition of any religion). This constitutional amendment provides 
both the fundamental foundation for religious freedom protection and possible legal 
remedy at the highest judicial level if that freedom is violated.  
 Neither the ‘free exercise’ nor the ‘nonestablishment’ clause is clearly 
enshrined in China’s current constitution because of the CCP’s imposed dominant 
atheistic ideology. Though not without limitations as I have shown in previous 
sections, Yang argues that due to the fact the principle of separation of State and 
religion is clearly stated in the constitution, this as a minimum, provides spaces for 
diverse CCP-tolerated religions or religiously based groups to grow and flourish. 
Consequently, this trend is likely to increase for more associational, contextual, and 
religious pluralization. Similarly, China’s increasing levels of social, economic, 
cultural, and religious diversity, which partially evolved from the State’s active role in 
globalization, appear to be ongoing as well. 
 As I demonstrated in the previous sections, with the increasing level and 
degree of pluralism and democratization in today’s China, the question lies in whether 
China can evolve into a more progressive form of constitutionalism that, essentially, 
not only guarantees citizens’ basic rights and freedoms, especially true religious 
freedom in the letter of the law but also enforces it with a robust judicial review 
process. 
 Carlson maintains that China’s courts have not significantly contributed to 
protecting religious freedom and even though religious believers, theoretically, 
possess a constitutional right to ‘freedom of religious belief,’ until the State upholds 
its constitution, citizens do not have any judicial means to enforce their religious 
rights.910 According to Carlson, two diverse perceptions address the understanding of 
religion in a Chinese context. One opinion interprets religion from a positive and 
active perspective and argues that religion can readily adapt to the socialist society of 
contemporary China and meaningfully contribute to the society’s conformity and 
harmony. On 10 May 2011, seventeen Chinese church leaders who appealed to the 
Chinese Congress exemplified the positive perception Carlsen notes as they utilized 
China’s constitution and universal standards to appeal for remedial measures on 
behalf of a major persecuted church. The details of the event include: in light of a 
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major crackdown on and forced closure of one of the largest Chinese Protestant house 
churches in Beijing, the 1,000 plus members of the Beijing Shouwang house church 
and the seventeen Christian pastors, representing a nationwide house church 
movement from various Chinese cities, signed and submitted an unprecedented 
citizens’ petition to the National People’s Congress, a first since the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party. At their own peril, these seventeen persecuted church 
leaders called upon the CCP regime to stop the persecution of peaceful church 
gatherings like that in the Shouwang house church. They also appealed for a 
constitutional review of government-issued regulations concerning religious affairs, 
and compliance with the international human rights standards and norms on religious 
freedom. Furthermore, in a historically significant move, the seventeen church leaders 
continued to demand that the Chinese Congress enact formal legislation to protect 
religious freedom for all Chinese citizens as part of inalienable ‘political rights’ and 
abolish all ‘regulations’ that they deemed incompatible with the spirit of China’s 
constitution and universal standards. The following relates an excerpt from the 
petition, entitled, ‘We Stand up for Our Faith: A Citizens’ Petition to the National 
People’s Congress on the Church–State Conflicts’: 
It is our belief that religious freedom is the paramount freedom of the human society and is a 
part of the universal values of the international community. In the meantime, it is also the 
cornerstone of other political rights and property rights. Without the just and universal 
freedom of religious belief, there will be no way for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country 
to build a peaceful civil society and there will be no way to bring forth social stability, ethnic 
unity and the prosperity of our country.911 
 The second opinion suggests that the existing differences between the 
religious consciousness value system and the socialist consciousness world outlook 
and value system inevitably contribute to conflicts between the two. Even though 
there may appear to be a basic social united front between religion and socialism, on 
an ideological level, this unity cannot exist.912 This attitude may persist before the full 
Christianization and democratization of China materializes. Nevertheless, essentially 
under Baorong Duoyuan, the Communist ideology must either yield its dominance or 
adapt to a democratized Chinese society. 
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 The impact of the Christianization currently occurring in China emboldens 
many Chinese church leaders, who despite persecution by the CCP publicly call for 
basic constitutional, democratic, universal values such as true religious freedom, due 
process under rule of law, and democratic governance accountable to both God and 
people. In November 2017, after Chinese government officials blocked Reverend 
Wang Yi,913 a Reformed church leader, from attending a major international 
convention commemorating the five-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation 
(1517–2017) in Jakarta, Indonesia, four renowned Chinese Reformed Protestant 
church leaders issued the Jakarta Declaration.914 In this declaration, the church leaders 
wrote: 
We hereby sincerely and solemnly call upon the Chinese authorities to confess and repent of 
their sins before God, the Creator of heaven and earth; and to return the power to the people, 
governing the country by the rule of law, guaranteeing the basic human rights of all the 
citizens living in mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau. All people, including Christians 
and adherents of other faith, human rights defenders, even Communist party members, 
suspects of corrupt officials and other criminals, were endowed with universal rights by God, 
and all should be protected by due process, because every person is made in the image and 
likeness of God. Any government has authority to neither control the Christian church nor 
restrict any citizen’s freedom of religion, belief, thoughts and speech, and their expressions in 
the public square accordingly.915 
 
The Jakarta Declaration projects the call for democratic accountability of the 
government in light of the Christianization of China as it demands that Chinese 
authorities adhere to international human rights standards and norms for people of all 
faiths, or of no faith, including CCP party members, with the spirit of liberal 
constitutionalism: 
The present Constitution of mainland China and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which the China government subscribes to, and other international human rights treaties all 
clearly guarantee the basic rights of every citizen in the matter of the freedom of religion and 
belief. This includes the freedom to assemble, the freedom to proselytize and also the freedom 
to travel aboard to participate in religious activities.916 
 Zhuo Xinping explains that in China, two different interpretations of religious 
freedom exist: 
One interpretation claims that religious freedom includes the ‘absolute freedom’ not just to 
have religious faith, thoughts, and ideas, but also engage in religious action and organization. 
                                                 
913 Reverend Wang Yi is a friend of mine and also an internationally known constitutional law scholar. 
914 ‘Chinese Pastors Call on China’s Communist Party to Cease Human Rights Violations – Seek Help 
from Global Community’, in Standard Newswire, 17 March 2017 
<http://www.standardnewswire.com/news/ 9966113293.html> [accessed 02 December 2017] para. 3 of 
11 in the section entitled ‘Here We Stand: A Call from Jakarta.’ 
915 ‘Chinese Pastors Call.’ 
916 ‘Chinese Pastors Call.’ 
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The other interpretation claims that religious freedom includes ‘absolute freedom’ only as to 
religious faith, thoughts, and ideas, because such matters are within the area of privacy. But as 
to religious organizations and their activities, religion has here only ‘relative freedom’; since a 
religious organization is a social organization, it must be under legal control like all social 
organizations. […W]hen religion is no more merely a private, individual matter, but manifests 
itself instead as a religious organization engaging in activities with others in society, it 
necessarily must be transparent in its social existence and activities, which means it must obey 
social laws and accept social supervision.917 
 Xinping argues that two diverse proposed purposes for legislation on religion 
exist in China. One proposed purpose encompasses the protection of religious 
freedom. Legislation on religion enacted for this purpose expresses respect for 
religious belief and other faiths in human society. The other proposed purpose 
includes the intent to control religion or, minimally, to control religious organizations 
and activities.918 
 Neither of these two stated purposes appears compatible with the principled 
pluralism nor Baorong Duoyuan model. They are found either incomplete or in 
violation of the international norms on religious freedom. The former does not 
guarantee the freedom of manifestation of a citizen’s religious belief, while the latter 
is designed to control and suppress religions by intentionally aiming to regulate and 
restrict citizen’s religious activities.  
 According to Xinping, the differences between citizens’ and the CCP’s 
understanding of the purposes for religious legislation as well as their comprehension 
of the social significance and value of religion in Chinese society contrast 
considerably.919 The preamble of China’s 1982 Constitution, for example, asserts that 
the expression of freedoms or rights, including those relating to the freedom of 
religion, will prove unlawful if it violates any of the following four basic principles: 
1. keeping the country on the socialist road; 
2. upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship; 
3. promoting the leadership of the CCP; 
4. following Marxism–Leninism and the Thought of Mao.920 
 Therefore, when a citizen exercises rights and freedoms, the determination of 
whether these actions conflict with the state’s interests, which include the above four 
basic principles, may be interpreted in numerous ways. These overarching political 
                                                 
917 Xinping, ‘Religion and Rule of Law.’ 
918 Xinping, ‘Religion and Rule of Law.’ 
919 Xinping, ‘Religion and Rule of Law.’ 
920 Li, Civil Liberties, p. 37. 
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principles may have posed the most serious challenges for China to evolve into a 
modern liberal constitutional State. Nevertheless, as I explore the Baorong Duoyuan 
model for China as a contextualized version of principled pluralism, given the 
seemingly unstoppable trend of pluralism and democratization that accelerated due to 
rapid Christianization, a kind of constitutionalism with Chinese characteristics could 
be gradually emerging. As I researched and stated in Chapter 3, this type of 
constitutionalism may neither follow the model under political liberalism, because of 
its failure to protect religious freedom for all, nor completely adopt the model after 
principled pluralism due to its overtly Christian orientation, reflected in both its 
historical context in the Netherlands and its constitutional text. Rather, the 
constitutionalism under Baorong Duoyuan will guarantee all Chinese citizens’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom for all with true State 
impartiality and a set of constitutional mechanisms which any citizen or group may 
utilize for appeals and reviews when rights and freedoms are violated. In the next 
section, to begin the contextualization of principled pluralism, I illustrate differences 
between the three theoretical models examined in this study – political liberalism, 
principled pluralism and Baorong Duoyuan – in light of religious freedom. 
5.4.3 Contextualization of Principled Pluralism to Develop Baorong Duoyuan 
Xu Huang and Michael Harris Bond explain that in the process of contextualization of 
a theory, the researcher identifies and incorporates relevant and meaningful elements 
within their context when analyzing empirical phenomena. Huang and Bond 
emphasize that ‘researchers must consider contextualization if they are to apply 
existing theories in new contexts.’921 Even if the researcher should borrow or draw 
from a theory applied in dramatically different contexts, contextualization can ensure 
that the researcher generates valid knowledge about phenomena in further novel 
contexts. According to Huang and Bond, contextualization possesses the potential to: 
 enhance existing theories; 
 improve their precision, and; 
 refine their predictions.922 
                                                 
921 Xu Huang, and Michael Harris Bond, Handbook of Chinese Organizational Behavior: Integrating 
Theory, Research and Practice (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), p. 37. 
922 Huang and Bond, Handbook of Chinese Organizational Behavior. 
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 As Huang and Bond note, in the process of contextualization, the researcher 
generates practical knowledge about phenomena in novel contexts. As I argued 
earlier, neither principled pluralism nor political liberalism prove to be ‘baorong’923 
enough to include everyone. Nevertheless, as I presupposed at the start of this study, 
Baorong Duoyuan, which primarily evolves from the contextualization of principled 
pluralism with considerations gleaned from political liberalism, encompasses 
religious freedom for all. 
 In the context of Baorong Duoyuan, the Chinese word, ‘duoyuan’ denotes 
pluralism. Initially, at the start of contextualizing principled pluralism, I considered 
Baijia Zhengming as the term for the title of my study’s ensuing theory. Baijia 
Zhengming relates to the quotation at the start of this chapter924 and would also 
correlate with the intent of Baorong Duoyuan. Similar to the term, ‘duoyuan’, Baijia 
Zhengming basically provides a poetic Chinese way to say ‘pluralism,’ to ‘let a 
hundred schools of thought contend.’925 The overall phrase, Baijia Zhengming, 
means: free airing of views; air one’s views freely; argue things out thoroughly; or 
freedom of expression.926 In addition, Baijia Zhengming, similar to Baorong 
Duoyuan, harmonizes with the Golden Rule, the founding worldview for this thesis.  
 While recognizing that the inborn value of human dignity resides in the heart 
of universal human rights, Baorong Duoyuan encompasses considerations from both 
Christian and secular worldviews. John Brian Paprock contends that at the heart of 
democracy, ‘every human being possesses an inherent and inviolable worth that 
transcends the authority of the state’, that ‘[…] flows from the conviction that every 
person, of whatever social, economic, or political status, of whatever race, creed, or 
location, has a value that does not rise or fall […] with income or productivity, with a 
status or position, with power or weakness.’927 In addition, Baorong Duoyuan refines 
codifications of political liberalism and principled pluralism to afford more concrete 
opportunities for maintaining religious freedom for all in China. 
 
                                                 
923 In Chinese this means tolerant. 
924 ‘Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought resonate’ serves to promote 
the idea that the State should permit each voice or religion have its say in the public realm. 
925 ‘Roots of Chinese’, paras 2–3 of 10. 
926 Encyclopedia Britannica editors (ed.), ‘Chinese Philosophy’ (2018), in Encyclopedia Britannica 
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-philosophy#ref171469> [accessed 5 January 2018]. 
927 John Brian Paprock, Workbook for Interfaith Ambassadors (Raleigh, NC: Lulu Publishing, 2011),  
p. 18. 
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5.4.3.1 Contexts for Baorong Duoyuan 
To develop Baorong Duoyuan, I considered components from both political 
liberalism and principled pluralism. As I stated previously, Baorong Duoyuan shares 
the same commitment to liberal constitutionalism as political liberalism and 
principled pluralism, though without explicitly adopting either a secular worldview 
like political liberalism or a theistic worldview like principled pluralism. However, 
Baorong Duoyuan more closely replicates principled pluralism as this theory better 
matches the intent of Baorong Duoyuan in protecting religious freedom for all. I 
argue that Baorong Duoyuan will surpass the capacities of principled pluralism as it 
appeals to a broader base of citizens for the common good of all faith or nonfaith 
adherents. Designed for a liberal constitutional framework in a democratic, pluralistic 
State, as some predict China will become in the next two decades, Baorong Duoyuan 
emulates the message that the Golden Rule encourages – treat others the way one 
would want to be treated. Found in all cultures, religions, and worldviews, versions of 
the Golden Rule range from ‘those of ancient Egyptian religions to those of West Asia 
(Judaism, Christianity, Islam), South Asia (Hinduism and Buddhism) and East Asia 
(Confucianism). Nonreligious worldviews such as those of the Council for Secular 
Humanism and the British Humanist Association’928 also sanction variations of the 
Golden Rule. Table 10 compares essential elements of political liberalism, principled 
pluralism, and Baorong Duoyuan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
928 Johannes A. Van Der Ven, ‘Reflective Comparativism in’ ‘Reflective Comparativism in Religious 
Research, A Cognitive Approach’, in Religion: Immediate Experience and The Mediacy of Research: 
Interdisciplinary Studies, Concepts and Methodology of Empirical Research in Religion, Hans-Günter 
Heimbrock and Christopher P. Scholtz (Frankfort Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), p. 105. 
capitalize title 
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Table 10: Comparison of Political Liberalism, Principled Pluralism, and BD929 
  
Political Liberalism 
 
 
Principled Pluralism 
 
 
Baorong Duoyuan 
Historical origin Post-Reformation Late nineteenth century Early twenty-first century 
 
Social context 
 
Conflicts with 
irreconcilable yet 
reasonable worldviews 
 
State demand for 
conformity and uniformity 
under pluralism 
 
 
A projected democratic, 
Christianized, pluralistic 
post-Communist China 
 
 
Worldview orientation 
 
Secular worldview 
 
Judeo-Christian (theist) 
worldview 
More inclusive, impartial, 
directional, pluralistic 
worldview 
 
Constitutional perspective 
 
Liberal constitutionalism 
favoring secular 
establishment 
 
Liberal constitutionalism 
with a modest Christian 
establishment 
 
Liberal constitutionalism 
with neither secular nor 
religious establishment 
 
Protection of religious 
freedom 
May protect religious 
freedom for all religions in 
private while exercising 
restraints on religious 
voices in public political 
discourses and even 
constraining certain 
religions 
 
Tolerates freedom of all 
worldviews in private 
settings and in the public 
square, with minor 
favoritism toward 
Christianity 
Protects freedom for all 
worldviews in private as 
well as in public settings; 
aligns with international 
norms for religious freedom 
 
Interrelations of spheres 
 
 
State-directed social order 
under a politically 
charged, uniform 
‘overlapping consensus’, 
with potential strife 
between contained and 
noncontained worldviews 
 
 
Sphere autonomy under 
organic social unity with 
potential tension between 
Christian and non-
Christian worldviews 
                                               
State-facilitated, impartial, 
harmonious interrelations 
between different spheres 
with diverse worldviews 
                                                         
Role of religious education 
in public schools 
 
May permit certain types 
of religious education to 
be taught930 
 
 
Allows religious education            
to be taught931 
 
Encourages religious 
education to be taught932 
 
 As I noted in Chapter 3, Rawls contends that, historically, political liberalism, 
a popular approach to diversity, originated after the Reformation. Politically, as the 
above table depicts, political liberalism draws from liberalism, as it contends that 
citizens can work together to support an overlapping consensus. Regarding religion, 
political liberalism proves to be theologically rooted in a secular worldview. In its 
                                                 
929 Original table I developed from current research. 
930 France is more resistant to religious education due to State-sanctioned, secular values. 
931 Christian religious education is particularly preferred. 
932 Favors school choice regarding teaching of religious education and is aligned with international 
norms to support religious preferences of parents and legal guardians of children. 
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constitutional perspective, political liberalism utilizes a constitutional democracy. In 
terms of protection of religious freedom, even though political liberalism professes its 
commitment to religious freedom, it subtly restrains certain religious views from 
being expressed in the public square. 
 In Chapter 2, I reported that Kuyper initially presented primary concepts 
contributing to the concept of principled pluralism which originated during 
nineteenth-century movements. Also, as I previously pointed out, Skillen933 coined 
the term ‘principled pluralism’ in the twentieth century. As Table 3 portrays, 
politically, principled pluralism draws from Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty theory 
which reasons that civil government, including the State, can claim and implement 
only limited authority. In the context of religion, principled pluralism proves to be 
theologically rooted in a Judeo-Christian worldview. In its constitutional perspective, 
principled pluralism utilizes a constitutional democratic framework. Principled 
pluralism aligns with Wolterstorff’s argument against the reasoning of political 
liberalism, which proposes that all citizens will agree on public legislation if religious 
reasons are omitted from public debate.934 Regarding the protection of religious 
freedom, principled pluralism protects a citizen’s natural rights, which include the 
right to freely exercise religion both in private and in the public square. 
 I submit that Baorong Duoyuan essentially seeks to protect the freedom of 
diverse worldviews not only in private but also in the public square. Hendrik M. 
Vroom contends that in a broad concept, every view of life may be considered a 
worldview. These worldviews then ‘are divided into two classes: secular and religious 
worldviews.’935 As Baorong Duoyuan draws from both principled pluralism, with a 
Christian foundation, and political liberalism, with secular roots, it applies aptly to all 
individuals. 
 
                                                 
933 Pryor, ‘Principled Pluralism.’ Pryor reports that the concept of ‘principled pluralism’ is developed 
and applied at length in Skillen, ‘Justice for Education.’ 
934 Wolterstorff, ‘Why Can’t We?.’ 
935 Hendrik M. Vroom, A Spectrum of Worldviews: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion in a 
Pluralistic World (New York: Rodopi, 2006), p. 1. 
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5.4.3.2 Vision for Baorong Duoyuan in China 
In contextualizing principled pluralism to develop Baorong Duoyuan, the theory I 
envisaged for religious freedom in China, I extracted several common denominators 
from principled pluralism and political liberalism. These consist of: 
 Both principled pluralism and political liberalism are contingent on a 
pluralistic society where diversity is manifested.936 
 Principled pluralism and political liberalism both agree on the need for a 
democratic government system where the elected officials are 
accountable to those who elect them in free elections, and both subscribe 
to a constitutional system that guarantees and protects the fundamental 
rights of citizens, especially minorities and vulnerable individuals. 
 Principled pluralism and political liberalism similarly strive to organize 
society so that citizens will be ‘equal and free’ (Rawls) and more likely 
coexist without stimulating conflicts and wars. Principled pluralism 
shares Kuyper’s concepts (build organic unity, where different spheres of 
society have their own sovereignty, and not State-imposed conformity, as 
I describe in chapters 2 and 3). 
 Principled pluralism and political liberalism both perceive the necessity for 
two essential components regarding the role of the State: 
o formation of a government with a fundamental structure (a 
constitutional essential) that includes religious freedom, as Rawls 
described, noted in Chapter 2; 
o guarantee of a mechanism for the execution of fairness in matters 
of justice. 
 Principled pluralism and political liberalism both aim to promote 
the goal of citizens working together for the common good of all. (Rawls 
‘ascribed’ to do this, yet political liberalism manifests some discrepancies 
as noted in Chapter 2.) 
 In a practical sense in a projected Chinese context, drawing from both political 
liberalism and principled pluralism, BD will: 
 hold elected officials accountable to citizens; 
 subscribe to a constitutional system that not only guarantees but protects  
                                                 
936 Pryor, ‘Principled Pluralism’; Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
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                  the fundamental rights of citizens;  
 endeavor to advance a civil society so citizens will be ‘equal and free’; 
 formulate a government with a central structure that respects the  
 sovereignty of other spheres, impartially protects religious freedom for all,
 and guarantees a mechanism that will execute fairness in matters of
 public justice;  
 promote the goal of citizens working together for the common good of all. 
 Even though principled pluralism parallels with political liberalism on 
numerous points, principled pluralism and Baorong Duoyuan differ from Rawls’s 
political liberalism in the following matters relating to the State–religion relationship: 
 Political liberalism constrains certain comprehensive concepts, including 
 those of certain religions, from participating in the public square. As I note 
in Chapter 3, Wolterstorff challenges Rawls’s assertion that the State can 
remain neutral while implementing the restrictions liberalism supports. I 
agree with Wolterstorff that instead of neutrality, the State needs to assume 
a nuanced concept of ‘affirmative impartiality.’ 
 Political liberalism utilizes the filter of proviso under public reason which 
stipulates that a citizen with a religious worldview who presents  a 
rationale to support a position relating to a public issue must translate that 
justification into the language of public reason. Consequently, this proves 
more burdensome for the religious person than the secular individual.937 
 Political liberalism stipulates that only certain ‘reasonable persons’ 
(determined by political liberals) can propose principles and standards as 
fair terms of cooperation to help ensure an overlapping consensus among 
free and equal, reasonable, and rational citizens.938 
 
 Consequently, as I expounded in Chapter 3, Rawls’s design of political 
liberalism under public reason fails to adequately and sufficiently protect religious 
freedom for all so the goal to achieve his proclaimed liberal ideal of social harmony 
and peace remains unsustainable. In this section, examining principled pluralism to 
determine how it could best be contextualized for Baorong Duoyuan to help China 
                                                 
937 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded, pp. 453–54. 
938 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 8. 
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protect religious freedom for all its citizens, I compare six critical components of 
principled pluralism with six of Baorong Duoyuan: social context; worldview 
orientation; constitutional perspective; protection of religious education, spherical 
interrelations; and the role of religious education in public schools, my focus for 
Chapter 6. Historically, as I reported in Chapter 2, principled pluralism, which grew 
out of Kuyper’s theory of sphere sovereignty with a predominantly theocentric 
Christian reformed orientation, originated in the late nineteenth century. My research 
regarding religious freedom in China stimulated the idea for Baorong Duoyuan, my 
proposed theory, during the early twenty-first century against a historical background 
of an atheistic State driven by Communism. The following six points underlie my 
formulation of the ways in which Baorong Duoyuan could contribute to addressing 
any potential deficits noted in principled pluralism and construct countermeasures 
necessary to help protect religious freedom for all in a Christianized, postcommunist, 
democratized future China. 
1. Social Context: The social context for principled pluralism would fail to 
complement China’s current system or its projected future one since it 
promotes a Christian faith-based pillarization approach in response to the 
demands of its originating country (the Netherlands) for conformity and 
uniformity under pluralism. Sharply different from the social context in 
which principled pluralism originated, my design for Baorong Duoyuan 
grew out of more than half a century of militaristic, monolithic, 
Communism-dominant State rule with hundreds of years of imperial 
culture in which Christianity and a Christian worldview had been deeply 
engraved on the Chinese mind as a Western imperialistic tool for 
humiliating the Chinese nation and culture. Despite the projected 
emergence of a future democratic, pluralistic, postcommunist China with 
Christianity as a political, social, and cultural minority influence, the 
context of contemporary China promoting a worldview counter to 
Christianity necessitates that the Baorong Duoyuan model be distinctive 
from principled pluralism. 
2. Plurality of Worldview: The Christian worldview orientation of principled 
pluralism would likely factor into China rejecting this theory and it being 
excluded as a feasible option for the future Christianized, democratic 
Chinese government as its orientation derives from the Judeo-Christian 
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(theist) worldview. Baorong Duoyuan, with its more inclusive, affirmative 
impartial, pluralist worldview supersedes principled pluralism with criteria 
open to adherents of all religions or beliefs as well as to those of non-
religions and anti-religions. The worldview orientation of Baorong 
Duoyuan is itself intrinsically pluralist and not specifically Christian. 
 
3. Constitutional Impartiality: Principled pluralism’s constitutional 
perspective of liberal constitutionalism with a modest Christian 
establishment as explicitly stated in the Dutch Constitution would likely 
repel the projected postcommunist China due to those who may not lean 
toward or want to be linked to any Christian concept. As Baorong 
Duoyuan adheres to the constitutional perspective of liberal 
constitutionalism with neither secular nor religious establishment, it would 
not present the same perspectives of principled pluralism but those of a 
more inclusive, impartial, directional pluralist worldview and, therefore, 
could provide an attractive, acceptable alternative for China’s future. 
4. Equality of Religious Manifestations: As I conclude in Chapter 2, although 
principled pluralism tolerates freedom of all worldviews in private settings 
as well as in the public square, with its minor favoritism toward 
Christianity in societal and cultural settings, this theory would not likely be 
readily accepted or successfully mesh with the religious diversity projected 
for the future China which would embrace all worldviews without 
favoritism. As Baorong Duoyuan aligns with international norms for 
religious freedom, my proposed theory would meet the need in the 
projected future China to protect freedom for all worldviews in the private 
sphere as well as in public settings, individually and communally. 
5.   Harmony of Sphere Interrelations: Regarding the interrelations of spheres, 
principled pluralism promotes the concept of each sphere being 
autonomous under an organic social unity. This method increases the 
potential for tension between the Christian and the non-Christian 
worldview, however, and, in turn, would negate principled pluralism’s 
compatibility with China’s future diversity. Baorong Duoyuan’s support 
for State-facilitated, affirmative impartial, harmonious interrelations 
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between different spheres with diverse worldviews makes it a better match 
for the future China than principled pluralism. 
6.   Religious Education in Public Schools: In the future Christianized, 
democratized China, the role of religious education in public schools, 
which I focus on in Chapter 6, will constitute a critical criterion in 
education. Even though principled pluralism more closely matches 
Baorong Duoyuan in this area as it allows religious education to be taught, 
nevertheless, principled pluralism’s preference for a Christian-based 
religious education system would cause this theory to lose its potential as 
an optimal choice for a postcommunist, normative directional pluralistic, 
democratized China. Overall, Baorong Duoyuan exceeds principled 
pluralism not only because it encourages RE to be taught in public schools 
but also because it supersedes this theory by encouraging the inclusion of 
religious education in all public schools. Baorong Duoyuan further 
facilitates religious freedom for parents and guardians, as prescribed by the 
various international norms, by permitting them to ensure that their 
children’s education aligns with their preferred religion. 
 Baorong Duoyuan surpasses both political liberalism and principled 
pluralism in its potential to best ensure religious freedom in China’s projected future; 
nevertheless, Baorong Duoyuan may not appeal to China’s current governing officials 
because the CCP restricts religious freedom in the State’s limited pluralistic society 
for the sake of protecting its monopoly on political power. In the future, if Chinese 
citizens choose to reject Communist rule, voluntarily or otherwise, and China, as 
projected, transitions into a democratic, pluralistic State, then Baorong Duoyuan will 
offer the best option for the State to help ensure religious freedom for all. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
From research for this chapter, after examining challenges for China regarding 
religious freedom under China’s traditional State–religion relationship model and 
under the current rule of the CCP, I assert that both the historical imperial model and 
current method under CCP prove unjustifiable and unsustainable. Nevertheless, and 
despite the CCP failing to uphold ‘the freedom of religious belief,’ a phrase which 
China retains in its current constitution, several scholarly sources project that within 
the next two decades, China will become a Christianized democracy. I also 
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investigated the dilemma of whether, despite the seemingly eternal mode of political 
authoritarian rule continuing to operate in China, evidence of pluralism –
associational, contextual, and even directional in a descriptive sense – has begun to 
manifest itself in the State. After comparing political liberalism and principled 
pluralism, I conclude that Baorong Duoyuan, my contextualized model of principled 
pluralism, encompasses components that make this theory practical, understandable, 
and culturally accessible.  
 In Chapter 6, I continue to present the vision sustaining Baorong Duoyuan as 
the most viable option for China’s education model given the State’s anticipated 
status. I also consider criteria relevant to the potential implementation of RE under 
Baorong Duoyuan in postcommunist China’s education system, and discuss numerous 
challenges confronting China’s contemporary education system in relation to 
including religious education. After I compare political liberalism and principled 
pluralism as potential alternative theoretical foundations for China’s education 
system, I propose that Baorong Duoyuan could stimulate better, more positive 
progress regarding the State’s education system and fill China’s moral vacuum, 
particularly with the inclusion of religious education. I continue to argue that, 
ultimately, Baorong Duoyuan offers the best option for China in its projected 
Christian, democratized future to enhance religious education to help ensure religious 
freedom for all. 
  
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Baorong Duoyuan in 
a Postcommunist China’s Education System 
 
[T]he contribution of religious education to religious freedom is highly diverse.                                                
On the one hand, a narrow, traditional approach may lead to a kind of mental closure 
and a failure to make contact with the contemporary world.                                                                                                     
At its best, however, ‘learning from religion’ is a unique resource                                                                               
for the advancement of human freedom.939 
– John M. Hull 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Religious education not only reflects an investment in a State’s global economic 
realm,940 its absence or inclusion in education simultaneously determines the dearth or 
growth of religious freedom. The inclusion of religious education in compulsory 
education could also, as the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) 
notes, enhance respect and mutual understanding between individuals, and promote 
‘harmony, or at least ’tolerance’, between communities or individuals of different 
religions or beliefs.941 In contemporary China, the exclusion of religious education in 
its education system helps the CCP further regulate, restrict, and restrain religious 
freedom. 
 In Chapter 5, leading up to the focus for this chapter, considering religious education 
under Baorong Duoyuan in the education system of a postcommunist China, I reviewed 
numerous constraints the CCP imposes regarding religious freedom in China under the 
traditional State–religion model. I also examined contemporary challenges to religious freedom 
under the CCP’s State–religion model and presented China’s stance regarding RE. 
Additionally, I examined the unjustifiability of the CCP’s contemporary religious policy in 
principle and scrutinized its unsustainability in practice. I recounted predictions that China will 
become ‘Christian(ized)’ in the future and that, ultimately, the State will transition into a 
                                                 
939 Hull, ‘The Contribution of Religious’, p. 10. 
940 Vivien Stewart, A World-Class Education: Learning from International Models of Excellence and 
Innovation (Alexandria, VA: ASCD, 2012). 
941 ‘International Association for Religious Freedom’, information pamphlet <https://iarf.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/IARF-Trifold-Pamphlet-2015.pdf> [accessed 27 March 2016] panel 5 of 6. 
The International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) is a UK-based charity working for 
freedom of religion and belief at a global level. 
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democracy. I argue that Baorong Duoyuan would best suit the projected new China and that 
assimilating religious education into its future postcommunist, Christianized, democratized, 
education system could stimulate, support, and sustain the prospect of religious freedom for all. 
Furthermore, RE in China now, as well as in the future, could help students appreciate and 
develop their own identities. 942 
 In Chapter 6, I examine the vision for, the criteria necessary to stimulate, and the 
development of the design for the implementation of religious education under Baorong 
Duoyuan in postcommunist China’s education system. I discuss several conflicts and 
deficiencies of China’s contemporary education system, particularly regarding religious 
education, which inherently contribute to the State’s failure to protect religious freedom for all. I 
concurrently expound an unfulfilled concern from Chapter 4: If education systems under 
principled pluralism and political liberalism would not effectively contribute to China’s 
ideological goals for education, could Baorong Duoyuan, a contextualized model of principled 
pluralism, stimulate positive progress in the State’s pedagogy realm, particularly with the 
inclusion of religious education? 
 As I further examine alternative theoretical foundations for China’s education system, 
namely, political liberalism and principled pluralism, to reveal what education under these two 
concepts could demarcate, I ultimately propose Baorong Duoyuan to constitute a viable option 
for China’s education model in its projected democratic, Christianized State. 
 
6.2 Confronting Challenges to Religious Education 
Allan Walker, Shuanye Chen, and Haiyan Qian note that most states revere education 
as the foundation for building a competitive economy with creative, innovative, and 
knowledgeable workers. 943 According to Vivien Stewart, China’s ideological goals 
include plans to transition the State from an agricultural and low-wage manufacturing 
economy to a global leader in various fields. This objective reflects only one of the 
critical challenges confronting the State’s contemporary education system. 
 China’s long-term goal for students to complete twelve years of schooling 
universally throughout the State by 2020 reflects another challenge for China in the 
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realm of education.944 Yu Tianlong asserts that additional challenges in China’s 
education system include the need for moral education and that: 
Political emphasis continues to be reflected in most recent governmental policies in moral 
education. […] Despite new changes in education andsociety, the politics of moral education remains 
like a ghost: omnipotent, influencing and controlling educators’ thinking and practice.945 
 
 Accordingly, if China becomes a democratized, Christian State as projected, 
the implementation of Baorong Duoyuan could help the State meet the following 
three aforementioned educational goals: (1) transitioning from its agricultural and 
low-wage manufacturing role to leading in other areas, including science, medicine, 
and technology; (2) students universally completing twelve years of schooling; (3) 
addressing the need for moral education. If China were to overcome these challenges 
relating to education, particularly regarding religious education, this would, in turn, 
simultaneously constitute a practical, positive investment in the State’s future.946 In 
addition, I suggest that under Baorong Duoyuan, the implementation of religious 
education in China’s education system holds potential seeds to stimulate, support, and 
sustain religious freedom for all in the State. 
 
6.2.1 Challenges in China’s Education System 
Leslie Grant and others note that the State’s extreme focus on examinations has 
contributed to China’s academic deficiencies. For example, China’s citizens 
experience low averages in completing schooling and discrepancies exist between 
rural and urban high school attendance. In addition, China’s traditional education 
system bolsters authoritarian teachers, encourages conformity and, in turn, 
discourages the development of students’ creativity. According to Grant and others, 
the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) had tried to correct some of China’s 
academic failures by starting to implement venues for the expression of creativity and 
innovation in the State’s academic curricula nationwide. Nevertheless, ‘teacher talk’ 
still dominates the classroom with the teacher perceived as an authoritative model. 
Students perceive teachers as experts with instant answers for every question.947 
                                                 
944 Stewart, A World-Class Education, p. 67. 
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 Despite the central government reportedly starting to relinquish a portion of its 
control over the curriculum and assessment, the CCP continues to control most 
critical aspects of education, including the development and selection of textbooks. 
Due to the test-orientated system in China’s education system and the Party’s 
excessive ideological control, achieving a quality-orientated education, which would 
stimulate innovation and creativity, remains questionable. 
 Some recent educational reform efforts by the CCP that have not fully 
materialized may complement Baorong Duoyuan’s vision for China’s future 
education system. At times, these efforts have included the CCP permitting teachers at 
the local and provincial school levels to both develop and select some textbooks. In 
efforts to improve the State’s education system, Chinese education leaders 
systematically study approaches and strategies that other countries implement. The 
aim of recent major curricula reforms that the MOE has introduced appears to be to 
direct China away from its traditional didactic classroom practices which emphasize 
memorization to the implementation of more Western approaches that integrate 
inquiry methods into teaching strategies and encourage more student participation in 
classrooms.948 In educating pupils regarding values, Caroline Koh reports that some 
Chinese teachers have begun to favor and implement more informal approaches to 
teaching certain moral values, the approach Baorong Duoyuan will encourage in 
teaching. These include role-modeling, leading by positive example, and maintaining 
a positive, harmonious environment to help students learn about the basic virtues of 
good citizenship, such as loyalty, sacrifice, patriotism, and morality.949 
 The challenge remains that the role models and cited examples reflect CCP 
ideological political indoctrination without sufficient credibility. Javier C. Hernández 
reports that, currently, amid concerns that the Party can sustain its hold over Chinese 
youth, President Xi Jinping has begun to restructure political education in China’s 
more than 283,000 primary and secondary schools.950 According to Hernández’s 
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observation of Xie Hong, a teacher of fifty fourth-grade Chinese students at the 
Workers and Peasants Red Army Elementary School in Yuqing County, China:951 
 The school’s curriculum recounts the experience of Mao’s soldiers during the early years of 
the revolution, who are portrayed as heroically fighting to free China from rapacious warlords 
and Japanese invaders. As at some Red Army schools, students wear military uniforms around 
campus; in Ms. Xie’s classroom, that is a privilege reserved for the best students.952 
 Another challenge regarding China’s education system involves issues relating 
to diverse cultures in China. James Leibold points out that China does not deliberately 
use the term ‘multi-cultural education’; nevertheless, the MOE and the State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission frequently refer to the significance of ‘cultural pluralism’ 
(wenhua duoyanxing).953 As in the West, the school level portrays the primary arena 
where the State may implement cultural pluralism, particularly in developing a 
curriculum to promote understanding and tolerance of diverse cultural and knowledge 
systems. However, the success of the ongoing process of curriculum reform for multi-
cultural education in China requires a political environment that will allow both 
structural and directional pluralism. Baorong Duoyuan provides these, but the CCP 
still resists them. 
 Fan Wang argues that China’s elevated level of ethnic diversity constitutes a 
significant factor contributing to a negative relationship in the State’s economic 
growth across Chinese provinces. According to Wang, ‘people have a tendency to 
associate with, socialize with, and be more comfortable with people who appear 
similar to themselves.’954 I argue that the restrictions and constraints the CCP imposes 
throughout various spheres in the State, which extend to excluding religious education 
in China, negatively impact religious freedom and obstruct opportunities to 
potentially cultivate rich relationships between diverse groups of citizens. Spring 
suggests that nurturing expectations for student achievement in school may be 
accomplished by the following three practices: 
1. targeted encouragement by parents, counselors, and teachers; 
2. campaigns to decrease the dropout rate; 
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3. ensuring students experience freedom of religion in schools.955 
 Contrary to China’s Communist foundation, the design for Baorong Duoyuan 
serves to complement the relationship between religion and the State because it offers 
concise, concrete concepts to address and help eradicate challenges in education, 
including the State’s current denial of the value of religious education. As I 
contemplate several dilemmas in education under political liberalism and principled 
pluralism in the following section, I ultimately explain how Baorong Duoyuan would 
supersede these two theories in a postcommunist, democratized China. It would also 
help ensure religious freedom inside and outside of the education setting. Unlike the 
CCP’s control which negatively impacts and stifles religious freedom for all in the 
State, Baorong Duoyuan promotes religious freedom and enhances understanding 
between diverse religious groups as well as between those professing no religion or 
proclaiming to be anti-religious. 
 
6.2.2 Ways the Traditional Family and the Community Relate to Education and 
the State 
 
Chao reports that prior to 1911, in the Dynastic period, the State transmitted and 
enforced Confucian orthodoxy through the education system.956 Later, according to 
Mei-Ju Chou, Yi-Chan Tu, and Kai-Ping Huang, Chinese citizens abandoned the 
principles of Confucianism for a time, but they revived these ideologies in the 
twentieth century.957 Olga Lang stresses that Confucius did not consider the interests 
of the family and those of society or loyalty between family and community to 
contradict each other, but that he and his close followers perceived the family as ‘the 
root of the State.’958 To Confucius, strengthening the family and kin simultaneously 
served to bolster the State. In time, when the interests of the family started to 
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contradict those of the community or State, this concept changed, and the family 
became a means for these entities to accomplish their goals. 
 Despite the CCP’s concentrated tactics to control citizens’ lives to further 
State goals, familial bonds remain strong in China. Chou, Tu, and Huang explain that 
instead of emphasizing any god or the afterlife, Confucianism, with humanism 
constituting its primary principle, spotlights the world and the family. ‘This position is 
founded on the perception that humans can be taught and improved with personal and 
community efforts, especially self- cultivation.’959 Chou, Tu, and Huang note: 
One principle that Confucianism highlights, filial piety, depicts a principle protracted in the 
Chinese culture. This principle indicates that there must be deference to older individuals, 
mostly within one’s family. This principle is perfectly encapsulated in Confucius’ statement 
‘when I walk along with two others, they may serve me as teachers. I will select their good 
qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and avoid them.’ Under these conditions, family 
is not something contrived; it is a major part of one’s development.960 
 The Confucian principle of modeling behavior on that of one’s elders helps 
explain why those in the younger generation frequently follow their elders without 
question and why they rarely, if ever, challenge them or their teachers. Tamara 
Hamlish explains that family includes immediate family members and encompasses 
grandparents and married siblings.961 Joseph C. W. Chan stresses that even though the 
Confucian perception of human life fundamentally molded the basic configuration of 
Chinese society and culture throughout the past two thousand years, it has never 
constituted an established religion. According to Chan: ‘The interest of Confucianism 
as a religious humanism lies in its concern for this world, with a clear mission to 
improve human life and society.’962 Nevertheless, Zinghao Zhou points out that 
because Confucianism and Chinese traditional religions prove morally centered, the 
CCP willingly utilizes these vehicles to promote the common good and family 
values.963      
 Grant and others assert that certain traits of Chinese culture encourage some 
overlap between school and family. Similar to the ways parents assume their children 
will be submissive, teachers expect students will respect and submit to their teaching 
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and authority. These authors state that ‘strong interdependence [exists] among family 
members, and children are raised with the belief that their school performance reflects 
on their family’s honor.’964 Rosemary Foot explains that according to Asian values, 
the rights of an individual, as well as those of the family, succumb to respect for 
authority and the rights of the community.965 I concur with the point that Confucius 
presented hundreds of years ago: that the family, an integral component of the 
community, constitutes an equal and autonomous partner with the State, as well as 
with other sovereign spheres of society, like businesses and educational institutions. 
 Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer report that as the CCP perceives 
education to constitute a base from which the State may enhance the quality and 
‘cultural level’ of citizens, the Party strongly promotes education in both rural and 
urban communities. Peggy A. Kong observes that parents in rural communities highly 
value education for the futures of their children.966 According to Kong: 
 Rural residents considered their own quality of life lacking compared to what 
they believed was the good quality of life of urban residents. They explained […] that rural 
conditions were less developed and that their work and living conditions were ‘bitter’ (ku).967 
 
Parents in the rural community which Kong observed considered that living in 
cities and obtaining an education not only indicated success but were necessary for 
survival. In sharing their reasons for supporting their children’s education, these 
parents explained that they believed education represents a necessity for living in 
contemporary society.968 
 Aligning with the idea that the interests of the family and those of society or 
loyalties to one or the other are not in opposition to each other, the family instead 
being the base on which State is founded,969 Lang stresses the need for members of 
Chinese communities to support and complement each other.970 Samuel Ling asserts 
that parents need to encourage their children971 to consider careers other than the 
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traditional ones: for example, in the fields of business, science, technology, or 
medicine. Alternatively, careers in areas of the social sciences and humanities 
contribute to the development of positive, significant ideas for a society’s pluralistic 
worldview972 and, ultimately, serve to benefit the community. 
 In China’s contemporary society, as Koh notes regarding democratic societies, 
states as well as classrooms increasingly reflect their diverse religious populations. 
Despite numerous controversies and reservations regarding teaching of morality, 
progressively pluralistic States, including China, generally expect citizens to 
demonstrate moral behavior. Although venues for the inculcation of moral education 
may vary from one State to another, as well as from one school to another, RE 
provides students with the opportunity to better understand a plurality of values and 
beliefs.973 
 Koh explains that China currently includes moral education within the 
purview of citizenship education, known as Deyu in Chinese. In the past, Deyu, which 
denotes ideological moral political education, utilized indoctrination to emphasize 
compliance with the CCP’s social and political mandates. Currently, moral education 
involves a focus on moral development through life and learning experiences.974  
 As this study reflects, the cultivation of moral values through education, 
particularly through religious education, comprises a controversial subject. Despite 
debates, research reveals that the need for moral values to be propagated 
overwhelmingly exists in contemporary China. I argue that this need will prove to be 
ongoing not only in the projected future China but throughout the increasingly, 
religiously pluralistic world and that religious education could best fulfill this need. I 
propose that if implemented in a postcommunist democratized, Christianized China, 
RE under Baorong Duoyuan could contribute to ultimately strengthening citizens’ 
morality. Religious education could also help counter residual effects from China’s 
contemporary ‘moral vacuum,’ which I examine in the following section. 
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6.2.3 China’s Contemporary ‘Moral Vacuum’ 
Arthur Kleinman admits that a common consensus regarding morality in China 
concerns him and several of his friends. The claim that ‘China […] has no moral 
compass today’975 correlates with findings from a significant survey conducted in 
2014 on ‘social diseases’ in China, as Huaihong He explains: ‘As many as 88 percent 
of respondents (60.2 percent fully agreed and 27.8 percent agreed somewhat) believed 
that China has been beset with a “social disease of moral decay and the loss of 
trust.”’976 Widely occurring phenomena which regularly contribute to the State’s 
ethical and moral problems include a decline in professional ethics among Buddhist 
monks, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and particularly government officials. According to 
He, the level of severity and the scale of moral disruption in the State depict 
symptoms of China’s contemporary moral miasma. 
 Ma Jian, an author whose books are banned in China, stresses that the CCP’s 
perceptions of procreation and childbirth as political, like most other facets of human 
life in the State, also contribute to China’s moral vacuum. According to Jian, initially, 
after the CCP gained control of China in 1949, Mao outlawed abortion and the use of 
contraception, encouraging families to have children. He intended to increase the 
State’s workforce and the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. Mao’s strategy 
backfired, and China’s population doubled from approximately 500 million in 1949 to 
almost a billion thirty years later. After Deng Xiaoping gained power in 1978, the 
State implemented the one-child policy to align with China’s goal to restrict its 
population to 1.2 billion by the year 2000.977 Chinese couples could legally give birth 
to only one child, unless they lived in the countryside and their first child was a girl. 
Then the family could have two children. 
 Even though this temporary control to engineer society recently ceased to be 
enforced, the State continues to intrude into its citizens’ intimate lives. Steven Jiang, 
Paul Armstrong, and Susannah Cullinane report that in October 2015, the CCP issued 
the following statement, which took effect on 1 January 2016: ‘To promote a balanced 
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growth of population, China will continue to uphold the basic national policy of 
population control and improve its strategy on population development. China will 
fully implement the policy of “one couple, two children” in a proactive response to 
the issue of an aging population.’978 Like Jian, Jiang, Armstrong, and Cullinanne 
argue regarding China’s previous one-child policy that even its current two-child 
policy will not erase years of the brutal practices of forced abortions and sterilizations 
under this plan. I agree with Jiang, Armstrong, and Cullinanne because, under this 
plan, a child conceived during a third pregnancy would be forcibly aborted without 
the mother’s consent. The killing of millions of babies979 in the name of State-
controlled economic development relativizes the value of life to materialism and 
contributes to the rapid moral decline in Chinese society. 
 Kleinman and others recount that with the advent of China’s moral vacuum, 
the ideology of the CCP no longer proves acceptable to many citizens. Subsequently, 
a resistance to official atheism as well as a seemingly delegitimatized Communist 
credo has transpired and contributed to even high-ranking cadres withdrawing support 
for the State’s once-powerful Communist stance.980 While Communism has 
undermined traditional Chinese moral values, citizens’ corrosive cynicism has 
similarly tainted Confucian convictions. I contend that the inherent meaning of the 
quotation, ‘Schools should also teach students about the different ultimate sources for 
morality, including religion,’981 further alludes to the need for a better understanding 
of morality. It also reiterates the fact that even though the CCP will not currently 
permit this teaching, the need for religious education in China exists. I argue that 
fulfilling this critical need in China will more likely be feasible in China’s projected 
democratic, Christianized future under Baorong Duoyuan. 
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6.2.4 Dearth of Freedom Regarding Religious Education 
No real freedom for religious education exists in China. Magda Hornemann stresses 
that the restrictions which China implements regarding RE ‘reflect the authoritarian 
State’s desire to exercise control over religious groups.’982 Hornemann contends that 
China’s restrictive measures regarding religious education mirror the State’s goal to 
ensure that religious groups do not promote political subversion or become 
independent of the State. Nevertheless, the CCP’s objectives sometimes undermine its 
projected goals.983 The control that the State extends to religious education not only 
contributes to social instability, it may also further pit religious groups against the 
State. 
 According to the 2014 International Religious Freedom Report, the CCP only 
permits parents to teach the beliefs of officially recognized religious groups to 
children under the age of 18. Children may also participate in religious activities; 
however, Xinjiang officials require that minors complete nine years of compulsory 
education before they can receive religious education. Adults who force minors to 
participate in religious activities become subject to legal penalties. 984 As I note in 
Chapter 5, the CCP promotes the teaching of atheism in schools, and mandates that 
atheism be taught as the guiding ideology at all levels of education in China. 
 Lan Li stresses that even though the CCP has written citizens’ rights of 
religious freedom into every PRC constitution since 1954 and claims to permit 
freedom of religious belief, in practice, the ideological position of the CCP has been 
that of atheism.985 Xiaohuan Su explains that the Confucian imperial orthodox 
ideology did not promote atheism nor was it atheist. Neither did Confucianism oppose 
the State religious ritual of ancestor worship or numerous other religious ceremonies, 
including the worship of heaven and earth, or the worship of sheji (State).986 
According to Don Starr, in China ‘the kindergartens […] begin to train children in the 
classroom learning skills that characterise Confucian learning environments: respect 
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for the teacher, self-discipline in learning and respect for fellow students.’987 In recent 
decades, a number of major universities have initiated some teachings about religions 
by establishing either a department of religion,988 as at Peking University.989 Some 
universities have set up study centers specializing in research about certain religions, 
such as Christianity, as at Renmin University.990 
 Yik-Fai Tam notes that increased attention to the academic study of religion at 
a number of Chinese institutions for social science research, including the Central 
Nationalities University in Beijing, has benefited several minority religious 
communities.991 The religious departments and centers do not examine diverse 
religions and beliefs to better understand them, but either study about religion as a 
way of comparative world religion studies or conduct research about religion as a way 
of encouraging a philosophical or cultural point of view. For example, Jinghao Zhou 
reports that the Department of Philosophy at Beijing University offers the following 
religious courses: 
Introduction to Religion, Marxism on Religion, Classic Texts of Chinese  
Buddhism. Classic Texts of Chinese Islam. Introduction to Qur’an. Original Text of Daoism, 
Introduction to the Bible, Religious Philosophy, History of Christianity, History of Buddhism, 
and Science and Religion.992 
 Although the departments of English Language and Literature at a number of 
other Chinese universities offer various religious courses, including ‘Reading the 
Bible,’ professors cannot teach the Bible from a religious perspective, only from a 
cultural one.993 The CCP’s purpose for permitting teachings about religions appears to 
correlate with what Zhou surmises regarding the State’s hope for religious schools as 
well as the goal for the training of professional clergy. The CCP anticipates that those 
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citizens who receive training in religion will ultimately love the socialist motherland 
and support China’s leadership.994 
 Hornemann reports that, currently, certain religious groups cannot teach 
religious education in China. As I noted in Chapter 4, when the State includes 
religious education in public education, the approach directly correlates with religious 
freedom as it reflects the State’s stance on religious pluralism. The CCP only permits 
State-approved religious groups associated with China’s five State-backed monopoly 
faiths to ‘apply to set up educational institutions for the study of their faith or training 
of clergy.’995 In addition to the CCP dictating that teachers may only teach subjects 
within the State’s enforced curriculum, State regulations and practices determine the 
number of institutions as well as the size of each facility. 
 
6.2.5 Confronting Challenges to Religious Education in China 
Yang notes that although religious education of children proves to be a common 
practice in most countries, Chinese authorities routinely prohibit children younger 
than eighteen from receiving religious education.996 John Taylor argues that religious 
education ‘should be conceived as a tool to transmit knowledge and values pertaining 
to all religious trends.’997 Taylor stresses that as RE includes the foundations of 
religious belief, it profoundly differs from catechism or theology and, instead, 
religious education contributes to the broader framework of diverse education models 
that international standards define.998 I agree with Taylor that religious education 
represents more of pedagogical than theological value. 
 I argue that restrictions and constraints the CCP imposes throughout various 
spheres in the State, which extend to excluding religious education in China, not only 
negatively impact religious freedom but also negate opportunities for the teaching of 
truths in relation to understanding individuals who differ from one another. In turn, 
the dearth not only in freedom, but also in knowledge, further compounds the 
negative relationship with the State’s economic growth as well as obstructs 
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opportunities to potentially nurture rich relationships between diverse groups of 
citizens. 
 When educators teach information about diverse religions in an inclusive, non-
biased way, religious education can help individuals better understand those who 
believe in and practice other religions as well as those professing agnosticism, 
atheism, or anti-religious beliefs. Conversely, transmitting knowledge about religious 
education in an exclusive, biased way can stimulate misunderstandings between 
individuals with diverse beliefs. Norman Richardson stresses that: ‘[R]eligion in 
schools is capable of being either very creative or very malign.’999 Religious 
education can either help students grow personally and become stronger in their faiths 
or it can stunt their personal growth and contribute to their faith becoming weaker. 
Creative RE can help students become more knowledgeable and, if they desire to do 
so, able to credibly transfer their allegiance to that of another belief system. 
Conversely, negative religious education can hinder students from learning about 
other religions or beliefs and, even if they desire to do so, block them from 
investigating the possibility of transferring their commitment to a different ethos. 
 As noted earlier, China’s 1982 Constitution stipulates that its citizens have the 
right to believe in ‘normal religion.’ As the State does not define what constitutes 
normal, however, the meaning remains unclear, with local authorities determining 
diverse meanings of the word at their discretion. Taylor argues that although the 
Chinese constitution specifies that citizens are free to believe in any religion, the CCP 
limits their religious practice by a plethora of regulations. According to Taylor, 
individuals in China ‘can worship in temples, churches, and mosques that are 
registered with the government, but if they worship in settings other than the ones 
officially designated for religious practice, they place themselves in a situation of 
potential illegality.’1000 Clergy, imams, monks, priests, and pastors can reportedly 
lecture, perform religious rituals, and lecture to laypeople; nevertheless, they must not 
engage in these or other religious activities in any locations other than those CCP 
officials consider appropriate. 
                                                 
999  Norman Richardson, ‘Religious Education in Northern Ireland: Towards New Relationships’, in 
Religious Education in Schools: Ideas and Experiences from around the World, ed. Zarrin T. Caldwell 
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 Zhou explains that teaching a moral and social code depicts one distinctive 
characteristic of Chinese traditional religions. As the CCP remains sensitive about any 
perceived political aspects of religions, particularly Christianity and Islam, the State 
diligently monitors and controls overt religious activities, including religious 
education.1001 Due to the incalculable restrictions the CCP imposes on religious 
education in China, this critical, potentially positive mode for enhancing morality in 
the State remains undeveloped with limited influence. 
 Contemporary challenges to RE in China primarily relate to restrictions the 
CCP regularly imposes. Nevertheless, even in China’s projected democratized, 
Christianized future, with the CCP’s control negated, the implementation of religious 
education will likely require that the MOE overcomes several ongoing as well as 
numerous unfamiliar obstacles: 
 the fact that textbooks do not present information to help students understand 
or discuss diverse religions, or anti- or nonreligious beliefs, or their codes for 
living; 
 a situation where there are teachers who are nonspecialists in religious 
education; 
 the need to recognize diversity within each religion and understand that each 
one, as well as non or anti-religious beliefs, encompasses variety, with some 
individuals of the same religion or belief interpreting their faith in diverse 
ways; 
 the need to openly acknowledge controversy and, at times, encourage pupils to 
critically examine religions, getting them to realize not all of religion 
constitutes a ‘good thing’; 
 the need to understand the social reality of diverse religions and that of anti- or 
nonreligious beliefs, including perceptions relating to ethical or philosophical 
matters; 
 the need to examine the role of religious education in nurturing community 
cohesion and in educating for diversity and realize this will empower students 
to identify their personal attitudes, biases, opinions, feelings, and stereotypes; 
 the need to cultivate respect for the devotion of others to their beliefs yet retain 
the right to criticize, evaluate, and question viewpoints that differ from one’s 
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own;the need to comprehend the power that religion as well as non and anti-
religious beliefs possess in the lives of individuals, as well as in their 
emotions, feelings, and intellect.1002  
Despite the CCP’s preference for atheism, the State’s contemporary goals relating 
to pluralism could conceivably position religious education as a priority for China to 
implement in its education system. I argue, however, that this would more likely 
successfully transpire in China’s projected democratic, Christianized future. As the 
State would incorporate information to support its goal to develop moral, educated 
citizens, these individuals could, in China’s foreseeable future, not only learn about 
but experience the religious freedom that religious education presupposes. 
Nevertheless, the system underlying the State’s foundation for the implementation of 
RE, as I discuss in the following section, will confront barriers that Baorong Duoyuan 
can best overcome. 
 
6.3 Barriers to Successfully Implementing Religious Education 
In Chapter 5, I listed several fundamental concepts that I drew from both political 
liberalism and principled pluralism to develop Baorong Duoyuan as an alternative for 
a postcommunist, democratized China to help protect religious freedom for all. 
Although political liberalism and principled pluralism both purportedly aim to 
empower citizens to conjoin their efforts to pursue the common good for all, as each 
conditionally supports religious freedom, political liberalism as well as principled 
pluralism would encounter barriers prohibiting the implementation of religious 
education in China’s projected future State. In some areas of religious education, 
political liberalism would align with Baorong Duoyuan, yet counter this theory in 
others. Similarly, principled pluralism would correlate with aims of Baorong 
Duoyuan in some respects, yet it would contravene this theory in several others. 
Despite areas of congruence with my contextualized model of principled pluralism, 
however, I argue that both political liberalism and principled pluralism would 
experience more as well as more extreme challenges to implementing religious 
education than would Baorong Duoyuan. 
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6.3.1 Implementing Religious Education under Political Liberalism 
In addition to political liberalism devaluing religious education in compulsory 
education, I noted in Chapter 3 that political liberalism, an offshoot of liberalism, fails 
to demonstrate impartiality regarding participation in the public square by preventing 
specific sects  from drawing upon comprehensive doctrines. Although Rawls claims 
that political liberalism promotes citizens’ equal rights, including religious freedom, 
his reasoning falters as it relates to a pluralism of comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines regarding inclusion in the public square. 
Consequently, due to its constraints regarding reasoning about religion, political 
liberalism would fail to successfully serve as a foundation for education in China’s 
projected future. As this bias would likewise translate into decisions regarding 
religious education, I argue that political liberalism would, subsequently, fail to 
demonstrate impartiality as far as education, thereby constructing one significant 
barrier to the successful implementation of religious education in China’s projected 
future. 
 Bryan T. McGraw argues that even though religious individuals may be 
reasonable and show respect for others and their differing views, one may not 
reasonably expect that they would, as political liberalism directs, agree to prescind 
from their religion-based moral convictions when engaging in public discourse in 
political or educational arenas.1003 I agree with McGraw and with the challenge that 
George Lazaroiu1004 makes regarding the reasoning Rawls attributes to political 
liberalism: 
Rawls refers to a view of individuals only to the extent required to attain his aim of typifying 
persons as free and equal. The identities of people that are incompletely composed by their 
visions of what is essentially important are individuals’ nonpublic or moral identities (political 
identity is not partly made up by individuals’ views of what is fundamentally valuable). 
Specific goals and aspirations are indispensable to nonpolitical identity. […] Individuals have 
a power to constitute and reconsider their views of value, being free to select them: pluralism 
about visions of value is a vital aspect of a liberal society. Each person has specific rights that 
cannot be abandoned simply for other individuals to gain more advantages.1005 
 
 Religion seldom proves to constitute a strictly spiritual matter but rather 
involves moral instructions as to how an individual is to act in daily secular affairs. 
                                                 
1003 Bryan T. McGraw, Faith in Politics: Religion and Liberal Democracy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
1004 George Lazaroiu, ‘The Political Ontology of Rawls’s Work’, Analysis and Metaphysics, 13 (2014) 
<http://www.questia.com/read/1P3-3554660951/the-political-ontology-of-rawls-s-work> [accessed 13 
March 2016] para. 1 of 1 in Conclusion. 
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R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            263 
 
 
Although one may reasonably expect religious individuals to act with a certain 
amount of civility in the public realm, showing respect for others and their different 
views, it may not be reasonable or even practical expect them to act in the public 
square without reference ‘to their deeply held, religiously based moral 
convictions.’1006 So, even if aspects of Rawls’s political liberalism appear reasonable 
to some as a way of encouraging social harmony to a point, I argue that certain 
principles, particularly regarding the exclusion of religion from the public square, do 
not equate with fairness or justice. 
 Another likely insurmountable barrier I foresee for political liberalism in a 
postcommunist, Christianized democracy would be that this theory aligns more with 
Western than Eastern reasoning. Nevertheless, Mehmet Fevzi Bilgin argues for the 
prospects of non‐ Western contexts, such as China, being favorable to adopting 
Rawls’s political liberalism. Although Bilgin recognizes the reality of the religious 
resurgence in numerous non‐ Western societies, he contends that political liberalism 
constitutes a significant theoretical potential resource for States such as China. Bilgin 
disputes previous research which finds that the socio‐ political conditions in China 
and other non‐ Western societies may fail to satisfy the sociological requirements that 
political liberalism stipulates. Instead of concluding that countries like China, ‘will 
have to wait centuries to live up to the social and moral standards of political 
liberalism,’1007 Bilgin insists that the conditions for a State to adopt political 
liberalism do not require the sociological assumptions or the extensive time that 
Rawls appears to suggest.1008 
 The institution of a political liberalism regime would not encourage political 
liberalism’s essential political reasonableness among the diverse religious views 
anticipated in China’s future. When considering political liberalism, Rawls 
contemplates: ‘How is it possible there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’1009 In the scenario Bilgin notes, the 
political and social conditions in China primarily prove neither free nor equal. 
                                                 
1006 Jonathan Den Hartog, ‘The 1950s, Principled Pluralism, and the Future of America’, in Public 
Discourse <http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/13991/> [accessed 11 December 2016] para. 
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1007 Mehmet Fevzi Bilgin, The Prospects for Political Liberalism in Non-Western Societies (St Mary’s 
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 Bilgin may have a legitimate point by assuming that a non-Western State 
might not need an extended period to meet at least some of the conditions for political 
liberalism to be implemented. Nonetheless, to satisfy the political liberalism model in 
a country like China, as I noted in Chapter 5, under the pattern of State supremacy 
over religion regarding the State–religion relationship in both its traditional model in 
the Dynastic period and contemporary patterns under the leadership of the 
Communists, the short-term transition toward a mature environment where a civil and 
democratic society can flourish will take much longer than Bilgin states. In fact, 
Rawls repeatedly proclaims that he envisages his structure of the political liberalism 
model as based on the social-political conditions of the United States.  
 In addition to political liberalism’s unreasonable ‘reasonableness,’ Jethro K. 
Lieberman notes another barrier to implementing religious education under political 
liberalism. In Rawls’s original position, Lieberman recounts that Rawls recreates flesh 
and blood people into disembodied spirits and shrouds them in a ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
These individuals reportedly do not have any knowledge about their place in society, 
or about their class or social status and converge into one single individual. 
Consequently, the need for discussion dissipates while unanimity becomes certain. 
Rather than considering real constructions of actual individuals, ideological conflicts 
dissipate under political liberalism.1010 According to Van de Putte, Rawls’s theoretical 
process would prove counterproductive and contribute to even more challenges for 
religious education in a postcommunist China. Putte argues that the political ideas of 
freedom and equality relate to the will to achieve a fair society despite ideological 
conflicts.1011 
 As I argued in Chapter 5, although Rawls claims that political liberalism 
promotes citizens’ equal rights, including religious freedom, his reasoning falters as it 
relates to a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines.1012 Chinese citizens do not currently, nor will they typically, converge into 
one single individual to affirm one another’s doctrines in the future. Political 
liberalism’s inability to impartially recognize, reiterate, and resolve conflicting 
perceptions, coupled with its thinly veiled biases toward certain religious and 
                                                 
1010 Jethro K. Lieberman, Liberalism Undressed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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comprehensive doctrines, renders it improbable as a means of successfully 
implementing religious education in China’s projected future. However, for assorted 
reasons, principled pluralism, similar to political liberalism, as I submit in the 
following section, would also fail to effectively serve as a theoretical foundation for 
implementing religious education in a postcommunist China’s education system. 
 
6.3.2 Barriers to Implementing Religious Education under Principled Pluralism 
Following their exposure to information relating to diverse religions when receiving 
religious education, students can more objectively choose or reject what they discern 
as partial or whole religious truths. Nevertheless, as I note in Chapter 5, principled 
pluralism, which primarily originated from a Dutch culture, depicts a Christian, 
theologically based theory. Due to principled pluralism’s basic Christian foundation, 
this theory, as political liberalism, would routinely encounter barriers prohibiting the 
successful implementation of RE in China’s projected Christianized, democratized 
future State. The foundation of principled pluralism will particularly limit its appeal 
and its acceptance by numerous non-Christian groups, atheists, and non or anti-
religious sects. In addition, controversies could emerge periodically as well as 
challenges to guidelines and content for religious education because principled 
pluralism could encompass preferences for texts biased toward Christianity. In 
addition, the probability exists that some secularists, numerous atheists, and others 
professing religious faiths other than Christianity would at times object to principled 
pluralism’s prioritization of values.1013 
 In Chapter 2, I noted that Schweitzer suggested the principled pluralist 
perspective for religious education creates opportunities for students to strengthen 
their abilities to evaluate religious truths.1014 Although principled pluralists would 
likely consider these prospects as positive, those with allegiances to beliefs other than 
Christianity would probably challenge its validity. Glenn argues that although many 
parents appear to prefer that education includes religious education, where the law 
permits or requires RE, the results have typically proved unsatisfactory. The outcomes 
have failed to satisfy either nonbelievers or believers.1015 Similarly, in China’s 
projected Christianized future, nonreligious as well as non-Christian adherents could 
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fear that their children may be indoctrinated, while Christians may perceive that the 
predictable generic focus of religious education could distort and trivialize their faith. 
 In Chapter 4, I reported that principled pluralism supports dialogue within 
individual religions as well as between various religious groups, principally Christian 
ones. Nevertheless, in a sense, as I previously noted by referring to Schmidt, because 
principled pluralism emphasizes the significance of associations and communities, 
this prompts principled pluralists to circumvent individualism (particularly in extreme 
formats).1016 I submit that principled pluralism’s emphasis on Christianity and the de-
emphasis that it gives to individualism could construct a significant barrier to the 
implementation of religious education. Charles L. Glenn’s argument against the 
stance that principled pluralism would adopt in religious education, stressing that 
Christianity supersedes other beliefs, illustrates this expected obstacle. According to 
Glenn, ‘In elementary education, an emphasis upon how groups and individuals in 
society differ in their convictions and loyalties does not seem appropriate.’1017   
      Pincipled pluralism’s theistic posture, coupled with its historical Christian origin, 
would likely invite conflict with certain atheists, those with no religious beliefs, and 
those who are anti-religious. As a result, a significant barrier for the implementation 
of religious education under principled pluralism could arise. 
 Proponents of principled pluralism, like those of political liberalism, argue that 
principled pluralism supports religious freedom. Although a Christian worldview 
serves as the theological foundation for principled pluralism regarding issues 
concerning religious freedom, the philosophical stance that principled pluralism 
basically supports proves inclusive. This position reflects views which most other 
religions mirror and includes the atheistic worldview, written in Article 36 of China's 
constitution.  
 If principled pluralism should arbitrarily employ fundamentalist approaches 
such as theonomy in the implementation of religious education, tensions among the 
diverse truth claims of other and nonreligious beliefs would arise. If principled 
pluralism were to demonstrate favoritism for the Christian religion or not give other 
diverse non-Christian beliefs due exposure, this would devalue religious education as 
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it is taught in public schools, and erect a barrier of suspicion to the potential positive 
implementation of RE under principled pluralism. 
 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) states the following to emphasize the need for recognizing and affirming 
the value of diverse religions as far as children are concerned: 
There is no single approach to respecting religious and cultural rights in education systems. 
Separate schooling systems for different religions or languages can serve to discriminate 
against and marginalize groups of children if the schools are afforded inequitable funding and 
status. They can also serve to exclude and marginalize children from educational and 
employment opportunities. Conversely, the imposition of a uniform schooling system that 
takes no account of minority cultures and religions can serve to oppress and undermine 
children from those communities and contribute to educational failure and high drop-out 
rates.1018  
 Instead of constructing barriers to the implementation of religious education in 
a postcommunist, democratized, Christianized China, UNESCO asserts that the 
foundation for religious education must respect diverse religions and afford freedom 
for parents and guardians to ensure that the religious and moral education their 
children receive conforms with their own convictions.1019 As public schools would 
likely utilize one of four1020 out of five approaches to implementing religious 
education under principled pluralism, interpretations with regard to the chosen 
approach as well as its intensity could conceivably favor Christianity. 
 Although principled pluralism would comply with legal guidelines within 
domestic, regional, and international norms, it could subtly or perhaps even overtly 
support a preference for Christianity in teaching. This would counter UNESCO’s 
recommended guidelines and international norms regarding RE and would likely 
contribute to one more barrier to religious education succeeding under principled 
pluralism. Consequently, for this and the other reasons I noted in this section, I 
conclude that in their approaches both political liberalism and principled pluralism 
would fail to overcome significant barriers to the implementation of religious 
education. 
 
                                                 
1018 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/United Nations Children’s Fund, 
A Human Rights-Based Approach to Education for All (New York: United Nations Children’s Fund/ 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2007), p. 78. 
1019 United Nations, A Human Rights-Based Approach. 
1020 The five approaches to teaching religious education, introduced in Chapter 4, are: (1) learning into 
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6.3.3 Religious Education under Political Liberalism and Principled Pluralism 
The numerous inherent barriers which political liberalism and principled pluralism 
could present regarding religious freedom confirm that neither theory would prove 
successful for implementing religious education in a postcommunist, Christianized 
democracy. Nevertheless, in this section, I envisage how religious education would be 
taught under political liberalism as well as under principled pluralism. This further 
confirms my arguments regarding inadequacies that the two theories would provide 
for religious freedom and ultimately supports my stance that Baorong Duoyuan offers 
the best option for religious education in China’s future. 
 
6.3.3.1 Religious Education as Portrayed under Political Liberalism 
Political liberalism would fully support the separatist approach for religious education 
in China’s projected future because this would distance the teaching of religions from 
public education. In Chapter 4, I noted that Ahdar and Leigh explained that separatists 
argue the responsibility for religious education belongs to the parents and that the 
State should firmly separate itself from RE. Without religious education in public 
schools in China, however, some students would only know about their own family’s 
religion or, at the other extreme, due to misconceptions, become prejudiced against 
others with beliefs different from their own.1021 Although political liberalism would 
conditionally support the moderate secularist approach because this method tolerates 
some teaching of religions, it would still offend some religious individuals.1022 
Political liberalism would typically reject religious education aligning with 
ideological or radical secularists. 
 In the public-school system in China’s projected postcommunist future, 
political liberalism would not permit the teaching of religious education using the 
religious instruction method. Political liberalism would stipulate, however, that 
although certain conditions would constrain RE from being taught using the learning 
about religion approach, this approach would be acceptable. Political liberalism would 
never, however, permit the teaching of religious education using the learning from 
religion method. According to the reasoning of political liberalism, learning from 
religion could offend certain religious adherents or those professing non or anti-
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religious beliefs. I argue contrariwise that the learning from religion approach in 
religious education would best equip China’s future generation to understand beliefs 
of others that differ from their own – religious, nonreligious, and even anti-religious. 
The preference of political liberalism for the separatist approach in religious 
education would prove biased toward the ‘religious’ philosophies of atheists and those 
with anti-religious beliefs. It would also, ultimately, constrain religious freedom in 
education for young people. 
 
6.3.3b Religious Education as Portrayed under Principled Pluralism 
Contrary to political liberalism adopting the separatist approach as its preference 
regarding religious education, principled pluralism would negate this option as it fails 
to protect religious freedom for all and, in a sense, appears to demonstrate a 
preference for non and anti-religious beliefs. Principled pluralism would concur with 
political liberalism regarding the secularist approach to religious education. Like 
political liberalism, principled pluralism would permit the moderate approach in 
teaching religious education. Principled pluralism would, like political liberalism, 
determinedly prohibit RE from aligning with ideological or radical secularists. In 
addition, principled pluralism would conditionally approve the religious instruction 
approach as the one to be utilized in religious education in the public-school setting in 
China’s projected postcommunist future, as long as the teaching of one specific 
religion did not dominate the process. Similarly, principled pluralism would 
conditionally approve the learning about religion method for teaching religious 
education as long as the teachings and practices of one religion were not 
overemphasized in the learning sessions. 
 Principled pluralism would also support the learning from religion approach to 
religious education, provided one religion did not dictate that its beliefs and practices 
override others in the school. If religious education were implemented under 
principled pluralism’s Christian base, however, it could potentially favor Christianity. 
In turn, this could negate equal representation of other religions, atheism, and beliefs 
professing anti-religious views. This could work to counter RE in public schools and 
sabotage the potential for its success in a postcommunist, Christianized, democratic 
China. 
 In the next section, I focus on the vision, criteria, and design for the 
implementation of religious education under BD. I propose that as Baorong Duoyuan 
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will complement RE, it would best serve as the foundation for religious education in 
China’s future education system. 
 
6.4 Implementing Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
I argue that the CCP’s rationale for promoting Confucianism and Chinese traditional 
religions, while banning other religions and religious education, does not promote but 
counters the common good for all and the family values of Chinese citizens. Amitai 
Etzioni explains that religion fills the vacuum left when values the State previously 
promoted wane, as with Communism, for example, or when, as in China, citizens 
experience a moral vacuum and find the State’s values unfulfilling. Etzioni 
emphasizes that, in turn, billions of individuals embrace religion. For example, in 
politically and economically underdeveloped countries, which would include China, 
the ‘avoidance of teaching moral and religious values […] is not the case.’1023 Rather 
than secularization overtaking society and people becoming less religious or 
abandoning religious beliefs, relegating religion to the private sphere as political 
liberalism advocates, religion constitutes a critical source of ethical and spiritual 
guidance for many Chinese individuals. 
 Contrary to many secular policy makers as well as numerous political liberals 
who question the value of religion and whether religious education should be 
implemented in public schools, I argue that religious education possesses the potential 
to simultaneously enhance a person’s understanding of their own belief system and 
contribute to their gaining an enhanced empathetic understanding of others practicing 
different beliefs. While political liberalism and principled pluralism could 
conceivably overcome some of the barriers that I note in the previous sections, they 
would likely fail to successfully implement religious education in China’s future 
education system. Nevertheless, as I examine basics contributing to the vision, 
criteria, and development of Baorong Duoyuan in the next sections, which confirm 
my proposition that my theory would best suit religious education in China’s 
projected future as a Christianized democracy. 
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6.4.1 Vision of Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
In contrast to political liberalism and principled pluralism erecting barriers to the 
success of religious education in China’s projected Christianized, democratized State, 
Baorong Duoyuan, a contextualized ‘offshoot’ of principled pluralism, promotes the 
potential for religious education to flourish and bloom. Nevertheless, despite 
numerous differences with political liberalism and principled pluralism, Baorong 
Duoyuan shares some similarities with these two theories, and a particular one which 
Robert Jackson notes – growth in understanding one’s own beliefs as well as those of 
other individuals. 1024 In the vision that I foresee for religious education in China 
under Baorong Duoyuan, religious education would be equally accessible for all in 
each educational institution and school and, as a result, this growth would permeate 
the State. 
 In considering the implementation and growth of religious education that I 
foresee for China in its projected future, I agree with Gottfried Adam and Martin 
Rothgangel that aspirations regarding religious education constitute an ongoing 
process with continuing reflections on diverse levels.1025 Nevertheless, I envisage that 
the projected format of RE will be learner-centered with transparent goals and 
expectations of achievements for students. Jackson relates several other goals and 
benefits for religious education as follows: 
a key aim for religious education is to develop an understanding of the grammar – the 
language and wider symbolic patterns – of religions and the interpretive skills necessary to 
gain that understanding. The achievement of this aim requires the development of critical 
skills, the application of which opens up issues of representation, interpretation, truth and 
meaning. Religious education develops self-awareness, since individuals develop through 
reflecting upon encounters with new ideas and experiences. Religious education is thus a 
conversational process in which students, whatever their backgrounds, continuously interpret 
and reinterpret their own views in the light of what they study.1026 
 The following three notable pedagogical values may be gained from religious 
education under Baorong Duoyuan’s model: 
1. It provides access for all students to learn about different religions, 
including atheistic and anti-religious beliefs and the diverse cultures 
                                                 
1024 Robert Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education and Plurality: Issues in Diversity and Pedagogy 
(New York: Psychology Press, 2004). 
1025 Gottfried Adam and Martin Rothgangel, ‘Reasons for Religious Education in Public Schools’, in 
Basics of Religious Education [translation of Religionspädagogisches Kompendium] eds. Gottfried 
Adam, and others (Bristol, CT: V & R Unipress GmbH, 2014), pp. 131–44. 
1026 Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education, p. 169. 
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affiliated with each religion or belief system.1027 By providing equal access 
to religious education for all students, regardless of their personal religious 
affiliation, lack of religion, or anti-religious belief, religious education 
under Baorong Duoyuan’s model equips students for learning about diverse 
religions and different worldviews. This proves especially important in the 
Chinese context because traditional Chinese society tends to be 
homogeneous,1028 utilizing a monolithic system both with regard to religion 
and ethnically and politically, to organize a designated social order. Under 
Baorong Duoyuan, the promotion of religious education in a more 
heterogeneous, pluralistic manner will also help neutralize and de-
emphasize the negative impact of the Communist, atheistic-oriented 
educational culture. 
2. It helps students develop and apply critical skills to interpret truth and
 meaning.1029 Religious education under Baorong Duoyuan would foster 
further directional pluralism, at least in a descriptive way. Learning from 
and about diverse faiths and belief traditions regarding the way other 
individuals interpret their personal truth-claims would help students from 
differing religions develop critical thinking skills and better prepare 
themselves to defend both their own and other individuals’ faith and 
freedom of expression when challenged and would also be helpful in 
promoting understanding of other beliefs. 
3. It fosters partnerships to promote common good and counter religious 
extremism. As Jackson additionally notes, another subsequent long-term 
benefit that I envisage for the implementation of religious education under 
Baorong Duoyuan is that it contributes to ‘Fostering positive relations 
between religious groups of different faiths.’ 1030 Consequently, BD can also 
                                                 
1027 Yecheng, ‘A “Homogeneous” China?’ in Davidson in China, 15 September 2012 
<http://china.davidson.edu/news/a-homogeneous-china/> [accessed 4 December 2017] para. 3 of 10. 
1028 Jos Raadschelders, and Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Global Dimensions of Public Administration and 
Governance: A Comparative Voyage (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), p. 111. ‘In truly and 
sociologically homogeneous societies people share a language, a history, and an ethnicity.’ 
1029 Jackson, Rethinking Religious Education, p. 169. 
1030 ‘Principled Pluralism: Report of the Inclusive America Project’, interview with Meryl 
Chertoff, in Rumi Forum <http://rumiforum.org/qprincipled-pluralism-report-of-the-inclusive-
america-projectq-with-meryl-chertoff/> [accessed 15 April 2016] para. 3 of 4. 
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establish partnerships that could help promote the common good of those 
with diverse belief systems. 
 As students study different belief systems, religious education will empower 
them to engage in knowledgeable communication and better understand those from 
diverse cultures and others professing diverse beliefs. This proves especially critical 
following 9/11 with much of terrorism originating from either homegrown terrorists 
who are radicalized in a homogeneous religious environment or brainwashed by 
international extremist religious propaganda. 
 The vision for religious education in compulsory education under Baorong 
Duoyuan will include the full protection of religious freedom and cultural rights of all 
groups. This will include atheists and agnostics as well as those professing non or 
anti-religious beliefs. I argue that contrary to stifling freedom of religion as the CCP 
continues to do, despite claims to the contrary, the implementation of religious 
education under Baorong Duoyuan possesses the seed for religious freedom to 
subsequently root and grow in China. To prepare the ground for my vision regarding 
the implementation of religious education under Baorong Duoyuan so that it can 
begin to germinate, I propose that China’s future MOE introduces several positive 
criteria that I present in the next section. 
 
6.4.2 Criteria for Implementing Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
To help ensure that the implementation of religious education under Baorong 
Duoyuan in a postcommunist China encompasses principles which will nurture RE, it 
mandates that the MOE clearly identifies necessary principles for RE. Criteria 
founding the plan for religious education must be clearly constructed and documented 
with methods to ensure accountability. I propose that the future Chinese education 
system implements the following benchmarks. Although these standards reflect three 
crucial areas for education reform to align with Baorong Duoyuan, education leaders 
should not use these as an excuse to penetrate the education system with a secularist 
worldview in the name of ‘State neutrality.’These benchmarks are: 
1. Guidelines for teaching religious education should neither promote nor 
suppress the teaching of any one legal worldview, religious belief, or non-
belief. 
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2. In teaching religious education, the State should promote freedom of 
education as being compatible with the principles of religious freedom, 
aligning with international norms. 
3. The State should clearly present criteria to ensure protection of the right 
for parents to exercise their preference to choose or set up education 
institutions for their children according to their religious or nonreligious 
affiliation.1031 
 These three proposed criteria for implementing Baorong Duoyuan prove 
compatible with the basic principles of religious freedom manifested regarding 
education and align with various international human rights instruments, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, as well as the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Geneva Declaration), the Canadian Children’s 
Rights Council, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 To develop criteria for implementing religious education in China’s future 
education system, I draw from both the OSCE, specifically the Toledo Guiding 
Principles on Teaching about Religious Beliefs in Public Schools, and information 
that Grant and others published. These authors stress that Chinese scholars found that 
most teachers do not use evidence which empirical studies generate to guide their 
teaching but, instead, rely on conventional wisdom. Consequently, the following 
framework for implementing religious education under BD reflects seven major 
guidelines drawn from Chinese ‘conventional wisdom,’1032 contextualized to be 
compatible with OSCE principles which stipulate that educators are to: 
1. develop and maintain an environment conducive to learning that respects 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, and civic values; 
2. study and understand students’ belief systems, demonstrating a commitment to 
religious freedom; 
3. ensure objectivity in teaching about religions and beliefs without favoring one 
religion over another; 
4. establish a spirit of mutual respect and understanding for students that they 
may replicate as they relate to others; 
                                                 
1031 Maussen, ‘Religious Governance in the Netherlands.’ 
1032 Grant and others, West Meets East, p. 13. 
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5. clarify goals and organize learning opportunities, implementing creative and 
varied vehicles for learning; 
6. cultivate the attitude, knowledge, and skills to help students learn in fair and 
balanced ways about diverse beliefs and religions as well as non or anti-
religious beliefs; 
7. include a focus on key historical and contemporary developments but also 
reflect local and global concerns relating to religion. 
 
 Another critical criterion for the implementation of religious education under 
Baorong Duoyuan would be the stipulation that teachers and other educators receive 
mandatory initial as well as ongoing training, i.e. continuing educational units 
(CEUs). Training sessions for teachers could include identifying ways to help students 
understand diverse beliefs in China’s pluralistic population. These educational 
sessions for teachers would equip them to best facilitate religious education by 
introducing and reiterating basic concepts which align with Baorong Duoyuan and 
help ensure religious freedom in the school setting. 
 One distinctive feature of religious education under the Baorong Duoyuan 
model is that its compliance with international norms guarantees the rights of parents 
and legal guardians and ensures their preferred role in choosing their children’s 
education according to their religious preference. This is critical both to protecting the 
religious freedom of parents and legal guardians and guaranteeing their choice for 
their children’s religious education. The UN Human Rights Committee reaffirmed 
these principles during its 48th session: 
The Committee is of the view that article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects 
such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in a neutral and objective way. 
The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and 
moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in article 18.4, is related to 
the guarantees of the freedom to teach a religion or belief stated in article 18.1. The 
Committee notes that public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or 
belief is inconsistent with article 18.4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory 
exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.1033 
 
 According to Carolyn Evans, the European Court of Human Rights asserts that 
the duty of the State regarding religious education encompasses more than the content 
                                                 
1033 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-Eighth Session, 1993), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35, in University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
<http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom22.htm> [accessed 10 January 2018] point 6 of 11. 
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of classes. It also extends to concerns which affect parents and students. Evans further 
notes that the parents’ religion or belief must be respected in religious education. 
Equipping educators with principles for involving parents in children’s religious 
education depicts one more prominent criterion that could help circumvent 
misunderstandings regarding religious education, ensuring both that parental rights in 
this area are honored1034 and that the beliefs of their children are recognized.1035 
Cultivating classroom practices to ensure that religious education remains compatible 
with the principle of religious freedom for all could additionally contribute to parents 
more favorably consenting to their children participating in RE. In the next section, as 
I propose a design for the implementation of religious education under Baorong 
Duoyuan in China’s projected future, the recommended format must include fair and 
unbiased examinations of different beliefs as this will help students better understand 
those practicing different religions, both inside and outside the educational setting.1036 
I consider this necessary to ensure that the interests of the majority do not overshadow 
those of the minority. 
 
6.4.3 Design for Implementing Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
The design for the implementation of religious education in public education under 
Baorong Duoyuan in China’s projected future draws insights from a myriad of 
sources both inside and outside the education setting. The scheme would develop and 
implement ‘Life Education,’1037 with specific plans for education that include 
religious education (learning from religion). The design would ensure that employees, 
teachers, and others officially involved in education were transparent, fair, and 
accountable to help ensure that students obtain a quality education free from religious 
                                                 
1034 Carolyn Evans, ‘11: Religion and Freedom of Expression’, in Religion and Human Rights: An 
Introduction, eds. John Witte Jr and M. Christian Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp. 188–203. 
1035 Maussen, ‘Religious Governance in the Netherlands.’ 
1036 Evans, ‘Religion and Freedom.’ 
1037 Shu-Sum Ng and Wenko Chan, ‘Introducing “Life Education’ in Taiwan” in Religious Education 
in Schools: Ideas and Experiences from around the World, ed. Zarrin T. Caldwell (London: IARF, 
2002) <https://iarf.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Religious-Education-in-Schools.pdf> [accessed 3 
March 2016] pp. 39–42 (p. 40). ‘“Life Education” consists of a school’s planned provision to promote 
its pupils’ personal, social, and spiritual development. This program includes learning from religious 
education in a multi-faith approach, education about death and life, character education, career 
education, and physiological health education. These aims correspond with the educational ideas of the 
Republic of China’s Constitution, which emphasizes that education and culture are a means to develop 
people’s national consciousness, autonomous consciousness, moral consciousness, physical health, and 
social and life intelligence.’ 
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persecution. The design would allow for protection of each person’s religious 
freedom. It would also provide guidance and implement strategies to develop and 
encourage student engagement and excellence not only in academic achievements but 
also in the areas of arts, health, morality, and other national and global concerns.1038 
Curricula would reflect the advocating of multicultural education.1039  
 The foundation for the design of religious education would evolve from but 
not be restricted to international guidelines for religious freedom and relevant 
research regarding religious education. To enable students to learn correct attitudes 
about different religions, the design for religious education under Baorong Duoyuan 
would include equipping teachers with certain ‘tools.’ These tools would contain the 
curriculum, textbooks, and strategies to complement both religious education and 
religious freedom. I assert that implementing religious education using these types of 
tools would help students learn to overcome barriers in communicating with others 
not only in their current education setting but also later when they become adults and 
can contribute to social progress. 
 
6.4.3.1 Foundational Design of Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
As I assert in Chapter 4, under Baorong Duoyuan, the constitution for a future post-
communist, Christianized, democratic China will explicitly stipulate that the State: 
1. will guarantee freedom of religious belief for all citizens as prescribed in 
international human rights norms; 
2. shall treat all religions, beliefs, or nonbeliefs impartially and equally; 
3. shall not only protect citizens’ freedom of religion or freedom of religious 
belief but also secure and preserve the manifestation of their religion or 
belief; 
4. shall not establish any national religion, belief, or nonbelief. 
 For public schools, the guiding philosophy will be that of structural and 
directional pluralism under Baorong Duoyuan. The guiding philosophy for private 
schools will be categorized as freedom of school choice, with parental and legal 
guardian preference. For public schools, the MOE will establish and facilitate 
                                                 
1038 Concepts adapted from ‘The Responsibilities of the Ministry of Education’, in Ministry of 
Education of the People’s Republic of China (2015) 
<http://en.moe.gov.cn/About_the_Ministry/What_We_Do/201506/t20150626_191288.html> [accessed 
1 March 2016]. 
1039 Leibold, Minority Education in China. 
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multiple religious education curriculums, with a minimum requirement that the 
content should be in the form of ‘learning about religion.’ Content in the form of 
‘learning from’ and ‘learning into’ religion may be made available for optional 
studies. The curriculum in private schools should be designed by the local school 
board to reflect the school choice of different faith or nonfaith traditions. The syllabus 
will comply with minimum national education standards for liberal arts and science. 
The minimum national standard should be the promotion of fundamental rights and 
freedoms as given in the State constitution, aligning with international human rights 
standards and norms. Public and private schools will be managed with a degree of 
local and community autonomy as will the employment of teachers. In managing and 
employing teaching staff under Baorong Duoyuan, the MOE will maintain a national 
resource pool for qualified, registered religious education teachers. 
 In the implementation of religious education under Baorong Duoyuan, the 
primary goal – to promote religious freedom for all, must constitute a core factor 
founding all considerations. Public funding should be available for all schools with 
money allocated impartially, regardless of the school’s religion or nonreligious belief, 
including schools organized by adherents of an atheistic worldview. Funding for 
private schools may be obtained from multiple sources, including the State, 
businesses, local community organizations, and private citizens. Table 11 illustrates 
concepts for the implementation of religious education under Baorong Duoyuan. 
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Table 11: Design of Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
 Public School Private School  
                                     
Goal 
 
Promote religious freedom for all 
 
Promote religious freedom for all 
 
Funding source  
 
Public funding available without 
bias toward religion 
 
Funding obtained from multiple 
sources, including the State, 
businesses, local community 
organizations, and private citizens 
 
 
Guiding philosophy 
Structural and directional 
pluralism under Baorong Duoyuan 
Freedom regarding school choice 
(parental and legal guardian 
preference) 
 
Religious education 
curriculum 
State-facilitated, multiple 
curriculums with a minimum 
requirement of content in the form 
of ‘learning about religion’ 
(content in the form of ‘learning 
from’ and ‘learning into’ religion 
may be made available for 
optional studies) 
 
Promotion of fundamental rights 
and freedoms in the State 
constitution, aligning with 
international human rights 
standards and norms (minimum 
national standard) 
 
Local school board designed to 
reflect the school choice of 
different faith or non-faith 
traditions, with minimum national 
education standards for liberal arts 
and science 
 
Promotion of fundamental rights 
and freedoms in the State 
constitution, aligning with 
international human rights 
standards and norms (minimum 
national standard) 
 
 
School management; 
Teacher employment 
Local and community autonomy 
in both hiring and management. 
State-facilitated national resource 
pool for qualified, registered 
teachers of religious education 
 
Local and community autonomy 
in both hiring and management. 
State-facilitated national resource 
pool for qualified, registered 
teachers of religious education 
 
 
 
6.4.3.2 Curriculum and Textbooks for Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
To promote the cultural, mental, and physical development of students and nurture 
their moral and spiritual growth in an anticipated postcommunist society with a 
pluralist worldview under the Baorong Duoyuan model, the State operates as a 
facilitator to develop the curriculum. By working with the local school board to 
develop multiple diverse curricula, the content will reflect the school choice of 
diverse faiths or nonfaith traditions and align with international human rights 
standards and norms. In addition, the syllabus for religious education would be 
structured to help prepare students to effectively embrace experiences, opportunities, 
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and responsibilities later in life. 1040 The curriculum would specifically equip 
instructors to teach students to: 
 examine and analyze diverse religious beliefs as well as non or anti-
religious beliefs and practices of religions and worldviews; 
 use coherent reasoning in synthesizing their own and other individuals’ 
arguments and ideas regarding sources of wisdom and authority, ensuring 
accurate references to their historical, cultural, and social contexts; 
 evaluate various expressions and ways of life inherent in diverse religions 
and worldviews in a clear, well-informed way; 
 explain varied responses to reflective questions about diversity, the 
expression of identity, meaning, and value; 
 argue for and validate personal positions regarding vital questions about 
the nature of religion and evaluate the perspectives of others; 
 utilize several research methods to study, as well as critically evaluate 
various approaches to, and perspectives relating to, concerns regarding 
community cohesion, mutual understanding, and respect for all, locally, 
nationally, and globally; 
 research and skillfully present several rational, reasonable arguments 
which profoundly encompass moral, religious, and spiritual concerns.1041 
 
 The successful implementation of the religious education curriculum is 
aligned with and relies on the choice of textbooks. At times, in public schools, due to 
concerns about freedom of religion in religious education and concerns about 
religious and non or anti-religious beliefs, some parents insist that the school exempt 
their children from reading specific textbooks. According to Lieberman, both the 
school exempting a child from reading a specific textbook and the school board 
having the right to require that a student utilize prescribed textbooks that prove to be 
morally or politically biased. Although withdrawing offensive textbooks could 
eradicate some conflicts, if a minority were to control which textbooks could or 
                                                 
1040 Religious Education Council of England and Wales, A Curriculum Framework for Religious 
Education in England (London: Religious Education Council of England and Wales, 2013) 
<http://www.medway. gov.uk/pdf/REC%20RE%20curric%20framework%20Oct%202013.pdf> 
[accessed 19 April 2016]. 
1041 Religious Education Council of England and Wales, A Curriculum Framework. 
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couldn’t be used, then this would likely diminish learning and undermine religious 
education. To protect the religious freedom of students who may be offended by 
certain texts or teachings, perhaps teachers could offer alternative texts.1042 Parents 
could ask that their children be exempt from these classes or enroll them in a non-
public school, which would still be state-funded, where their preferred religion or 
belief would be taught. 
 Under Baorong Duoyuan, the choice of textbooks would reflect all religions, 
including minority religions or beliefs. No content containing bias or prejudice of any 
kind toward any religion or belief should be included. Results from a 2011 study 
entitled Connecting the Dots: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan 
indicate texts that illustrate this point. The study found certain examples of bias 
toward certain religions, a practice contrary to that  which China should use in its 
projected future State. For example, passages ‘portray Pakistani Christians as 
Westerners or equal to British colonial oppressors, and Pakistani Hindus as Indians, 
the arch enemy of Pakistan.’1043 The textbooks, which reportedly reach more than 41 
million children, portray religious minorities in a negative light, depicting them as 
inferior and untrustworthy. Robert P. George, an American legal scholar and political 
philosopher, states: 
Pakistan’s public school textbooks contain deeply troubling content that portrays non-Muslim 
citizens as outsiders, unpatriotic, and inferior; are filled with errors; and present widely-disputed 
historical ‘facts’ as settled history. 
Missing from these textbooks are any references to the rights of religious minorities and their 
positive contributions to Pakistan’s development. Thesetextbooks sadly reflect the alarming state today 
of religious freedom inPakistan. A country’s education system, including its textbooks, should promote 
religious tolerance, not close the door to cooperation andcoexistence.1044 
The study recommended that Pakistan’s MOE should replace current biased 
texts with revised textbooks to indicate that religious freedom reflects the protection 
the State’s constitution provides to all Pakistanis. Similarly, I propose that the MOE 
in a projected postcommunist, democratic constitutional China ensures that both the 
design of the curriculum and the content of textbooks mirror religious freedom for all 
in religious education, especially for minorities. 
                                                 
1042 Lieberman, Liberalism Undressed. 
1043 ‘Pakistan: Public School Textbooks Continue to Teach Intolerance’, in ChristianTimes.pk, 11 April 
2016 <https://www.christiantimes.pk/683-pakistan-public-school-textbooks-continue-to-teach-
intolerance/> [accessed 10 January 2018]. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF) sponsored the study.  
1044 ‘Pakistan: Public School’, para. 2 of 5. 
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6.4.3.3 Strategies in Religious Education under Baorong Duoyuan 
When working with other educational specialists developing strategies for the 
implementation of religious education under Baorong Duoyuan, China’s future MOE 
needs to assess potential areas of difficulty students may experience1045  to equip 
teachers to address these concerns. At times, some students may struggle to 
understand specific concepts of religions that differ from their own. To address this 
concern, teachers need a variety of teaching strategies for students when they analyze 
and relate facets of different beliefs. To help students feel less threatened by diverse 
religions and beliefs, teachers may also need to employ creative approaches when 
comparing information extracted from other resources to material in textbooks. 
 Under Baorong Duoyuan, as teachers utilize strategies to respond to 
challenges in religious education, they may find that some students interacting with 
diverse beliefs need empathy, especially when these beliefs diametrically oppose 
those taught at home. Using the learning from religion approach to religious 
education, the method I recommend, teachers could implement perspective-taking 
exercises for considering diverse religions. For this strategy, teachers would 
orchestrate opportunities for students to perceive themselves in the positions of others 
with beliefs that differ from their own. Participating in such an assignment would help 
students to better understand the viewpoints and feelings of others as well as motivate 
them to consider or predict the impact that their behaviors might have on other 
individuals.1046 According to Koh, perspective-taking exercises may not only 
stimulate empathy and humanitarianism but can also nurture students’ moral affect 
and cognition. Meryl Chertoff recommends several tactics to help young people 
transferring from one culture to another that could also break down barriers 
concerning religion when implementing religious education in China’s projected 
future State.1047 Engaging young people in dialogue and uniting them into broader 
community programs portray generic strategies that the MOE could approve for 
                                                 
1045 National Council for Curriculum and Assessment, Post-Primary Religious Education Guidelines 
for Teachers of Students with Mild General Learning Disabilities (Dublin: NCCA, n.d.) 
<https://www.ncca.ie/en/resources/pp_religion> [accessed 10 January 2018].   
1046 Koh, ‘Moral Development.’ 
1047 Chertoff, ‘Principled Pluralism: Report’, para. 3 of 4. 
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teachers to utilize in the learning from religion approach. More specific examples of 
these techniques include but would not be limited to: 
 Storytelling. Teachers could utilize narratives portraying different religions as 
well as clarifying values that individuals with certain religious and non or anti-
religious beliefs hold. This could prove particularly effective for humanizing 
others with diverse beliefs; 
 ‘Show and tell.’ Students could share religious practices and traditions within 
a designated ‘show and tell’ classroom session. These scenarios could, 
henceforth, help promote a spirit of respect and tolerance for others and their 
beliefs; 
 Community service. Involving students in community service programs would 
expose them to diverse populations and beliefs and enable them to contribute 
to the welfare of others while practicing moral actions1048 and, as Chertoff1049 
notes, they would also be working for and contributing to the common good 
of society.1050 
 
 Numerous elements must exist for a pluralistic society to thrive. These 
include ‘religious identity, positive inter-religious relations, increased education, and 
understanding and dialogue.’1051 Chertoff argues that: 
individual families should also work to promote pluralism; young people should be 
encouraged to engage with and discover new cultures while having the choice to retain 
their own beliefs. ‘Safe places’, where people from diverse backgrounds can come 
together and talk about their faith and beliefs should be promoted, especially in formal 
education settings from a young age. […M]ediation in these initiatives will reassure 
families that their children will not lose their own faith, but rather gain a basic education 
that highlights shared values, shared stories and holidays. This type of education serves 
to break down religious barriers and promotes shared ethical values.1052 
 
 In China’s postcommunist, democratized State, strategies for implementing 
religious education under Baorong Duoyuan would also need to ensure that legal 
provisions in religious education comply with international guidelines to: 
1. end positive privileges for religion and for religious people, acts (speech, 
behavior), and organizations; 
                                                 
1048 Koh, ‘Moral Development.’ 
1049 Chertoff, ‘Principled Pluralism: Report’, para. 3 of 4. 
1050 Chertoff, ‘Principled Pluralism: Report.’ para. 3 of 4. 
1051 Chertoff, ‘Principled Pluralism: Report’, para. 3 of 4.  
1052 Chertoff, ‘Principled Pluralism: Report’, para. 4 of 4. 
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2. afford equal treatment in all kinds of organizations as well as in diverse 
domains and spheres of life in relation to religious education; 
3. limit opportunities for voluntary self-separation from religious education 
based on the religious (or non or anti-religious) views a person holds 
and/or ethnicity, in an attempt to combat (involuntary) segregation and 
unequal treatment and unequal opportunities for members of religious as 
well as non-religious groups and communities.1053 
 Amid contemporary globalization, Chinese perceptions can negate or nurture 
the way citizens understand other cultures and religions. Tam notes that ‘the growing 
importance of religion in international affairs, the attention to ethnicity as a global 
political force, and the rise of China as an economic and political power’1054 all 
impact minority religious communities in the People’s Republic. I submit that these 
issues likewise affect other communities, families, and education in the State. Tam 
contends that discussions of religion and public life in China must also include the 
numerous ways in which minority ethnic communities contribute to understanding 
how religion will shape the common future of China. I agree but, additionally, argue 
that understanding diverse cultures and their religious beliefs as well as recognizing 
contributions of all communities in China and how they impact the State’s strengths 
and weaknesses will help determine the State’s future. As I elaborated in the previous 
section, because Chinese citizens’ perceptions of family and community affect the 
State, understanding these entities will, subsequently, affect the vision, design, and 
criteria for the implementation of religious education in a postcommunist China’s 
education system under Baorong Duoyuan. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
As a foundation for implementing religious education in China in a projected post-
communist, democratic, Christianized State, Baorong Duoyuan would provide a safe, 
impartial environment for those adhering to diverse religions as well as for those with 
nonreligious beliefs to express their beliefs without fear of persecution or prosecution. 
Baorong Duoyuan will include religious education to equip students to better 
                                                 
1053 Maussen, ‘Religious Governance in the Netherlands.’ 
1054 Philip L. Wikeri, and Yik-Fai Tam, ‘3: The Religious Life of Ethnic Minority Communities’, in 
Chinese Religious Life, eds. David A. Palmer, Glenn Shive, and Philip L. Wickeri (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 50–67 (p. 53).  
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understand and more effectively communicate with others who adhere to religious 
beliefs that differ from their own philosophies. As Baorong Duoyuan would enhance 
religious freedom in China’s education system, it would simultaneously help 
stimulate, support, and sustain religious freedom for all as young people learn to live 
out the understandings that they learn regarding religious pluralism. 
 In addition to Baorong Duoyuan demonstrating more compatibility with 
international norms than political liberalism or principled pluralism in relation to 
religious freedom, my theory also proves to be more inclusive of diverse beliefs than 
either of these theories in terms of religious freedom for all. As BD will incorporate 
impartiality regarding the State’s diverse religious groups, implementing religious 
education under this theory in a post-Communist education system in China will 
prove more effective than either China’s current Communist foundation, political 
liberalism, or principled pluralism. As I argued in Chapter 5, Baorong Duoyuan draws 
from both principled pluralism, with a Christian foundation, and political liberalism 
with secular roots. Because it utilizes teaching about religion in religious education, 
Baorong Duoyuan may be acceptable to all groups, those adhering to a specific 
religion as well as atheists and those professing nonand anti-religious beliefs. 
 Unlike some of the CCP’s unsustainable efforts to improve China’s 
contemporary education system, BD specifically targets challenges in the projected 
future China with sustainable, realistic solutions and goals. If China, as sources in 
Chapter 5 project, becomes a Christianized democracy under a constitutional design 
without any national religious or nonreligious establishment, with full guarantees of 
all aspects of religious freedom, then it would impartially facilitate the integration of 
diverse populations and beliefs/religions into a more harmonious State. In that future 
China, religious education could enhance the understanding of the value of other 
religions or beliefs in strengthening the support for religious freedom for all.1055 From 
implementing the lessons gleaned from religious education under Baorong Duoyuan, 
both individually or collectively from State to family, citizens would learn to listen 
and speak to one another to reveal common understandings and goals in life, despite 
their differences. 
 In the next and concluding chapter of my study, I summarize why neither 
political liberalism nor principled pluralism would be acceptable to a future post-
                                                 
1055 China, ed. Robert André LaFleur (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2010). 
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communist, constitutional democratic China in relation to religious freedom. Thus, I 
propose my Baorong Duoyuan model with its distinctively designed goal of 
protecting religious freedom for all would be the best choice. 
  
 
 
Chapter 7 
Baorong Duoyuan for a Post-Communist China 
The human solidarity that I envisage is not a global uniformity but 
unity in diversity [another name for integral pluralism]. 
We must learn to appreciate and tolerate 
pluralities, multiplicities, cultural differences.1056 
 – Hans-Georg Gadamer 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I stated the theme of my thesis in a hypothetical question: What is the 
best guiding philosophy under which religious freedom for all could be protected in a 
postcommunist, Christianized, democratic China? Initially, I chose two alternative 
philosophies, political liberalism, the most popular model that most Western 
democracies adopt, and principled pluralism, originating from the Netherlands. 
Kuyper pioneered principled pluralism, which his colleagues further developed. After 
exploring and expounding both political liberalism and principled pluralism in 
subsequent chapters, using religious education as my benchmark, I concluded that 
neither theory would sufficiently protect religious freedom for all, nor would the 
projected future China accept political liberalism or principled pluralism. Although 
principled pluralism appeared to be a better option in protecting religious freedom 
than political liberalism in Western democracies, it falls short in several ways to 
ensure religious freedom for all. Therefore, as the need for a distinctive theory 
unfolded, I contextualized principled pluralism to develop Baorong Duoyuan, which 
matches its meaning, inclusive pluralism. 
 
7.2 Chapters 2 through 6 
7.2.1 Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, I posed the question: Among Christian political theories, could 
principled pluralism best protect religious freedom for all, and if so, how? In this 
chapter, I initially explored the history and theoretical foundation of principled 
                                                 
1056 Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 1996), Introduction. Hans-Georg Gadamer said this in an interview with the Indian 
political theorist, Thomas Pantham. 
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pluralism, and then explained various elements contributing to the development of 
this theory. I examined contemporary implications of principled pluralism, 
particularly in relation to the State–religion relationship. My research confirmed that 
under the design of sphere sovereignty and structural pluralism, contrary to theonomy 
and other Christian, nonpluralistic approaches, principled pluralism’s philosophy, 
with a Christian worldview orientation, would most coherently and consistently 
provide protection of religious freedom for all. 
 
7.2.2 Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I considered this question: Among the liberal, secular-orientated 
political philosophies, could Rawls’s political liberalism offer a viable option for 
protecting religious freedom? From my examination of Rawls’s concept of public 
reason under political liberalism in this chapter, I discovered that although this theory 
embraces a positive goal of achieving harmony among different reasonable, yet 
irreconcilable comprehensive religious or moral ideas in a plural democratic society, 
it would fail to protect religious freedom for all. I concluded that due to its doctrine of 
PRSR and the proviso, the mechanism to try to achieve an overlapping consensus 
under political liberalism’s design through public reason,  it would neither sufficiently 
nor completely safeguard religious freedom for all citizens. I also determined that 
with its doctrine of containment regarding certain groups deemed as ‘unreasonable 
and irrational,’ political liberalism could potentially infringe the religious freedom of 
some citizens. 
 
7.2.3 Chapter 4 
The nature of religious education1057 in a State’s public-school system constitutes one 
of the best thermometers to test whether a country protects religious freedom for all 
its citizens. In Chapter 4, I addressed the question: In what ways could religious 
education complement a State’s education system? When I surveyed how RE had 
been implemented in the education systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands, I found conflicts and clashes between the State and 
                                                 
1057 The umbrella of religious education encompasses a number of approaches for its implementation, 
five which I discuss later in this chapter. According to Cathy Byrne, and Ahdar and Leigh, these 
include: (1) learning into religion (also known as religious instruction); (2) learning about religion (also 
known as reported state neutrality); (3) learning from religion; (4) the separatist approach; and (5) the 
secularist approach.  
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minority religious groups. Under political liberalism in the United States, the United 
KIngdom, and France, as well as among religious groups, tensions have often run 
high. Under principled pluralism, however, although not without instances of conflict 
with Muslims due to its Christian constitution, society in the Netherlands routinely 
demonstrated more harmony than the other three states I surveyed. I proposed that to 
safeguard religious freedom, the State should implement religious education as a vital 
component of its public education system.  
 
7.2.4 Chapter 5 
Three questions contributed to my research in Chapter 5: 
1) What kind of theory could potentially enable China to achieve the goal of 
realizing religious freedom for all citizens? 
2) If such a model exists, under what conditions could it be successfully 
implemented? 
3) Are these conditions foreseeable in China’s projected future State? 
 From historical and contemporary research, I concluded that in present-day 
China, under the CCP’s current repressive regime, the claim that China experiences 
religious freedom would be unjustifiable and unsustainable. Nevertheless, I also 
concluded from research that a projected, inevitable Christianization of China will 
accelerate the process of pluralization and constitutional democratization – two 
general necessary conditions for a Baorong Duoyuan system to develop in the future 
State. I maintained that under both directional pluralism and a constitutional, 
democratic, socio-political system, Baorong Duoyuan, which contextualizes the 
principled pluralism model, provides the best potential theory for China. With a 
constitutional design unlike that of either the Netherlands or China, and with no 
religious or nonreligious establishment, Baorong Duoyuan could best help facilitate 
religious freedom for all. 
 
7.2.5 Chapter 6 
How would Baorong Duoyuan safeguard religious freedom with a design for religious 
education in a postcommunist, democratic China? In answering this question in 
Chapter 6, I initially pointed out that conflicts and deficiencies in China’s 
contemporary education system, particularly regarding religious education, 
substantially contribute to China’s failure to protect religious freedom for all. I then 
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presented two criteria that contributed to my vision for religious education under 
Baorong Duoyuan: (1) public funding for all schools; and (2) school choice. I 
ultimately proposed that under a specific constitutional guarantee, Baorong Duoyuan 
would not only prove more compatible with international norms than principled 
pluralism, it would provide a positive, sustainable option in a projected post-
communist education system in China to help ensure religious freedom for all. 
 
7.3 Results of Study 
These findings from chapters 2–6 contribute to fulfilling my study’s aim: to determine 
the best guiding philosophy under which religious freedom for all could be protected 
in a postcommunist, Christianized, democratic China. I maintain that if Chinese 
citizens consent to implementing my theory as a vehicle for protecting religious 
freedom, they would find that Baorong Duoyuan, which aligns closely with 
international norms under a liberal constitutional framework, offers the most 
reasonable, consistent, and coherent guiding solution to help ensure their consensus.  
 Despite much study about religious freedom, my work in developing Baorong 
Duoyuan convinced me that the following tough questions still need to be addressed: 
 How the State can best handle the following two extremes relating to religious 
freedom: 
  1. those who call for anything but religion in state affairs; and 
  2. those who espouse the cause of ‘nothing but religion,’ 
 How can the State protect the freedom of one group, whether religious, non-
religious, or anti-religious, without permitting that group’s freedom to infringe 
on another group’s rights? 
 Can the tolerant tolerate the intolerant, particularly when an extreme secular 
group in control attempts to advance its agenda but excludes those with 
religious views? The other side of this potential prejudice may also prove true 
as some religious extremists may want to enforce their rules regarding religion 
on all in society. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Reflecting on the time I invested in conducting my study, I realize that the process 
presented several common collegiate challenges amid some expected scholastic 
struggles. Throughout the examination of various works from diverse authors, I 
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learned that, in some ways, I could even agree with those opposing my perceptions. 
One benefit that resulted from completing the challenging course of research 
surprised me. Ultimately, this study transformed me from a compassionate, biased 
activist, ready to take a stance of ‘us [Christians] against them [political liberalism 
adherents and CCP officials]’ to a more objective, yet compassionate academician. At 
times, when I became disheartened, I reflected on the message Winston Churchill 
shared  on 29 October 1941, when he addressed the boys of Harrow School. The 
following words from his speech encouraged me: 
Never give in, 
Never give in, 
never, never, never, never – 
In nothing, great or small, 
large or petty – never give in 
except to convictions of honour and good sense!1058 
 
 In the real world, as the CCP perceives differences among diverse religions to 
threaten its control, Chinese government officials too often abuse their power to try to 
force others to ’give in‘ to the Party’s dictates. As I noted at the start of this study, in 
attempts to eradicate certain religions, the CCP often employs torture and other cruel 
methods of force to fabricate evidence against the State. I assert that never giving in to 
states which like China deny religious freedom to citizens, as well as exerting efforts 
to eradicate religious persecution of individuals at local and international levels, can 
help secure religious freedom for others throughout the world. 
 As Gadamer envisages, in a model world, contrary to government officials 
persecuting those practicing diverse religions, State representatives would appreciate 
and tolerate those with different beliefs. In our less than ideal world, no matter what a 
person’s religious, nonreligious, or anti-religious beliefs may be, I maintain that 
citizens who have religious freedom need to tune in to the cries of ‘Help[…]. Help?  
Help!’ from those who do not. We not only need to listen to cries from those being 
persecuted for their religious beliefs in China and throughout our global community, 
we also need to do what we can to help facilitate religious freedom for all. Ideally, I 
believe that under Baorong Duoyuan, all religious, nonreligious, and even anti-
                                                 
1058 Winston S. Churchill, Never Give In!: The Best of Winston Churchill’s Speeches (New York: 
Hyperion, 2003), p. ii. 
 
R. Sun                                                           Baorong Duoyuan                                                            292 
 
 
religious individuals and groups in a postcommunist, Christianized, democratic China 
would realize that freedom.
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